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The science is unequivocal: the Earth’s biosphere is approaching global 
warming tipping points which, if passed, will become irreversible, taking the 
planet on a trajectory to a new geological era, unsuitable for human life.  The 
scale and timing of irreversible tipping points being passed is not definitively 
known. Unless however, an urgent and radical change in the direction of 
human activities occurs, certainly within less than a decade, wide scale 
catastrophe is certain.  How can we stop this? 
 
There has been an absence of critically informed debate about whether the 
current solutions proposed by international institutions (market, technical or 
biofuels) will work. The thesis begins by critically examining these, arguing 
that the dominant political economy framework in which they are embedded, 
precludes real and effective alternatives. 
  
Through the prism of the South African coal and electricity sectors, the thesis 
is able to demonstrate some key issues relevant to global warming, such as 
class, power, accumulation and the metabolic rift. South Africa was chosen as 
it represents a microcosm of the global capitalist economy. It also reveals the 
contradictions of being on the front line, both in facing the consequences of 
global warming and in exacerbating its causes. The coal and electricity sectors 
provide a snapshot of conflicting class interests, of the power and 
pervasiveness of the capitalist system and the relevance of these to global 
warming.  
 
In light of the South African analysis, the thesis argues for the importance of 
explicit and critical theory as a framework for understanding the world and 
providing a basis for social change. Critical theory is the dominant framework 
for political economy. It enables an ecological critique of capitalism, drawing 
on the historical materialism of Marxism, arguing that the imperatives of 
capitalism’s unrestrained exploitation of the ecology and society are based in 





metabolic rift, global warming and a myriad of other symptoms of the crises of 
capitalism. 
  
It is argued that the problems of global warming cannot be solved through 
capitalism. This means different economic structures will need to be 
established. The thesis concludes by setting out the principles upon which to 
build future societies. These are based within the constraints of first, humans’ 
physical needs for survival; second, the biosphere’s capabilities; and third, the 
harmonious and restorative relations between humans and nature. While the 
purpose is not to provide a comprehensive blueprint for the future, the thesis 
also provides examples of where some of these principles are found currently 


























Writing this thesis has been a wonderful journey for me, both intellectually and 
emotionally.  
 
First to have had the opportunity to do a PhD is something I have felt was a 
great privilege and something I have really savoured. On the journey, I have 
received considerable support from a very wide range of people. 
 
In particular I would like to acknowledge my supervisors, Scott Fitzgerald and 
Dora Marinova who have provided very sound advice and detailed feedback. I 
think the first piece of advice I would give to anyone about to undertake a PhD 
is ‘choose your supervisors well’. I did and have been most fortunate with 
both.  
 
I would like to say a very special thank you to Geoff Harcourt who gave me 
some very valuable and detailed feedback and references which helped with 
the development of the theory chapters. 
 
The intellectual journey has been marvellous; the emotional journey 
unexpectedly and stunningly enriching.  
 
I spent nine months in South Africa during the three years of working on the 
thesis – a country where, without fail, people were hospitable and unstintingly 
helpful. So many - from refugees to those living in shacks in Khayelitsha, to 
people hitching rides whom my husband, Gavin, and I picked up on our travels 
- these ordinary ‘little’ people - the unemployed, the black poor, the exploited 
and marginalised - were so generous and so prepared to give us a glimpse of 






Touring the coal mines in the Limpopo for information and experiences for the 
thesis, we plucked two young women and their babies from the crowd of 
refugees from Zimbabwe on the side of the road at Messina near the border 
with Zim. I will never forget you – how we sang the songs of Rod Stewart as 
we hurtled down the freeway to an unknown fate for you in Johannesburg. The 
pain of your lives was unbearable. Gavin and I sat in the car and cried after we 
had dropped you off.  
 
Sister Sally Duigan all the way from Adelaide - to take care of AIDS orphans 
and the young girls and boys who graduate from being orphans to being 
otherwise on the streets. Your courage, your knowledge, advice and most of all 
your compassion, were inspiring. Thank you. Richard Spoor, the civil rights 
lawyer who gave so much of your time and valuable information about mining 
conditions for labourers – including foreign labourers. Thank you.  
 
Various activists, academics and NGOs, but especially Earthlife Africa, David 
Fig, David Hallowes – all generously helpful to me. All inspiring people who 
use their knowledge and positions to build a better South Africa.  
 
From Cape Town – a city of gross inequalities – I have many to thank. 
Nkwame Cedile who introduced us to Khayelitsha and to local activist groups. 
Tinashe Njanji – a refugee from Zimbabwe, nearly dying from tuberculosis, 
who survived xenophobic attacks and still joins the struggle for justice. 
Tinashe, now a good friend, has been sending me a constant stream of 
information for this thesis on current events that are often below the radar of 
mainstream media. There are Richard and Mowjumba and sons Nashir and 
Bashir from Burundi; Lorraine from Zim; and Henry from the Congo – all 
caught up in the xenophobic attacks of May 2008 and who continue to struggle 
to survive in a world which holds them captive to the violence and injustices of 
a system built on dispossession, exploitation and inequality. All victims of the 
economic policies which are so heavily criticised in this thesis and all 
wonderful, resilient people who have shared a part of their lives with me. To 





motivated me to want to try to make a contribution to changing the world in 
which we live.  
 
A big thank you to the director Sue Cleary - and to Di McIntyre - from the 
Health Economics Unit (HEU) at the University of Cape Town for so 
generously providing me with a computer, office space and very warm 
hospitality on each of my visits to Cape Town. I would like to thank everyone 
in the HEU for their warmth and friendship. What an extraordinary bunch of  
people who have so much to contribute to your various countries throughout 
Africa. You not only gave me such a rich education of Africa but extended to 
me a feeling of warmth and belonging that I will always remember.  
 
Close to home, I want to thank especially my children, Katherine, Nic and 
Alex, for your support, patience and encouragement during the time I have 
been doing the PhD. 
 
Finally, I want to thank Gavin - my husband, mentor and soul mate. I would 
never have started a PhD if it hadn’t been for your encouragement. It would 
never have been completed without your support. Since beginning on this 
journey, you have been so unstintingly supportive, encouraging and helpful. 
You have done everything from touring coal mines to providing thought-
provoking conversations and been prepared - with a cup of tea at 2 o’clock in 
the morning - to discuss everything from global warming to Marx to urban 
agriculture – forever patiently. You have cooked more dinners than your fair 
share, accompanied me to places I would otherwise never have gone and 
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1 
PART I  INTRODUCTION AND GLOBAL WARMING  
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to thesis 
 
There is no longer any doubt that human induced global warming is occurring. 
What is not known is the timing and magnitude of effects and at what point 
irreversible tipping points will be passed, taking the planet on a warming 
trajectory which will be catastrophic for humans and most species. It is the 
greatest issue facing humanity. The key points in the evidence of its existence 
are presented but this thesis is not about global warming per se. It is about the 
political economy of global warming. To be more accurate, I have recognised 
in the thesis it is necessary to see global warming as one of a suite of problems 
arising from the globalised capitalist system.  
 
The term ‘political economy’ requires immediate definition. It has been chosen 
because it involves an insightful approach to understanding society – 
particularly in relation to power, class and ‘the social relations of production’ 
(see below) which are issues of particular concern in analysing the structural 
dynamics relevant to global warming. Weingast and Wittman (2006: 3) 
summarise the range of interpretations of political economy as follows:  
 
For Adam Smith, political economy was the science of managing a 
nation’s resources so as to generate wealth. For Marx, it was how the 
ownership of the means of production influenced historical processes. For 
much of the twentieth century, the phrase political economy ... had 
contradictory meanings. Sometimes it was viewed as an area of study (the 
interrelationship between economics and politics) while at other times, it 
was viewed as a methodological approach. Even the methodological 
approach was divided into two parts – the economic approach (often 
called public choice) emphasising individual rationality and the 





For this thesis, I have drawn on the definition from Munro (2004: 146-7): 
 
Political economy is firstly a study of society and social processes. It 
focuses on ‘material production’ in two senses: (i) how the creation, 
distribution, exchange and consumption of goods, services, income and 
wealth occurs, and (ii) how the organisation and imperatives of material 
production influence almost all of society’s other institutions, be they 
political, civil or cultural. Second [political economy] has analysed the 
nature of economic growth and change and how the prior distribution of 
resources (such as land, labour and capital, and the conflict between the 
respective classes) affects economic change. Third [political economy] is a 
social science both in terms of its social content (the study of how people, 
classes, social systems, institutions, gender, etc. produce and reproduce the 
material bases of societies), its use of scientific methodologies (whether 
empirical, historical materialist, deductive, etc.) and its self-reflexive and 
self-critical nature. Fourth, the values inherent in political economy reflect 
its status as a child of the Enlightenment. Finally, the founders of political 
economy were political activists who saw government as a fundamental (if 
flawed) buttress of the economy. 
 
Ballaam and Veseth (2005: 5) add some points which are relevant to the use of 
the term in this thesis. In this, political economy is ‘necessarily international in 
context’ and looks at the ways that ‘individuals, states, and markets of the 
world are connected to one another and the arrangements or structures that 
have evolved to connect them [reflecting] culture, history and values’. It 
involves explicit analysis of power structures and an understanding of the 
power of ideology.  
 
There is no pretence in the philosophical neutrality of political economy. This 
thesis will be drawing on Marxist theory (which fits well within the critical 
political economy approach) to take a critical and analytical approach to the 
structures underpinning global warming and the neoliberal solutions to this 
problem. For this thesis, political economy has considerable relevance in 
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addressing the practical problem of global warming, situating it not as the 
central problem - albeit one that requires immediate attention - but a historical 
and material symptom of a political and economic system that is in crisis. The 
thesis draws on the methodology of political economy and critical theory 
(discussed in more detail below) to examine both the causes of and the possible 
solutions to global warming. The defence of such a methodology, if defence is 
needed, is that the debate about the causes of and solutions to global warming 
is strangely de-contextualised from broader social, economic and ecological 
crises, and largely ‘a-theoretical’.   
 
It must also be recognised that that debate has to be political. This is where the 
political economy of global warming, while drawing on environmentalism, at 
the same time  has to challenge that body of knowledge. It is a point made by 
Rosewarne (2002: 180): ‘if the engagement of political economy with 
environmentalism is to be one of substance, it must be more than an 
intellectual excursion through competing paradigms. The intellectual task must 
also have a political edge to it so that it engages with environmentalism 
politically.’ In terms of the road travelled by this thesis, as it turns out, it is 
very much guided by what Rosewarne (2002: 181) then adds: ‘A political 
economy of the environment [and I would add global warming] should look 
towards identifying and critically engaging with the social forces that can 
create the transformation necessary for effecting a sustainable future.’ Part IV 
of the thesis seeks to do just that.      
 
A second key concept for the thesis is the ‘social relations of production’. I am 
using this in a Marxist sense. Marx (1894: np) wrote: 
 
The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped 
out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as 
it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a 
determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation 
of the economic community which grows up out of the production 
relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form. It 
is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of 
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production to the direct producers — a relation always naturally 
corresponding to a definite stage in the development of the methods of 
labour and thereby its social productivity — which reveals the innermost 
secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure and with it the 
political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the 
corresponding specific form of the state. 
 
Further, on the social relations of production, Marx (1847: 207) wrote that the 
‘relations of production in their totality constitute what is called the social 
relations, society, and, moreover, a society at a definite stage of historical 
development, a society with peculiar, distinctive characteristics.  
 
In other words, humans’ impact on the environment is determined by the 
particular social structure of the society, the social relations amongst people 
and the material/social relations of people with the broad ecology. Within the 
capitalist social structure, the ecological conditions of social reproduction have 
been largely ignored with the natural environment being treated as a free and 
limitless resource for the economy, until more recent decades when various 
ecological crises have forced a reassessment. A political economy approach is 
based on the centrality of the social relations of production; it takes into 
account the class structure of society, as well as exploitation – of humans and 
nature - and hence social or class conflicts. It also takes into account the role of 
institutions, including the state as a political institution, recognising the 
inseparable relationship between institutions and power relations.  
 
The Marxist political economy approach is methodologically, theoretically and 
historically useful in answering the question: ‘can capitalism solve the problem 
of global warming?’ 
 
Turning to the empirical part of the thesis, the idea of focusing on South Africa 
was primarily because of the need to think through from an empirical base how 
best to establish a theory of political economy for examining global warming. 
Setting off initially with a view of global warming as ‘the’ focus of the thesis, 
two things happened. First the examination of South Africa in the context of 
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global warming led me to recognise that seeking to build the thesis on some 
compartmentalised view of that phenomenon would be inadequate. The 
problem of global warming is one of a suite of problems which the capitalist 
system throws up. It follows that the scope of the thesis then had to expand to 
encompass this idea, while still keeping global warming central. In particular 
the analysis of the political economy of South Africa as set out in Part II of the 
thesis allowed me to see how to build the theory in Part III. Indeed the original 
intention (which is more common in doctoral theses) of the empirical case 
study following the theory was jettisoned. The study of South Africa is better 
seen and is now labelled as not a case study but as a microcosm of the global 
economy. That insight and the subsequent rearrangement of both my thinking 
and the layout of the thesis were stimulated by the comment from Amin (1997 
np) that South Africa is ‘a kind of microcosm of the world capitalist system’. 
That is, South Africa captures and reflects the global social relations of 
production, exemplifying the ecologically exploitative and destructive nature 
of the capitalist political economy. 
 
The fact that South Africa can be seen as a microcosm of the global political 
economy, including the global class divisions, makes it a fertile context for the 
theory in Part III. The position of South Africa in the history of capital 
accumulation and the contradictions raised by global warming for South Africa 
provide pointers to the theory in Part III and for seeking alternative social 
relations of production in Part IV. South Africa is run on neoliberal economic 
policies; it has enormous poverty and on some reckonings is the most unequal 
society on the planet; it exhibits the symptoms of the classic Marxist 
‘metabolic rift’ - that is, the rift between the ecological and economic 
reproductive dimensions of society.  South Africa demonstrates the traits of 
alienation in various forms; it reveals in various ways both the imperative and 
the expansion of capital accumulation and growth (and a failure of trickle 
down); it exemplifies the way that financialisation occurs and how that 
exacerbates not only inequality and class divisions but also global warming; it 
demonstrates the convergence of interests of the global elites; it provides a 
good example of the contradictory influences of international institutions and 
the capitalist model of development, particularly in the context of global 
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warming; and, by focussing in Part II of the thesis on fossil fuels and South 
Africa, illustrates the lack of motivation on the part of the national government 
and of global institutions such as the World Bank when driven by the edicts of 
neoliberalism to address the problems of global warming. It in turn highlights 
that the poor are already, and will continue to be, the first and worst affected 
from the impacts of global warming, and yet are those least responsible for its 
causes.  
 
The thesis thus casts a wide net to catch a large number of issues relevant to 
the political economy of global warming, particularly issues such as the 
continuance of poverty and inequality – for global warming, poverty and 
inequality are all rooted in the same inequitable global power structures, in the 
same social relations of production. The complex, multi-factorial nature of 
global political economy enables these connections to be made, connections 
which are essential if solutions to global warming are to be found. 
 
1.2 Objectives and methods 
 
The main research question is: can capitalism solve the problem of global 
warming? 
There are six sub-objectives to this thesis. They are: 
1. To summarise what the science is saying about global warming and the 
health of the biosphere 
2. To place the discussion of global warming into a critical theoretical 
context, emphasising the importance of the distinction between critical 
theory and positivism. 
3. To document and outline some of the key criticisms of neoliberal solutions 
to global warming. 
4. To present a microcosm of the globalised capitalist system from the 
perspective of political economy. The microcosm selected is South Africa.  
5. To provide a Marxist theoretical framework for criticism of aspects of 
capitalism selected for their relevance to global warming. 
6. To develop alternative core social, political and economic principles 




1.    The thesis draws on peer reviewed scientific literature to give an outline of 
what the science is saying about the unequivocal fact of global warming. 
 
2.     For the second objective of placing the discussion of global warming into 
a critical theoretical context, the thesis makes the distinction between critical 
theory and positivism and it is in the methodology section that this objective is 
first and foremost located. It is argued that the distinction between positivist 
and critical theory is particularly important in relation to issues such as global 
warming for someone writing from the ‘West’ which is dominated by positivist 
a-theoretical analyses of and responses to global warming.  
 
3.     For the third objective, there is a brief summary of what the science is 
saying about global warming, contextualising this within the inseparable wider 
framework of the general health of the biosphere.  My method of enquiry (for 
this and the next two objectives) involves researching a wide range of 
secondary sources of global warming literature from a broad group of 
disciplines. With this objective, in addition to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) reports, I have drawn on work by the Stockholm 
Resilience Centre1, which has brought together international scientific 
research on a broad range of ecological issues and which constructs a picture 
of the biosphere’s ‘planetary boundaries’. Additionally, I have used global 
data from publications such as the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators 2010; and ecological footprint data from the Global Footprint 
Network (2010) and from the United Nations’ Human Development Index 
2010.  
 
By situating the science of global warming in the context of the general health 
of the planet, I have consolidated the argument of why neoliberal, deductive, 
single-issue conceptualisations and solutions - be they a carbon tax, carbon 
emissions trading schemes, renewable energies, biofuels or carbon 
                                           




sequestration - will not solve and may even exacerbate the problem of global 
warming. A wider biospheric context for global warming is provided which 
identifies the imperative of conceptualising global warming as but one of a 
suite of urgent and interrelated crises.  
 
Building on the argument of whether capitalism can solve the problem of 
global warming, the third objective documents neoliberal solutions to global 
warming and then outlines some of the key criticisms of these solutions. This is 
important groundwork for the development of the arguments around whether 
capitalism can solve the problem of global warming. I have based this section 
on a selection of reports in the literature, including Oxfam (2008), the FAO and 
IIED 2008 report, Fueling Exclusion? (Cotula and Dyer, et al. 2008) and 
Friends of the Earth’s (FOE 2010) reports on biofuels and Lohmann’s (2007) 
Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatisation 
and Power; Friends of the Earth’s A Dangerous Obsession (FOE 2009) and 
Subprime Carbon? Re-thinking the world’s largest new derivatives market 
(FOE 2009a). 
 
Objectives two and three which are based on secondary sources are integral to 
the progression of the thesis argument. 
 
4.     Presenting a microcosm of the globalised capitalist system from the 
perspective of political economy for objective four enables a picture of how 
capitalism is expanding on the continent of Africa.  This presages global 
warming catastrophe for that continent. The microcosm selected is South 
Africa. I have drawn on a range of political economy and history literature, 
publications and South African media – as well as spending three months each 
year for the past three years in South Africa, attending township activist 
meetings, university forums and lectures, touring the countryside and visiting 
coal mines, working in a voluntary capacity with refugees, picking up 
labourers hitching the long distances to and from their work and meeting 
people involved in issues of social justice and environmental issues. In this 
sense, in terms of the methods of research adopted, the thesis is multi-




South Africa is not so much a case study as a vignette of capitalism, selected as 
it captures many of the globally destructive mechanisms and contradictions of 
the capitalist system, including several particularly relevant to global warming. 
South Africa is a country which was brought into the capitalist system through 
the colonial era and is now an agent in spreading that particular system 
throughout Africa. It is a country which illustrates deep class divisions, the 
divisions between the benefits and burdens of capitalism which will be 
magnified as a direct consequence of global warming.  South Africa provides 
an example of the history and continuing development of a rift both between 
humans and between humans and the broad ecology. It thus captures the 
essence of what Marx termed the ‘metabolic rift’ which is a concept central to 
the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis.  
 
5.     Objective five seeks to provide a Marxist theoretical framework for 
criticism of aspects of capitalism selected for their relevance to global 
warming. It is based upon and guided by the key components emerging from 
the study of the microcosm that is South Africa. It constitutes the theoretical 
core starting with an overview of contemporary Marxist ecological literature 
guided by the South African empirical material and key points in that country’s 
economy relevant to global warming. The theory is selected for its expose of 
key concepts relevant to global warming from a Marxist perspective: the 
metabolic rift and specifically the carbon rift and its historical, material and 
social roots; alienation – of humans from the broad ecology (of which humans 
are a part); capital accumulation and the financialisation of capital – and their 
relevance to global warming. These provide the scope for an understanding of 
the causal and compounding basis of global warming and the inextricably 
related and various crises of capitalism. 
 
6.     The final objective of the thesis is to develop alternative core social, 
political and economic principles compatible with a diversity of just and 
sustainable futures. For this objective, I use some historical examples of 
transformative change and base the core principles being proposed for future 
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sustainable societies in large part on a response to the Marxist criticism of 




The thesis is centrally concerned with methodology, that is, the theoretical and 
conceptual framework for setting the thesis’ principal question ‘can capitalism 
solve the problem of global warming?’ I deliberately set this as the thesis 
question because the capitalist hegemonic ideology precludes such a question 
being asked by the dominant (national and international) governance and 
research institutions in finding solutions to global warming. ‘Global warming’ 
is a subject of such profound consequence and importance - intersecting with 
all other aspects of human society; it is an equity and justice issue; an issue 
which illustrates urgently and graphically the chasm between the economics of 
globalised society and the survival of humanity; the chasm between the rich 
and powerful and the poor and powerless. Methodologically, it is a subject 
which illustrates the distinction between positivist and critical theory and so the 
over-riding methodological approach relates to the first objective of the thesis: 
to place the discussion of global warming into a critical theoretical framework. 
It is to the significance and centrality of critical methodology and theory that I 
now turn because this is at the very crux of why real solutions to global 
warming necessarily represent a fundamental challenge to the political, 
economic and ideological status quo.  
 
It is particularly important to establish the significance of Marxist critical 
theory in discussing such a complex and ideologically-anchored issue as global 
warming as this phenomenon is increasingly being conceptualised in normative 
terms as no more than a market failure requiring market (including technical) 
neoliberal solutions.  
 
The reasons for the emphasis placed on methodology and theory in this thesis 
is that much of the global warming debate is contextualised within the global 
neoliberal capitalist framework which is so hegemonic that it presents the 
world as if it is ‘how it is’, the one and only reality and possibility for human 
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development. Theory provides frameworks for interpreting and making sense 
of the world. Particularly for many researchers and academics in the West, who 
are deeply ensconced in and/or are beholden to the institutions and ideology of 
capitalism, a critique of the system and its theoretical underpinnings is 
essential groundwork for understanding this aspect of what has been called the 
‘crisis of civilisation’.2 This is seen as essential before we can begin to 
construct alternative paradigms. Critical theory provides the methodology, 
framework and analysis for a more detached view of contemporary society, its 
political economy structures, power relationships, institutions and 
epistemologies. 
 
Western epistemology includes two broad schools of theory – positivism and 
critical theory. The positivist school was born of the work of early nineteenth 
century French philosopher, Auguste Comte (Zalta 2010) who developed a 
secular approach to knowing the world around reason and logic and the notion 
that sense perceptions are the only credible basis of human knowledge and 
meaningful thought. Positivism attempts to equate the understanding of social 
reality with the scientific explanation, prediction and control of natural reality 
as practised by the hard sciences of chemistry, physics and biology. Social and 
natural realities are conceived by the positivists as objectively quantifiable and 
measurable. What appears on the surface is conceived as the full extent of 
reality. Juxtaposed to this is critical theory which involves an approach to 
knowledge that questions interpretations of the world, particularly in relation to 
the political or power dimensions of society and our lives as socialised beings. 
The central tenet of critical theory is that all knowledge is historically 
contextualised and political in nature. Thus critical theorists contend that 
knowledge is shaped by a society’s institutions, its culture, its underlying 
political economy structures and its interests. 
 
It was only in the early philosophical manuscripts of Karl Marx that a critical 
theory of society first emerged. It did so against the background of the class 
                                           
2 This term is from the Alternate Information and Development Centre (AIDC) Crisis of Civilisation 
Conference in South Africa in October 2010. 
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struggles and social revolutions which were occurring in Europe in the middle 
of the 19th century when class antagonisms between workers and capitalists 
intensified.  At this time, workers encountered conditions of profound 
exploitation and inadequate wages to meet their survival needs – a factor in 
providing the fertile ground for the development of critical thinking about 
society and its social relationships as a whole. Critical theory is the dominant 
framework within political economy. 
 
Certainly theories of history and the notion of telos or goals of human society 
existed long before Marx, for example, going back to the time of Plato. 
However prior to the advent of critical theory, critiques of society had been 
essentially of the state and the laws of the state. What Marx did was to develop 
a critical and social theory based on the alienating relations of humans in 
capitalist society. Thus in his early work, Marx (1963) was concerned with the 
release of humanity from the alienating and exploitative relations of 
production. Marx considered that the whole society was alienated from the 
human actors who produced and reproduced it and was therefore beyond the 
control of the very human beings who made up the society.  This contrasted 
with the positivist schools that saw society in a-historical terms and simply as a 
description of its component observable parts. 
 
Subsequent Marxists, such as Marcuse (1964), explained the central 
importance of critical theory in a way that brings out its relevance to issues 
such as global warming today. He proposed that truth lay in the attempt to go 
beyond what appeared as reality by critiquing that apparent reality, while 
committing to attempt to change the world into a better place – a world beyond 
injustice, racism, inequality, wars and so on. In this framework, critical 
analysis is seen as useful in trying to make the world a more humane place in 
which to live.  
 
The political significance in the difference between these two approaches can 
be practically illustrated by, for example, the facts of the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These read like a wish list. For 
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example, one MDG is to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people whose income is less than $1 a day. This is a neatly positivist approach 
to tackling poverty and inequality. It is a-historical. It describes but leaves 
unattended the structural and historical causes of such phenomena.  
 
Criticism of the MDGs is voiced by Navarro (2002: 473) at a more general 
level when he writes that the ‘international agencies are masters of 
depoliticising what is profoundly political’. A critical theoretical approach to 
poverty and inequality would seek to understand their institutional and 
historical causes, thereby providing a basis for changing the structural and 
institutional bases. Critical theory presents ‘facts’ and ‘reality’ as the historical 
products of humans with the aim that humans become conscious of their social 
products (Kirkpatrick, et al. 1978) and therefore more able to change them. 
Critical theory enables us to analyse and understand how particular ideologies 
serve particular social classes and how this is tied to concepts of power and 
hegemony. As Escobar (1995) has shown, development institutions from the 
World Bank down create knowledge within the confines of the positivist 
framework.  
 
While the establishment’s responses to global warming are not only inadequate 
but an extension of the climate change denialism supported by the right, critical 
theory challenges this status quo.  This is particularly important at this historic 
juncture when humans are facing the brink of survival. It is essential we turn to 
critical theory first to interpret and then to change this world.  
 
Critical theory and critical research focus on the need and potential for 
transformative social change which empowers the marginalised, oppressed and 
exploited.  It provides the tools for example, for building critical democracy 
(Fiske 1993), and critically conscientising subjects rather than providing a 
‘banking’ education for consumers of education (Freire 1970). 
 
Gramsci’s (1971) notion of hegemony is central to critical theory and research.  
He argued that the dominant powers of the 20th Century were not exercised just 
by physical force – although that too – but by complex socio-cultural and 
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economic factors and institutions such as schools, the media and churches. 
Universities, once the site of more critical reflection and discourse, have 
increasingly been brought into this hegemonic milieu with, on the one hand, 
increasing dependence on corporate sponsorships and, on the other, university 
‘outputs’ being quantified and streamlined to meet the needs of the economic 
system. One institution that has come to the fore, perhaps above all others in 
creating the dominant ideology in the Gramscian sense, is the institution of the 
market.  Polanyi (1944) wrote before the era of neoliberalism of the 
irrationality and ideological nature of market liberalism. As a central and 
dominant institution of capitalism, the market acts as an agent in the 
reproduction of capitalism, with people - individuals - being reduced to 
consumers and where, as Margaret Thatcher infamously claimed, there is no 
such thing as society. This is the ‘Washington consensus’ model (Williamson 
1990), the neoliberalised capitalism which creates an economic order in which 
the market mechanism largely determines the fate of human beings and the 
environment, resulting in the devaluing of, or even disintegration of society. 
Market solutions to global warming are an example of the irrational and 
ideologically-captured framework which dominates the global warming 
‘debate’ and which can destroy society. Crucially, critical theory questions the 
assumptions captured by this dominant system and its hegemonic ideology and 
hence, critical theory provides the over-arching framework for political 
economy.  
 
Critical theory for example questions assumptions such that ‘the Australian 
way of life’ (or the US’s or Western European countries’ way of life) is at the 
apex of a human development trajectory and ‘non-negotiable’. It questions that 
such countries are un-problematically democratic models for the rest of the 
world to follow (Kincheloe and McLaren 2002). Critical theory is concerned 
with the principles of justice, issues of power, ideology, class, oppression and 
exploitation, of how the world developed historically to the point reached 
today, where the richest 10 per cent control 85 per cent of global wealth while 
the poorest 50 per cent own only 1 per cent (World Bank 2010); where the 
damage from human activities to the environment has become so great as to 
threaten the survival of all human and other species. Importantly, critical 
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theory is not just concerned with abstract academic research but focuses on the 
need, potential, tools and processes for transformative social change, led by 
those who have been critically conscientised, empowering the marginalised. It 
seeks to enable the building of a diversity of societies and cultures that are 
enduring and in harmony with the biosphere.  
 
Thus the role critical theory to this thesis is to make the theoretical approach 
used here politically explicit - a clear statement of my overtly political 
approach. Global warming is not an isolated problem to be solved through 
technical or market solutions, arising from the same alienating social relations 
of production as ‘the problem’. It comes from a particular system of political 
economy, with particular, unequal power relationships that are integral to the 
system, from particular modes of production and consumption, from particular 
industrial technologies, from particular relationships between the market and 
science and technology and from the marketisation of the broad ecology – 
including humans.  
 
As explained earlier, it was in first describing and then analysing the South 
African economy that I came to realise the signally important usefulness in 
juxtaposing critical theory alongside positivism in seeking to examine both the 
causes of and solutions to global warming. That realisation also brought me to 
appreciate two other issues that turn out to be central to the thesis: that global 
warming is one of a suite of problems arising from capitalism; and that the 
source of both denialism of and the proposed market solutions to global 
warming are embedded in positivist neoliberal ideology. While the focus 
remains global warming, the study of South Africa pushed me to mount a 
wider theoretical and conceptual analysis than I had originally intended. 
 
Clearly the dominant neoliberal paradigm fits into the positivist school. It has 
been moulded by Western institutions which have played a causal role in the 
climate crisis. These are both hegemonic and weighted in favour of the 
interests of the global power elite. This positivist view presents itself as an 
incontrovertible fact which is independent, final and unchallengeable. It simply 
is. Mullard (2004: 87) notes that in most discussions of globalisation, the 
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market economy and neo-liberalism are presented devoid of ideology and 
questions of power. There is an absence of questioning. It represents ‘a 
surrender to what is seen as the implacable and irreversible logic of social 
reality. It is a project in which market liberal ideas have a life of their own – 
difficult to challenge and difficult to dislodge’ (Mullard 2004: 107). He 
continues: ‘Most [market] economists think ideology has no role in their 
thinking. Market liberalism is presented as the only viable alternative that can 
protect individual rights and democracy is linked to free markets as if the two 
were inextricable’ (Mullard 2004: 107). There is no discussion of an alternative 
because there is no need for such a discussion. Neoliberalism is the ideological 
summit (Fukuyama 1992). There is nowhere better to go - although there is no 
end to the trajectory of progress and development, growth and consumption 
and hence ecological destruction. 
 
This positivist, neoliberal worldview hides the fact that issues such as global 
warming and solutions such as carbon trading are political in nature. The 
positivist approach springs from the theoretical paradigm that underpins the 
status quo and, in doing so, prevents the emergence of real solutions to the 
complex problems of our global society, including global warming. It breeds 
and feeds both the extreme form of denialism that fails to acknowledge that 
global warming is happening, as well as a more general malaise of denialism in 
which there is refusal to address the systemic causes of global warming. Both 
create barriers to a questioning of the development trajectory that has given 
rise to it in the global institutions charged with addressing the problem and in 
public discourse more generally. The general malaise is perhaps the more 
dangerous because it is so deep and pervasive and hence unseen, and diverts 
from the possibility of addressing the systemic causes of global warming.  It 
results in protecting the capitalist system rather than the biosphere. The neo-
liberal conceptualisation of global warming frames it as a single, separate, 
economic and technical issue – an issue which can be fixed by market and 
technological mechanisms.  
 
It is further argued here that adopting a particular perspective of history 
matters. In the context of this thesis, the Marxist historical account of the 
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development of capitalism is critical to an understanding of the political 
economy of global warming. This is for three inter-related reasons. First, to 
understand the inseparable dichotomy between accumulation and dispossession 
and to address this division so there can be justice for all impoverished peoples 
around ecological debt3 - a prerequisite to any solution to global warming; 
second, as a basis for understanding and changing the systemic structural 
underpinnings of global warming; and third, to enable the development of new 
political economy structures which avoid the pitfalls of capitalism. One can 
only understand the causes of global warming by critiquing and understanding 
the political economy of global warming. Only then can one begin to build 
alternatives which address the causes of global warming and not just selective 
symptoms. 
 
There is a need however to be wary of another form of exploitation and 
alienation, that of adopting a wholly western philosophical basis for this 
discussion. While Marx saw the superstructure of society, which arises from 
the economic sub-structure, as containing the cultural aspects of society, he did 
not develop the concept of cultures and cultural diversity – omissions this 
thesis touches on here and returns to again in Part IV because of their 
importance to future societies.  
 
Connell (2007) argues that mainstream social science has long conceptualised 
the world in terms formulated by the educated and affluent in Europe and 
North America, using the majority world as a data mine. She seeks to include 
recognition of the historical consequences of the global expansion and 
domination by the West, in particular in relations to authority, exclusion and 
inclusion, and the hegemony by the metropolis over the periphery. 
Furthermore, she argues that theories that build only on the experience of the 
most privileged 600 million people, and use it to explain the world for the 
whole 6,000 million, lack credence (Connell 2007).  
                                           
3 The idea of ecological debt is not new, dating back at least 200 years. In modern times however its 
contemporary meaning is most frequently ascribed to Accion Ecologica Ecuador: ‘the debt 
accumulated by Northern, industrial countries toward Third World countries on account of resource 
plundering, environmental space to deposit wastes, such as greenhouse gases, from the industrial 




Connell (2007: 213) contends that theory needs to recognise the ‘dynamism of 
the periphery’ and to find a way of ‘connecting the different formations of 
knowledge in the periphery with each other’. Ideally, it is recognised that there 
is a need to redress the dominance of Western epistemology and ideology, by 
acknowledging and drawing on the theories, experiences and perspectives of 
the majority, marginalised world, what Connell calls ‘Southern theory’, in 
constructing stories about the world. It has been beyond the scope of this thesis 
to do so. However, as the thesis draws on South Africa as a microcosm of the 
global economy, I have used some of the African and South African 
scholarship and literature to form my arguments. I readily acknowledge 
however that the overall thrust of the thesis remains Western in its 
epistemology. To do adequate justice to ‘Southern theory’ would require 
another thesis.  
 
Before leaving the views of the majority world, it is however worth turning to 
Indian writer and scholar, Nandy (1987: 22), who argues that oppressed people 
and cultures, in resisting oppression, have to have some resistance to modernity 
and to the ‘connotative meanings of concepts such as development, growth, 
science and technology, history and revolution’. Such concepts, he suggests, 
are a new form of ‘the state’ and can represent a form of violence and injustice.  
Nandy believes the theories of the oppressed must also encompass the 
connections between cultural survival and the global structures of oppression 
and the West. 
 
For the majority who live outside the experience and hegemony of Western 
ideology and the material lives of Western industrial society, there is inevitably 
a very diverse and different worldview of global warming. This is not given the 
status of theory in industrialised societies’ arenas of scholarship. It is shaped by 
non-industrial/non-scientific modes of subsistence and the very intimacy and 
interconnectedness of the relationship between humans and their environment.  
This relationship has been expressed by many Indigenous people. In one (of 
what could be many), it is captured by the words of Australian Aboriginal 




Everything about Aboriginal society is inextricably interwoven with, and 
connected to, the land. Culture is the land, the land and spirituality of 
aboriginal people, our cultural beliefs or reason for existence is the land. 
You take that away and you take away our reason for existence. We have 
grown the land up.  We are dancing, singing and painting for the land. We 
are celebrating the land. Removed from our lands, we are literally 
removed from ourselves. 
 
Thus in examining the purpose of theory for this thesis, it is important to 
recognise that the concepts used in the development of theory (Middleton and 
O'Keefe 2001: 20): 
 
operate within linguistic structures, sets of meanings, which are largely 
formed by the society in which it is held - the dominant values of society 
are embodied in the linguistic and structural assumptions by which 
discourse proceeds. Where the exchange is between classes or between 
rich and poor states, the most powerful parties will do their utmost to 
ensure that it is their language, their values, which are seen as 'natural', as 
possessing 'sense' and as being obviously 'right'.  
 
At the heart of Western material and ideological dominance are science and 
technology. These have come to dominate the social relations of production, 
and the ideology of progress. They however are not politically, socially or 
economically neutral. Nandy (1987) critiques the culture of science on the 
basis of its isolating mechanism, the psychological separation of cognition 
from affect. He writes (Nandy 1987: 50) that the culture of the West was 
defined by a contractual, competitive individualism and that an ‘utter 
loneliness flowed from this’. He links the entwinement of science and powerful 
technologies with the interests of the state and ruling elites, arguing that 
science has become a key to the dominant ideology of the postcolonial state, 




It is thus necessary to draw attention to the role science plays in rational, 
industrialised society and in the justifications for Western ways of constructing 
frameworks, conceptualising and changing the world. The predominance of 
science, and the inseparableness of science from the economy and the state, 
accord it special attention in discussing the purpose of theory to this thesis. 
Shiva (1988: 232) writes: ‘The nexus between modern science and violence is 
obvious from the fact that eighty per cent of all scientific research is devoted to 
the war industry’. 
 
Shiva (1988: 232) continues that the reductionist nature of science supports an 
economic structure ‘based on exploitation, profit maximisation and capital 
accumulation’. In similar vein, Illich (1981) labelled industrialised economic 
development that is based on science and technology, a war activity. Shiva 
(1988: 233) proposes that the global, multidimensional ecological crisis is an 
‘eloquent testimony to the violence that reductionist science perpetrates on 
nature’. It is the sum total of all of these parts of the capitalist system which are 
in need of deep and critical analysis. The purpose of theory in this thesis is thus 
to enable us to see better and at a deeper level where this coming together of 
the state, the corporation, and the capitalist relations of production, is leading 
humanity – and to help to see a way to build a different future. 
 
While recognising the importance of the diversity of epistemologies to the 
future of humanity, I will draw on particular aspects of a Marxist theoretical 
framework to shed critical light on the historical, structural and systemic 
causes of global warming. I have turned to Marxism as it provides a historical, 
materialist and critical analytical framework to the understanding of history 
and contemporary society – a framework that goes beyond the limitations of a 
positivist, descriptive approach to issues such as global warming. It enables us 
to break through ‘established reality’ (Marcuse 1964: 80). Additionally, as 
Marcuse (1967) argues, for the rich in Western society ‘it appears crazy at first 
to want a revolution for we have whatever we want.’ But he adds that the aim 
is ‘to transform the will itself so that people no longer want what they now 
want’ (Marcuse 1967 np). This was written over 40 years ago when Marcuse 
almost certainly would not have been thinking of global warming but this idea 
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of the need to ‘transform the will’ is echoed in the thesis in seeking to create a 
conceptual framework that gives us hope that there are alternatives to the 
capitalist system which is destroying the planet. Critical theory and 
methodology provide the tools to build that conceptual framework.  
 
1.3  A map of the thesis  
 
The thesis is divided into four parts. Part I consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 
includes the introduction, an overview of the literature, the methodology used 
and definitions of political economy. Global warming evidence and projections 
are covered in Chapter 2, placing both in the wider context of social and 
ecological problems confronting the planet in general. Chapter 3 outlines and 
evaluates international institutional responses to global warming: the Kyoto 
Protocol, emissions trading schemes, biofuels and technologies – both 
renewable technologies and technologies such as carbon capture and storage.  
 
Part II, the study of South Africa as a ‘microcosm’ of the global economy, is 
divided into 5 chapters, covering the African context of South Africa and its 
ecology, history and political economy, before turning to a particular slice of 
South Africa’s economy - the coal and electricity sectors. The study includes 
details and discussion about a recent World Bank loan supporting expansion of 
the coal/electricity sectors, before concluding with discussion and analysis of 
the study in relation to the political economy of global warming. 
 
Using the methodologies of critical theory and of political economy in the 
‘global microcosm’ of South Africa, Part II builds to the theoretical section of 
the thesis in Part III. This draws on Marxist ecological theory for a critical 
analysis of the political economy of global warming, bringing to the fore issues 
of class, power, inequality, alienation, financialisation and the rift between 
humans and nature. This in turn allows a critique of the current economic 





Part IV is my contribution to the political economy of global warming. It 
provides a platform for bringing this together as it has been developing 
throughout the thesis. More specifically it presents ‘the way forward’, arguing 
that alternative models of human development that address the contradictions 
of capitalism, including global warming, are both necessary and possible. This 
section does not provide a blueprint for future societies, but rather key 
principles which not only address many of the major contradictions of 
capitalism, but would enable a flourishing of a diversity of societies that are 
enduring, resilient, just and equitable. 
 
Each part of the thesis is distinct. There is however, a common thread running 
throughout which is that of finding a solution to the most fundamental of 
human relationships – the social relations of production – and how to live in 

















The evidence of human induced global warming is now irrefutable (Hansen et 
al. 2008; IPCC 2007) and humanity is facing, in the near future, a potentially 
terminal event in geological time, marking the end of the Holocene epoch,4 
thus destroying the world as we know it (Foster et al. 2010).  The science is 
unequivocal: the Earth’s biosphere is approaching global warming tipping 
points which, if passed, will become irreversible, taking the planet on a 
trajectory to a state unsuitable for human life. The next section presents a brief 
synopsis of the evidence for global warming. Thereafter section 2.3 gives a 
brief account of the physiological causes of global warming. An assessment of 
the future of global warming is presented in 2.4 before section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 The evidence 
 
Global warming refers to the increase in global atmospheric temperatures as a 
result of increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.5 
Every internationally reputable scientific research institution supports the claim 
that anthropogenic global warming is occurring. Given that and the very large 
and increasing volume of research being done on global warming, this thesis 
does not set out to provide a summary of the literature on the scientific 
evidence on global warming.  The ‘fact’ of global warming is now largely 
uncontested, although there remain ideologically driven ‘nay-sayers’. Today, 
questions remain around predictions of timings of tipping points and the scale 
and timing of widespread catastrophe, with controversies centred more on the 
conceptualisation and hence solutions to the problem. 
 
                                           
4 The Holocene  refers to the relatively stable geological period of the last 10-12,000 years of the 
Earth's history, a period during which all human civilisations have developed. 
5 I use the term ‘global warming’, rather than ‘climate change’, throughout the thesis as I think the 
concept has a less abstract, ‘scientised’ sense to it. 
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Certainly the reputability of the research and evidence on global warming 
remain of the highest importance. The largest and most comprehensive body of 
evidence to date is in the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change6, (IPCC) Assessment Report - Climate Change 2007, the Fourth IPCC 
Assessment Report. This UN body is widely considered to be the most 
authoritative source on climate change science, with two provisos. First its data 
are out of date due to the delay created by the peer-review process and the 
governments’ approval processes – relative to the rapidity of changes to global 
warming evidence. Second its findings are conservative, again due to the 
approval process of the reports. There have been four Assessment Reports put 
out by the IPCC - in 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2007, and most recently, in 
November 2007 a ‘synthesis report’ of all the evidence reviewed by the IPCC. 
 
According to Rockstrom et al. (2009), in the 2007 IPCC report current climate 
models may have significantly underestimated the severity of long-term 
climate change for a given concentration of greenhouse gases.  They maintain 
that most models suggest that a doubling in atmospheric CO2 concentration 
will lead to a global temperature rise of about 3oC (with a probable uncertainty 
range of 2-4.5oC), once the climate has regained equilibrium.  However, they 
argue, these models do not include long-term reinforcing feedback processes 
that further warm the climate, such as decreases in the surface area of ice cover 
or changes in the distribution of vegetation.  Including these feedbacks would 
result in a doubling of CO2 levels and an eventual temperature increase of 6oC 
(with a probable uncertainty range of 4 -8oC.  Such a temperature increase 
would undermine ecological life support systems and thus human society.  
(Rockstrom et al. 2009). 
 
  
The strength of the IPCC reports, however, is that, for evidence which has 
enormous international significance, these publications follow internationally 
                                           
6 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, based in Geneva Switzerland, was established in 
1988 by two United Nations organisations - the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) - to assess scientific, technical and socio-economic 
information relevant for the understanding of climate change, its potential impacts and options for 
adaptation and mitigation. 
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agreed, strict procedures and involve hundreds of experts and thousands of 
scientists producing rigorously peer reviewed literature. The author teams 
reflect a range of views, expertise and geographical representation. 
Furthermore, each report has to be unanimously approved by 154 governments, 
including the United States and oil and coal producing countries - a major 
challenge and one that it would be reasonable to claim would have a 
conservatising affect on report findings. The latest 2007 report has attracted 
criticism from leading climatologists themselves, who see it as underestimating 
the risks of global climate change (Clark and Foster 2007).  
 
Global average temperatures have risen considerably since measurements 
began in the mid-1800s with the total increase in global surface temperature  
being estimated at 0.76º C ± 0.19º C (IPCC 2007a).  Since 1979, the rate of 
warming has been about twice as fast over the land as over the ocean. During 
the last century, the Arctic has warmed at almost twice the global average rate 
(IPCC 2007a: 237).  The warming of the ocean since 1955 has accounted for 
more than 80 per cent of the increased energy in the earth’s climate system 
(IPCC 2007a: 47). The IPCC (2007b) projects a further increase of 0.4°C in 
warming during the next two decades. Already, significant geophysical 
changes are occurring as a result of this temperature increase - from subtropical 
deserts expanding hundreds of kilometres pole-ward, Arctic sea ice shrinking 
at an unseasonal and unprecedented rate, species moving pole-ward or to 
higher ground and mountain glaciers receding - such as in the Himalayas, 
Andes and Rocky Mountains (glaciers which together provide fresh water for a 
billion people) (IPCC 2007; Hansen 2005; Hansen et al. 2008). It is worth 
noting that historically, four of five mass extinctions, where it is estimated that 
at least half of the animal and plant species were wiped out, occurred during 
periods of warming comparable to those we are facing today (Mayhew et al. 
2008). 
 
There have been a number of scientific papers published since 2005 predicting 
‘tipping points’ in the global warming process – that is, critical thresholds at 
which anthropogenic forcing cause small perturbations that can precipitate 
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large changes – beyond which the warming process is reinforced by positive 
feedback mechanisms to the point that global warming takes on a momentum 
independent of human activities (Lenton et al. 2008). If it has not already 
happened, it is now almost certain that within several years we will have set in 
motion sufficient feedback mechanisms so that humans will be powerless to 
stop the Earth’s change to a new climate, and possibly a new geological era, 
which will not be conducive to human life. This will bring with it extreme 
weather events, rising sea levels, increasing droughts, floods and storms of a 
magnitude not experienced in human history. Hundreds of millions of people 
will become refugees.7 
 
The science states that the safe level of atmospheric carbon dioxide is no more 
than 350 parts per million (ppm). The level was 280 ppm in pre-industrial 
times, but had risen to 310 ppm by 1958 when records first started to be kept at 
Mauna Loa in Hawaii.8 The carbon dioxide level in the atmosphere is already 
389.69 ppm (December 2010 – See Figure 2.1) and rising increasingly quickly 
and currently at about 2 ppm per year. The implication of this is that we are no 
longer at a safe atmospheric carbon emission level and scientists, such as 
Hansen et al. (2008), are arguing there is need to reduce atmospheric carbon 
levels urgently to 350 ppm, and then more gradually to 300 ppm. A further 
implication is that we may have already overshot irreversible tipping points 
with the Earth’s inertia, largely contained in the Earth’s oceans, slowing what 
could be already determined climate catastrophe. 
 
                                           
7 An example of one tipping point comes from the vast expanse of the western Siberian tundra where 
permafrost encasing the world’s largest frozen peat bog has started melting on a large scale for the 
first time since it originally formed 11,000 years ago at the end of the last ice age. If this thaws, 
billions of tons of methane would be released into the atmosphere, and methane, in terms of its impact 
on global warming, is 20 times more potent than CO2 (Sample 2005). Other potential tipping points 
include the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation (THC), melting of the Greenland ice 
sheet, the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, disturbance of El Nino Southern Oscillation, 
Indian Summer Monsoon, Sahara/Sahel and West Africa Monsoon; clearing of the Amazon 
Rainforest and boreal forests  (Lenton et al 2008); the acidification of oceans, desertification of land 
(both reducing the ability for carbon absorption); and melting polar ice caps reducing reflecting 
surface to deflect the sun’s radiation. 
 8 Charles Keeling set up a carbon-dioxide monitoring station on top of Hawaii's Mauna Loa volcano 
where he could get the cleanest air possible. The data gained from this proved fossil fuels were 
causing global warming and the ‘Keeling Curve’, as it came to be known, became what is the 
cornerstone of global-warming science today. 
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Greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 were reported to have increased to 30.6 
gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon dioxide, an increase of 1.6 Gt on the previous year, 
resulting in the highest carbon emissions in history (Harvey 2011). This 
emissions trajectory means there is a 50 per cent chance that global average 
temperature will increase by more than 4o C by 2100 and runaway global 
warming. While most of the increase comes from China and India, much of the 
developed world’s very small amount of reduction in the trajectory of 
increasing emissions is due to the dependence on high emissions-producing 
imports from China (Harvey 2011), and all countries are ‘eyeing up 
extraordinary and risky ways to extract the world's last remaining reserves of 
fossil fuels’ (Harvey 2011: np).  
 
With respect to the oft-stated goal of keeping global warming to less than 2oC, 
Anderson and Bows (2011) argued that two degrees is a recipe for global 
disaster. In early 2011, Hansen concluded as a result of new research, that 
warming of just 0.8oC above the pre-industrial baseline, meant that no 
‘cushion’ is left to avoid dangerous climate change and setting the limit at 2o 
and CO2 levels of 450 ppm, were prescriptions for disaster. (Hansen and Sata 
2011).  Yet few analysts expect average global temperatures to rise less than 
2oC, even with ‘the most concerted social action’ (Monthly Review 2004). 
Anderson and Bows (2011: 21) contend that ‘despite high-level statements to 
the contrary, there is now little to no chance of maintaining the global mean 
surface temperature at or below [a rise of] 2oC. Moreover, the impacts 
associated with 2oC have been revised upwards, sufficiently so that 2oC now 
more appropriately represents the threshold between ‘dangerous’ and 
‘extremely dangerous’ climate change’.  
 
It is argued that many species and vulnerable people in poor countries are 
struggling with the impacts already and, even if no more CO2 were emitted, the 
emissions of global warming gases that have already occurred will cause at 
least a further 0.5oC degree warming and have consequences for another two 




Mauna Loa CO2 Record: December 2010 
 
Source: http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/. Accessed January 2011 
 
Global warming however is only one indication of the enormous rift between 
humans and the environment. Such warming both coincides with and will 
compound a number of other biophysical crises: species extinction; depletion 
of the oceans’ fish populations; desertification; land and soil 
degradation/toxification; deforestation; air pollution; water shortages/pollution; 
the peaking of world oil production; food crises and many macro-social 
problems such as poverty, inequality and insecurity. While all cannot be 
attributed solely to the globalised, dominant political economy of capitalism, 
this thesis provides supported argument that globalised capitalism has been the 
dominant driving force (Amin 1992, 2009; Bagchi 2005; Fanon 1967; Harvey 
2005; Navarro 2002, 2007; Sweezy 2004; Wallerstein 1976). All of these 
factors together amount to what has been labelled a ‘crisis of civilisation’ 
(Amandla 2010). 
Scientists at the Stockholm Resilience Centre (2010) have identified nine 
planetary boundaries which, if transgressed, may be devastating for human 
survival. The factors involved are climate change, stratospheric ozone, land use 
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change, freshwater use, biological diversity, ocean acidification, nitrogen and 
phosphorus inputs into the biosphere and oceans, aerosol loading and chemical 
pollution. The Centre suggests that the factors are interconnected and for three 
of them - climate change, biological diversity and nitrogen input to the 
biosphere – the boundaries have already been crossed, thus threatening the 
ability of the other indicators to stay within their boundaries. 
 
In other words, within a short space of time we are facing not only the very real 
possibility of irreversible global warming tipping points being passed, but a 
range of indicators predicting that the Earth’s biosphere is being irretrievably 
degraded to a point where it will no longer be capable of supporting human and 
other species’ life. As Foster (2009: np) contends ‘it is impossible to 
exaggerate the environmental problem facing humanity in the twenty-first 
century’. Parallel to, and compounding the crises of the biosphere, are the 
social crises – poverty, inequality, food and water insecurity, and war. 
  
Another useful measure of how the human species has taken the planet to the 
brink is by considering the ecological footprint – that is, how much of the 
biosphere is required to produce and reproduce the conditions of life enjoyed 
by individuals, communities, countries and global society as a whole. This is 
measured in global hectares, giving a measure for comparing what the 
biological capacity of the Earth is compared with what is extracted from the 
biosphere to produce what is consumed. The Global Footprint Network’s 
(2010) Living Planet Report states that humanity’s ecological footprint has 
more than doubled since 1966. In 2001, humanity used the equivalent of 1.5 
planets to support its activities. By 2030, it projects that humanity will require 
the capacity of two Earths to absorb carbon dioxide wastes and keep up with 
natural resource consumption. 
 
2.3 The causes  
 
Canadell et al. (2007) claim that climate change is due to global economic 
growth, a more carbon-intensive economy and a reduced capacity of the land 
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and oceans to absorb carbon from the atmosphere. They maintain that the 
principal human induced causes of global warming are fossil fuel extraction 
and consumption, land use and deforestation. The declining ability of the 
‘sinks’ (oceans, forests and land) to absorb carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases will exacerbate the warming cycle and at the same time 
increase the uncertainty in modelling predictions.9  
 
Industrialisation (including deforestation and land clearing) has resulted in 
growing amounts of green house gases (GHGs), including CO2, being emitted 
into the atmosphere from the burning of fossil fuels in which carbon has been 
stored in an inert form for millions of years. Around 97 per cent of the CO2 
emitted by Western industrialised countries comes from burning coal, oil and 
gas for energy (Global Carbon Project 2010). Before the industrial revolution, 
CO2 levels were around 580 billion tonnes of carbon in the atmosphere. In 
2007, the figure was close to 750 billion tonnes, 90 per cent of it emitted by the 
rich industrialised countries (Lohmann 2007: 6).  
 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel burning and industrial processes have 
accelerated globally, with an annual growth rate increasing from 1.1 per cent 
for 1990–1999 to more than 3.3 per cent for 2000–2006 (Global Carbon 
Project 2010). Global economic growth, the energy intensity of growth and the 
carbon intensity of energy in the early twenty first century have all been 
exceeding expectations that had been built into  influential assessments of 
climate change (such as the IPCC’s and the 2003 Stern Review) and it has been 
assumed this trend will continue (World Watch Institute 2009). At the same 
time, until recently, half of the global emissions of CO2 were being absorbed 
by land, forests and ocean with the other half remaining in the atmosphere 
(Miller 2008). Over the years these sinks have been responsible for removing 
55 per cent of the carbon emissions from human activities – with land and 
forests removing 30 per cent and the ocean 25 per cent. Fifty years ago, for 
every ton of CO2 emitted into the atmosphere, natural sinks removed 600 kg 
(Canadell et al. 2007; Global Carbon Project 2010). Currently, that figure has 
                                           
9 Many of these ‘feedbacks’ are absent from current climate models which means that estimates tend 
towards the conservative.  
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fallen to 550 kg and it is falling further (Canadell et al. 2007; Global Carbon 
Project 2010). 
 
While the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has increased by 35 per 
cent, the level of atmospheric methane has risen much more, by 151 per cent, 
mostly from agricultural activities such as raising cattle and growing rice 
(Canadell et al. 2007; Global Carbon Project 2010). Methane is much more 
potent and problematical as a greenhouse gas than CO2. 
 
Currently the amount of fossil fuel carbon emitted into the atmosphere each 
year is greater than for the most fossil-fuel intensive of the IPCC emissions 
scenarios developed in the late 1990s (Canadell et al. 2007). With respect to 
big emitters, China passed the United States as the top emitting country in 
2007 (Vidal and Adam 2007), although China’s per capita carbon emissions 
remain well below those of the United States, which, on a per capita basis, are 
comparable to Australia’s per capita emissions (Vidal and Adam 2007). 
 
Per capita emissions in the poorer, less industrialised countries remain well 
below those in industrial countries (Global Carbon Project 2010). No region is 
decarbonising its energy supply and the growth rate in emissions is greatest in 
rapidly developing economies, particularly China. Global energy consumption 
is expected to grow by 50 per cent by 2030 (from 2008) (Hightower and Pierce 
2008: 285). The combustion of fossil fuels, primarily coal, oil and natural gas, 
accounts for about 74 per cent of all CO2 emissions and for roughly 57 per cent 
of all greenhouse gas emissions globally (Hightower and Pierce 2008). 
 
The International Energy Outlook (EIA 2010) projects world energy-related 
carbon dioxide emissions will grow from 29.7 billion metric tons in 2007 to 
33.8 billion metric tons in 2020 and 42.4 billion metric tons in 2035. A 
significant dimension of energy use is the so-called ‘carbon intensity’ of the 
global economy. This is the amount of carbon emitted to produce one dollar of 
wealth. Even in its most conservative projection, the IPCC assumed that the 
trend of decreasing carbon intensity would continue. This has ceased to be the 
case. After almost 100 years of improvements since 2000 the long-term trend 
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of declining CO2 emissions per unit of energy has reversed (Global Carbon 
Project 2010).  
 
Additionally, what has happened is that, as Li (2008: np) writes, falling energy 
intensity (resulting from rising energy efficiency) has translated into more 
rapid capital accumulation (economic growth) and has rarely led to absolute 
declines in energy consumption. This is known as the ‘Jevons Paradox’, named 
after the nineteenth century British economist William S. Jevons (1866) who 
first noted this perverse effect. 
  
Since 1750 developed countries, with less than 20 per cent of the world’s 
population, have been responsible for 80 per cent of the atmospheric CO2 
accumulation (Global Carbon Project 2010). The world’s poorest 800 million 
people have contributed less than 1 per cent. Yet the latter are the most 
vulnerable to the effects of global warming. 
 
It has been the use of fossil fuels by the industrialised countries which has 
raised atmospheric CO2 to its current level. Today however the rapid, coal–
dependent development of China and India is the most important driver of 
growth in global carbon dioxide emissions. Between 2000 and 2007, carbon 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion worldwide increased 22 per cent to an 
estimated 8.2 billion tons per annum, according to Flavin (2008) from the 
Worldwatch Institute. China produced 57 per cent of the growth in emissions 
during this period; India contributed 8 per cent, the United States and Europe 4 
and 3 per cent, respectively. (Flavin 2008).  The ratio of per capita emissions 
for Americans and Chinese is more than 4 to 1; compared to Indians more than 
13 to 1; and to Africans 18 to 1.  Coal provides 70 per cent of the commercial 
energy in China (and 56 per cent in India). 
 
The only industrialised countries which reduced their carbon emissions during 
the 1990s were the Soviet Union, due to the collapse of its economy; France, 
because of the significant growth in reliance on nuclear power; and the UK, 
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with the opening of the North Sea oil and gas fields and the closing of coal 
mines (Lohmann 2007). 
 
There is inevitably a high correlation between economic growth and energy 
consumption, with world economic growth being one of the best predictors of 
global energy consumption (Stern 2003). Now, as access to oil and gas fossil 
fuels becomes more difficult, the use of more carbon intensive fuels is 
growing. It is to be noted that the energy intensity of fossil fuels can vary 
dramatically across types of fuel. The combustion of coal for example 
generally releases 1.8 times as much carbon dioxide per unit of energy as 
natural gas does and 1.3 times as much as oil (Worldwatch Institute 2009). 
Again the production of oil from Canada’s tar sands emits up to three times as 
much carbon as producing conventional oil (Worldwatch Institute 2009). 
Despite the irrefutable evidence of the relationship between fossil fuel use and 
carbon dioxide emissions, the search for and extraction of fossil fuels are 
continuing at what appears to be an unprecedented rate, fuelled in part by 
anticipated shortages, growing investments and increasing prices. Just as one 
example, an Arctic land grab is under way by the five countries with Arctic 
coastlines: Russia, Denmark, Canada, the United States and Norway. It is 
ironic that the thawing of the Arctic which has happened because of global 
warming is seen as a boon to enable access to huge reserves (Klare 2008). As 
Gare (2008) argues, the environment is defined by its exchange value and 
environmental destruction increases profits; when there are shortages, prices 
rise and the greatest profits are made. 
 
Hence, the scientific evidence of anthropogenic global warming is 
incontestable. Most of the consequences however are in the future and the 
course of global warming remains uncertain. For some of the low lying coral 
atoll islands such as Kiribati in the Pacific Ocean, for low lying coastal regions 
such as the Bay of Bengal, for some drought stricken areas of Africa, the 




So what are the projections for future global warming?  The next section turns 
to this question. 
 
2.4 The future 
  
As has already been stated it is impossible to exaggerate the problem presented 
by global warming. Further warming is already locked in, with greenhouse 
gases having lifetimes of decades and centuries. According to the organisation 
350.org, unless we reduce the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere to 
350 parts per million (the level passed in 1988) as a matter of urgency, we will 
cause huge and irreversible damage to the Earth. In 2009, emissions levels 
decreased by 1.3 per cent due to the global recession but have since returned to 
a growth rate of 3 per cent per annum (Black 2010). Le Quere (quoted in 
Garfield 2008), professor of environmental sciences at the University of East 
Anglia and the British Antarctic Survey, stated that such emissions levels 
presaged a global average temperature rise of up to 6.1°C over the next century 
(UNEP 2006). Lovelock (2006), a somewhat controversial scientist, predicts 
that if the forces at work in the economy continue on their present trajectory, 
only a few hundred million people living close to the North Pole will survive 
this century.  
 
Hansen et al. (2008: 7-8) write: 
 
Our home planet is dangerously near a tipping point at which human-made 
greenhouse gases reach a level where major climate changes can proceed 
mostly under their own momentum. Warming will shift climatic zones by 
intensifying the hydrologic cycle, affecting freshwater availability and 
human health. We will see repeated coastal tragedies associated with 
storms and continuously rising sea levels. The implications are profound, 
and the only resolution is for humans to move to a fundamentally different 
energy pathway within a decade. Otherwise, it will be too late for one-
third of the world’s animal and plant species and millions of the most 




According to the IPCC (2007: 72), there are a number of uncertainties that if 
resolved, ‘could lead to new robust findings’, meaning in essence that their 
projections would be more alarming. These uncertainties include the 
magnitude of CO2 emissions from land use change; the scarcity of data from 
some regions, particularly poor countries; the analysis and monitoring of 
changes in extreme weather events; and ‘how development planners 
incorporate information into their decisions’ (IPCC 2007: 72). Juxtaposed to 
this critical situation has been the inability of the global and nation-state 
institutions even to begin to take appropriate action. 
 
The science has moved on from the 2007 IPCC report. The consequences of 
global warming may be moving even faster. In an exercise that reveals the 
extent of the challenge facing humanity, Monbiot (2007: 17) took the global 
figure for carbon dioxide production in 2000 together with figures presented by 
the IPCC in 2007 showing the cuts necessary to prevent global warming from 
eventually exceeding 2oC. He estimated this would mean that, by 2050, the 
world would need to cut its emissions to roughly 15 per cent of their volume in 
2000.  
 
Monbiot (2007:17) continues:  
 
I looked up the global figures for carbon dioxide production in 2000 and 
divided it by the current population. This gives a baseline figure of 3.58 
tonnes of CO2 per person. An 85 per cent cut means that (if the population 
remains constant) the global output per head should be reduced to 0.537 
tonnes by 2050. The UK currently produces 9.6 tonnes per head and the 
US 23.6 tonnes. Reducing these figures to 0.537 means a 94.4 per cent cut 
in the UK and a 97.7 per cent cut in the US. But the world population will 
rise in the same period. If we assume a population of 9 billion, the cuts 
rise to 95.9 per cent in the UK and 98.3 per cent in the US.  
 
Furthermore Monbiot (2007) points out that the IPCC figures might be out of 
date and also underestimate emissions due to missing carbon cycle feedbacks 
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which he claims currently account for 18 percent of global warming but are 
likely to intensify. 
In a paper presented in the Geophysical Research Letters, Weaver et al. (2007) 
argue that even with a 90 per cent global cut by 2050, the 2oC threshold would 
eventually be broken. That paper suggests that to stabilise temperatures at 
1.50C above the pre-industrial level requires a global cut of 100 per cent, in 
other words a complete decarbonisation of the economy.  
The world population is growing, projected to be 9 billion by 2050. So too is 
the global economy and the latter is much more of a problem, especially as, at 
the very core of the global market economy, is the fundamental principle of 
economic growth which is dependent on fossil fuels. This is not news. That 
issue was central to the deliberations of the Club of Rome in 1972, published in 
the report Limits to Growth (Meadows 1972).  Yet in the intervening four 
decades, the issue has been very largely ignored. As economic growth occurs 
in carbon-based growth economies, the demand for fossil fuels rises as well as 
the emissions of greenhouse gases. Neither increased energy efficiency of 
existing energy sources nor renewables can do much to arrest this process.  
Monbiot (2007: 17) writes about how the implications of economic growth to 
carbon reduction targets were driven home to him:  
 
Professor Rod Smith [shows] that a growth rate of 3 per cent means 
economic activity doubles in 23 years. At 10 per cent it takes just seven 
years. This we knew. But Smith takes it further. With a series of equations 
he shows that "each successive doubling period consumes as much 
resource as all the previous doubling periods combined. In other words, if 
our economy grows at 3 per cent between now and 2040, we will consume 
in that period economic resources equivalent to all those we have 
consumed since humans first stood on two legs. Then, between 2040 and 
2063, we must double our total consumption again. Reading that paper I 




While the industrialised nations are calling for cuts to greenhouse gas 
emissions in the rapidly industrialising Third World10, such development is 
strongly predicated on fossil fuel energy. For example, in just one of a number 
of such projects, in 2008 the World Bank underwrote a $4.1 billion, coal-
powered Tata Ultra Mega plant in Gujarat in western India which would emit 
25.7 million tons of carbon dioxide per year making it one of the world’s 50 
largest greenhouse-gas emitters (Nace 2008). The Tata plant was to be 
classified under the Kyoto Protocol as a Clean Development Mechanism11 
development because it would be using ‘super critical coal technology’, a 
technology which would produce slightly higher energy efficiency from the 
coal than average. Lohmann (2007) argues that despite the World Bank's 
involvement in carbon trading initiatives, such as the Clean Development 
Mechanism and Prototype Carbon Fund, from 1992 to 2004 it approved $11 
billion in financing for 128 fossil-fuel extraction projects in 45 countries, 
projects which will ultimately lead to more than 43 billion tonnes of carbon-
dioxide emissions, a figure hundreds of times more than the emissions 
reductions that signatories to the Kyoto Protocol are required to make between 
1990 and 2012. I will look at another example of World Bank funding, namely 
for the expansion of the coal sector, in the South African study in Part II. 
2.5 Conclusion 
What emerges here is that, while global warming is the focus of this thesis, it is 
not possible to isolate it as an issue in terms of its causes, effects and solutions. 
The thesis as a whole thus spreads itself more widely.  
 
Nevertheless, the science is clear. Global warming is happening and threatens 
the very existence of life on the planet. The causes are very much a function of 
the growing global economy, the use of increasing quantities of fossil fuels and 
the decreasing ability of ‘sinks’ to cope. The world is heading into very 
dangerous territory in terms of the survival of species. It may well be already in 
territory from which there is no return. 
                                           
10 I use the term ‘Third World’ in the thesis as it is evocative of un and under-development, poverty, 
exploitation and exclusion, rather than being a uniform or analytically precise term. 
11 The Clean Development Mechanism  (CDM) refers to a market mechanism whereby rich countries 
can count as a reduction in their emissions the equivalent of emissions reduced by investing in 




This thesis seeks to explain in terms of political economy how we as humanity 




CHAPTER 3    Global warming: proposals for solutions   
  
3.1 Introduction   
 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First it sets out the global warming 
solutions proposed to date and puts these in the context of the political 
economy of the international institutions that have been dealing - or failing to 
deal - with these issues. Second the chapter examines whether the predominant 
global warming solutions proposed to date do constitute genuine solutions. 
These fall into three broad categories: market, technical and biological (or 
biofuels). I will refer in general to these three categories as neoliberal 
solutions, as they have developed out of the dominant neoliberal political 
economy. I have only briefly touched on nuclear powered energy (a fourth 
solution) as a substitute for fossil fuels as, while there has been a revival of 
arguments used in favour of nuclear power (including from Hansen and 
Lovelock), these do not stand up to examination and have been dealt with 
extensively elsewhere.12  
 
There has been considerable energy, billions of dollars in public and private 
investments (Bond and Erion 2009; Vidal 2008) and much precious time (one 
could argue in excess of 14 years for Kyoto’s carbon markets) devoted to 
neoliberal solutions to global warming. Global emissions continue to increase 
by 2–3 per cent per annum and we have gone beyond the safe limit for carbon 
dioxide equivalent in the atmosphere. To settle for these options and to indulge 
in the degrees of optimism surrounding their effects might just possibly be 
justified if we were here dealing with the prevention of some relatively 
insignificant adverse event and if time were not of the essence. We are not; we 
are seeking to address the greatest threat humankind has ever faced, not in a 
thousand years but in a generation. It is a time not for optimism but for realism. 
This chapter seeks to provide some of that realism.  
                                           
12 For example, see Clarke 2010, Why James Hansen is wrong on nuclear power. 
http://links.org.au/node/1607. Accessed January 2011; Caldicott 2006; Environmentalists Do Not 
Support Nuclear Power: Critique of James Lovelock and Patrick Moore 2007 




The chapter begins by showing how public awareness of humans’ destructive 
use of the environment has grown over time. There is then, in section 3.3, 
consideration of how internationally that awareness led governments in the late 
1990s to the signing of the Kyoto Protocol. Given the importance of that 
Protocol and the sorts of market solutions it proposed, both sections 3.4 and 3.5 
are devoted to it, first explaining it and then criticising it. Section 3.6 examines 
other proposed solutions to global warming. The chapter concludes in section 
3.7 that none of these solutions whether individually or in tandem is sufficient 
to provide an answer.  
 
3.2 Growing public awareness 
 
One of the earliest and most influential environmental books, published in 
1962, is Rachel Carson’s seminal work, Silent Spring, which drew attention to 
the consequences for the environment of indiscriminate use of pesticides and 
the efforts of corporations to suppress this information. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
UK economist Barbara Ward wrote several books in the same vein, including 
Only One Earth (1972), written with René Dubois. That book broadened the 
popular base of environmentalism and connected ideas of sustainability to 
economics. Ward and Dubois proposed that richer countries should commit a 
certain proportion of their GNP in aid to the developing world. They started to 
see a close connection between wealth distribution and conservation of 
planetary resources, advocating for the careful husbandry of the Earth as an 
essential ingredient for the survival of the human species, and for the creation 
of decent ways of life for all the people of the world.  
 
In 1966 eminent economist Kenneth Boulding (1966) wrote The Economics of 
the Coming Spaceship Earth, describing the economies of industrial countries 
as ‘cowboy’ economics, exhibiting reckless, exploitative and violent 
behaviour. Boulding maintained that there was a need to constrain extraction 
and consumption, to limit pollution and to restore the material world. He 
argued for goods to be produced that would last as long as possible. Boulding’s 
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influence led in the 60s and 70s to an increasing awareness that economic 
growth was causing environmental decline.  
 
In terms of growing public awareness, another highly significant publication 
during the 60s was Garret Hardin’s The Tragedy of the Commons (1968). This 
argued inter alia that there cannot be unlimited population and unlimited use of 
resources and that the higher the population level, the lower has to be the 
standard of living, and vice versa. Hardin’s work initiated calls to put an 
economic value on the ecology. In the early 1970s the Club of Rome’s Limits 
to Growth (Meadows 1972) was published, predicting a catastrophic collapse 
of society as a result of the growth in the use of resources, of pollution and, 
particularly, of the population. This book contained a condemnation of both 
capitalists and socialists alike, as both saw economic growth as essential for 
progress (Beder 2006: 14). Limits to Growth is something of an intellectual 
reference point for the issue of global warming. It is not a critique of global 
capitalism as such but rather of continuing growth, consumption, population 
and pollution in a finite world.  
 
That early environmental literature did not connect with the more critical 
writers of that time, such as Franz Fanon (The Wretched of the Earth 1967) 
writing on the violence of colonialism, or Andre Gunder Frank (The 
Development of Underdevelopment 1966), an early exponent of the theory that 
rich, developed countries gain from poor, under-developed countries, so long 
as they remain as colonies in the international capitalist system. Writers in the 
Marxist tradition, such as Frank, but also Baran and Sweezy (Monopoly 
Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order 1966), 
contributed significantly to laying the intellectual foundations for the 
radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s in the West and the social justice component 
of contemporary environmentalism. Yet while they did so in the context of the 
need to address the global poverty/wealth, development/under-development 
gap, in the industrialised West no strong connection was made between the 
critique of capitalism and the environment, leaving a vacuum in intellectual 
pursuit until more recent times, with writers such as John Bellamy Foster 
(Ecology Against Capitalism 2002) and in journals such as Monthly Review 
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and Capitalism Socialism Nature. Thus while in these early days, people did 
predict a pending doomsday and advocated a moratorium on economic and 
industrial growth, these ideas faded into the background, particularly with the 
rise and increasing ideological hegemony of neoliberalism in the late 1970s.  
 
It is also relevant to bring in the more popular global warming literature which 
also illustrates the limitations of the hegemonic positivist ideological 
framework. Since 2005, there has been a spate of popular English language 
books on global warming. Along with documentary-style television programs 
and films such as Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth (2006), this literature has 
played a significant role in bringing about the beginnings of the necessary 
cultural shift in attitudes to global warming.  While global warming is now 
very much on the agenda politically, in part due to this literature, it is also 
illustrative of the dominance of the neoliberal paradigm in the political/cultural 
context as it fails to examine the structural issues of global warming. Jarred 
Diamond’s Collapse. How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive (2005) uses 
environmental-caused collapses of societies from previous eras, up to and 
including the genocidal war in Rwanda, to provide a warning to our current 
civilisation. Curiously, given the historical scope of collapsed societies covered 
in his book, Diamond’s solutions (to today’s environmental problems) focus 
not on structure but on the individual: how one votes, consumer spending and 
advocacy, concentrating on one’s local environment and donating discretionary 
money to environmental causes. Tim Flannery’s The Weather-Makers, 
published in October 2005, also emphasises the role of the individual, making 
a passionate plea for lifestyle changes. He argues ‘there’s no need to wait for 
government to act, you can do it yourself’ (Flannery 2005: 303). Like 
Flannery, science journalist George Monbiot also calls for lifestyle changes.  
Monbiot’s Heat: How to Stop the Planet Burning (2006) rightly dismisses 
carbon offsetting, drawing an analogy between that and pushing food around 
on a plate to make it look like it has been eaten. He also forecasts that our 
society will look like a poor Third World country if we press ahead with the 
90–100 per cent carbon emission reductions necessary to prevent climate 
warming catastrophe. Monbiot provides detail on how we can cut our carbon 
dioxide emissions, starting with our homes, our energy systems, and our 
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transport, retail and construction industries. He also draws attention to the 
interests that have funded climate change denial. He does not however call for 
structural, political economy change. 
 
Mark Lynas, in Six Degrees. Our Future on a Hotter Planet (2007), explores 
what conditions on the planet will be like as temperatures rise through each 
additional degree. He turns to carbon rationing as a solution to global warming, 
arguing that rationing (of goods) in the United Kingdom during the Second 
World War brought about a dramatic improvement in the quality of life of 
people – and carbon rationing would do likewise. There is much merit in this 
argument. Each of these books has great potential to raise the level of 
awareness but they have failed to galvanise the level of action required and do 
not attend to the need for structural change. Significantly, they make no 
connection between the ecological debt and ecological credit issues, the 
inequitable and unjust relationship between levels of consumption in the North 
and South and the price that is already being paid in the South as a result of 
global warming. 
 
Taking a different tack, Eugene Linden (2006: 257-258) in Winds of Change 
writes of the demise of civilisations across the millennia because of resource 
abuse and changing weather.  He states:  
 
Having proven through history that extreme climate shifts are costly if not 
fatal for past civilizations, our species is busily pushing the climate 
towards producing extremes never before experienced during modern 
times. Instead of preparing or trying to avert climate change, people are 
dismantling natural protections against climate extremes and making 
changes that will likely amplify the events themselves. The explanation 
[is] a combination of a collective failure of the imagination, and belief in 
the godlike power of markets and progress.  
 
New York Times writer Elizabeth Kolbert (2006) visits numerous locations 
where the effects of global warming are evident. At one site (permafrost 
melting) she records that such melting has the potential to add a further billion 
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tons of the potent greenhouse gas, methane, into the atmosphere. As the world 
moves closer to the unknown tipping point – whether it is 350 ppm CO2 or 450 
ppm CO2 - the continuing of ‘business as usual’, Kolbert claims, is a very high 
risk response. Kolbert (2006: 189) in her conclusion writes that ‘it may seem 
impossible to imagine that a technologically advanced society could choose, in 
essence, to destroy itself, but that is what we are now in the process of doing’. 
 
Beyond this literature, it would be remiss at this stage not to mention that 
which is concerned with the more readily identifiable denialism of global 
warming as it has been very effective in ‘muddying the waters’ even within the 
neoliberal positivist framework. One book from the US,  Merchants of Doubt 
(2010) by Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, captures how a loosely-linked 
group of high level scientists, with strong connections to politics and industry 
and a particular political agenda, have effectively conducted a campaign of 
obfuscation around the science of global warming (with assistance from a 
complicit media). Oreskes and Conway provide an authoritative account of 
how this group was involved in, or funded by, the same bodies which 
conducted campaigns to mislead the public over issues such as the links 
between smoking and lung cancer, CFCs to the ozone hole and coal pollution 
to acid rain. Oreskes and Conway are writing from the experience of the US 
where ‘big money’ (Sachs 2010)  has been involved in backing climate change 
deniers, bringing doubt to the global warming science and effectively making 
controversial in the public arena that which is now scientifically certain. 
 
Alongside this literature and the growing public awareness reflected in most of 
the literature, the United Nations environment agenda was developing, from a 
1972 conference through to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and beyond. The next 
section looks at this in the context of the two broad families of international 
institutions – the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions - to allow 







3.3 Background history of international responses to global warming 
 
During the second half of the twentieth century, two broad families of 
international institutions, (the United Nations and the Bretton Woods financial 
institutions) were developed to facilitate various aspects of international 
relations and governance. Both families have approached the world through a 
Western perspective and were developed on the basis of modernisation theory, 
assuming that Western values are both superior and universal (Lohmann 2009; 
McIntyre and Mooney 2007; Raffer and Singer 2001; Shiva 1993). Perhaps 
more importantly, both families of institutions have long since adopted the 
political economy models of capitalism, particularly in more recent times,  
neoliberal capitalism. 
 
The first step in creating modern international financial institutions was made 
at Bretton Woods in July 1944, heavily influenced by John Maynard Keynes, 
the British macro-economist.  The Bretton Woods institutions were to promote 
international financial and commercial relations between the major 
industrialised nations and to create an international economic order to prevent 
further depressions such as the Great Depression of the 1930s and the war that 
followed.  Keynes’ vision was of a global macroeconomic and financial system 
of management, a global currency and a world central bank which would 
maintain full employment and provide the liquidity required for these purposes 
(Raffer and Singer 2001: 2-4).  
 
This vision is unfortunately so very different from what has emerged in 
practice from the Bretton Woods institutions of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development – now the World Bank – and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The latter was established as an 
international institution to manage international payments but ‘changed from 
an institution of collective action into an instrument to discipline others’ (Toye 
2003: 359). The multilateralism of Keynes has been replaced by the global 
economic dominance of the United States and the other G8 countries.13 
                                           





The United Nations was founded after World War II to promote world peace 
and facilitate cooperation in international law, international security, economic 
development, social progress and human rights. It is a much more genuinely 
international organisation based on one member (nation), one vote, although 
this arrangement is also not without its limitations. 
While the Bretton Woods institutions were envisaged as specialised agencies 
of the United Nations, today, ‘the secretary-general of the United Nations is 
not even allowed to address the annual meetings of the Fund and Bank’ (Raffer 
and Singer 2001: 6). Raffer and Singer (2001: 7) continue:  
 
the UN was not to be trusted with the hard instruments of development 
such as finance and macroeconomic policy making; that was to be the 
preserve of the Bretton Woods institutions with their system of weighted 
voting and firm control by the Western industrialised countries.  The UN 
was to be put in charge of the ‘soft’ instruments, such as food aid, 
technical assistance, children, women, social policy and more recently, the 
environment.  
 
The political economy rules of the Bretton Woods institutions today have, 
according to Raffer and Singer (2001: 9), resulted in a ‘constant tendency to 
transfer income from poorer to richer countries [offsetting] much of the flow of 
aid and investment into poorer countries.’ This has been further added to ‘by 
enforced country-by-country stabilization and structural adjustment programs’ 
(Raffer and Singer 2001: 9). The Bretton Woods institutions have become 
immensely more powerful than the UN, giving more power to the interests of 
the world’s rich and powerful, who have withheld energy and resources from 
the UN and invested them instead in the IMF and the World Bank (Raffer and 
Singer 2001: 10). The world’s most powerful countries, representing less than 
20  per cent of the world’s population, have hugely disproportionate power in 
the Bretton Woods institutions because of the membership, chairmanship and 





This is the setting for international environmental governance. The 
environment is a ‘soft’ issue and hence comes under the United Nations 
institutions with considerably less power and influence than the World Bank, 
the IMF, the G8 and the WTO, all institutions which play key roles in 
supporting the global economy status quo. The raison d’être for these latter 
institutions is economic growth and capital accumulation. As environmental 
justice group Global Exchange (2008) claims, for example, the WTO is used 
by corporations to dismantle hard-won local and national environmental 
protections on the grounds they are ‘barriers to trade.’ 
 
The history of global environmental efforts can be traced back to the UN 
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 which in turn 
led to several multilateral environmental agreements (Khator and Fairchild 
2005). This was succeeded by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) (1983-85), chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, a 
former Norwegian Prime Minister and Minister for the Environment. It was 
this Brundtland Commission which set the contemporary environment agenda 
(Middleton and O’Keefe 2001). The Brundtland Report (1987: 43) focussed 
attention on the need for economic development, supporting the idea that 
economic growth was sustainable provided it was brought about largely 
through improved technologies, thereby avoiding destroying or depleting 
natural resources but also ensuring a redistribution of resources towards poorer 
nations. The call for economic growth at that Stockholm Conference was made 
in the interests of developing nations. The Report (1987) argued that 
sustainable development has to meet the needs of the present but weigh this up 
with the ability of future generations to meet their needs. The notion that the 
affluent nations reduce their own growth to make room for the growth of 
poorer nations was not raised, nor were the structural or political economy 
issues of environmental degradation. 
 
The Commission sought to elevate the status of environmental issues to a 
global level. Finger (1993: 43) states that the Brundtland Report was about 
awareness raising and planetary stewardship. It said nothing about power 
structures. Middleton and O’Keefe (2001: 2-3) echo this view, suggesting that 
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the concept of sustainability ‘was deliberately ill-defined to prevent 
unnecessary and destructive objections. [E]conomic concerns were reduced to 
interpreting the environment as a market problem, not to an analysis of the 
market as an environmental problem.’  
 
In the late 1980s the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the 
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) established the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to investigate climate change. The IPCC was 
and is built on a peer review process that is exhaustive, both a strength, in 
establishing the credibility of the research, but also a weakness, particularly in 
more recent years as we approach (or pass) tipping points and the speed of 
climate change gathers momentum.  
 
In the wake of the Brundtland Report, the United Nations General Assembly 
set up the Rio Earth Summit for June 1992, to examine progress on the Report, 
to re-think economic development and to stop the destruction of irreplaceable 
natural resources.  For a UN conference, Rio was unprecedented in its size and 
scope. It was significant not in what it achieved, which was remarkably little, 
but that so many powerful institutions participated, including many 
multinational corporations, in particular the fuel and vehicle sectors which 
were anxious about the direction in which UN environmental conferences were 
heading. It is significant that at about this time the Global Climate Coalition 
(GCC) was formed as a powerful lobby group of car manufacturers and oil 
companies which were then largely responsible for persuading the US 
government to prevent the Rio Summit from adopting anything that might 
threaten their interests (Middleton and O’Keefe 2001: 41). I note that the 
members of the  GCC included the American Petroleum Institute, Chevron, 
Chrysler, Cyprus AMAX Minerals, Exxon, Ford, General Motors, Shell Oil, 
Texaco and the United States Chamber of Commerce. It was involved in 
aggressive lobbying at international climate negotiation meetings, including in 
the lead up to the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, where it persuaded the US 
government to avoid mandatory emissions controls, and in 1997, prior to treaty 
negotiations in Kyoto, when it launched an advertising campaign in the US 
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against any agreement aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
internationally (Sourcewatch 2010).  
 
Banuri (1993) writes that overall the Rio Summit is best seen from two 
perspectives: that of the rich North, which was pictured as defending the Earth; 
and that of the South, which believed that it was to remain poor and suffering 
so that the North could continue its rich lifestyle. This was particularly the case 
around the issue of historical ecological debt incurred by northern 
industrialised nations toward the Southern non-industrialised nations. It is 
telling that the Rio Summit made no mention of reductions in consumption and 
lifestyles by the rich or of the issues of ecological debt. Yet, as Banuri (1993) 
argued (albeit in 1993), if the South disappeared tomorrow, the environmental 
crisis would still be here - but not if the North disappeared. 
 
The overriding significance of Rio was that, for the first time, governments 
acknowledged the threat of the ecological crisis and the need to establish a 
framework for tackling climate change. It also drew attention to the facts that 
poverty and excessive consumption by the affluent were placing stresses on the 
environment and that economic decisions had to take environmental impacts 
into account.  There was further a clear recognition that fossil fuels were linked 
to global climate change. It failed however to recognise the significance of the 
historical, material and structural underpinnings of environmental problems 
such as global warming, or that inequality and poverty grew out of the same 
global political economy and could not be separated from the environmental 
issues. To me this signals that whatever the solutions developed from the UN 
institutional processes, they were most likely to be ineffective.  
 
At the same time as this conference was being planned and executed, the IMF, 
the World Bank and various free trade agreements were busily restructuring 
global trade, banking and investment rules and driving these matters in the 
completely opposite direction to the rhetoric of the Rio Summit. It is 
significant that three years after Rio, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
was established (in 1995). That body has consistently skewed trade benefits to 
the North (Khator and Fairchild, 2005) and undermined UN environmental 
 
50 
governance efforts. The WTO has been highly influential in shaping the world 
economy by promoting free trade of goods (and later services) across national 
borders and adversely affecting national environmental governance structures 
where they have existed and placing barriers to their formation, where they 
have not. It is  argued by many that free trade encourages and even obliges 
countries to ignore their commitments to environmental obligations and human 
rights (Barrett 1994; Global Exchange 2009; Khator and Fairchild 2005). The 
Rio Earth Summit, with its grand motherhood statements, was no match for the 
cut and thrust of the global capital accumulation imperatives. 
 
Scientific evidence of anthropogenic global warming continued to mount 
during the 1970s and 1980s.  In 1988, James Hansen, the director of NASA’s 
Goddard Institute for Space Studies, appeared before a hearing of the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and, in a historic 
testimony lasting only fifteen minutes, made the points that: there was  ‘99 per 
cent confidence that the earth was warming’; the warming could be traced with 
‘a high degree of confidence to the greenhouse effect; and that in his model the 
greenhouse effect was already strong enough to increase the odds of extreme 
summer heat and drought in the US’ (McKibben 2006: np).  
     
International discussions to control greenhouse gas emissions began in the 
early 1990s under the auspices of the United Nations. The resulting treaty, the  
United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC)  was 
agreed to in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro in what is known as the ‘Earth Summit’. 
The purpose of the treaty was to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic global 
warming by imposing voluntary limits on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
One outcome of the Treaty was to establish  national inventories of GHG 
emissions which were used to create the 1990 benchmark levels for developed 
countries. This first UN international environmental treaty has been described 
however as being no more than ‘aspirational’ (Middleton 2001: 41). 
 
 3.4  Kyoto 
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When the UNFCCC voluntary emission targets failed to reduce emissions, 
renewed negotiations led in 1996 to the IPCC concluding in their Second 
Assessment Report (Bolin et al. 1995: 4) ‘that the balance of evidence suggests 
that there is a discernible human influence on global climate’. Emissions 
continued to rise.  This led to the development of the internationally binding 
Kyoto Protocol, adopted by the UNFCCC in Kyoto, Japan in 1997 and which 
came into force in 2005. Most countries signed, but some, such as the United 
States and Australia (prior to the Rudd government signing in December 
2007), chose not to ratify it.  
Emissions have continued to rise since the signing of the Kyoto Protocol. In 
short, Kyoto has failed as a solution to global warming. It is however an 
important policy event in the history of global warming action internationally. I 
have therefore chosen in this section to describe Kyoto briefly and in the next 
to provide some key points of criticism of it.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol set GHG emissions at 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels by 
2008-2012, for all industrialised countries. Under the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities, the Protocol required developed nations in 
general to make larger cuts. The reason for this was two-fold: developed 
countries could better afford the cost of cutting emissions and, secondly, these 
countries have historically contributed more to the problem.  
 
The implementation of the Kyoto system consisted of two main thrusts. Firstly, 
governments of industrialised countries provided free tradable permits to large 
industrial polluters to emit a certain level of carbon dioxide; and second, 
trading schemes between GHG polluters were set up with additional pollution 
credits being able to be obtained by companies investing in the South in 
projects that would emit less carbon than if the investment had not been made. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol developed three mechanisms whereby signatories could 
meet their GHG reduction obligations: (1) Emissions Trading in an emissions 
trading scheme; (2) the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM); and (3) Joint 




Under Kyoto, developed countries (labelled Annex 1 under Kyoto) can use an 
emissions trading system to help to meet their emissions targets. In such a 
scheme, countries can allocate permits to individual companies for the 
emission of a particular quantity of greenhouse gases. The level of permits 
decreases over time. If permits are issued to a level equal to or below the 
assigned amount, then, in principle, a country can meet its Kyoto commitment.  
If a country is incapable of meeting its target, it can buy permits from countries 
that are under their targets. Similarly, for companies within a country, a trading 
of permits is allowed for excess (or conversely reduced) amounts of carbon 
emissions produced. This is based on the assumption that the measures of 
emissions are accurate and honestly recorded. Additionally, companies and 
countries can sequester carbon by, for example, growing of forests and 
restoring vegetation. However, accounting for the carbon sequestered in forests 
is fraught with difficulties because of the variation from impacts of wider 
environmental conditions on the capacity of trees for absorbing carbon, the 
drying effects of plantations on soils (thus releasing carbon from the soil), the 
different stages of tree development absorbing and emitting different levels of 
carbon, the longevity of the plantation, and so on.  The social impacts of tree 
plantations for carbon sequestration have also been significant to date with land 
being taken from poorer communities for plantation use. The largest and most 
stable carbon sinks are in fossil fuels in the ground – coal, oil and gas – the 
very fuels which power the current global economy.  However, Kyoto does not 
directly tackle issues related to this source or sink.  
 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), under Article 12 of the Kyoto 
Protocol, is currently the predominant form of emissions transaction. The 
CDM allows a developed country with an emissions-reduction commitment to 
implement an emissions-reduction project in a developing country that is 
additional to what would have occurred in the absence of the certified project 
activity (Article 12, paragraph 5.2 of the Kyoto Protocol). Such projects can 
earn saleable certified emission reduction (CER) credits (by the sponsoring 
country/company) which can be counted towards meeting Kyoto targets. The 
idea of the CDM is that it seeks to support sustainable development and 
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emissions reductions in non-industrialised countries, while allowing 
industrialised countries flexibility in how they meet their emissions reductions.  
 
The third market mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol is Joint Implementation 
(JI) where industrialised countries can invest in projects in other industrialised 
countries (Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol). This allows a country with an 
emission commitment under the Kyoto Protocol to earn emissions reduction 
units from an emissions-reduction project in another Annex B Party (that is for 
example a poorer Eastern European industrialised country making a transition 
to a market economy), each equivalent to one tonne of CO2 with this being 
counted towards meeting its Kyoto target. The idea is that JI offers parties 
flexible and efficient means of meeting their commitments, with the host party 
benefitting from foreign investment and technology transfer.  
 
3.5  Criticisms of Kyoto  
There are other proposed solutions to global warming (and these are dealt with 
briefly in section 3.6). As far as I am aware, none of even the more ardent 
supporters of these others, such as renewable, sees these as comprehensive 
solutions but only ameliorating global warming. Carbon trading has been seen 
as a potential saviour although this was not the intention originally of Kyoto. 
However, debunking carbon trading is important as such trading is unlikely to 
lead to even an amelioration of global warming.  
 
It is important to set the Kyoto protocol in proper perspective. It was originally 
intended only as a first small step in the move to cut greenhouse gas emissions. 
It is based on the premise that ‘removals by sinks’ could compensate for 
‘emissions by sources’. There is however no evidence for this (Lohmann 2007: 
37).14  
 
                                           
14 Publications dealing with a critical appraisal of carbon trading include: Lohmann’s seminal work, 
Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatisation and Power (2006) which 
is a study funded by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation; The Carbon Neutral Myth: Offset 
Indulgences for Your Climate Sins produced by Carbon Trade Watch (Smith 2007) and, more 
recently, Friends of the Earth’s A Dangerous Obsession: The Evidence Against Carbon Trading and 
For Real Solutions to Avoid a Climate Crunch (FOE 2009a); and again FOE 2009, Subprime Carbon? 
Re-thinking the world’s largest new derivatives market. 
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The Kyoto Protocol was compromised from the start, in large part by the 
position taken by the US, which in turn was heavily influenced by the fossil 
fuel and automobile industry interests. The European Union had asked for 
greenhouse gas cuts of 15 per cent by 2010. The US team asked for 5.2 per 
cent by 2012, got agreement and then refused to sign.  The rich nations, it was 
argued by the US negotiators, should be allowed to buy their cuts from other 
countries, and to sell the gases they weren’t producing to other nations, and 
that rich nations could buy nominal cuts from poor ones.  
 
In March 2001, with these issues unresolved and no major industrial country 
yet having ratified the agreement, the Bush administration declared that the 
Kyoto Protocol was 'fatally flawed’, and that it was pulling out (Foster 2001). 
This represents the end or at least the beginning of the end of a climate accord. 
Does this matter? I would suggest from a moral point of view it does. 
However, there are fundamental flaws with Kyoto and with carbon trading 
more generally. There is a body of well documented research on carbon trading 
which is unanimous in its conclusions that carbon trading is ineffective, 
inequitable, inefficient and unjust and with not only the potential to exacerbate 
the problem it is designed to fix but effectively delay real action.  
 
Specifically there are problems in the operation of CDMs. For example, the 
UNFCCC countries ‘have been allowed to set their own definition of 
sustainable development and judge whether a project meets these criteria, 
rather than adopting a universal definition’ (Bond et al. 2009: 3). Beyond this, 
there are numerous documented cases which provide evidence of the abuse of 
the spirit of the CDM in such a way as to call into question its basic validity 
(Bond et al. 2009; Friends of the Earth 2009; Lohmann 2007). I will return to 
this shortly. 
 
The first and fairly damning argument against such trading as a solution to 
global warming, as Lohmann (2008) emphasises, is that it is aimed at the 
wrong target and does not address global warming. He maintains that to 
address global warming, we need to keep most remaining fossil fuels in the 
ground. Instead, as Lohmann argues, carbon trading is built on the premise that 
 
55 
we need to keep the fossil fuel industry going for as long as possible. It is in 
essence an attempt to maintain business as usual. Its targets are set in easy 
terms because governments worry about only the short term and in particular 
the short term effects on unemployment and economic growth if they were to 
devise carbon trading schemes with real bite. Its horizons are also short-term 
and narrow in the sense that it is the considerations of each national 
government with its own national interest that result in no meaningful 
international agreement on carbon trading. Inevitably while the focus remains 
on maintaining the status quo, no real effort is put into what sorts of structural 
changes are needed to run future economies in such a way that most remaining 
fossil fuels can remain in the ground. 
 
There is no evidence to date that emission trading schemes work, even on their 
own terms. Probably the most successful scheme, or at least that which is most 
lauded by proponents of carbon trading schemes, is the European Union’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). However, as the Sandbag Report 
(Morris and Worthington 2010), by a climate campaign group which, it is to be 
noted, is supportive of carbon trading indicates, over its five year life to 2012 
the EU ETS would result in carbon savings amounting to less than one third of 
one per cent of total emissions. However, it is more likely that that delivery 
will have been more to do with the economic downturn of the global financial 
crisis than the ETS itself. 
 
What the literature critiquing carbon trading reveals is that this is a market 
solution geared toward not only maintaining ‘business as usual’ but in fact 
towards expanding business by privatising perhaps the last remaining 
commons – the atmosphere. As Lohmann (1999: 13) writes:  
 
[j]ust as in pre-20th century England legal means had to be found or 
invented to allow landowners full private property rights over land and 
forests which would allow them to exclude commoners from sharing their 
pasturage, fuel, and food sources, so exclusionary legal mechanisms are 
now being formulated to give investors private property rights to parcels 
of the atmosphere or of forest or plantation carbon. Just as a deskilled, 
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decontextualized abstraction called "labour time" had to be identified, 
isolated, and made into exchangeable property during the Industrial 
Revolution, so, in an equally wrenching, contradictory process, a fiction 
called "tradable carbon" is today being worked up which is loftily 
indifferent to the local social, political, photosynthetic, geological, or 
combustion circumstances surrounding various aspects of the carbon 
cycle. 
 
While the thesis argues that we cannot expect the forces that created global 
warming, that is, capitalism, to solve global warming, there may be some who 
would argue against that proposition and suggest that the market be given a 
chance. The argument is unsustainable. As Lohmann (2008: np) tellingly 
argues: ‘Prices can do many things, but one thing they have never done is to 
solve problems that require structural change’. Yet the defenders of the market 
in this context, despite the Global Financial Crisis, remain true believers. Thus 
Tickell (2008: 9) arguing in support of Kyoto writes: ‘[m]arkets are generally 
the best means of allocating finite resources without unnecessary waste, while 
keeping as many people happy as possible.’ 
 
Rosewarne (2010/11: 32) writes: ‘Emissions trading systems are privileged 
over other forms of market intervention because of a confidence in market 
processes that presumes trade in carbon permits and offsets will be organised 
in terms of a perfectly competitive market.’ As he then points out, remarkably, 
‘while recognising the limits of this presumption, both the Stern Review and 
the Garnaut Review refuse to question the merits of this conviction’ 
(Rosewarne 2010/11: 32).  The existence of perfect markets might by seen by 
some to be something of a figment of the imagination of neoclassical 
economists. I would suggest that there have to be dangers in entering a 
fairytale world if we try to argue that the murky uncertain world of emissions 
trading schemes could possibly fulfil the very stringent criteria needed for 
perfect competition! 
 
Despite the inability of prices to bring about structural change, prices can 
reveal some interesting issues within the market context. Garfield (2008: np) 
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writes: ‘[a]t its outset, [EU] allocations [of emissions targets] were largely 
based on estimates prepared by the corporations themselves, resulting in permit 
allocation levels that, in some industries, exceeded real carbon emissions by up 
to 50 per cent. This meant that most companies were not forced to make 
emissions cuts nor purchase pollution permits.’ And what happened? Garfield 
again notes (2008: np): ‘When the extent of the permit surplus became public 
knowledge, the price of permission to emit 1 tonne of CO2 collapsed from a 
peak of 33 Euros to 0.20 Euros’! Further ‘between January 2005 and August 
2007, emissions from installations covered by the ETS actually rose by 0.8 per 
cent’.  
 
Compounding the unsuitability of emissions trading schemes is the further 
major issue of the failure of rigorous regulatory frameworks for carbon trading 
schemes leading to considerable ‘creative accounting’.  For example, a 
company selling carbon credits generated by a tree plantation established in a 
poor country, can use the ‘future value accounting’ method (Friends of the 
Earth 2009; Lohmann 2008) to claim that a certain amount of CO2 emissions 
has been neutralised and that this has happened immediately. The reality of 
course is that this will not occur for several decades – and then only if 
everything goes as planned. Further, this is a situation that is impossible to 
monitor. Meanwhile, these same carbon credits can be used by a coal-fired 
power station in a rich country to continue its pollution (Kenny 2007: 13).  
 
Even more problematical to offsetting are biological constraints. The 
hydrocarbons taken from deep within the Earth’s crust are in a very stable 
environment where there is little contact with the atmosphere.  This is very 
different from the carbon being stored in trees at surface level – a very unstable 
environment – where it can quickly re-enter the atmosphere at the point of 
death of the tree. As Lohmann (1999) says, keeping a tree from dying and the 
carbon being released into the atmosphere for a century or more, would require 
forms of biological, political and economic policing unknown in human 
history. I would submit that an additional problem is the exporting of the 
problem to a poor, Third World country. In the case of trees being grown to 
offset carbon emissions, for example, efficiency demands that they are grown 
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on the cheapest land available, which then is located in peripheral locations, 
competing with other land (and water) uses and with people with fewer 
resources and power – no match for rich, powerful, polluting corporate bodies. 
It is also, in effect, an extension of the ecological footprint of the 
company/country, and an extension of the principles of colonialism. 
Furthermore, it does nothing to reduce the carbon emissions at source. 
 
It is noteworthy that some sections of the corporate sector are aware of the 
fundamental problems of carbon trading. A report by Standard Life 
Investments on Carbon Management & Carbon Neutrality in the FTSE All 
Share warned that such schemes ‘have the capacity to disguise the failure to 
achieve actual reductions in overall greenhouse gas emissions’ (Smith 2007: 
6). Citigroup’s Peter Atherton has indicated that the EU ETS has done nothing 
to curb emissions and additionally has acted as a highly regressive tax (Smith 
2007). The Wall Street Journal in March 2006 claimed emissions trading 
would make a lot of money for some  large corporations but do little about 
global warming. Newsweek in March 2007 (cited in Bond 2007: 8) claimed the 
carbon trading through the Clean Development Mechanism wasn’t working 
and furthermore represented a grossly inefficient way of cutting emissions in 
the developing world. It was argued that the trade is a game which has (by 
2007) transferred $3 billion to some of the worst carbon polluters in poor 
countries. 
 
A key consideration that I have built into this thesis is that the principle of 
equity should predominate when considering reparations and funding for 
renewable technology. This is not going to be achieved through carbon trading 
or by elite institutions being given the right to yet greater emissions.  This 
leaves us with what I think is the only conclusion possible, that is, that the 
carbon emissions have to be tackled at the source and the effective transition 
from fossil fuels can only be achieved through major structural change. Beder 
(2006: 214) argues that the use of plantations to create carbon offsets occupies 
millions of hectares of land in poor countries.  This further  expands the 
ecological footprint of affluent nations at the expense of other nations, 
effectively imposing intergenerational inequity ‘by allowing this generation to 
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park carbon in trees and on paper to meet their reduction commitments, while 
leaving the responsibility for permanent reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions to future generations’.  
 
Lohmann 1999:7 agrees that emissions targets are inequitable:  
any measure requiring all countries to reduce emissions by similar 
percentages, for example, would allow the US to go on producing roughly 
one quarter of the greenhouse gases released yearly, even though it has 
only four per cent of the world’s population. Similarly, North-South 
‘carbon trading’ suggests that it is legitimate for rich countries or 
companies who already use more than their share of the world’s carbon 
sinks and stocks to buy still more of them – using cash which has itself 
been accumulated partly through a history of overexploiting those sinks 
and stocks. 
Beder (2006a: 214) also argues that the ‘commodification and privatisation of 
forests can turn ecosystems which some 100 million people depend on for 
food, medicines, fuel, water and other services into a resource that is owned or 
managed by corporations for its carbon storing potential’.  Rosewarne 
(2010/11: 48) writes of how ‘the forests of the South are transformed into 
sequestration  sites to help polluters of the North avoid any meaningful 
engagement in meeting emissions reduction targets’. An equitable approach 
can only be determined if the people concerned and affected have a genuine 
say in such determination.  
 
The other worrying aspect of carbon trading is that the ‘players’ in these 
schemes are not perhaps who one might have immediately imagined. As 
Walker (FOE 2009: 3) writes: ‘The majority of trade is carried out not by 
polluting industries and factories covered by carbon trading schemes but by 
banks and investors who profit from speculation on the carbon markets – 
packaging carbon credits into increasingly complex financial products similar 
to the ‘shadow finance’ around sub-prime mortgages which triggered the 




Walker (FOE 2009: 2) goes on to argue ‘[t]he credit crunch has taught us that 
Governments, not markets are best placed to safeguard our future - at this 
critical point in the fight against climate change, Ministers must step in and 
lead the way with a new direct approach to tackling carbon emissions’. I would 
agree that markets are not best placed ‘to safeguard our future’. Walker’s faith 
in governments to do so however assumes that they are genuinely seeking to 
reflect the wishes of the critically informed people and to look to the long term 
interests of the planet. That faith seems misplaced given the history to date of 
governments’ inaction on global warming in general and, as indicated above 
and in more detail later in the thesis, the influence on governments  by the 
market and the interests of capital accumulation. 
 
Walker (FOE 2009) is however right to point to the dangers of the trading that 
is occurring and its dominance by banks and investors. Yet more tellingly 
Friends of the Earth emphasise the way in which carbon trading has boosted 
the financialisation of economies in a report they aptly title Subprime Carbon? 
Re-thinking the World’s Largest New Derivatives Market. It is worth quoting 
the relevant comments at some length (FOE 2009: 2): 
 
The buying and selling of carbon is fundamentally derivatives trading. 
Currently, most carbon is sold as futures or forward contracts, a type of 
derivative. These contracts contain promises to deliver carbon allowances 
or credits in a certain quantity, at a certain price, by a specific date. 
Today’s carbon markets are small, but if the United States adopts carbon 
trading on the scale envisioned by most federal cap-and-trade bills, carbon 
derivatives will become what Commodities Future Trading Commissioner 
Bart Chilton predicted would be “the biggest of any derivatives product in 
the next four to five years”.  
 
The report adds (FOE 2009: 4):  
 
Today speculators do the majority of carbon trading, and they will 
continue to dominate as carbon markets grow. In fact, about two–thirds of 
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carbon investment funds by volume were not established to help 
companies comply with carbon caps, but rather for capital gains purposes.  
 
The financialisation of carbon trading is placing the future of the planet in the 
realm of an unstable, unregulated, speculative, casino economy which has no 
end other than to make increasing profits for increasingly small numbers of 
people. Such financialisation has no connection to the lives of the great mass of 
people, other than to siphon off increasing percentages of their share of the 
world’s wealth. Carbon trading is anti-democratic, given the ‘international 
capital markets [ability to] place serious limits on state authorities to regulate 
their economies’ (FOE 2009: 87). 
 
The idea that the future of the planet might rest with derivatives is truly 
alarming.  Ferguson (2008) reports: ‘In 2002, legendary investor Warren 
Buffett warned that derivatives were time bombs and "financial weapons of 
mass destruction" that could harm not only their buyers and sellers, but the 
whole economic system.’ He was proved right. Buffett (2002: np) also said: 
‘The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle … Central banks and 
governments have so far found no effective way to control, or even monitor, 
the risks posed by these contracts. Closing down a derivatives business is 
easier said than done. The reinsurance and derivatives businesses are similar: 
Like Hell, both are easy to enter and almost impossible to exit.’ There is little 
evidence to suggest that these derivatives markets are any more controllable 
now than then. Yet it is this ‘time bomb’ that is the financial basis of the 
carbon trading in which so many governments want to place their faith to save 
the planet.  
 
What emerges from this discussion of carbon trading as any possible resolution 
of global warming are several points but most fundamentally three. First, 
carbon trading is not aimed at resolving global warming; second, the EU’s 
carbon trading scheme, which is the one held up by proponents as the best one 
to date, is not delivering; and third, the whole process, which is increasingly 
furthering the financialisation of economies, shows that the extent of learning 
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from the Global Financial Crisis is minimal. Carbon trading is essentially a tool 
to further capital accumulation. 
 
Arguments against carbon trading are relevant to Kyoto as already explained in 
the previous section as carbon trading is the centre-piece of Kyoto. Yet the 
Kyoto Protocol (and carbon trading) has dominated discussions around finding 
solutions to global warming. So much time, money and effort have gone into 
the development and defence of this scheme, it would be foolish to dismiss it 
out of hand. The problems and uncertainties surrounding Kyoto and carbon 
trading are such that to place real weight on it as a vehicle for saving the planet 
would, I submit, be tantamount to global suicide. What is at stake is just too 
threatening to rely on a process that has problems at both the level of the 
principles and of operational practice. Yet what has happened since Kyoto, at 
Copenhagen 2010 and beyond, does tend to make me look back at Kyoto with 
a certain degree of fondness. Albeit with the important absence of the US, there 
was some hope, if limited substance, that governments were at least committed 
to working toward a global agreement on the need to tackle humanity’s biggest 
and most urgent problem. That is no longer the case today. 
Since the Kyoto Protocol was signed, there has been an acceleration in 
greenhouse gas emissions (Hansen 2010; Pearman 2007; Schellnhuber 2008). 
The rate of CO2 production has exceeded the IPCC's worst case forecast 
(Hansen 2010; Lohmann 2007). No nation is decarbonising its energy supply. 
Most economies are growing and growing numbers of people around the world 
aspire to the idealised, high consumption livestyles projected on globalised 
television programmes. The prices of energy commodities have risen thereby 
encouraging further investment and exploration in carbon fuels and the rush for 
oil, coal and gas appears to gather momentum. 
 
There is also the question of the effects of Kyoto on development. In an article 
titled The Great Asian Carbon Swindle (Smith 2008), the merits of the CDM 
are questioned on two grounds: in its failing first to achieve its objectives of 
development for Third World countries; and second to act as the carbon 
emission offsetting it is supposed to provide for an industrialised country.  The 
article claims that ‘this market was worth US$17.5 billion [in 2008], a 200 per 
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cent increase in market value since 2006’. Some CDM projects not only do not 
contribute to development; often the recipients are large polluting industries 
with a negative impact on local communities. As an example it is shown that 
CDM money is being used to support the palm oil biofuel industry in 
Indonesia, an industry which has attracted global attention for its devastating 
impact on Indigenous people’s livelihoods and the forest environment. The 
transparent  accounting of offsets in CDM projects is so important. To date too 
little effort has gone into addressing this issue. Given the scale and scope for 
fraud with CDMs, it is difficult, if not impossible, to devise a monitoring 
mechanism that will allow this problem of accountability to be resolved. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol awards rights of emissions per capita on what can only be 
described as an inequitable basis. The countries awarded the greatest rights to 
emit are those which are the most inefficient users of energy. Australia for 
example is one of the most carbon inefficient countries in the world in terms of 
the amount of energy input for the amount of productive input, ranking 109th 
out of 141 nations.15 Yet it was granted emissions rights amounting to around 
27 tonnes per capita.  Countries such as Namibia, Lao PDR, Nepal and 
Bangladesh, ranked 1st, 5th, 18th and 23rd respectively, received zero tradable 
rights (Lohmann 2007: 119). These countries have never used the ‘carbon 
sink’. Further if they sought to follow the course of economic development 
promoted by western neoliberal capitalist institutions, there is now no space or 
resources for them to do so.  
 
This conclusion however needs to be set in the very specific context of what 
success might have meant for the Kyoto Protocol. At best, it would have been 
only a very modest symbolic first step in slowing global warming.  Kyoto was 
aimed at a stabilisation of greenhouse gas emissions at around 5 per cent below 
the 1990 levels. Its target, even if it were to be successful, would thus fall very 
far short of the massive cuts in emissions – at least 60-70 per cent16 - that 
                                           
15 www.doingbusiness.org/rankings. Accessed June 2010.  
16 Most of the literature suggests the need for reductions in annual GHG emissions of 60-90 per cent 
from 1990 or 2000 levels by 2050 for countries listed under Annex 1 in the Kyoto Protocol. Recent 
research suggests that the reductions need to be 60-70 per cent average for the whole world. Because 
Australia’s emissions are around six times the global average, a contract and converge target for 
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world climate scientists have repeatedly insisted are necessary to stave off 
global warming.  
 
Since 1997, a system of carbon trading has usurped the great bulk of the UN’s 
work on climate change. As currently devised, that system rewards the worst 
polluters and deprives climate friendlier enterprises of both money and human 
brainpower. It undermines the impetus for regulation, taxation and reduced 
consumption. It provides a green-wash for climate unfriendly practices. 
Perhaps most important, carbon trading benefits and empowers mainly those 
institutions most active in blocking and interfering with low carbon systems 
and climate friendly industrial change.  
 
Why then is it that the Kyoto Protocol and carbon trading markets (with their 
links to the bio-fuel and other technological fix industries) are seen as the main 
solutions to be seriously considered? What has blocked the necessary action?  
In this thesis I argue that it is the interests of capital and the capital 
accumulation process that have placed barriers in the way of any real and 
adequate response to carbon emissions. The power of hegemonic ideology is so 
deep and pervasive that, even when society is confronted with a human-
induced catastrophe, the majority of Western society fails to question a 




3.6  Other solutions 
 
                                                                                                                        
Australia is therefore six times greater than 60 per cent, which means more than 90 per cent for 
Australia (Spratt  and Sutton 2008). This corresponds with new data which suggest a global target of 
80 per cent and 95 per cent for developed nations using the principle of “contract and converge”. It 
should be noted that “contract and converge” is not equitable, because the developed nations are 
responsible for three-quarters of all anthropogenic emissions, have the capacity and responsibility to 
support developing countries in carbon-substituting technology and resources, and the capacity and 
responsibility to cut per capita emissions more deeply than developing nations. We are close to or at 
the tipping point when the Greenland ice sheet starts the irreversible melting that will lift sea levels by 
five to seven metres, in as little as a century according to James Hansen (2007). At 2oC it will be too 
late for Greenland, and over a third of species will be committed to extinction Spratt and Sutton 
(2008).   
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I have restricted discussion of technical solutions to the realm of power 
generation – leaving aside problems of carbon emissions from deforestation, 
land use and transport. This is because each category of emission source has its 
own complexities, but to some extent power generation is a carbon emitter that 
is representative of these other sources – all of which arise from a particular 
economic structure. I will return to land use in Part IV of the thesis which will 
cover the issue of how the uses of the land under different social relations of 
production have the potential to reduce carbon emissions from this current 
source. 
 
There are three broad categories of possible technological solutions to reducing 
CO2 from power generation: carbon capture and storage; nuclear power; and 
electricity generation from renewables such as solar, wind, geothermal, tidal 
waves and ocean currents. Additionally bio-fuels have been proposed as a 
partial solution.  
 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a technology favoured by the coal 
industry.  In principle it captures carbon dioxide from fossil fuel power 
stations, compresses it into a dense liquid and then pumps it deep underground. 
It differs from other abatement methods in that it does not seek to avoid 
emissions of CO2 but to prevent the gas from being released into the 
atmosphere. Considerable amounts of money are being invested in researching 
this technology. The United States alone has spent $3.4 billion in developing 
CCS technologies (Sourcewatch 2010a). Currently, Australia, Germany, 
Poland, the United Kingdom, China and Japan are planning carbon capture and 
storage tests. 
 
CCS is currently experimental, is as yet unproven and has a number of very 
significant technical problems. For example, the United States would need to 
provide CCS for the 40,000 oil and gas wells drilled each year in the U.S. 
alone at a cost that ‘could easily top $1.5 trillion per year’ (Xie 2008). 
Additionally, for this number of oil and gas wells, CCS would require the 
drilling of over 100,000 (and perhaps up to 3 times that number) of so-called 
injection wells, to inject enough carbon dioxide to keep total emissions at 2005 
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levels (quoted in Sourcewatch 2010a). The US Department of Energy has 
stated that the costs and scale required of CCS are prohibitive, as would be the 
cost of retrofitting existing coal plants with CCS (Ho 2008).  
 
Then there are the geo-political issues, such as monitoring, standards, locations 
and liability issues (in the event of leakages). Perhaps most problematical in 
my assessment is the fact that the solution will have to provide secure storage 
facilities for thousands of years. No one knows if this can be done as it is a 
completely untried concept.  
 
It is also estimated that it would add 50 per cent to the cost of energy (Li 
2008). Li writes that carbon capture and storage, if it does eventually work, 
will substantially increase the capital cost of electricity generation and reduce 
energy efficiency.  As Trainer (2007: 110-111) argues it will ‘take decades 
before carbon capture and storage is applied to a substantial portion of the 
world’s power plants’.  
 
Thus, there appear to be a raft of unresolved and probably irresolvable issues 
around this technology. At the very least, their resolution is beyond the 
timeframe in which we have to reduce carbon emissions drastically.  
 
I have already indicated earlier in this chapter that there is a plethora of 
information on the costs and benefits of nuclear power. In brief, there are many 
reasons why nuclear power does not provide an option for future energy, 
including the radiation risks it poses for human health, of both workers and 
public, and for the environment. It is a counter-democratic technology, not 
only through its centralisation of ownership, control and governance, but 
because of the security issues associated with it. For example, the most lethal 
radioactive waste needs to be insulated from the environment for 244,000 years 
(Fig 2009) – a proposition which alone should preclude its adoption, given 
current global economic and political stability, which may well deteriorate as 
global warming steps up.  Nuclear power is hugely expensive in both building 
the power station and sourcing its fuel, but also in terms of the opportunity cost 
of forgoing investment in renewable energies. The experience of Japan as a 
 
67 
result of an earthquake and tsunami in which three reactors at the Fukushima 
Dai-ichi nuclear plant were seriously damaged in March 2011 is a warning of 
the types of issues which rule out nuclear power as a viable, sustainable option 
for power generation. 
 
Fig (2009) argues that nuclear power opens up the potential for the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. If one adopts the precautionary principle and 
the sustainability criterion of maintaining the planet for future generations, the 
evidence around environmental and safety problems associated with nuclear 
does not make this a viable option for energy production.  Furthermore, 
uranium is a finite resource which, it is suggested, would be in short supply by 
2020, if this option were adopted (Energy Watch Group 2006).  
 
There is much valuable work being done on renewable energies. Heusemann 
(2003), for example, claimed a recent experiment sponsored by the German 
government intended to show that a network with 61 per cent of electricity 
from wind, 14 per cent from solar photovoltaics and 25 per cent from biomass, 
could meet up to 100 per cent of electricity demand. While wind, wave, tidal, 
solar, hydro and geothermal power are proven technologies, there are still 
many questions regarding how much energy such renewables can provide, and 
what impact the development of such energy systems will have on the 
environment (for example, the toxic effects of mining rare earths and the 
amount of land required for positioning windmills, solar panels, and so on).  
 
Jacobsen (2008), a professor of civil and environmental engineering at 
Stanford University, conducted the first quantitative, scientific evaluation of 
the main proposed energy-related solutions to global warming and energy 
security. His study assessed their potential for delivering energy for electricity 
and vehicles, their impacts on global warming, human health, energy security, 
water supply, water pollution and wildlife, as well as their space requirements, 
reliability and sustainability. Jacobsen (2009) found that the options of coal, 
nuclear and biofuels were getting the most attention and yet were 25 to 1,000 




While renewables have to be the predominant energy source for the future, 
there is no possibility that renewables will be able to sustain the high 
production and consumption lifestyles which characterise western 
industrialised society. Trainer (2007) authoritatively documents why this is the 
case. He also points out an additional fundamental reason why the transition to 
renewables will not enable a continuation of ‘business as usual’. Global 
warming, as this thesis reflects, is not one isolated problem that can be solved 
by a technical fix. Simms and Johnson (2010: np), in a New Economics 
Foundation report The Great Transition, after reviewing all the existing models 
proposed for dealing with global warming and energy use (including 
renewable, nuclear, geo-engineering, carbon capture and storage), maintain 
that these are ‘potentially dangerous distractions from more human scale 
solutions’ and that there are no ‘magic bullets’ to save us.  They conclude that 
even if we were to transition to an entirely clean energy-based economy, this 
would not suffice as we are consuming nature’s absorption and regeneration 
services 44 per cent faster than nature can regenerate and absorb them. Simms 
and Johnson (2010a) argue that what is urgently required is a new macro-
economic model that enables humans to live within the constraints of the 
biosphere. They conclude that global warming is a systemic problem, and it 
can only be fixed by fixing the system. These arguments are used in later parts 
of the thesis to support my contention that the capitalist system is the problem 
and the resolution is not to be found through capitalist mechanisms.  
 
Finally, I turn to the initially much-heralded biofuels. A biofuel is a fuel that is 
derived from biological matter e.g. biodiesel, biogas and methane. Proponents 
of biofuels (such as the International Energy Agency), see them as part of the 
solution to both declining fossil fuels and rising carbon emissions from fossil 
fuels. However, an increasing number of studies are calling into question the 
use of biofuels as a solution to fossil fuel production of carbon emissions. 
Sanderson (2006) reports on studies that compare the energy that goes into 
making ethanol, expended during the harvesting, fertilising and transporting of 
corn to refineries, and then refining it, with the energy that is released when it 
is routinely burned. These show that the net gain is at best small. In another 
study by Scharlemann (2008), it is claimed that biofuels are not superior if 
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their production, which results in environmental destruction, pollution and 
damage to human health, is taken into account.  Likewise, Searchinger et al. 
(2008) cast doubt on the claim that substituting biofuels for fossil fuels will 
reduce greenhouse gases. This is because biofuels sequester carbon through the 
growth of the feedstock needed to produce them. This study showed that such 
arguments have not considered the consequences of not counting the carbon 
emissions that occur as farmers worldwide respond to higher prices and convert 
forest and grassland to new cropland to replace the grain (or cropland) diverted 
to biofuels.  
 
There are also grave social justice concerns about the growing use of biofuels - 
the opportunity cost in terms of food. According to an Oxfam Report (2008) 
titled Another Inconvenient Truth: How Biofuel Policies Are Deepening 
Poverty and Accelerating Climate Change, thirty per cent of price increases 
during the previous year was attributable to biofuels, suggesting that these have 
endangered the livelihoods of nearly 100 million people and dragged over 30 
million into poverty. A report by Catanzaro (2008: 7) claims that the growing 
biofuels industry is expected to consume 400 million tonnes of grain by 2020. 
Goklany (2011), in drawing on figures from the World Bank and the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), writes that biofuel production may have resulted 
in at least 192,000 excess deaths and 6.7 million additional lost Disability-
Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) in 2010 due to increased food prices as a result 
of the growing of biofuels.  He suggests these estimates are conservative. 
Goklany (2011) writes that these estimates exceed the WHO’s estimated 
141,000 deaths and 5.4 million lost DALYs attributed to global warming. 
 
The 2008 Oxfam report called on governments in the developed world to 
urgently halt and review their current biofuel policies due to the severe impact 
they were having on the poor in the developing world and that they were 
actually accelerating climate change and deepening poverty and hunger. This is 
because biofuels are causing the price of food to rise. If the fuel value for a 
crop exceeds its food value, then it will be used for fuel.  The report argued 
that, thanks to generous subsidies and tax breaks, land used previously for food 
crops was now being used for fuel crops. It indicated that rich countries were 
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supporting their own biofuel production through targets, subsidies, tax breaks 
and tariffs – what was described by Oxfam as a new tax on food. Rich 
countries spent up to $15 billion in 2005 supporting biofuels while blocking 
cheaper Brazilian ethanol, which is far less damaging for global food security – 
though not for the environment. 
 
One clear implication of this is that with respect to the question of land for 
biofuels versus land for food, there are major distributional effects. It is the 
poor who are most affected adversely by rising food prices. It is the affluent 




In conclusion, even if global warming is treated as an isolated and contained 
issue, which I argue in this thesis is not the case, technical and market solutions 
would not fix the problem. The theoretical context and analysis of these issues 
will be addressed in Part III but, as already indicated in the discussion of 
methodology, the reasoning behind these technical and market solutions rests 
within the positivist framework. Thus I submit that this positivist thinking 
provides little more than a description of the problem while precluding analysis 
that might challenge the vested interests seeking to uphold the status quo. The 
only way of preventing further global warming is to stop emissions of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases at the source. That is the biosphere 
system’s imperative for human and other species’ survival as we know it. 
However, the globalised capitalist economy is dependent on carbon fuel and on 
growth. For centuries capitalism has flourished but at the expense of building a 
debt to the biosphere which has left us faced with this massive problem of 
global warming.  
 
International institutional solutions to global warming do not challenge the 
global economic system, the imperative for this system to continue to grow or 
the values and lifestyles of a high consumption minority. Yet over half of the 
world’s population live on less than a dollar a day, some so poor they eat mud 
and sell their children into bondage (Young 2008: 18). In Part II, I will turn to 
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the study of South Africa, a country which represents a microcosm of the 
global political economy. This too provides an empirical account of the many 
strands that are relevant to understanding global warming and its solutions: the 
imperatives of capitalist political economy; the fossil fuel sector and 
electricity; the inextricable connection between accumulation and 
dispossession and the divisions between the ecology and society. While 
important in their own right in allowing a better understanding at an empirical 
level of the problems surrounding a capitalist political economy in action and 
especially those problems around capitalism’s continued fostering of global 
warming, Part II serves to allow me to begin to see how I might use a critical 
theoretical base to build a theory that is germane to the issues around global 
warming. Part II thus is more than an empirical analysis; it represents an 




















PART II SOUTH AFRICA – A MICROCOSM OF THE GLOBAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY  
Part II presents a cross-sectional slice through the history of capitalism, based 
on a country on a continent that has paid and continues to pay the price of 
being at the periphery of global capitalism and that is already suffering from 
the crisis of global warming. This ‘microcosm of the global political economy’ 
(Amin 1997: np) focuses on the political economy of coal mining and its 
connections to the expansion of not just the fossil fuel energy sector in South 
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Africa, but the wider sectors of the South African economy. That in effect 
means that I am able to adopt the stance taken by Ashman et al. (2010: 178) 
who ‘characterize the system of accumulation in South Africa as a ‘Mineral 
Energy Complex’ (MEC) where accumulation has been and remains 
dominated by and dependent upon a cluster of industries, heavily promoted by 
the state, around mining and energy’. Thus Part II throws light on the impact of 
capitalist expansion and the spread of the growing rift between humans and 
nature which is resulting in various social and ecological crises, including 
global warming. This study resonates with the experiences of coal mining, or 
mining generally, anywhere in the world, with the addition of some local 
particularities. For South Africa, one of the particularities was the transition 
from racial to class apartheid at the height of the neoliberal era. Because of the 
history of struggle against apartheid, South Africa has witnessed a particularly 
cruel awakening, as former anti-apartheid leaders adopted neoliberal capitalism 
as the model of political economy, leading to the continued exploitation and 
oppression of the majority and the formation of one of the most unequal 
societies in the world of today.  
 
I have drawn for an account of South Africa’s more recent history on a number 
of sources including Bond (1999), Fine and Rustomjee (1996), Innes (1984), Z. 
Magubane (2004) and  Terreblanche (2002),   No history is neutral but 
Terreblanche’s A History of Inequality in South Africa 1652–2002 historical 
account is considered both a seminal work and also unique as he is someone 
who has witnessed events from a number of viewpoints. Additionally, 
Terreblanche, an economist, is not a Marxist or from the ‘left’ as is the case of 
many of the writers I have quoted, but rather a social democrat who believed in 
a more prominent role for the state in tackling poverty and redistributing 
wealth. Terreblanche is an Afrikaner academic, formerly a member of the 
National (apartheid) Party, a writer and founding member of the Democratic 
Party – one of today’s main opposition parties and which can be described as a 
small ‘l’ liberal party. Bond on the other hand, provides a Marxist and activist 




Power and capital accumulation are ever present themes in South Africa’s 
history. Insightful analyses into the roots of South Africa’s power base can be 
found in a number of works including Fine and Rustomjee’s (1996) The 
Political Economy of South Africa and Innes’ (1984) Anglo American and the 
Rise of Modern South Africa.  The latter captures the integral relationship 
between the South African state, pre- and post-apartheid, private capital and 
mining and energy, giving an example of the enormous power of the 
conglomerate, Anglo American, within South Africa’s economy. Innes (1984) 
exposes the power of the mining industry corporations and private capital 
through the study of Anglo American which has long-running and extensive 
mining interests in South Africa, including in coal. He writes of the enormous 
and pervasive economic and political power which is wielded by that 
corporation in political and financial circles in South Africa and beyond.  He 
argues that the more prominently power displays itself, the less obvious it 
seems to some that it should be examined. It thus fulfils the Marxist and 
Gramscian notion of hegemony, of being ‘how it is’ discussed in the 
methodology in Part I.  
 
This Part of the thesis is in five chapters. In this first the reasons for choosing 
South Africa and in turn the South African coal and electricity sectors are 
presented and the scene set for the study of the South African economy more 
generally. Chapter 5 covers the relevant and recent economic history of South 
Africa from 1994 when the first democratic elections were held and the 
African National Congress came to power. Chapters 6 and 7 turn to the South 
African economy today with 6 looking at the economy as a whole but seizing 
on the importance of the electricity sector in that economy, while 7 examines 
coal more specifically. Part II finishes in Chapter 8 by bringing all of this 
together to emphasise the pivotal importance of the capitalist system to global 
warming not only for South Africa and Africa but for the planet.  
Part II as it progresses also allows me to consider a developing theoretical 
framework on which to build the rest of the thesis and address the research 
question of whether capitalism is able to solve the problem of global warming. 








CHAPTER 4   Setting the scene: South Africa and South African coal 
 
4.1  Introduction  
 
I initially chose South Africa to act as a case study while visiting the country 
for the first time in 2008, and being confronted by the vast seas of 
impoverished townships of Johannesburg and Cape Town on the one hand and 
the barbed wire fences and domestic security arrangements of the well-to-do 
white houses on the other. Every restaurant I visited manifested the divide 
between the wealthy white minority and the disempowered majority black 
populations. Thrown into the mix of first impressions were media reports of an 
energy crisis and the extent of the presence of large numbers of unsupported 
refugees from throughout the African continent.   The situation in South Africa 
struck me as being untenable – surely the blacks, by far the majority, would not 
long put up with being the domestic servants and security guards of white 
masters over whom they had achieved such a magnificent moral and political 
victory in 1994?  
 
As a former colonial and apartheid country which after political liberation in 
1994, was following the neoliberal economic model, South Africa provided a 
manageable empirical base to explore the question of whether capitalism could 
solve the problem of global warming. South Africa is a country which captures 
many of the key issues that the planet is facing with respect to global warming. 
It has a rich body of political economy literature particularly in relation to the 
Minerals Energy Complex, energy and the social relations of production, while 
being empirically a country which is early in the firing line with respect to the 
effects of global warming. 
 
In my early reading I became more and more convinced that the root problem 
of global warming was capitalism. I then read amongst other African writers, 
Samir Amin (1992, 1997, 2006 and later 2009, 2011) who wrote that South 
Africa is a microcosm of the global economy. It fitted perfectly, illustrating 
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many of the issues that were relevant to my chosen thesis topic on global 
warming. Amin (1997: np) described South Africa as: ‘a kind of microcosm of 
the world capitalist system, which brings together in a single territory a number 
of features peculiar to each constituent category of that system. It has a white 
population which, in its life style and standard of living belongs to the ‘first 
world’, while the urban areas reserved for blacks and coloureds belong to the 
modern industrial ‘third world’ and the Bantustans17 (now ex-Bantustans) 
containing the ‘tribal’ peasantry do not differ from peasant communities in 
Africa’s ‘fourth world’.  
 
I was fortunate to be able to visit South Africa for extended time periods in 
2008, 2009 and 2010, years coincidently marked by significant developments 
in the coal and electricity sectors. Also, although it might at first seem 
unrelated, this period witnessed a dramatic rise in the number of refugees 
flooding into South Africa and the mounting social unrest - xenophobia - as a 
result, in part, of this. In South Africa one can see the uneven development, of 
capital accumulation on the one hand for the benefit of an elite, and 
impoverishment for the majority and ecological destruction on the other.  On 
one hand are the opulent, gated communities and suburbs, largely for whites, 
and on the other, the vast townships (or slums), for example of Kayelitsha 20 
kms outside Cape Town or Soweto on the edge of Johannesburg. Blacks travel 
the long distances from the townships on unreliable public transport to clean 
and provide security for the white areas. The townships were created during the 
Apartheid years, bringing men off the land or ‘importing’ yet cheaper labour 
from neighbouring countries, separating them from their families to provide 
wage labour for the factories of Johannesburg, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Cape 
Town and elsewhere. Prior to this, during the colonial era, land was 
appropriated from the inhabitants who became cheap black labour for mining 
and agriculture. South Africa’s political and economic history during the last 
300 years provides a stark study in accumulation by dispossession.  
 
                                           




The recent history of South Africa reveals the adoption of neoliberal economic 
policies in the ranks of the African National Congress (ANC) immediately pre 
and post 1994 and the acceptance by first President Mandela, then Mbeki and 
later Zuma, that there was no other way. The shift in macro-economic policy 
away from some recognition that equity, justice and redistribution mattered, to 
an enthusiastic embrace of neoliberal capitalism is an extraordinary example of 
the power of neoliberalism and the corruptibility of the state. The policy, for 
example, of ‘Black Economic Empowerment’, conceived in principle as a way 
to promote black equity in business, in practice has served as another tool 
facilitating capital accumulation, as well as an opportunity for corruption 
amongst the new black elite facilitated by their international corporate partners. 
 
The sham that democracy in South Africa has become is summed up in the 
words of Tinashe Njanji (2010 personal communication), a young refugee and 
colleague from Zimbabwe, and currently a resident of Khayelitsha:  
 
So far we have had three presidents since 1994, councillors and mayors 
come and go but nothing changes. We only see them when they want our 
vote. Our unemployment rate is one of the highest in the world. We have 
no proper housing or water or electricity, transport or toilets; students are 
dropping out from tertiary institutes due to high tuition fees and rural 
youth don’t even get to tertiary levels. Youth are languishing on the 
township streets soon after completing their matric – with no possibility of 
a future. Most people are still residing in shacks – freezing in winter; 
cooking in summer.  
 
South Africa is important for the thesis for a number of other reasons. First, it 
has been described as a two tier economy in which the benefits and burdens of 
capitalist style development are clearly demarcated.  The formal economy is 
linked into the global economy and has a share in the spoils of the market 
economy. The informal economy, also inextricably linked into the formal 
economy through the surplus and highly exploitable labour, is the 
impoverished un- and under-employed, who live for the main in the outskirts 
of cities in townships and in rural areas. In reality, South Africa represents a 
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society with deeply entrenched class divisions which have, in policy terms, 
been de-racialised since 1994 (with particularly a growing black middle class 
and a small black elite). It retains however, a strong racial correlation to class 
divisions. South Africa well demonstrates the notion that capital depends on a 
reserve army of labour (Ashman et al. 2010). 
 
These two tiers or classes represent a microcosm of both the global divisions 
between the rich and the poor and the potential adaptive capacity of 
populations to global warming. Those with resources clearly have greater 
adaptive capacity, at least some options and resilience in the face of global 
warming; the impoverished and marginalised have no access to adaptive 
resources and little or no resilience. Yet in a world facing the disruptions that 
will occur as a result of global warming, what options the latter have are being 
increasingly eroded as a consequence of the very political economic activity 
which has given rise to global warming.  
 
Further, South Africa provides a snapshot of the contradictions and processes 
of the capitalist system and capital accumulation, both historically and in the 
contemporary neoliberal phase, from the viewpoint of a middle income country 
which displays the considerable distresses of uneven and ecologically 
destructive development. I have given particular attention to political and 
economic power issues, neoliberalism and financialisation, the coal and the 
electricity sectors, the growing inequality and destruction of the environment, 
and South Africa’s economic expansion and its consequences on the African 
continent. 
 
Third, South Africa captures many of the contradictions of capitalism that are 
evidenced in global warming. On the one hand the economy is underpinned by 
coal as the primary source of energy and the extraction rate of South Africa’s 
vast reserves is being increased for domestic consumption, for the cheap/less-
than-cost processing of materials for multinational benefit and for export. On 
the other hand, South Africa, and Africa generally, is very vulnerable to the 
impacts of global warming (Christensen et al. 2007; IPCC 2007; Toulmin 
2009).  In addition to the effects on people, South Africa’s rich and diverse 
 
79 
biodiversity and the precariousness of this to specific climate niches, provide 
an early litmus test of the impact of global warming. 
 
Fourth, South Africa is of significance as ironically the cradle of humankind, 
but also as the site for one of the twentieth century’s great liberation struggles.   
 
Finally, South Africa is a country with close historical (particularly in relation 
to the colonial era) and geographical ties and powerful and influential political 
and economic links to the rest of Africa. 
 
Having identified these factors as making South Africa a potentially good site 
for the empirical part of my thesis, I then selected the electricity sector, and 
within that the coal industry, for study for five reasons: first their centrality to 
the country’s political economy; second, the role electricity plays in South 
Africa’s connections to the rest of (particularly southern) Africa; third their 
specific and direct causal links to global warming; fourth, the impact the sector 
has on the country's environment, including but not only, its carbon emissions; 
and fifth, because of the inextricable entwinement of fossil fuels, capitalism 
and global warming.  
 
The study of South Africa allows an examination of the capitalist social 
relations of production and questions whether they are compatible with the 
preservation of the environment. It covers a broad canvas, encompassing South 
Africa’s environment, geopolitical location, history and political economy. It 
uses the thread of the coal and electricity sectors, their intersection with the 
Minerals Energy Complex, state power and South Africa’s position in the 
global industrial capitalist political economy, to flesh out the issues of global 
warming, development, justice and sustainability. Essentially, the South 
African study develops in such a way as to allow me to pose the question: is 
neo-liberal capitalism compatible with maintaining a planet conducive to 
human habitation? 
 
This section involves qualitative research, using mostly secondary, but some 
primary sources. The first chapter draws in the main on Statistics South Africa, 
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and a 2008 United Nations Habitat Report State of African Cities for the 
demographic data and on the IPCC Reports and various African and South 
African research institutions for the climate change data. The snapshot of 
South Africa’s economic and political history is based primarily on the 
scholarship of contemporary South African historians and political economists. 
Chapter 6 uses the work of Earthlife Africa, Benchmarks Foundation and 
Groundwork, three prominent civil society organisations involved in 
environmental and human rights advocacy with respect to the mining and 
energy sectors. Information on coal mining companies and the energy sector 
parastatals18- Eskom and SASOL - is taken from their respective web pages, 
plus reports in South African newspapers and the online Pambazuka News. In 
addition, travelling through the Western Cape, Gauteng, Limpopo and 
Mpumalanga provinces (see map below) in 2009, I met and talked to various 
community members affected by coal mining, health workers and people 
advocating for communities, either dispossessed by mining operations or 
suffering the health effects of mining, as well as white landowners opposed to 












                                           
18 Parastatal definition: performing a function usually associated with a government and under its 
indirect control (Macquarie International English Dictionary, complete and unabridged, 2004: 1365). 
South African parastatals include the Electricity Supply Commission, now known as Eskom; the 
South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation, SASOL; and the South African Iron and Steel 
Corporation, ISCOR, which was sold in 1989. While Eskom and SASOL remain parastatals, they 
operate very much according to the same principles as private corporations – being driven by profit 
motives rather than by service to the community. 
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Map 4.1    South Africa’s Provinces 
Source: http://www.sa-
venues.com/maps/atlas/southafrica_provinces.gif 
What follows is an account of how the malaise of contemporary South African 
society developed historically. While far from complete – that would be a 
thesis in its own right - it provides a context for my examination of the mining 
and electricity sectors and global warming. Growing out of the history, 
political economy and the imperative for accumulation, currently there is 
aggressive expansion of South African corporate investment interests into the 
rest of Africa.  The exploitation of South Africa’s mineral wealth by 
multinational corporations continues. This phenomenon resonates with mining 
activity throughout Africa and in many parts of mineral rich areas of the Third 
World.  
 
Just as South Africa's wealth has been built on the country's vast mineral 
resources 19 (Fine and Rustomjee 1996; Innes 1984; Terreblanche 2002), much 
of its environmental destruction has the same source. The South African 
                                           
19 South Africa has nearly 90% of the platinum metals on Earth, 80% of the manganese, 73% of the 




economic and political elite may be geographically, and in terms of power, on 
the periphery of the global economy, but they are key players at the centre of 
capitalism in sub-Saharan Africa (Bond 2003; McDonald 2009).  Illustrations 
of this can be found in The New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) formed in 2001, a neoliberal initiative of the Mbeki government; the 
spread of a centralised (in South Africa) subsidised fossil fuel-based energy 
system throughout southern Africa and in the exploitation of cheap and free 
labour from surrounding countries (McDonald 2009). 
 
This first chapter of the South African study covers the demographics and the 
economy of Africa as context for South Africa, followed by a similar overview 
for South Africa with global warming very much in mind in both accounts.  
 
4.2  The African setting 
 
Africa has a land mass of 30 million square kilometres and a population of 1.1 
billion people, projected to reach 2 billion by 2050 (Population Reference 
Bureau 2009). Between 1950 and 2005, the urban population grew from 33 
million to 353 million (Boko et al. 2007); by 2050 it is projected to be 1.2 
billion (UN Habitat Report 2008). Today, less than half the population of sub-
Saharan Africa lives in urban areas (Toulmin 2009).  Seventy per cent of urban 
dwellers live under slum conditions, where sharing three toilets and one 
shower with 250 households in a community is not at all unusual (UN Habitat 
Report 2008; UNFPA 2010). According to Parnell et al. (2010), quoting 
August 2008 World Bank data, the development context for the majority of 
Africa’s population is unlikely to improve in the short term. This is particularly 
disconcerting as more than half of the population in sub-Saharan Africa 
survives on less than US$0.70 per day. Parnell et al. (2010) write that, despite 
sustained moderate economic growth in much of sub-Saharan Africa, there is a 
continued rise in urban poverty, inequality and exclusion of the urban poor. 
Furthermore, the growth that is being achieved is often at a high cost to the 
environment and to the poor who tend to carry a disproportionate burden when 
ecological services fail. While poverty is common to both, levels of infant 
mortality and HIV infection are higher in slum areas than in poor rural areas of 
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southern Africa (UNFPA 2010). Such factors are significant given the 
anticipated synergistic impact of global warming on already fragile and 
impoverished living conditions. 
 
There are 53 nations on the African continent, the majority formerly colonies, 
and an enormous diversity of languages, cultures and ecosystems. Most people 
are poor, still relying heavily on natural resources and agriculture and live in 
countries with very high levels of inequality, and often poor governance 
structures, all factors which will compound the impacts of global warming 
(IPCC 2007).  
 
Africa has about 15 per cent of the world’s population and only 2 per cent of 
global trade (Wilson and Abiola 2003). Overall, African countries remain a 
source of raw materials generally for industrialised economies and of minerals 
in particular. Many of these raw materials are mined by transnational 
corporations. There is limited agricultural produce for trade, however, Friends 
of the Earth International released a report in 2010 Africa Up For Grabs, 
showing that the amount of land being taken in Africa to meet industrialised 
countries' increasing demand for biofuels is underestimated and out of control. 
Furthermore, countries and companies are grabbing productive land for 
growing food for export (SBS 2011). 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa has become increasingly vulnerable in terms of food 
security – in part as a result of growing aridity, wars and lack of investment 
and of support for small scale farmers. However, as Bryceson (2002) writes, 
there are historical reasons for Africa’s declining food security which can be 
linked to the development of industrial capitalism expressed in the processes of 
de-agrarianisation and urbanisation, factors significant to this thesis and to 
which I will return in Part IV. Bryceson (2002) writes that the European 
colonial mission molded the various agrarian, pastoralist and hunter-gatherer 
groups into peasant20 producers through the imposition of taxes on the one 
hand and forced land acquisitions on the other.  This was followed by the 
                                           
20 Bryceson (2002) defines the term peasants as rural dwellers who live off the land as farmers and/or 
pastoralists combining subsistence and commodity production. 
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building of an agricultural export economy based on cash crops of sugar, 
cotton, tobacco, coffee, cocoa and so on. The Green Revolution of the 1970s 
then introduced dependence on fossil-fuel based fertilisers for commercial 
crops but, with the oil crises in the mid 1970s, peasant commercial agriculture 
could not compete in global markets. Today, the pressures on rural subsistence 
agriculture continue with the expansion of industrial agriculture, industrial and 
mining developments (competing for land), land grabs for biofuel and export 
food production. This push is part of the neoliberal development agenda and is 
resulting in the migration of displaced rural peasants into urban slums where 
they help to swell the ranks of the unemployed and the informal sector. 
 
Africa receives nearly $13 billion in aid annually (about 4 cents per day per 
person) but spends more, an estimated $15 billion annually, on foreign debt 
repayments (Abbas and Ndeda 2009: 80)21. Many African countries have 
suffered as a result of the growing financialisation of the global economy and 
the deregulation of the financial sector, with capital flight amounts often 
exceeding what countries receive in development aid (Boyce and Ndikumana 
2010)22. Historical debts in the opposite directions, incurred from slavery, 
colonialism and apartheid, are not acknowledged by the major state and 
international institutions (Abbas and Ndeda 2009: 80); nor are the capital flows 
from South to North from, for example, drug patents of $40 billion a year 
(Rosenberg 2002: 28), or the use of the South by the North for the disposal of 
toxic wastes, a service valued at billions (Ibitayo and Burns 2008). Third World 
debt particularly affects Africa and has become an inescapable trap for many 
African countries.  It is also a significant mechanism for transferring wealth 
from the people of the South to financiers of the North according to the Third 
World Network.23 In sub-Saharan Africa the ratios of foreign debt to GNP rose 
                                           
21 Sub Saharan Africa’s total external debt in 2007 was $195 billion, an amount equivalent to 25% of 
the region’s GNI (World Bank 2009a). 
 22 According to Boyce and Ndikumana (2010) sub-Saharan Africa is a net creditor to the rest of the 
world, in that the subcontinent’s private external assets exceed its public external liabilities: total 
capital flight amounts per annum to $420 billion (in 2004 dollars), compared to the external debt of 
$227 billion. Econometric analysis indicates that for every dollar in external loans to Africa in this 
period, roughly 60 cents flowed back out as capital flight in the same year, a finding that suggests the 
existence of widespread “debt-fuelled” capital flight.  
23 Between 1980 and 1992, African countries paid three times the original amount of foreign debt 
owed in 1980 and yet debt still remains at over US$1.3 trillion (Third World Network 2010).   
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from 51 per cent in 1982 to 100 per cent in 1992, and of foreign debt to total 
exports from 192 per cent in 1982 to 290 per cent in 1992, ‘a period during 
which the Third World debt crisis was allegedly resolved’ (Third World 
Network 2010: np). The impact of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis on Africa 
(declining foreign aid, declining primary commodity trade) and South Africa 
(which experienced a recession and major jobs loss) (Arieff et al. 2010) is one 
indication of the vulnerability of Africa in a globally connected economic 
system over which they have little input or control. 
 
This is some of the economic and political context for Africa and South Africa 
in facing global warming. 
 
4.3 Africa and global warming 
 
In Africa, while population has grown from 287 million in 1960 to over a 
billion today, the continent’s natural resources on a per capita basis have 
decreased by 67 per cent (Footprint Network 2009), due to growing global 
resource consumption and the increasing demands on Africa’s raw materials, 
population growth pressures and the impact of global warming on crop 
production. Africa’s average ecological footprint per person is 1.4 hectares 
(Footprint Network 2009), compared to a global average of 2.1. It is also 
smaller than the 1.8 hectares of bio-capacity available per person within Africa 
because part of its ecological foot print is consumed elsewhere (it is reasonable 
to assume as a result of the continuing economic colonisation of land, food, 
mineral resources and so on). Thus compared to the rest of the world, the 
average African’s footprint is small. To make vital quality of life 
improvements, large segments of Africa’s population must have greater access 
to natural resources. 
 
On food security, much of agricultural production is carried out by 
unsupported small scale farmers, a sector of society that has been widely 
neglected by governments across Africa. As a result of the compbined factors 
of lack of support for small scale farmers and global warming impacts, by 2020 
food production is expected to decline by up to 50 per cent. By 2050, revenues 
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from agriculture are forecast to fall by as much as 90 per cent (Boko et al. 
2007: 435) as a result of global warming. With respect to water, about one 
quarter of the population (or 200 million people) in Africa currently experience 
‘high water stress’, a figure which could grow to 250 million by 2020 and to 
350–600 million by 2050 (Boko et al. 2007: 435). 
 
With respect to the Human Development Index and Millennium Development 
Goals,  there is evidence that malaria, which kills about 900,000 people each 
year in Africa, will, as a result of global warming, move further into southern 
Africa and resurge in areas such as the highlands of East Africa where it has 
until now been largely eradicated (Boko et al. 2007: 437). The IPCC (2007) 
states that, given concerns about the impact on disease of climate change, 
much further research is needed on the potential impact of global warming on 
dengue fever, meningitis and cholera.  
 
According to the IPCC 2007 Fourth Assessment Report, climate change and 
urbanisation will interact, with unpredictable effects, but urbanisation and 
climate change may work synergistically to increase disease burdens 
(Confalonieri et al. 2007). Chapter 9 of the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC (2007) states that ‘Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to 
climate change and climate variability, a situation aggravated by the interaction 
of multiple stresses, including endemic poverty, complex governance and 
institutional dimensions: limited access to capital ... infrastructure and 
technology; ecosystem degradation; complex disasters and conflicts [such that] 
adaptations may be insufficient to cope with future changes of climate’(IPCC 
2007: 435). The report is backed by around 400 peer reviewed papers, all of 
which indicate, to varying degrees, the critical situation Africa is facing already 
on a multiplicity of fronts, all of which will continue to be exacerbated by 
global warming.  
 
From this IPCC Report, evidence indicates the impact of global warming in 
Africa will vary over the continent. It can however be stated that widespread 
effects include increased aridity, sea level rises, extreme weather events, 
coastal erosion, reduced fresh water availability, deforestation, loss of forest 
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quality, woodland degradation, coral bleaching, increases in the prevalence of 
malaria and vector born diseases, and impacts on food security causing 
increasing hunger and malnutrition, and loss of income. One simple example of 
the current effects of global warming is on women who are walking ever 
longer distances each day to fetch water, not only increasing the already heavy 
burden on their lives, but also ‘reducing time for income generating activities’ 
(Toulmin 2009: 25). 
 
It has been projected that temperatures will increase across the continent 
between 1.5o and 5.8o C by 2080, an enormous increase which is expressed in 
the understated terms of ‘leading to increased plant stress and increased risks 
of drought’ (Toulmin 2009: 24). According to the IPCC (2007), Africa will 
warm more than one and a half times the global average because of its land 
mass and particular geophysical characteristics. The consequences of global 
warming are predicted to be more severe in Africa and in fact African countries 
are already suffering major levels of warming, with drought and extreme 
weather events disrupting Africa’s agricultural systems. As Map 4.2 indicates, 
the heaviest burden of climate change expressed as deaths due to climate 
change in the year 2000 is clearly sub-Saharan Africa, a situation it is 
reasonable to predict will become even more marked as temperatures increase. 
Compounding the physical stresses are the economic models adopted by or 
forced on to many African countries; the historical legacies of colonialism and 
resource plunder; the continuing plunder of the continent for resources; land, 
minerals, biofuels and so on; the neglect of rural and primary sectors and the 





Map 4.2   Estimated Deaths Attributed to Climate Change in the Year 




Source:  McMichael et al. (2004). This map shows the estimated numbers of deaths 
per million people that could be attributed to global climate change in the year 2000, 
drawing from data from the World Health Organization.  
 
Already population and development pressures have taken a heavy toll on 
ecosystems such as forests and rangelands – leading to loss of biodiversity and 
land cover, and depletion of water availability through the destruction of 
catchments and aquifers – factors which will be exacerbated by global 
warming. An example of the development pressures will be examined further 
in the vignette on CoAL of Africa’s coal mining in the Limpopo in Chapter 7. 
In some African ecosystems, an increase in temperatures beyond 1o C will 
cause significant changes in the distribution of species, their composition and 
migration patterns. The IPCC (2007) states that numerous organisms in the 
deserts are already at their tolerance limits, with possibly no further capacity to 
adapt, particularly in vulnerable areas which includes eastern and southern 
Africa (Boko et al. 2007). 
 
This information must be seen against the background of three key points. 
First, the African continent has contributed least to carbon emissions, in 2007 
just 1 tonne of carbon dioxide per capita per annum. The world average is 4.3 
tonnes, South Africa 7.9 tonnes (very inequitably sourced), the US 20 tonnes 
and Australia now in excess of 20 tonnes per capita (Toulmin 2009: 8). 
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Second, the countries of Africa most affected by global warming have little 
political power in the international political arena. Third, the powerless 
majority such as small scale farmers, herders and fishermen, the urban 
unemployed and slum dwellers and those employed in the ‘informal’ economy, 
are doubly disenfranchised at the global warming table, as their interests 
diverge from their national and continental elites.  
 
While sub-Saharan Africa constitutes a wide diversity of economies and 
interests, including a division in class interests, there was nonetheless broad 
unity amongst African nations at the Copenhagen Conference in December 
2009, with the exception of South African negotiation leaders. The main 
concerns expressed by the African contingent were around the Copenhagen 
Accord’s decision to adopt a temperature increase of 2o C as the benchmark for 
global warming. According to IPCC analysis, such an increase threatens Africa 
with catastrophic harm and would mean at least 3o of warming in all regions of 
Africa (PACJA 2009).  Anti-apartheid leader and South African Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu was quoted as saying that ‘a global goal of 2 degrees is to 
condemn Africa to incineration and no modern development’ (PACJA 2009: 
np). Other areas of focus of African disaffection with the Copenhagen meeting 
were around the ‘hopelessly inadequate’ (PACJA 2009) funding over and 
above current levels and the lack of any firm commitment to provide such 
funding; the shifting of the burden of mitigation to developing countries; and 
the undemocratic and non-inclusive manner in which discussions were 
conducted. 
 
In light of the dominance of powerful interests in deciding the future of the 
planet’s climate, the following quote captures some of the voices of those most 
affected by global warming and helps to put  a ‘human face’ to global warming 
in Africa. It is from the 2010 Pan-African Climate Justice Manifesto (PACJA 
2010).24 
 
                                           
24 http://www.pacja.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36&Itemid=129. np. The 
quote is long, but I have included it as we so rarely hear the voice of Africans in Australia. 
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Africa stands on the frontline of climate change. Across our continent, in 
villages, in towns, on coastlines and deep in the heart of Africa, people 
battle daily with a growing climate crisis. Our rivers run dry. Our crops 
turn to dust. Seasons shift and change. The effects of climate change are 
reflected in the expectant eyes of hungry children. In the lengthening 
footsteps of women carrying water.  
 
Across Africa, a growing congregation of people suffers starvation and 
disease while others, after freeing themselves from the grip of grinding 
poverty, are shackled again by an increasingly hostile climate. It is a cruel 
irony indeed that a people who have lived for so long in harmony with 
nature, imprinting the lightest of carbon footprints on the earth are now 
suffering and living in abject poverty due to the damaging effects of 
greenhouse gases emitted by developed countries.  
The effects of climate change are real, we are seeing the consequences; but 
they are not of our making. For over two centuries the industrialized world 
became wealthy by drenching the atmosphere in carbon. They plundered 
resources from every region of the world. On mountains of coal and oil, 
they built cities of plenty. In great buildings they constructed while 
triggering the climate crisis they shelter from its effects. Those left outside 
are now told seek another path to prosperity, while the sun beats down, or a 
perfect storm – not of their making – gathers on the horizon. 
 
After 400 years of the colonial ‘civilising’ mission in Africa, followed in the 
post colonial period by relatively large sums of aid, northern economic advice, 
reforms which withdrew funding from rudimentary social service 
infrastructures through structural adjustment programmes and neo-liberal 
models of development, 80 per cent of Africans still have no electricity, 340 
million are without access to safe drinking water, 580 million people do not 
have access to adequate sanitation facilities (WHO/UNICEF 2008) and 
massive inequality remains. Global warming is now an additional factor which 
will compound the many problems facing African people. It has been estimated 
that already three hundred thousand people die each year – many in Africa - as 
a result of global warming (Vidal 2009) and The Lancet predicted that the loss 
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of healthy life years as a result of global warming would be 500 times greater 
in African populations than in European populations (Costello et al. 2009).  
 
The situation for many in Africa is desperate. As Toulmin (2009: 8) writes, the 
‘poor have few if any options, except risking the sea crossing in a leaky fishing 
boat from Senegal, Libya or Morocco, in the hope of a landfall in Europe’. 
Less well-known is that many more will continue to make the long and 
dangerous trek overland to South Africa.25 
 
This is a snap shot of Africa in a globally warming world. Already, the impact 
of various disasters on the continent have had an impact on South Africa,  one 
of the most obvious being the movement of large numbers of refugees across 
South Africa’s borders, some from as far away as Somalia. It is reasonable to 
project even greater and more complex impacts from the effects of global 
warming on African countries and this at a time when South Africa itself is 
experiencing the growing stresses of climate change. I will now turn from the 
broader context of the African continent to the specific case of South Africa. 
 
4.4 The South African setting 
 
South Africa has a population of 49 million people (Statistics South Africa 
2009), eleven official languages and four recognised broad racial categories: 
black 79.5 per cent, white 9.2 per cent, coloured 8.9 per cent and Asian 2.5 per 
cent. It is a middle income country with a well-established economy. The GDP 
annual growth rate since 2000 has been over 4.5 per cent. However, this 
growth has been achieved without job creation or any distribution of benefits 
across the society.  Today, South Africa’s wealth distribution is very unequal 
and poverty is of epidemic proportions.  The poorest 20 per cent of the 
population receive only 1.7 per cent of the total income; the richest 20 per cent, 
70 per cent (Republic of South Africa 2009). South Africa is now the most 
                                           
25 I could find no data estimating how many people are currently trekking across Africa to escape 
famine, drought, water shortages, wars and political persecution. I have met a (small) number of 
refugees who have made this trek – several more than once – a trek of heroic and often tragic, 
proportions.  In 2009, 1000 refugees a day alone were believed to be crossing the border from 
Zimbabwe to South Africa (Duigan 2009). 
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unequal society on Earth (Ashman et al. 2010), the degree of economic 
inequality having increased since the end of apartheid in 1994. Official 
unemployment now stands at 35.4 per cent (Ashman et al. 2010). The true 
figure must be much higher as many in the so-called informal sector, plus 
many refugees, are not registered as being unemployed. Official figures for 
unemployment in the 15–24 year age group stood at 48.1 per cent in 2009 
(Statistics South Africa 2009). In July 2009, 42.9 per cent of the population 
lived on less than $2 a day.  
 
One indicator of the health of a country’s political and economic institutions is 
the health of its people. Life expectancy at birth in 2010 was 49 years 
compared to 64 years in 1995, the decline largely attributable to HIV/AIDS) 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2010). As the South African Health Review 2008 states 
‘extreme wealth inequalities and high unemployment play an important role in 
poor health’ (Bradshaw 2008: np). Health is strongly correlated with socio-
economic position, and there is growing evidence that inequalities play a role 
in poor population health outcomes (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). 
 
Bradshaw (2008: 51) states: 
Despite uncertainty about the exact levels of mortality, it is clear that the 
health of the South African population has worsened in the last decade. 
South Africa can be considered to have a quadruple burden of disease, 
including diseases and conditions related to poverty and under-
development, chronic diseases, injuries and HIV and AIDS. Differentials 
in health status have been observed between populations, wealth and 
urban-rural groups and education levels. 
 
It is believed that in 2008, over 250,000 South Africans died of AIDS 
(Statistics South Africa 2009), with the substantial burden (41 per cent) of 
deaths among 25-49 year olds (Avert 2006).  There are an estimated 1.4 million 
AIDS orphans in South Africa (Avert 2006). There have been claims that the 
employment practices of the mining industry have contributed significantly to 
the spread of HIV/AIDS (Cleary 2009; Duigan 2009; Spoor 2009 – personal 
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communications)26. Diarrhoea and gastro-enteritis have overtaken HIV/AIDS 
as the biggest killers of children under five years, with the deaths doubling 
over the previous four years (Bradshaw 2008).  
 
Moving from health to other indicators of the depth of inequality in South 
Africa, one that is particularly relevant in light of the country’s history is that 
87 per cent of its land remains white owned. Since its inception in 1995, the 
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights27 has dealt with only 2 per cent of 
all restitution claims (String Communications 2009). This problem is 
compounded both by mining companies’ applications for mining rights under a 
policy framework which favours the mining company (Spoor 2009 personal 
communication) and by the lack of training and infrastructural support for 
people returning to the land after a break in land/livelihoods relationships of 
decades and generations.  
 
Twenty per cent of urban households have no electricity and a quarter have no 
running water. In rural households, eighty per cent have neither (Magubane 
2004a: 658). The response by government to these situations has been very 
poor. Allegations of political corruption are common28 and the ‘corporate 
capture of government and government officials’ (to be explored further in the 
next chapter) continues (Terreblanche 2002: 97). 
 
Within South African society, there is a growing disaffection with the 
persistent and deepening poverty and the lack of adequate services such as 
public transport, water, electricity, housing and health care. Reynolds (2010: 
np) claims that ‘South Africa has more people’s protest action per head of 
population than anywhere in the world – a factor driven by the poor conditions 
                                           
26 Additionally, large numbers of miners from other countries in the region have contracted 
HIV/AIDS while working in South African mines – returning home to die untreated in their own 
communities (Spoor 2009 personal communication).   
27 The Restitution of Land Rights Act, passed in 1994 by the South African government, was aimed at 
addressing the injustices of racially based land dispossession in the past as well as establishing a more 
equitable distribution of land ownership – land reform being a cornerstone of poverty reduction 
programmes. 
28 Stories of high level corruption in South Africa are frequent news items in the weekly Guardian 
Weekly and daily, The Cape Times. 
 
94 
that people are living under without basic services and in the context of the 
huge gap between constitutional promises and reality’.  
 
In Khayelitsha29, for example, water is a ‘shared tap, sanitation a non-existent 
luxury and diarrhoea, a constant reality’ (Reynolds 2010: np). Eighty per cent 
of Khayelitsha residents live in shacks (Thom 2006). Visiting Khayelitsha in 
the company of members of the People’s Health Movement30, I was shown into 
a room in a men’s accommodation compound, measuring no more than 3.5 by 
2.5 metres. It accommodated four men, of very different ages and unrelated to 
each other, in bunk beds along with all their cooking utensils, stove and 
personal effects. There was no electricity or running water. All the men were 
from rural areas and one, a fifteen year old, said his aspiration was to go to 
school but he didn’t have the means. When he worked, he had to send money 
home to his family. He was uneducated, unskilled and faced frequent periods 
of unemployment. Adjacent to this room were rows and rows of the same, with 
narrow, muddy alley-ways in between; no recreation space, no community 
cooking facilities, no laundry, no place to escape the confines of the room. 
However, this room was at least of substantial construction. There were vast 
seas of less substantial shacks, small, flimsy dwellings made from corrugated 
iron, cardboard and bits and pieces. Fires, as a result of the crude and crowded 
cooking conditions, are frequent. Wires are strung from power-lines to the tin 
shanties making the many unsafe and illegal connections to the power grid. 
The poverty is crushing. 
 
Refugees are a significant part of the population of South Africa in terms of not 
only numbers but also as a focus for violence and frustration in the form of 
xenophobia, such that they must be included in any overview of South African 
vital statistics.  Furthermore, today’s refugees are an omen of things to come. 
There will be increasing numbers of Africans making their way across the 
                                           
29 Khayelitsha is a black township about 10 kilometres from the outer, mostly white, suburbs of Cape 
Town, with a population of 2 million. By contrast, Cape Town is one of the world’s most beautiful 
(and rich) cities. Domestic dwellings in the white areas are very spacious, and most have gardeners 
and domestic ‘char’ women; guard dogs and barbed wire fences. 
30 The People’s Health Movement (PHM) is a global coalition of grassroots and health activist 
organisations dedicated to addressing the burden of preventable disease globally but in particular that 
carried by developing countries.  
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continent to South Africa as the impacts of global warming become more 
intense and widespread. The current (2010 figures) population of refugees in 
South Africa is estimated to be in excess of 5 million.31 These people come 
from all over Africa, but particularly conflict zones such as Ethiopia/Eritrea, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi and Zimbabwe. Many of these 
refugees have no documents which enable them to seek work32 (or become part 
of official statistics) and with little redress to unscrupulous employers who 
employ people and then fail to pay them.  There are no data on this. However, 
anecdotal evidence from speaking with a number of refugees in different 
geographical areas of South Africa indicates this practice is common. The use 
of refugee labour without payment by businesses in the northern Limpopo 
Region is particularly rife – it is the border where many refugees cross into 
South Africa. They arrive with little and with few choices for survival.  Further 
south, in Johannesburg and Cape Town for example, refugees exist on the 
fringes of the poverty stricken townships in a state of insecurity, subjected to 
constant harassment and the occasional flare up of violent xenophobic attacks. 
This picture would not be complete without reference to the growing black 
middle class33. Statistics are difficult to find.34 However, from an anecdotal 
perspective, visibility of a black middle class is evident in the media, politics 
and policy arenas, and new housing estates, but not in many of the mainstream 
cultural spaces. Politically, however, the significance of the black middle class 
cannot be underestimated because of their role in maintaining the status quo 
                                           
31 Figures for refugees are unreliable – official figures underestimating numbers 
32 Refugees need to obtain documents from the Home Affairs Department – an almost impossible task 
due to the obstructionism and ineptitude of the department (personal experience accompanying 
refugees). 
33 Middle-class is defined by Statistics South Africa (2010) as: residing in formal housing, having a 
water tap in the residence, having a flush toilet in the residence, having electricity as the main lighting 
source, having electricity or gas as the main cooking source, and having a landline or a household 
member having a cell phone. 
34 The percentage of all South African households with a middle-class standard of living increased 
modestly from 23% to 26% between 1998-2000 and 2004-2006. About 85% of White households 
and 75% of Asian households had a middle-class standard of living throughout the period. Coloured 
households with a middle-class standard of living increased from 41% in 1998-2006 to 48% in 2004-
2006. Almost no rural African households had a middle-class standard of living. The percentage 
of urban African households with a middle-class standard of living rose from 5% to 22%. 
Among middle-class households, white households were much  better off than middle-
class households from other population groups. In 2006, 73% of white households with a middle-class 
standard of living reported expenditure of more than R2500 per month, while this was true of only 
56% of middle-class Asian households, 53% of middle-class Coloured households and 32% of 
middle-class African households (Statistics South Africa 2010).  
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and as evidence that apartheid no longer exists. The position today of the black 
middle class recalls Fanon’s (1967: 122) comments in the Wretched of the 
Earth. Fanon writes: 
 
The national middle class discovers its historic mission ... that of 
intermediary ... of being the transmission line between the nation and a 
capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the mask of 
neo-colonialism. The national bourgeoisie will be quite content with the 
role of the Western bourgeoisie’s business agent, and it will play its part 
without any complexes in a most dignified manner. 
 
In summary, South Africa remains deeply divided along class lines, in part 
because of its history, but also in large part, because of the particular political 
economy structures which are essentially a continuation of the process of 
capital accumulation of previous governments. The history and politics of this 
division will be examined further in this part, and discussed in the theory in 
Part III. Now I will turn to South Africa’s ecology and the potential impacts of 
global warming. 
 
4.5  South Africa and global warming 
 
Southern Africa has an exceptionally rich endemic flora and fauna which, in 
addition to its intrinsic value, play an important role in sustaining human 
livelihoods (Von Maltitz and Scholes 2006). South Africa’s biodiversity has 
been identified as being particularly vulnerable to global warming (Von 
Maltitz and Scholes 2006) because of its degree of adaptation to very specific 
climatic conditions. There are seven broad biomes35: savannah, nama karoo36, 
succulent karoo, grassland, forest, desert and fynbos37 (Von Maltitz and 
Scholes 2006).  
                                           
35 Terrestrial ecological zones 
36 Biomes of the arid plateau of South Africa 
37 Fynbos means fine-leaved bush - a local term for the heath-like vegetation found in the southern 
coastal areas of South Africa that have a Mediterranean-type climate with winter rainfall. Fynbos 
display exceptionally high levels of endemism.  The uniqueness of the Cape Floristic Region, which is 
largely coincident with the fynbos, has resulted in it being considered as one the world’s six floristic 




Two of the biomes, the fynbos and succulent karoo, have particularly high 
levels of biodiversity and endemism and climate change according to Von 
Maltitz and Scholes (2006) is therefore likely to impact on these biomes more 
severely. They maintain that there is already evidence of a shift eastward with 
the biomes, and that by 2050, 38–55 per cent of South Africa will have a 
climatic envelope that does not match any current biome with completely new 
species groups and wide scale species loss (Von Maltitz and Scholes 2006). 
One 1999 study referred to by Von Maltitz and Scholes (2006) predicted that 
the succulent karoo biome would lose almost its entire current distribution, as 
hotter and dryer conditions prevailed but that each of the other biomes would 
be affected and would shift and lose species, and that furthermore 
desertification would increase. All of the biomes are important from a 
livelihood perspective – particularly the savannah.  
 
There are many aspects to the impact of global warming on South Africa. Here, 
based largely on the 2007 IPCC Report, just a few are mentioned. It is 
predicted there that Southern Africa will on average be 3.4o warmer by the end 
of the century and 1o  to 3o warmer by 2050, relative to temperatures during the 
second half of last century. This increase will vary between regions, with for 
example, a possible increase of 4.5o in the Northern Cape (of South Africa) 
during summer (Joubert 2008: 153). 
 
As a result of rising temperatures, South Africa will experience greater 
frequency and intensity of droughts, floods and heat waves. It will become 
hotter and drier in the west and hotter and wetter in the east, but with an overall 
drying due to evaporation (Joubert 2008)38. Rainfall is expected to decline 
significantly in southern Africa; East Africa (including the north east of South 
Africa) will become wetter, with rain falling in more intense storms causing 
greater risks of flooding and damage (with water being largely lost due to run 
off rather than sinking into the soil). Most regions of southern Africa are 
expected to experience water stress by 2025 (Das et al. 2008) and most farmers 
                                           
38 The regional Millennium Ecosystem Assessment states that for every 1o C temperature increase, the 
evaporation rate rises by 5%.  
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in the region are and will be dependent on ground water for their personal as 
well as agricultural needs (CSIR 2009). The adverse impacts of global 
warming on agricultural and other livelihood sources threaten efforts to 
improve food security and poverty reduction, thereby lessening the chances of 
attaining the Millennium Development Goals in the region (Nhemachena et al. 
2008). 
 
In the Western Cape (the south west of South Africa), the 2007 IPCC report 
predicts falls of winter rain will continue to move southwards toward the pole, 
resulting in extreme drying in the region during winter – something which will 
impact greatly on the fynbos and export agriculture, 50 per cent of which 
comes from this region. Reports have forecast an overall 25 per cent decrease 
in winter rainfall by 2050. Additionally, ‘season creep’ is predicted, with 
spring rains being delayed and having potentially devastating consequences for 
crops and wild seeds (Joubert 2008). 
 
With respect to agriculture, crop modelling predicts that maize, which 
constitutes 70 per cent of total grain production in South Africa, will decrease 
by up to 20 per cent within 50 years (DEAT 2007), mostly in the drier western 
regions. Other crops grown in environmentally-favourable areas are also at 
risk, as changes occur in both rainfall and temperature. Additionally, there are 
expected to be detrimental changes in pest diseases in the agricultural sector 
(Joubert 2008). 
 
The IPCC 2007 Report forecasts sea-level rises of 0.2-0.6 metres by 2100. In 
addition to the ocean warming, expanding and rising as a result of global 
warming, there is already evidence of a change in storm frequency and 
intensity.  The interaction of all these factors can give rise to catastrophic 
results (Das et al. 2008).  There are already many examples of events that 
could be attributed to changes in the biosphere as a result of global warming. 
For example, in March 2007, along the coast of KwaZulu-Natal, sea levels 
were about 8.5 metres above mean spring tide level, causing widespread 
damage. From this one event, direct infrastructure damages alone cost in 
excess of R400 million (roughly $A67 million) (Das et al. 2008). A further 
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example is found in the evidence from preliminary analysis of fire data from 
the South African Cape region which suggests that the ‘mean return period of 
wild fires has decreased from 31.6 years in the 1970s to as small as 13.5 years 
in the decade leading up to 2010’ (Das et al. 2008).  
 
Toulmin (2009)39 suggests that South Africa, as with the whole of Africa, 
needs to focus on three key areas for adaptation to global warming: food 
security, water and health. She quotes sources which suggest that an essential 
part of global warming adaptation is building resilience into ecological, social 
and institutional systems (Thornton et al. 2006; quoted in Toulmin 2009: 30) 
and that ‘[s]trengthening local, indigenous coping strategies and building on 
community institutions are key ways forward’. Boko et al. (2007: 450) state 
that ‘[a]daptive capacity and adaptation emerge as critical areas for 
consideration on the continent’ and that the ‘mix of climate stresses and other 
factors in Africa means that for many, adaptation is not an option but a 
necessity’ (Boko et al. 2007: 452). They also state that ‘[a]daptation is shown 
to be successful and sustainable when linked to effective governance systems, 
civil and political rights and literacy’. In the context of South Africa, as will be 
shown in the next chapter, these criteria already pose significant problems 
which will both exacerbate and be exacerbated by global warming.  
 
South Africa, compared to the rest of Africa, is a disproportionately large 
producer of carbon emissions - emitting more than 40 per cent of Africa’s 
greenhouse gases from less than 8 per cent of Africa’s population – and with 
the majority of its electricity produced from coal. Under the Kyoto Agreement, 
for the period 2008-2012, as a developing country, South Africa did not have 
any obligation to reduce carbon emissions. South African President Jacob 
Zuma was party to the brokering of The Copenhagen Climate Accord reached 
in December 2009 along with the U.S. President Barack Obama, China’s 
Premier Wen Jiabao, India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Brazil’s 
President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. The Accord acknowledged the 2o C target 
as a cap on temperature increases but included no collective target for cutting 
                                           
39 The Director of the International institute for Environment and Development, UK. 
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emissions or a peak year for carbon emissions. Other African and non-African 
vulnerable countries had been holding out for deeper emission cuts, wanting 
restrictions on global temperature rises to 1.5o C this century.  
 
South Africa, in concert with China, India and Brazil, has argued it is a 
developing economy with large impoverished populations and, as such, cannot 
have restraints placed on its development trajectory. Whether such claims are 
justified or a guise to allow vested interests to continue “business as usual” 
including continuing poverty, inequality and exacerbating the impacts of global 
warming, is examined in the next chapter which  explores South Africa’s 
history and political economy to date and which in turn provides a framework 
for a contemporary critical appraisal of these claims. 
 
South Africa’s response to climate change will be under close scrutiny during COP 
17, the 17th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change which started in Durban on November 28, 2011.  South Africa is 
playing a key role in hosting the COP 17 Conference with International Relations 
and Co-operation Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane being president of the summit, 
and President Jacob Zuma opening it.  South Africa is seen as playing a key role 
because  it is seen as hosting the talks on behalf of Africa. 
South Africa ratified the UNFCCC convention in August 1997, acceding to the 
Kyoto protocol in July 2002, although as stated in this chapter, South Africa was  not 
required to undertake any formal, legally binding, greenhouse gas emissions 
agreements during the protocol’s ‘first commitment period’ between 2008 and 2012. 
In 2004, South Africa tabled its first formal government response to climate change 
with the National Climate Change Response Strategy, which acknowledged that 
climate change was possibly the greatest environmental challenge facing the world 
this century, with the African continent confronting greater challenges than the 
developed world, both in terms of the impact of climate change and the capacity to 
respond to it. 
In October 2007, a  draft Long term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) report prepared 
for the South African cabinet,  presented five scenarios of future growth paths for 
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South Africa, each of which involved a different level of greenhouse gas emissions. 
The scenarios were developed to inform national policy and the country’s climate 
negotiating position in the post 2012 period (Hallowes 2008). 
Business as usual, or ‘growth without constraints’, provided the high end scenario in 
which emissions were projected to rise dramatically. Under this scenario, projected 
growth would lead to an almost fourfold increase in emissions, from 446 million tons 
of CO2 equivalent in 2003 to 1,640 million tons by 2050. This was followed in 
descending order of development and emissions scenarios, until the fourth low 
growth path scenario which was  described as that required by science - different 
from the other three scenarios as it included a particular climate target, that is 
reduced emissions by 30 to 40 per cent from 2003 levels by 2050.  
The Zuma government in principle agreed to an emissions trajectory which would 
see emissions (theoretically) peaking between 2020 and 2025, with upper limits of 
583 and 614 million tons of CO2 equivalent respectively, then plateau for up to 10 
years and decline in absolute terms between 2036 and 2050, to somewhere between 
212 and 428 million tons of CO2 equivalent. 
At COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, Zuma negotiated on the basis of these figures, 
however, making them conditional on financial and technical assistance from the rich 
nations. 
Further muddying the waters on South Africa’s position vis-a-vis COP 17, South 
Africa’s Environment Minister Edna Molewa stated just four months prior to the 
conference that her government was continuing with its target of a 34 per cent 
reduction in emissions by 2020 and 42 per cent by 2025 relative to the country’s 
‘business as usual’ trajectory - (Groenewald 2011), a development trajectory which 
the government  is further locking itself into with its World Bank loan for coal-fired 
power station expansion (see chapter 7). In addition to this coal usage trajectory, 
South Africa  continues to pursue nuclear energy (Greenpeace August 2011).40 
 
Bond, in his latest edited book, The Politics of Climate Justice, to be released during 
the COP 17 meeting, brings a clarity to South Africa’s climate position.  He writes:  
 




[i]f President Jacob Zuma’s government really cared about his closest 
historical constituencies in rural KwaZulu-Natal villages, who are amongst 
those most adversely affected by worsening droughts and floods, then it would 
not only halt the R250+ billion worth of coal-fired electricity generators being 
built by Eskom at Medupi and Kusile. The state would shut the world’s single 
largest CO2 emissions source, Sasol’s Secunda plant which makes oil from 
coal, and also reverse the R80 billion heavy oil refinery authorized for 
construction at Coega, north of Port Elizabeth. It would reverse its trillion-rand 
nuclear energy fantasy and also deny approval to 40 proposed new coal mines 
in Mpumalanga, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal allegedly needed to supply the 
plants and export markets in coming years on grounds that – just as at the 
Cradle of Humankind northwest of Johannesburg, which is suffering threats of 
debilitating acid mine drainage – these will cause permanent contamination of 
rivers and water tables, increased mercury residues and global warming. 
Pretoria would offer a Just Transition package to all affected workers, 
transforming their thousands of lost jobs in fossil fuel industries into 
employment in renewables, public transport, building refurbishment, 
appropriate production and disposal, reformed agriculture, healthcare and 
education, as demanded by labour, environmentalists and communities in the 
Million Climate Jobs campaign.41   
 
Bond (2011a) maintains that  key South African and global elites  are incapable of 
reconciling the threat to the planet with their economies’ addiction to fossil fuels. 
Other chapters in Part II of the thesis support the claims that the South African 
government is doing little to mitigate climate change. 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has attempted to present a broad perspective of this 
critical moment in African and South African history. The chapter has 
indicated that there are a number of factors - the expansion and deepening of 
the capitalist social relations of production, food crises, water crises, capital 
flight, unemployment, burgeoning city slums, poor governance, de-
peasantisation and rural poverty – which will act synergistically with global 
                                           
41 See also my chapter The Politics of Climate Change in South Africa in Bond 2011a - to be 
published at  COP 17. 
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warming, compounding the burdens already borne by the majority of Africans 






CHAPTER 5  South Africa’s background 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
There is an extensive body of scholarly work written on South African political 
and economic history. I have therefore chosen to focus on particular writers 
and commentators whose work brings context to issues germane to the political 
economy of global warming in South Africa.  This provides an understanding 
of how South Africa’s economy has developed in the post-apartheid era against 
the interests of the majority of South Africans. This issue and period are 
crucial, given the imperative for an African country which needs both to follow 
and to promote, throughout sub-Saharan Africa, a sustainable development 
pathway in the context of global warming.  The years of colonial settlement of 
South Africa, while laying the foundation for inequality, poverty and 
ecological destruction, are given less attention. 
 
5.2 The period prior to democracy in 1994 
 
Given global warming and the potentially catastrophic effects it will have on 
the country, it is ironic that South Africa’s history and archaeology link the 
people of today to the first human societies on the planet. South Africa is 
known as ‘the cradle of humankind’ after Charles Darwin deemed it as such 
and is testament to the fact that the country had the environmental conditions 
suitable for the development of the first human societies.  
 
Both the province of Mpumalanga and the area of the Limpopo province 
known as Mapungubwe, which are the principal locations for this study, have 
extensive evidence of human history that dates the lives of the first humans and 
their ancestors back many millennia (Delius 2007). The latter area was the 
centre for trade in southern Africa between 1200 and 1300 AD. Evidence exists 
in a number of locations in South and southern Africa of the San people (or 
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Bushmen) who were hunter-gatherers from around 100,000 BC, and of the 
Khoikhoi people who came later and were agri-pastoralists. By 500 BC, Bantu 
(and other language) speaking peoples were migrating into the south of Africa 
and by the time of the first European settlement, there were many different 
language groups in the region (de Wit 2007). 
 
South Africa is one of the many African countries which were colonised by 
Europeans from the 16th century until the independence movements of the 
twentieth century (with Ghana being the first colony to gain independence in 
1965). The fifteenth century saw discoveries of South Africa by Portuguese 
navigators Bartholomeu Diaz and then Vasco da Gama, but it was not until the 
17th century that Dutch farmers, Islamic leaders deported from what was 
Batavia, and French Huguenot refugees, along with imported slaves, began 
settling in southern Africa and requisitioning land from the Indigenous peoples. 
The Dutch, closely associated with the Dutch East India Company, became 
known as the Afrikaners. From these roots emerged the Boer trekkers who 
moved to the interior, appropriating land and engaging ‘in rentier exploitation, 
living off rents in labour and in kind extracted from indigenous peoples whose 
land they had seized’ (Marais 2001: 8). 
 
The discovery of diamonds in the Kimberley in 1867, and gold in the 1880s, 
led to a rapid expansion of British influence, as the British, who had been 
content with control of the coastal regions for geopolitical reasons, now saw 
South Africa as a potentially huge capital asset. Bond (2003) gives an example 
of the long and intimate marriage between imperialism and finance in South 
Africa’s geopolitical history, writing of how the power and vision of finance 
were engaged in the deepening of colonialism in South Africa. Accompanying 
the flows of capital to the diamond fields, Britain effected the complete 
subjugation of African kingdoms during the 1870s, as well as the invasion of 
the Afrikaner Transvaal Republic in 1877. The discovery of gold and diamonds 
and the resulting influx of (mostly British and particularly Rothschild’s) capital 
(Bond 2003) were the beginnings of what became the central minerals energy 
complex (MEC) in South Africa.  
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The early developments around mining fostered the ‘integration of [the] South 
African economy into the world economy as a source of primary commodities’ 
and set the ‘pattern of labour and social relations that would become the 
definitive feature of South African society. Capital accumulation would be 
based on the exploitation of a low-wage, highly controlled expendable African 
workforce which was to be reproduced in a system of ‘native reserves’ at 
minimal cost to capital’ (Marais 2001: 9). This workforce was drawn from the 
whole of Africa; in fact, until the 1970s, it included more non-South African 
than South African workers (Marais 2001).  
 
The expansion of industrial capitalism into the mining and agriculture sectors 
in South Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries resulted in serious 
divisions in society, including the racial division of labour and the 
marginalisation of black African communities who were increasingly forced to 
move to more marginal land and eventually into Bantustans during the 
apartheid era. South Africa’s economy, even during the 19th century, contained 
early tensions between the interests of mining capital and those of agricultural 
and industrial capital, the former preferring ‘free trade’ policies and the latter 
the protectionism and subsidies of the state (Marais 2001: 9). Each of these 
sectors required cheap labour and, for the agricultural sector as it became 
mechanised, increasing areas of land for farming. Van Onselen (1996), in The 
Seed is Mine: The Life of Kas Maine, a South African Sharecropper 1894-
1985, documents the very considerable social and economic hardship this 
caused the black farm-labour tenants and sharecroppers. By the 1950s, a 
comprehensive system of labour control measures had been introduced, 
including pass laws, labour bureaus and single sex living quarters - all part of a 
comprehensive approach to providing cheap and docile labour for Afrikaner 
agriculture and industry (Terreblanche 2002).  It is of note that the gradual 
removal of the dispossessed black population from white farming resonates 
with Marx’s descriptions of the enclosures of the commons and the 
consolidation of landholdings in England in the 16th and 17th centuries. In the 
South African context, however, there were additionally systematised racist 
dimensions to the deep class divisions which became increasingly entrenched 
in everyday life, as well as in the political and economic structures of the 
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society. Callinicos (2009) argues that a theory of imperialism explains these 
racist dimensions. Firstly, racism legitimised European colonialism and the 
integration of the global South into the world economy as a supplier of 
agricultural products and raw materials which required coerced labour; and 
secondly, racism allowed the expropriation of land, the spread of indentured 
labour, various taxes and other extractive and inhumane practices.  
 
‘The Afrikaner Nationalists’ very public pursuit of apartheid, of racially 
sanctioned avarice and greed’ and the ‘racial bigotry and double standards 
[wherein a] black man was damned by his success if he worked hard and 
damned for his laziness if he failed’ (Van Onselen 1996: 311) became deeply 
entrenched in South African society. These racist divisions gained full 
expression with the victory of the white supremacist Afrikaner National Party 
in 1948 and thereafter the implementation of apartheid policies.  These led to a 
systemic hardening of the race/class divisions and of labour exploitation and 
land expropriation that had begun with European settlement.  One far reaching 
apartheid policy was that which underpinned the creation of Bantustans, 
whereby 13 per cent of South African land (the most marginal) was 
demarcated for the majority (80 per cent) black South Africans. This policy has 
significance for the sustainability, food security, human development and 
mitigation strategies for the communities of people living in these areas today. 
The homelands were overpopulated with the ‘resettled’ black population – the 
reserves of cheap labour.  Much of this land has since been found to overlay 
various rich mineral deposits, a factor which is relevant to the accumulation 
strategies in South Africa in the 21st century.  
 
According to Terreblanche (2002), the three threads to South Africa’s history 
over the last three centuries to 1994 are white political and economic 
supremacy; land dispossession; and the exploitation of labour. It is clear that 
these themes continue to have repercussions and further expression in the 21st 
century. To this can be added that South Africa demonstrates a system of 
accumulation which has been very heavily influenced by the financial sector 
and which has laid the foundation for today’s close alliance between finance, 
mining and energy.  The particular system of accumulation that developed in 
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South Africa occurred around the MEC (Fine and Rustomjee 1996), a system 
built on a core set of industrial sectors which developed very strong linkages 
with each other and which have dominated the course of economic history in 
South Africa through to today. Fine and Rustomjee (1996) argue that the MEC 
not only exhibits the characteristics of conglomerate behaviour within that 
sector, but effects control over other parts of the economy through its influence 
over the financial sector and through linkages to both state and private capital.  
South Africa clearly has exhibited and continues to exhibit the definitive 
relationships of capitalism, that is, the exploitative division between labour and 
capital and compounded by the division of race. However, in looking at 
another definitive aspect of capitalism, that is the competitive relations 
between the individual types of capital that control a society’s productive 
forces, the fragmentation, competition and division that normally exist in the 
capitalist system are not so evident in South Africa. The linkages between the 
MEC and other sectors – both state and private – have been consolidated 
through ‘ownership and control, through relationships between state and 
capital or through the imperatives of apartheid’ (Fine and Rustomjee 1996: 92). 
(When below I move to consider the post-apartheid era, the particular 
characteristic of these linkages appears to have continued, while at the same 
time, the class divisions not only remained but widened and consolidated 
through the imperative of capital accumulation.)  
 
One other thread common to South Africa’s geo-political economy history 
since the late 1870s that is of particular relevance to this study, is the relentless 
degradation of the environment which accompanied the subjugation and 
exploitation of the de-peasantised and proletarianised population. Van Onselen 
(1996) captures a part of this painful process in The Seed is Mine, as he 
recounts the life and times of Kas Maine, a black South African who struggled 
to eke out an existence under conditions that prejudiced his every effort to 
secure land for sharecropping in an environment which  privileged whites and 
dispossessed blacks. The background for Kas Maine’s story is one in which 
large numbers of blacks were increasingly being forced to leave the land to 
work as cheap labour in the mines in the period covered in this book from the 




In summary, from the perspective of accumulation and the entwined issues of 
equity and the environment, up to 1994 South Africa developed as a country 
with a heavy reliance on minerals and energy related capital intensive 
production (Fine and Rustomjee 1996); with growing surpluses of 
unemployed, mainly black, workers (Bond 2003); with extremely uneven 
development; with a strong and powerful financial sector; and as a powerful 
sub-imperial power on the African continent. It is to the contemporary period 
that I will now move to set the more current context for the issue of global 
warming and South Africa.  
 
5.3 Immediately pre 1994  
 
The success of the African National Congress - the ANC - in coming to power 
after the first post-apartheid democratic elections in 1994 and the first black 
presidency of Nelson Mandela, brought a sense of hope for freedom from 
racial, political, social and economic oppression to the majority of the black 
population in South Africa. It also inspired not just liberation movements 
worldwide, but the international community. Judd (1996: 411) describes the 
fall of apartheid as ‘one of the last and, arguably, one of the most dramatic and 
moving transfers of power within a country which had formerly been ... within 
the British Empire and Commonwealth’.  However, one has to ask whether 
there was a real transfer of power, other than the addition of a new black elite 
at the table. Certainly, the ‘face’ of political power at the top levels changed 
but evidence supports the argument that the economic power remained with the 
Afrikaans-dominated financial sector and, more specifically, the MEC.  
 
Innes (1984) writes that to know how the South African economy functions, 
we first  have to know the conditions and extent of the power (of a corporation 
such as Anglo American), what form it takes, how it works and what its 
limitations are. He reveals how Anglo America was and remains actively 
involved at a number of levels in influencing the direction of political change 
in southern Africa, and the continuing development and expansion of 
capitalism in South and southern Africa. He argues that the transition to 
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monopoly capitalism in South Africa also produced the phenomenon of South 
African imperialism during the 1960s and 1970s, a time when the process of 
monopoly transformation in South Africa reached new heights (Innes 1984: 
239). This expansion of South African imperialist tendencies in Africa has 
continued in the post-apartheid era and, of particular relevance for this study, 
not only, but including, on the back of expansion of the electricity sector.  
 
Innes’ theme of the enormous power of one company, Anglo American, is 
taken further to the whole minerals/energy sector by Fine and Rustomjee 
(1996). In their seminal work in which they coin the concept of the minerals-
energy complex (MEC), they spell out its centrality to the South African 
economy. In another paper, Fine (2008: np) describes the MEC as ‘a system of 
accumulation, centred on core sectors that has a character and dynamic of its 
own that was far from pre-determined [and] can be traced back to the 
emergence of mining in the 1870s through to the present day’. The MEC has 
played a central role in structuring electricity power relations in South Africa 
and the country’s policy position in relation to coal, the energy sector and, not 
by default, macroeconomic policies and actions in relation to global warming. 
It has become central to any contemporary critical analysis of the South 
African economy as it sits at its core, not only by virtue of its weight in 
economic activity but also through its determining role in the rest of the 
economy. The MEC is used in the thesis to describe in effect where political 
and economic power lie in South Africa and how it has been hugely influential 
on the shifting role of the state. 
 
With the safeguarding of positions of large-scale private capital, as well as the 
apartheid regime's frenetic pressure and campaigning during the pre-1994-
election period, to those who might have feared a major shift in economic 
power post 1994, the status quo appeared relatively secure at the time of the 
transition. Additionally, the civil service and key posts in ministries by the 'old 
guard' in areas such as economic affairs, mining and energy, meant any 




The external forces of history were also pitted against any major shift of power 
during South Africa’s historical transformation from apartheid state to 
democratic nation.  As Magubane (1979) proposes, an understanding of 
contemporary South African inequality and political economy requires it to be 
placed within a wider political economy matrix, which takes into account the 
inequality between, on the one hand, advanced capitalist countries and, on the 
other, South Africa. The former have benefitted from capital accumulation 
drawn from the colonies, enabling their industrialisation, while fostering 
underdevelopment and impoverishment in the colonies. For Magubane (1979), 
imperialism, colonialism and the development of capitalism are the pegs on 
which an understanding of South African race, class and contemporary society 
can be hung. In arguing this, he highlights the importance to contemporary 
South African society of European settlement and cultural domination, the 
migrant labour system upon which the MEC was developed, and the 
appropriation and exploitation of South Africa’s (and more widely Africa’s) 
human and natural resources.  
 
It is of note that there has been a deliberate obfuscation of class and the class 
struggle in contemporary South African political analysis both by the ANC and 
by the dominant global institutions. As Magubane (1979) argued in the 
apartheid years (but it remains true well after that time) there was a reluctance 
to criticise a political elite when that elite is black.42 Prior to 1994, the ANC 
policies promised socialism and African unity (Bond 2000; Magubane 2004; 
Terreblanche 2002). Before the 1994 election, however, the ANC had dropped 
some of its policy planks, such as nationalisation of large scale industry and 
sweeping government redistribution of wealth from whites to blacks. In 
retrospect it is thus clear that neoliberal pathways to development were in the 
minds of at least some of the ANC leaders prior to 1994.  In fact at that time, 
even COSATU (the Council of South African Trade Unions), then one of the 
world’s most militant trade unions, endorsed the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, effectively removing trade protection and leaving small newly 
                                           
42 The death of Nelson Mandela will perhaps mark a point of departure for many from the ANC 
which has not delivered on its pre-1994 promises. 
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developing industry exposed and vulnerable. Terreblanche (2002: 101) 
explains this shift as being 
 
due to the extraordinary capacity [of the corporate sector] for 
propagandising and myth-making [which] enabled it to convince ANC 
leaders ... that the corporate sector [was] the deus ex machina that would 
solve all social problems of poverty, inequality and unemployment. It said 
it could do so provided three preconditions were met: first, South Africa 
should be democratised; second, the corporate sector (and with it, also the 
power and property relations of the South African economy) should be left 
intact, and granted all the freedom ... normally granted to a corporate 
sector in a genuinely liberal-capitalist system; and third, a neoliberal 
macroeconomic and export-oriented policy should be implemented in 
order to integrate South Africa into global capitalism. 
  
In turn, the corporate sector promised ‘that if its role in the economy was left 
intact, it would deliver the jobs, taxes and improvements in living standards’ 
desired by the ANC (Terreblanche 2002: 103).  
 
While it was under public gaze and the pre-1994 political negotiations were 
taking place for the transition from the apartheid regime to free and inclusive 
democratic elections, the ANC leaders were wined and dined, flattered and 
cajoled from morning till night by the captains of mining, industry and banking 
(Bond 2000; Terreblanche 2002). The corporate sector and the IMF were able 
to pressure the ANC on the economic directions being taken. Terreblanche 
(2002: 102) argues that the corporate sector was a ‘major player’ in the 
negotiations around the transfer of power from the apartheid regime to majority 
rule, ‘boxing in’ the ANC. It was in 1993 that Mandela and the ANC made a 
concession to the cornerstone of neoliberal economic development policy, as it 
was promoted by the IMF and the World Bank in middle and low income 
countries – the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). These included free 
movement of capital, free trade, privatisation and in general a heavy reliance 
on the market which in turn meant low taxes and less interference by 
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government in the market, which more deeply tied South Africa into the 
neoliberal development path, further impoverishing the poor majority.  
 
Importantly, there was a lack of technically competent economists within the 
ranks of the ANC (Terreblanche 2002). It was thus relatively easily persuaded 
that, if it did not follow a neoliberal road, all hell would break loose in the 
markets and this would place the whole transition process at risk. At stake was 
the future political and economic direction of the country. Given the 
comparative wealth and position of South Africa relative to all the other 
African countries, this direction, including its ideology, was crucial to the 
corporate sector and the international institutions of global capitalism.  During 
the years of the apartheid regime, the country had suffered a period of 
prolonged stagflation, in part due to international trade boycotts, but also as a 
result of the unevenly structured economy. The corporate sector was then 
focussed on finding a ‘new accumulation strategy’ (Terreblanche 2002: 95) 
from both the global economic arena and the African continent. 
 
According to Terreblanche (2002: 96), the main characteristic of this strategy 
was ‘that the supreme goal of economic policy should be to attain a high 
economic growth rate, and all other objectives should be subordinated to this’. 
This resulted in the ANC in 1993 abandoning its previous policies of 
redistribution and poverty alleviation. The Transitional Executive Council, an 
initiative of the ANC to oversee the transition, signed a confidential protocol 
with the National Party and the corporate sector on economic policy, before 
accepting a secret $850 million International Monetary Fund loan to tide the 
economy over (Bond 2000). The protocol committed the ANC to a neoliberal, 
export-oriented economy with a strategy of ‘redistribution through growth’ 
(Terreblanche 2002: 96). It was trickle down capitalism.  
 
Bond concurs with this account of this critical period, writing that the power of 
white English-speaking business rose during the 1990-94 negotiations in a 
period that included South Africa’s longest depression, from 1989-93. In late 





[the] long-standing ANC promises to nationalise banks, mines and 
monopoly capital were dropped [April 1992]; Mandela agreed to repay 
$25 billion of inherited apartheid-era foreign debt [October 1993]; the 
central bank was granted formal independence in an interim constitution 
[November 1993]; South Africa joined the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade on disadvantageous terms; and the International Monetary Fund 
provided a $850 million loan with standard Washington Consensus 
conditionality (Bond 2010: np). 
 
 
5.4  Post 1994 
 
In January 1995, the process of privatisation began in earnest with the abolition 
of controls over the South African exchange rate. This was followed by the 
raising of interest rates to a record high. Further, between 1998 and 2001, the 
ANC government granted permission to South Africa's biggest companies to 
move their financial headquarters and primary stock market listings to London, 
resulting in a large outflow of financial capital leaving the country. Between 
fraudulent activities by banking and stock-broking officers, false trade 
invoicing, debt swaps, transfer pricing to shell companies by major 
conglomerates with a presence in South Africa (Bond 2000) and various other 
nefarious activities, capital flight from South Africa was significant during the 
1990s.  This generated unprecedented profits, at the same time robbed South 
Africa of much needed capital and resulted in a ‘cataclysmic drop’ in the value 
of the rand (Bond 2000). While there is much detail in relation to the scurrilous 
financial and mining sectors’ activities during the transition period 1994–2000 
(see in particular Bond 2000), the main point for this thesis is that the ANC 
leaders failed to protect the interests of those, the majority, they were chiefly 
elected to serve. This was accompanied by a  voraciousness of greed by the 
economic elite and, conversely, a complete lack of loyalty and commitment to 
the majority by the most powerful players in forming the new economic 




At the time of the ANC democratic victory in 1994, the West welcomed South 
Africa back into the international fold of democratic nations. A year after its 
election and under pressure from domestic business, the World Bank and the 
IMF, the ANC came to accept privatisation in principle and dropped talk of 
regulating foreign investment.  The government gradually eliminated measures 
to protect the currency and implemented some facets of trade liberalisation 
even faster than required by its commitments to the WTO (Fine 2008). This 
again accentuated existing inequalities and poverty.  
 
Carnegie (2007) writes of the impact of the global spread of financialization on 
South Africa since 1994 and how this has negatively impacted on the country, 
serving the growth and dominance of the financial sector and rentier interests. 
Carnegie (2007: np) writes that the ‘internationally hegemonic neoliberal 
discourse and [South Africa’s] sub-hegemonic domestic financial interests’ 
ensured monetary policies which favoured the expansion of the ‘financial 
sector over the interests of South African labour and industry’.  Such policies, 
according to Carnegie (2007), not only created short and long term instabilities 
in the economy, but increased inequalities in an already seriously divided 
country. A part of this neoliberalisation and financialisation of the economy, in 
more recent years since 1994, economic growth has been driven by 
consumption and debt creation without sufficient investment and building of 
infrastructure and productive capacity, thus entrenching benefits of the 
financial sector while increasing the country’s economic liabilities, with 
consequences for the majority population and the stability of the economy.  
Ndikumana and Boyce (2002) argue that there is a strong correlation between 
the availability of credit to the private sector, capital flows and capital flight, 
trends which have been apparent in other southern African nations, and very 
probably could be shown also for South Africa.    
 
In a sense, Terreblanche (2002) claims, the ANC got what it wanted – political 
control- while the corporate sector got what it wanted - continued control of the 
economy, the latter at least with the added advantage that South Africa was no 
longer the subject of international trade embargoes. All of this took place 
against the background of wider events:  the global power shifts (including 
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ideological shifts) between the communist block and the West, the hegemonic 
power of the neoliberal ideas proposed by the Washington institutions and 
Western governments and the loss of material support for the ANC from the 
Soviet Union. 
 
Africa is often portrayed as an economic ‘basket case’, a continent plagued by 
corruption, poor governance, underdevelopment, violence and poverty. South 
Africa, by comparison, is held up as one of the more successful models of 
development in sub-Saharan Africa. It is treated by the West as a key link to 
other sub-Saharan African countries.  It is able to project the aspirations of 
southern Africa by being seen to be in concert with Western ideological 
imperatives. This is true for the minority, the middle and upper class which is 
overwhelmingly white but now includes a ‘black elite’. 
 
One can ask why there might have been any belief in the ANC that neoliberal 
policies would deliver what they had fought for in the apartheid years. The 
conflation of economic freedom (expressed through trade, private ownership, 
the free movement of capital, but not labour or basic economic security) with 
political freedom has always been a cornerstone of neoliberal ideology and a 
fundamental condition for profitable capital accumulation. As was wholly 
predictable, the practical policies arising from this political ideology as adopted 
by the ANC have given rise to growing inequality and continuing poverty in 
South Africa. 
 
In 2001, a policy statement from COSATU (2001: np) reflected unease with 
this strategy and its consequences: 
 
In contrast to ... political progress, in socio-economic terms the legacy of 
Apartheid remains entrenched and, with the massive loss of jobs in the 
past decade, even appears to be worsening.  Wealth is still concentrated in 
a white minority.  The nature of capital remains largely the same – 
concentrated in the mining–finance complex, which continues to dominate 
the commanding heights of the South African economy. Serious 
inequalities persist. Almost half of the population lives in poverty, 
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including many of the employed – the ‘working poor’. Unemployment and 
under-employment are on the rise The complex nature of the transition 
[has] emerged in deeply contradictory government policies. 
 
The people’s successful struggle against apartheid made South Africa a 
potentially remarkable society, a rainbow nation of people who had fought for 
and seemingly won freedom from oppression and exploitation. However, the 
adoption of the neoliberal capitalist model of development has turned South 
Africa into yet another competitor in the global market place with a 
government which increasingly lacks legitimacy. At the same time as it is 
unable to provide basic services, such as adequate water, housing, electricity, 
healthcare and education to many of its constituents, it exhibits a pervasive 
lack of due process in its bureaucratic and political functions. The model of 
development adopted by successive ANC governments and the policies 
implemented, indicate that, whatever degree of influence South Africa’s 
particular history has on contemporary society, the ruling class, black and 
white and the MEC together with transnational mining corporations, benefit 
enormously from the current structure and ideology of the economy.  
 
The vast majority who fought for liberation and independence from a race-
divided society remain part of a class that is marginalised and impoverished, 
the unemployed who constitute the ‘informal’ sector. Juxtaposed to this are 
South Africa’s new black political elite who are now the protectors of 
corporate investments, private property, law and order. The 2010 World Cup 
was something of a metaphor for South African politics: US$9.6 billion spent 
on World Cup infrastructure while one third of the population live on less than 
$2 a day (World Bank 2010), lack adequate shelter, food, water, health and 
education, with many of the one third having their stalls and shacks removed to 
make way for soccer stadiums, thereby presenting a clean and progressive 
image to the international media.  
 
To facilitate the development of neoliberal economic policies in South Africa a 
number of stages were involved. The next section highlights these and their 
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roles and at the same time introduces the key departments concerned with 
mining, energy and the environment. 
 
5.5  Key development policies post 1994 
 
There were a number of macroeconomic development policies post 1994.  
Chronologically these moved further and further down the neoliberal road. The 
earliest and one of the most significant policy frameworks adopted by the ANC 
government, and at least in part in keeping with its former progressive policies, 
was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in 1994. This was 
contained in the manifesto of the 1994 election coming out of COSATU and 
particularly the National Union of Mine Workers (NUM). It aimed at 
ameliorating the circumstances of the black majority and warned that ‘policies 
concentrating purely on promoting economic growth would accentuate existing 
inequalities, [and] perpetuate mass poverty’ (Terreblanche 2002: 108).  It 
sought to address the distortions and injustices that had developed during the 
apartheid era. A number of the RDP’s progressive social policies were adopted, 
such as in the areas of free primary health care for children under 6 years and 
pregnant women, and mine safety legislation. Others, however, such as 
community participation in environmental policy and decision making 
processes, were advocated but not implemented.  Thus the RDP represented at 
least some attempt to build a new cohesive nation and overcome the divisions 
of the past. 
 
However, the RDP lacked detail in its application and was underpinned or, it 
could be argued, was undermined by conservative economic policies. Following 
it, in June 1996, and undoing much of its thrust was GEAR (Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution), a new macroeconomic strategy and the 
economic plan championed by Thabo Mbeki, Mandela’s successor. Its focus 
shifted to economic growth. Its general thrust was in accordance with the 
Washington Consensus,43  and in many ways amounted to a self-imposed set of 
                                           
43 The Washington Consensus refers to the beginnings of neoliberalism and can be dated to the late 
1970s. To what extent it constituted a consensus is questionable as it was one man’s assessment of 
‘what would be regarded in Washington as constituting a desirable set of economic policy reforms’ 
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IMF- style structural adjustment policies. It removed many of the social reforms 
included in the RDP (large scale land reform, housing and municipal services, 
employment creation and youth programmes). The adoption of GEAR meant 
the economy was effectively divided in two: the first economy a capitalist 
enclave for a minority (6 per cent) of the population; the second, the informal 
sector, for the majority, the unemployed who live in the townships and in rural 
areas.  
 
In practice GEAR failed all three of its own key performance indicators for 
success: triggering growth, stimulating job creation and increasing socio-
economic equality (Marais 2001: 165).  The two economies of the post 
apartheid years have continued and have in fact further entrenched the 
systematic and systemic development of undevelopment and poverty. The 
formal economy, it is important to stress, is intimately dependent on the 
informal (which provides cheap labour underpinning the formal sector44) while 
those in the informal economy are largely dependent on their own resources for 
survival.  GEAR amounted to no more than a set of fantasy projections. Its 
failure has sometimes been conceded even by the government itself.  
 
The third institution of significance post-1994 was the broad-based Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) Act of 2003 which was essentially a growth 
strategy targeting racial inequality. The purpose of the BEE was claimed to be 
both moral and economic. It set out to redress the wrongs of the apartheid 
government which had systematically excluded black African, Indian and 
‘coloured’ people from equal participation in the country’s economy. It also 
sought to assist the economy to grow.  Particularly relevant to this study is that, 
as part of the BEE Act, there is a Mining Charter which aims to transform the 
mining sector so that mining companies have at least 26 per cent BEE (in 
essence black) ownership. In time this was planned to rise to 51 per cent. 
 
                                                                                                                        
(Williamson 2002).  The Washington consensus or neoliberalism constitutes a more extreme form of 
capitalism which saw the end of  Keynesianism (Williamson 2002). 




Walshe (in Gumede 2007: 12) claims BEE was aimed at building a black 
business class by establishing a national fund accessible to black Africans for 
business ventures. It was not seen as a redistributive tool but rather as part of a 
growth strategy. It was believed to be necessary to enable black Africans to 
‘regulate their own standard of living’ and to ‘supply the needs of their own 
people’. The concept had potential as an affirmative action strategy within the 
neoliberal framework.  Marais (2001: 135) however draws attention to the 
relevant history in the actual implementation and operation of BEE. He points to 
the ‘long standing but growing force of bourgeois and petit bourgeois layers 
within the ANC’ and to that part of ANC ideology which emerged from the 
1960s onward, which favoured the development of a black capitalist class. The 
notion of BEE had originally come from the National African Federated 
Chambers of Commerce (Marais 2001: 136), in other words, the capitalist class, 
in what must be considered a politically astute move to protect the wealth and 
class status quo, even if not the racial status quo of the elite. In that form it did 
not encompass all blacks but the ‘enrichment of the minority black capitalist 
class’ (Maseko 1999 quoted in Marais 2001: 136). Significantly too, Gumede 
(2007: 127) refers to the ‘massive potential for corruption when privatisation is 
used to promote black economic empowerment’, particularly when this is closely 
linked to the political elite. It has been plausibly claimed that ‘[t]he white 
establishment use black faces to gain access to the new government and often pay 
the blacks in the form of shares in their companies.’ BEE as it was already 
understood by late 1996 was a ‘sham’ (Business Report, 10 October 1997: 
quoted in Bond 2000: 39).  
 
The fourth major macroeconomic strategy adopted by the South African 
government post-apartheid was the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative 
of South Africa (or AsgiSA) introduced in 2006 during Mbeki’s second term of 
office. This has resulted in an increasing amount of state investment in 
economic infrastructure, investment made on the basis of financial returns and 
economic growth (McDonald 2009) rather than of meeting the needs of an 
impoverished population. This also marked a move away from the large scale 
expenditure by the state, as occurred in the GEAR years, for social 
infrastructure (Gentle 2009). The ANC’s partners, the South African 
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Communist Party and COSATU, supported AsgiSA as part of the post-GEAR 
consensus for increased government expenditure on the parastatals (Gentle 
2009: 67). As McDonald (2009) argues, AsgiSA investment was directed to the 
needs of capital, being especially channelled to the interests of mining and 
minerals beneficiation. Both GEAR and AsgiSA represent the tension between 
service delivery to the people and servicing the needs of capital accumulation, 
with the latter being triumphant and the principle being exported throughout 
the rest of Africa under the guise of development (McDonald 2009). 
 
The AsgiSA development model is supported by the African Union’s New 
Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Amongst its stated 
objectives are the eradication of poverty, the sustainable growth and 
development of African countries, the end to the marginalisation of African 
countries in the globalised world and the full integration of African countries 
into the global economy (NEPAD 2010). Drafted under President Mbeki’s 
direction, NEPAD is very pro-corporations, calling for a massive amount of 
foreign investment in privatised infrastructure. Its aims are to open up African 
markets and to secure increased trade, investment and aid, within the neoliberal 
development framework. Through NEPAD, the South African state facilitates 
the expansion and penetration of South African corporate, state and parastatal 
social relations into African economies (McDonald 2009), allowing the surplus 
reserves of capital to expand beyond the South African economy. The 
imperatives are profit, growth and the further expansion of the capitalist system 
throughout southern Africa. The consequence are the destruction of local 
economies and cultures, the de-peasantisation and proletarianisation of people, 
and the seizure of various commons (land, water and minerals in particular). In 
other words, the particular social relations of production continue to expand 
and deepen the rift between both classes and between humans and the 
environment. 
 
Other institutions which impinge on the subject matter of this study are the 
South African Constitution and various government departments – the 
Department of Minerals, the Department of Energy and the Department of 
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Environment45.  The constitution is widely acknowledged as excellent on a 
number of counts, including that it is remarkable for its attention to the 
environment.  The South African constitution and the environmental legislation 
which has flowed from that, are amongst some of the best in the world.  
Subsequent policies and practices have not been so remarkable.  
 
Under the Minerals Resources Development Act of 2002, the government 
nationalised mineral resources (Spoor 2009). Previously, land owners owned 
both the surface and underground mineral rights and therefore could negotiate 
with mining companies for compensation if land was taken for mining 
purposes. Now, the Department of Minerals controls mineral resources and 
issues prospecting and mining permits, subject to environmental impact 
assessments (EIAs) and in consultation with landowners and the communities 
affected – the last being points ‘in principle’. The EIAs are funded by the 
prospective mining company and it is the companies who employ the relevant 
consultants (Spoor 2009) so that the prospects for such EIAs being unbiased 
and critical of their contractors are not high. Again, the community 
consultations are often far removed from best practice, as Grobler (2009), the 
documentary journalist, indicates.  
 
Mining applications are subject to appraisal by the Department of Minerals and 
Resources (DMR) which can authorise them even against the advice of other 
departments, such as the Department of the Environment (DE) (and which the 
DE cannot contest). According to Grobler (2009), the Minerals Resources 
Development Act has delivered all sorts of irregularities. She argues that 
permits for both prospecting and mining are being issued in locations which 
are very sensitive in terms of both water and biodiversity. Grobler maintains 
that black rural communities, who are supposed to benefit from the new mining 
laws, aren’t. This is principally because the BEE partners are not bringing rural 
communities in as their partners. Instead, Grobler (2009: np) argues, they 
choose partners who are ‘high ranking government officials, their wives or 
                                           
45 Prior to June 2009, there were the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) and the Department 
of Environment and Tourism (DEAT). 
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husbands or family members’.  Groenewald (2009) confirms this claim. She 
describes how Coal of Africa, an Australian company covered in this study, is 
partnered with the Mvelaphanda group (holding 26 per cent) which was, until 
May 2009, headed by ‘Tokyo’ Sexwale, a very wealthy former cabinet member 
and who later was appointed as head of the Human Settlements Ministry by 
President Jacob Zuma.  
 
Grobler (2009) claims that ‘the Minister for Education’s husband has a mining 
company; the Minister for Transport’s wife has a mining company; the 
Minister for Water Affairs, who used to be Minister of Minerals and Energy’s 
husband, has a mining company. The Ex-Director-general of Trade and 
Industry and four of South Africa’s provinces’ previous premiers own or are 
BEE partners in mining companies. The list goes on and on’ (Grobler 2009: 
10). Since the national election held in May 2009, the former Minister for 
Minerals and Energy, Buyelwa Sonjica has been made Minister for the 
Environment. This means she will be the minister considering appeals made 
against the licences issued by the former DME, her former department. 
Environmentalists saw this as a sign that BEE coal-mining interests would now 
trump environmental concerns (Grobler 2009). 
 
That such high ranking and powerful public officials benefit from BEE brings 
into question the integrity not only of the programme but of the overall 
governance of mining in South Africa. This is a major concern. The fossil fuel 
sector has a powerful lobbying voice at both the international level and, in the 
case of South Africa, at the national level where corruption and political 
influence merge. This is but one vignette in the case for why national and 
global institutions will not tackle global warming. 
 
Grobler (2010) has also indicated that the state has announced plans to start its 
own mining company. The government has proposed that anyone who goes 
into partnership with it will then be exempt from some of the legislative 
requirements, including requirements in relation to environmental management 
planning and consultation with landowners. This would amount to not only a 
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further corporatisation of the state, but a complete merging of the interests of 
the government and those of the mining sector, including the coal sector.  
 
On the 23 June 2009, The Minister for Mineral Resources Susan Shabangu, in 
addressing the new Zuma-led parliament, said:  
 
In line with the internationally recognised principle that natural resources 
are a national patrimony, the heritage of all South Africans, the Minerals 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) vested the 
custodianship of all exploration and mineral rights in the State in 2004. 
Since the promulgation of the MPRDA, some progress, albeit less than 
envisaged, has been made toward the attainment of the objectives of the 
Mining Charter46. The promulgation of the MPRDA has also unlocked the 
mineral development potential of South Africa.  Since May 2004 we have 
received and processed an unparalleled number of applications for 
prospecting, exploration and mining, collectively peaking above 20,000 
and resulting in the development of several new projects. This is 
completely contrary to what has proven to be inept analysis, which 
suggested at the time that our new regulatory framework would destroy 
the mining industry (Shabangu 2009). 
 
She went on to say that: 
 
Mining remains an important contributor to the country’s   economic 
growth, with an average of 50 per cent of the country’s export earnings 
being derived from mining, while the sector is also a leading contributor to 
the country’s coffers through taxation. This emphasises the sensitivity 
with which we must treat the industry (Shabangu 2009). 
 
Shabangu also spoke about actions the department would be taking in response 
to the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and which resulted in the departmental-
                                           
46 The Mining Charter was developed by the ANC government in 2004 as a benchmark for reform of 
the mining sector – covering issues such as racial equity in mining, increased black economic control 
and labour conditions.  
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led Mining Industry Growth, Development and Employment Task Team 
(MIGDETT) developing recommendations that would ensure optimal 
development of the mining industry (Shabangu 2010). What actions, laws and 
policies this translates into are predictable, given the carte blanche treatment of 
the national and international mining sector under ANC governments to date. 
 
A further development of the economy, that is significant in terms of the 
organisation of the social relations of production, is closely entwined with the 
MEC and which is of continuing and growing significance, is the growth in the 
financial sector. As Ashman et al. (2010: np) write:  
 
In the context of South African production, financialisation has produced 
a particular combination of short-term capital inflows (accompanied by 
rising consumer debt largely spent on luxury items) and a massive long-
term outflow of capital as major ‘domestic’ corporations have chosen 
offshore listing and to internationalise their operations while 
concentrating within South Africa on core profitable MEC sectors. The 
result, even before the impact of the global financial crisis, was a jobless 
form of growth and the persistence of mass poverty for the majority 
alongside rising living standards for a small minority, including new 
black elites.  
 
Furthermore, what was needed in South Africa was for profits earned to be 
reinvested within the country in long-term value-added sectors that increased 
employment with decent working conditions (Mohamed 2009). In other words, 
the economy needed to be restructured towards more labour intensive 
industries and away from the MEC and the financial sectors, the latter of which 
contributed significantly to the destabilisation of the South African economy; 
from the high unemployment, underemployment and casualisation of 
employment; and from bubbles in real estate and financial asset markets 
(Mohamed 2009). Mohamed (2009) confirms that various government policies 
have led to increased financialisation of South Africa’s largest corporations. 
Short-term and speculative investments have ensued. The highly concentrated 
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South African economy is now even more concentrated and dependent on the 
MEC, particularly for export earnings. 
 
5.6  Discussion and conclusion 
 
What is significant and central to this study is that these macroeconomic 
policies of the ANC government have ensured South Africa has the highest 
national and one of the highest per capita carbon emission levels in the world. 
The arguments used by the government that economic growth is necessary to 
lift the poor out of poverty and hence, that no caps should be placed on South 
Africa’s carbon emissions, are false.  
 
South Africa illustrates the deepening and expanding division and the 
intimately connected paradox of private accumulation and public 
impoverishment within the system of capitalism. It represents a microcosm of 
the global capitalist political economy in which the accumulation of capital is 
juxtaposed to the increasing fragility of life for the majority of humans and 
species, the growing alienation of humans from the environment and through 
the destruction of the biosphere. For the ANC to gain power, compromise was 
perhaps inevitable, but the adoption of a neoliberal agenda at the expense of 
the poor and black communities which had brought them to power is a deep 
betrayal and abrogation of responsibility to the ANC’s constituents – the black 
majority. The socio-economic structures that the ANC inherited, along with 
South Africa’s continued integration into the global economy as a semi-
peripheral nation, have been further cemented since 1994, with the continuing 
dominance of the MEC in concert with the financial sector, in the South 
African economy and the rise of South Africa’s wealthy black elite, in part 
through the policies of Black Economic Empowerment. 
 
The extreme economic disparity experienced by much of the black population 
is a very clear retreat from commitments to public ownership enshrined in the 
Freedom Charter which was a statement of the core principles adopted in 1955 
by the South African Congress Alliance, embodying the hopes and aspirations 
of the black majority. Further the unambiguous safeguarding of private capital, 
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the obstacles placed in the way of progressive economic policies by business 
interests and the entrenched apartheid-era bureaucracy are all part of the 
neoliberal package which contributes to a critical understanding of South 
African society and the dominant political economy of today.  
 
South Africa has experienced colonialism, civil (colonial) war and apartheid. 
Each of these has incontestably and significantly influenced the shaping of the 
country. It is contemporary global political economy structures and ideology 
however which have been most determinative of current economic policies. 
One of South Africa's foremost social and political commentators and activist 
academics, Ashwin Desai (2002: 18) writes ‘[t]he transition to democracy was 
underpinned by corporatism ... conflict was to be institutionalized [and] control 
[was to be] by the ANC or its allies in the tripartite alliance’47. He observes 
that today dissent from the ANC party line is increasingly not tolerated.  
 
While the motivations are contested (Bond 2006; Magubane 2004), it is clear 
that the ANC diverted from the revolutionary course that governed them as a 
national liberation movement to a country integrated into the global capitalist 
economy with neoliberal policies. The ANC, in confronting the moral dilemma 
faced by a party whose constituents have remained impoverished, marginalised 
and trapped in the townships, has continued to leverage support from the 
people because of its historical role in freeing South Africa from apartheid. 
Disillusionment, violence and xenophobia are growing and the pressures 
brought about by global warming and a predictable massive influx of refugees 
from other African countries will serve to create in South Africa a tinder box 
for widespread racial, class and violent action and, one can envisage, 
potentially, a failed state, like its neighbour, Zimbabwe.  
 
Connell (2009: np) maintains that real power in South Africa remains ‘at the      
commanding heights of the black political and economic elite and with the rich 
white farmers’.  Fine (2008) writes: ‘it was inescapable that there was an 
                                           
 47 The Tripartite Alliance includes the ANC, Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
and the    South African Communist Party (SACP). 
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integral partnership between state and private capital, and an equally integral 
connection between a core set of activities around mining and energy, 
straddling the public/private divide’. This partnership with state capital 
supporting/subsidising private capital can be seen very explicitly in the energy 
sector today. The media have revealed that some of the largest mining 
companies in South Africa continue to have subsidised electricity from Eskom 
in special, secret ‘sweet-heart’ deals48, while the people of South Africa, many 
of whom cannot afford electricity at all, are faced with large price hikes.  In the 
context of global warming, it is then wholly appropriate that the thesis focuses 
on the power of this sector. It is the David and Goliath of South Africa and 
Africa – the impoverished, disempowered people who live on the margins in 
the struggle for survival versus corporate capital, corporatised state interests 
and an economy structured to favour the latter. It is a complex struggle for 
survival that now has added to it the growing impacts from global warming – 
food shortages, water shortages and a growing influx of refugees - and the 
disequilibrium of the very biosphere upon which the people so closely depend. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 will provide post-apartheid examples of the power and 
centrality of the coal and electricity sectors to the South African economy at an 
empirical level. They conclude with an analysis of the impact of this sector on 
South Africa in a global warming world. 
 
Moving this discussion to the international arena, in terms of the ANC 
development trajectory and the neoliberal thrust of economic policies adopted 
in the post-apartheid era, it is significant that the ANC came to power during 
the height of the neoliberal globalisation project. For some, the economic 
policies of post-apartheid South Africa have been little more than a 
continuation of the apartheid era economics and the question that is raised 
frequently in the literature (Bond 2000, 2006; Magubane 2004; Marais 2001; 
Terreblanche 2002) is whether the ANC government deliberately betrayed its 
constituents, or whether it was powerless to choose differently. Saul (2001), in 
                                           
48 BHP Billiton smelters import bauxite aluminium ore from Australia, use subsidised Eskom 




an article titled ‘Cry for the Beloved Country: Post-Apartheid Denouement’, 
maintains that there was a betrayal on the part of the ANC itself, while Connell 
(2009) suggests the ANC government was and remains powerless to be other 
than part of the globalisation project of capitalism.  
 
There was a concurrence of events at the time of the achievement of political 
democracy: the end of the apartheid era; the full re-integration of South Africa 
into the international arena after the years of sanctions and boycotts; the 
dismantling of protective tariffs by the new South African ANC government; 
the demise of the Soviet Union; and the hey-day of neoliberal ideological 
hegemony. The ideological climate of the global economy was dominated by 
the belief that there was no alternative to the neoliberal way.  
 
The implications of the neoliberal model of development now adopted by the 
South African political elite are rippling - perhaps raging - throughout sub-
Saharan Africa. The privatisation of African economies is now led by 
significant pan-African institutions. In this, South Africa takes a lead role, such 
as in the African Union’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) whose neoliberal mandate is to build public/private partnerships to 
promote growth, investment and jobs. In conjunction with the political 
institutions, and true to the capitalist globalisation project, South African 
companies are joining the rush to exploit other African countries (Bond 2006; 
Magubane 2004; and McDonald 2009).  The global context for the internal 
South African economic structure is its location in the global economy as a 
semi-peripheral economy led by a political elite convinced that the neoliberal 
nature of contemporary globalisation leaves Pretoria with no other choice than 
to support the Washington Consensus (Connell 2009). Just as South Africa 
belongs to the ANC in the sense that its moral authority (and ideological 
power) stem from its role in South Africa’s liberation history, South Africa, 
through its relations with international neoliberal institutions such as the World 
Bank, is able to spread its economic, financial and corporate interests 




All of this presents highly relevant background to the question of global 
warming.  This chapter has provided empirical evidence of the growing rift in 
society between the powerful elite, the owners and controllers of capital on the 
one hand, and society and the environment on the other. It has shown in whose 
interests the economy is structured in South Africa. In the context of this thesis, 
the study of South Africa, as I indicated in Chapter 4 in the quote from Amin 
as ‘a microcosm of the world capitalist system’, represents an analysis of the 
convergence of powerful political and economic interests and structures which 
deepen the rift between humans and the environment and between humans and 
fellow humans. This is the very rift that is fundamental to the capitalist social 
relations of production and is the genesis of a multitude of environmental and 
social crises, including the crisis of global warming. At the same time, it is an 
example of the unfolding tragedy of global warming, which will first and 
foremost affect those with the least power to change the course of events, and 
those with the least adaptive capacity to be able to withstand future global 
warming consequences. 
 
What must not be lost sight of in this description and analysis of South Africa 
in the post-apartheid era is the lost opportunity to build a united society, a real 
sense of community across the country. It would have been difficult but the 
time was ripe in 1994 and the period immediately following. The country was 
ready for that; in retrospect it was calling out for it. Mandela to some limited 
extent provided it but never really ‘seized the day’. And certainly once Mbeki 
was in power, with his desire to build a neoliberal state, that opportunity was 
gone. The white elite, realising that to preserve their own individual power 
there was no other way, welcomed the black elite to join their power base and 
that black elite quickly learned the ways of selfish individualism and 
increasingly severed their links with their black constituents. The moment was 
missed and the neoliberal die was cast.        
 
The next two chapters look more specifically at the economy today and its 
links, first to the electricity sector and then to the coal sector. These show how 
the economic structure and ideological power and control of these sectors 
further cement the South African economy within the capitalist globalisation 
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project while, at the same time, precluding any hope for an ecologically 
sustainable future and in turn for addressing in any coherent or effective way 
global warming. In addition they explain the workings of the South African 
economy, especially the energy sector but importantly also contribute to the 
empirical basis which leads to the theoretical framework for the thesis. They 








This part of the thesis links the realities of the South African experience to 
what is a contradictory model of development. The two sub-sets of the MEC, 
first in this chapter the electricity sector and then, in the next, the coal sector 
are examined through the prism of global warming. These sectors are integral 
to and determinative components of the social relations of production, the 
central core of the capital accumulation process in South Africa and the 
deepening contradiction between capital accumulation and the biosphere which 
is the structural underpinning of global warming. In the next chapter, the 
practical significance of coal to capital accumulation within South Africa and 
the expansion of the South African economy and capitalism in Africa are 
outlined. South Africa provides an example of an African country at grave risk 
from the consequences of global warming which, nevertheless, remains 
unwavering in its pursuit of coal fired electricity to underpin its economic 
growth. This also provides an empirical guide to the focus of the theoretical 
framework in Part III.  
 
South Africa has been described as ‘the economic powerhouse of Africa’ 
(South Africa Info 2010), leading in industrial and mineral production and 
generating a large proportion of Africa's electricity. It is both an important 
emerging economy and also the gateway to other African markets (South 
Africa Info 2010).  It has well-developed financial, legal, communications, 
energy and transport sectors, highly ranked banking regulations and stock 
exchange, and sound infrastructure supporting the distribution of goods 
throughout the southern African region. In other words, the infrastructure 
required by the global corporate sector is first world class.  
 
The chapter builds on the description and analysis of Africa, South Africa and 
recent South African economic history as set out in Chapters 4 and 5. Beyond 
this introduction, it identifies the electricity institutions and the various sources 
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of electricity and electricity governance, before turning to South Africa’s 
position on global warming. It finishes by setting the electricity sector in the 
context of the broad economy thereby providing a base to lead into a detailed 
discussion of the coal industry, the predominant source of electricity, in the 
next chapter. 
 
6.2   The South African electricity environment 
 
A major concern in considering the key institutions in South Africa in relation 
to electricity and global warming is the disconnect between the rhetoric of 
policy statements and the reality of economic development. On the one hand is 
the acknowledgement of poverty, inequality and the pending crisis of global 
warming; on the other is the reality of the policies implemented with the clear 
intent of growing the economy, increasing the coal-based electricity supply and 
expanding the capitalist relations of production throughout southern Africa. 
This disconnect can also be found in the arguments used by the South African 
government in climate change negotiations, where it has proposed unrestrained 
growth to enable the country to lift the poor out of poverty. The reality is that 
the neoliberal development agenda has resulted in a widening gap between rich 
and poor. 
 
Understanding the current situation on energy policy in South Africa and the 
links between the electricity sector and the economy in general can better be 
achieved if the reader has some knowledge of the various institutions that exist 
in South Africa which govern and influence energy policy. This section 
therefore briefly outlines the energy institutions – NERSA (the National 
Energy Regulator of South Africa), Eskom, SASOL and others. 
 
6.2.1  NERSA 
The National Energy Regulator (NERSA) is the authority established in 1995 
to regulate electricity, piped-gas and petroleum pipeline industries. 
Anecdotally, NERSA is known as a ‘toothless tiger’. It formed the Electricity 
Working Group in 1995 to develop proposals to restructure the distribution 
industry, a process in which different sectors of society were to be involved. It 
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became the case, however, that civil society and the trade unions were 
increasingly marginalised (McDonald 2009: 75). This resulted in ‘separating, 
ringfencing and corporatizing the generation, transmission and distribution 
sectors’ (McDonald 2009: 76) of Eskom (see below). This arrangement was 
then accepted in 2001 by the government which passed an Act which enabled 
the transformation of Eskom to a business model to assist its entry into global 
markets (McDonald 2009: 76). NERSA’s role was restricted to regulating 
Eskom’s market access and approving electricity tariffs, thereby reflecting the 





A remarkable 95 per cent of South Africa’s electricity and a yet more 
remarkable 45 per cent of Africa's is generated and transmitted by the state 
owned parastatal enterprise known as Eskom (Eskom 2008) which, as 
indicated above, is regulated by NERSA.  Eskom and its owners, the South 
African Government, are committed to continued growth of the South African 
energy sector, using coal as the predominant fuel source, an ‘energy future on a 
coal and nuclear strategy with limited renewable energy targets ... [the last 
amounting] to 1.5 per cent of final consumption’ (Sacsis 2009: np).  
 
Eskom was established in 1923. It is run on business principles with a mandate 
to deliver cheap and abundant electricity, primarily to mining and industry. It is 
thus a key institution in the MEC (Eskom 2010). It employs about 35,500 
employees, reduced from 66,000 over the past two decades (World Bank 
2009). Eskom generates, transmits and distributes electricity to industrial, 
mining, commercial, agricultural and residential customers and redistributors. 
It is described by McDonald (2009) as an institutional giant on the African 
continent and has continent-wide activities, buying and selling electricity to the 
countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).49  
                                           
49 Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 




Both the expansion and partial privatisation of Eskom paralleled South 
Africa’s process of post-apartheid economic neoliberalisation, with Eskom 
becoming a site for capital accumulation and sub-imperial expansion in the 
SADC. A wholly owned subsidiary of Eskom Holdings, The Eskom 
Enterprises (Pty) Limited group, was created in 1999 as part of a deregulatory 
thrust in South Africa around the energy sector, with expansion into 
telecommunications, IT, engineering and other services (Greenberg 2009: 91).  
A major focus of Eskom Enterprises has been to provide ‘lifecycle support and 
plant maintenance, network protection and support for the build [expansion] 
programme for all Eskom divisions’ (Eskom 2010: np). Of growing 
significance is the thrust to play a lead role in the South African export and 
expansion programme in Africa generally, on the basis of the GEAR 
macroeconomic strategy and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) (Greenberg 2009).  
 
Through Eskom’s sub-imperial dominance of the regional market, it is 
expected for example that South Africa will use 60 per cent of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo’s (DRC) output from the Inga Dams on the Congo River. In 
2006, more than 80 per cent of Eskom’s imported electricity came from 
Mozambique’s Cahora Bassa Hydro-electric scheme (which for many years 
has been bought at below cost under apartheid-era agreements), with a 
significant percentage of this being on-sold to Zimbabwe (for a profit).  Such 
activities are driven by a desire for capital accumulation rather than for 
development to benefit the poor. Indeed they have often led to dispossession of 
local communities of community-owned land and free access to water.  
 
Within South Africa, Eskom has 13 coal fired power stations, centralised into 
an interlocked power grid, with two more, Medupi near Lephalale in the 
Limpopo Province, already under construction, and Kusile, which has contracts 
already signed for construction, in Mpumalanga Province. Upon completion, 
Medupi and Lephalale will be the world’s third and fourth largest coal-fired 
power plants respectively (Munnik and Hallowes 2009). They have resulted in 
a flurry of new coal mining activity, licence applications, approvals and 
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contracts to supply coal. They are just two of the five large-scale plants that 
Eskom is proposing to build.  
 
The decision to build Medupi and Kusile was supported by claims that clean 
coal technologies – carbon capture and storage (CCS) - will be used (the major 
problems of which were discussed in Chapter 3). These claims are additionally 
challenged by the fact that South Africa does not have the right geological 
conditions for such technologies (Munnik and Hallowes 2009). It is to be noted 
too that the government’s rush to support coal is bolstered by having 
designated Eskom as the single buyer of power produced by independent 
producers. This reinforces yet further the preferential position of coal over 
renewables.  
 
Eskom’s current power capacity is 40,000 Mega Watts (MW), with 94 per cent 
of base load from coal, the majority of the rest from the 1800 MW Koeberg 
nuclear power plant, and a small amount from hydroelectric plants (Hallowes 
and Munnik 2009: 11). According to Eskom’s acting chairman, Mpho 
Makwana (2010), its current building plan will bring another 12,300 MW on 
line by 2017. Makwana is reported as having claimed that another 50,000 MW 
is required by 2028 – the ‘equivalent of another [existing] Eskom and more’. 
Such projections of future demand have been criticised as being exaggerated 
and an attempt to justify yet more investment in Eskom infrastructure 
(Nakhooda 2010: np).  
 
Central to Eskom’s growth in South Africa is its reliance on coal which in turn 
makes it especially central to my study.  (I return to this issue in Chapter 7.) 
Eskom predicts its electricity supply will grow at 4.4 per cent per annum and 
that CO2 emissions from electricity generation will double in less than 20 
years. However, in its 2008 Annual Report, Eskom states: 
  
[Eskom’s] climate change strategy contains our commitment to reduce our 
greenhouse gas emissions [and the] capital expansion plan provides a 
significant opportunity to change our energy mix by increasing the 
nuclear, gas, renewables and clean coal components. Plans include 
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increasing the renewables component to at least 1 600 MW by 2025 
(Eskom 2008). 
 
Eskom (2008) claims that clean coal technologies are already being applied to 
the coal-fired power stations under construction. This is at best misleading, 
given that such technologies will not be available for commercial use before 
2040 (ABC Four Corners 2009), and then only for appropriate geological 
formations not present in South Africa (Hallowes and Munnik 2009). Also the 





Sasol (Afrikaans for South African Coal and Oil) is a coal-to-liquids (CTL) 
producer, established under the apartheid regime as a means of securing South 
Africa’s independence from foreign oil imports.  It has more recently expanded 
its interests into mining, energy, chemicals and synthetic fuels.  It was at one 
time the largest private company listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
and is currently the largest coal-to-liquids chemicals producer in the world. 
Sasol’s Secunda CTL plant in the Mpumalanga region is the biggest single 
emitter of carbon dioxide on the planet, producing, for example, 318 million 
tons of CO2 in 2003 (Science in Africa 2006). Sasol has plans to construct a 
new CTL plant in the Limpopo Region. It is now also a global petrochemical 
group, producing fuels and chemicals. It is important at two levels: first as a 
component of South Africa’s high carbon emission energy mix; and second as 
a political player. Its economic role also both furthers and is driven by 
neoliberalism. For example Earthlife Africa and Oxfam International (2009) 
has revealed attempts by Sasol to claim carbon credits inappropriately under 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects by building a gas pipeline 
from Mozambique to Gauteng to fuel its Secunda plant. Such attempts are 
more in line with capital accumulation ambitions than with reducing carbon 





6.2.4 Other  
Mention of South Africa’s nuclear power and renewables completes the 
picture. South Africa has the only nuclear power station in Africa. It supplies 6 
per cent of South Africa's electricity and has a life expectancy of 30-40 years 
(Eskom 2010). Groenewald writing for The Mail and Guardian (5 March 
2010), reported that the South African government was putting out a tender for 
a second nuclear power station in September 2010, after the publication in 
May/June of the government's second integrated resource plan (IRP2) which 
was to outline South Africa's future energy strategy. The IRP2 would reveal 
how many nuclear power stations the country would ultimately build. As at 31 
January 2011, the IRP2 has still not been released. According to Groenewald 
(2010: np), South Africa's long-term mitigation strategy and how the country 
will cap its carbon emissions between 2025 and 2050 ‘foresees a huge role for 
nuclear power and renewable resources and this will almost certainly be 
reflected in the IRP2’. The existing (Koeberg) nuclear power plant has a total 
capacity of 1,800 MW but according to Groenewald (2010), Eskom plans to 
‘manage’ South Africa's carbon footprint by generating 20,000 MW from 
nuclear reactors by 2025. She writes that the deal for a second nuclear power 
plant was worth US$12 billion in 2008 and that even if South Africa were to 
award the tender for a nuclear reactor by the end of 2010 (it did not), the new 
nuclear power station would come online only in 2019 at the earliest. She 
seriously questions how South Africa will be able to meet its voluntary carbon 
emission reduction targets of 34 per cent below ‘business as usual’ levels by 
2020 and by 42 per cent by 2025, if nuclear does not come to the party.The 
long-term mitigation strategy (2008) called for a second nuclear reactor, but 
the tender process was cancelled at the end of 2008 at the time of political 
uncertainties around the demise of Thabo Mbeki. Nuclear power, however, still 
remains on the energy expansion agenda (Groenewald 2010). 
 
Bids to build a second nuclear plant have been costed at ‘substantially more 
than the R100 to R120 billion [A$16.6 to A$20 billion] that Eskom had 
estimated’ (Hallowes 2009: 11).  
 




The nuclear component of future electricity supply is 27 per cent in one 
scenario, and 0 per cent in another. Nuclear energy poses health and safety 
risks, and its claims to carbon-neutrality are questionable. The fuel 
enrichment is, for example, very energy intensive. But the immediate 
concern should focus on nuclear energy's economic implications. Nuclear 
energy is unpredictably expensive, as the PBMR's rising costs (now at 
R16 billion [$A2.35 billion]) have shown. The cost of the Finnish nuclear 
reactors  being built by Areva, the French company favoured to lead South 
Africa's nuclear expansion, has already more than doubled from the 2.5 
billion Euro declared in the Finnish parliament in 2003. On this scale, 
South African nuclear ambitions will cost more than the arms deal.' 50 
 
Significantly Munnik and Hallowes (2009: np) add: 'It will become the tail that 
wags the dog of macro-economic policy.' 
 
According to the Mail and Guardian (2010), South Africa again decided to 
shelve the development of a proposed second nuclear power plant, a Pebble 
Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR), due to the failure to find private investors and 
customers outside of South Africa for the energy produced. This is despite the 
fact that to date R9.2 billion had been spent on the PBMR, 80 per cent of the 
money coming from the government.51 
 
Finally, South Africa, a land of long, hot and sunny summers, good potential 
wind and wave power, has a very small component of renewable energy - 283 
MW out of a total of nearly 40,000 MW (Banks and Schaffler 2006)), with 
plans for only a small increase in the future. According to Groenewald (2010), 
and as indicated above, Eskom's six-point plan to curb climate change includes 
1,600MW of electricity to be supplied by renewables by 2025. Factors 
                                           
50 PBMR refers to Pebble Bed Modular Reactor. The arms deal, announced in 1998, was to re-equip 
the South African military forces, the first phase involving both the purchase of various hardware 
including patrol corvettes, light helicopters and submarines from manufacturers in Europe and 
kickbacks to high ranking members of the ANC. The first phase of the deal alone was in the order of 
R43bn (US$5.5bn) and more followed. 
51 Mail and Guardian 2010 SA mothballs Pebble Bed Modular Reactor project September 17 2010. 




affecting the uptake of renewable energy include the lack of political will and 
also, for Eskom, the fact that having a centralised grid based on coal fired 
power is the most profitable option.  
 
6.3  The South African economy, electricity and global warming 
 
In the global drive for mineral resources and energy supplies, the African 
continent has become of major strategic importance (Buscher 2009), both as a 
source of fossil fuels and energy in the global economy and also as a site of 
capital accumulation. As the regional and expanding hegemonic power and 
dominant country in the electricity sector on the continent (McDonald 2009), 
South Africa can be expected to have an increasingly influential role in Africa 
vis-à-vis the international arena, including around energy, global warming and 
the spread of capitalism. It is thus important to acknowledge the intricate 
relationship between electricity developments on the African continent and 
South Africa’s energy sector developments. McDonald (2009: xv) maintains 
that ‘electricity has become an integral part of all capitalist activity’. 
  
In the context of this thesis it is essential to examine how electricity fits into 
the wider dynamics of capital accumulation and crisis in Africa. This is 
particularly so at a time when the rush to build electricity capacity on the 
continent is akin to the 19th century ‘scramble for Africa’ with ‘electricity grid 
lines replacing the colonial railway lines of yesteryear’ (McDonald 2009: xvi). 
South African, American, European and Asian firms are increasingly active in 
Africa. The neoliberal development model, which drives and legitimises this 
expansion of capitalism, also serves both to justify neoliberal ideology as the 
only relevant governance model and to defend the spread of capitalist 
processes ‘in all spheres of life’ (Buscher 2009: 3956). The hegemonic 
ideology in this context becomes a practical reality.  
 
The benefits of the energy sector are not evenly distributed but favour the 
mining and financial sectors and, domestically, the well-off. The expansion of 
electricity by South Africa as a sub-imperial power, both for home 
consumption and for other sub-Saharan countries, is also accompanied by 
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increased social repression and forced relocation for hundreds of thousands of 
people who get in the way of this development. McDonald (2009: xviii) argues 
that in South Africa to date ‘the mining and industry sectors remain the 
primary beneficiaries of state electricity expenditures, but these sectors are 
joined now by a growing (urban) financial and services sector that has begun to 
dominate the South African economy’. 
  
Today, more than 30 per cent of South Africans are dependent on paraffin, raw 
coal and open wood fires for their cooking, heating and lighting needs 
(McDonald 2009). Renewable energy sources have barely been explored. As 
previously stated, imported hydropower, for example, from Mozambique, and 
the DRC has had detrimental social and ecological impacts on the people of 
these countries as a result of large scale dam building. Again, these 
developments are driven by a desire for capital accumulation rather than 
meeting the needs of the people.  
 
Despite the fact that most black South Africans have always had no, 
inadequate, or at best intermittent, illegal and/or unreliable electricity supplies 
(McDonald 2009), an electricity crisis in South Africa was first formally 
acknowledged only in 2005 when industry and the urban (mostly white) middle 
class faced blackouts known as ‘load-shedding’52. That this ‘load-shedding’ 
constituted a crisis is something of a metaphor for inequality in South Africa. It 
is also an example of uneven development within a country under a capitalist 
economy. The political economy structure around energy serves to deepen the 
racial and class divides.  
 
Since the 1990s, South Africa has had one of the most carbon intensive 
economies in the world (McDonald 2009: 131) and its total carbon emissions 
are set to grow. Of course, South Africa is only one of many nations with an 
economy at odds with an ecologically sustainable future, but the decisions 
                                           




being made in South Africa today have the potential to lock not only South 
Africa further into fossil fuel dependence, but also its neighbours.  
 
Bond (2003: 24) writes ‘[a]ccess to water and electricity has become a key 
struggle in South Africa’s townships. Thirty per cent of South Africans do not 
have access to electricity, and yet South Africa ranks as the eleventh largest 
emitter of carbon dioxide emissions in the world and has one of the highest 
levels of carbon dioxide emissions per capita in the world’.  McDonald (2009) 
draws up a theoretical framework for analyzing the dominance of coal to South 
Africa’s energy. In doing so he argues that the expansion of South African 
control over the electricity sector throughout southern Africa carries with it the 
expansion of neoliberal capitalism’s ideological, structural and managerial 
frameworks.  
 
Defining South Africa’s unsustainable, inequitable development, as being 
created by individuals in power, and whether they yielded to endemic 
corruption, is not the problem. It is the system. As Bond (2002: xvi) claims, it 
is ‘global capitalism, augmented by patriarchy, racism/ethnicism and various 
other ‘isms’ with at the helm, functionaries who promote neo-liberal principles, 
projects and policies’. South Africa’s post–apartheid politicians, bureaucracy 
and private sector mandarins have recognised that they can make statements 
about sustainable developments and reducing global warming and at the same 
time continue to implement policies that take the country in the opposite 
direction. Bond (2002: 4-5) writes of the ‘contradictions associated with over-
consumptive eco-destruction and the trajectory of unsustainable non-
development’ (Bond 2002: 4-5). I agree and will return to these issues in Part 
III in the theoretical chapters. I have seen with my own eyes the contradictions 
and different experiences between environment and development by the elites 
and the majority53. It is these different experiences, the deep class divisions, 
the exploitation and alienation of the majority of South Africans and their 
                                           
53 I have had some difficulty in finding an all embracing term that covers the broad collection of 
people who are not part of the global power and economic elite – peasants, workers, small scale 
farmers, unemployed urban slum dwellers, unemployed refugees, the lower middle and working 
classes in developed economies who are beneficiaries of the global capitalist system but whose 
position is nevertheless fragile within that system. 
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dispossession and alienation from the land in an economy driven by the 




Just as a thread running through the whole thesis is the issue of how best to 
promote human development in the context of a finite planet and particularly 
global warming, this study of South Africa too reflects a microcosm of that 
question: can capitalism, and currently, neoliberal capitalism, provide a 
material, social and political good that is sustainable and which benefits all 
South Africans? What or whose interests are being served by the expansion of 
the fossil-fuelled capitalist system, given the dire consequences already 
experienced on the African continent as a result of global warming? 
 
In summary, several key points are made in this chapter.  
 
· First, through the expansion of South Africa’s electricity system, both 
in South Africa and throughout sub-Saharan Africa, a significant 
component of the infrastructure for neoliberal capitalist expansion is 
being consolidated, carrying with it the structural changes necessary for 
economic growth and capital accumulation.  
 
· Second, this process can be seen as not only one of accumulation, 
dispossession and ecological destruction within South Africa but also 
the story of a sub-imperial power being visited on its sub-Saharan 
neighbours.  
 
· Third, and critically, it is also the expansion and deepening of the rift 
between humans and the environment, which if not repaired, could lead 
to the destruction of human society and the end of an epoch. 
 
This is the ultimate contradiction. There are South Africa’s fossil fuelled, 
capitalist economy on the one hand; and on the other, the very detrimental 
consequences of this economy to the ecology and South Africa’s future 
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survivability.  This chapter has begun to spell out this contradiction. Within 
that broader story, the coal and electricity sectors directly impinge on not just 
the environmental issue of global warming but also a whole gamut of 
environmental, governance and social issues: food and water security, health, 
air pollution and socio-economic issues of electricity access, poverty and 
inequality. The power of the energy sectors and their entwinement with the 
state represent a threat to the fragile democracy that is South Africa today. As 
Fig (2007) argues, that power is significant in driving macroeconomic policy 
on the continent. It is a major influence on global warming and on the 
prospects for South Africa getting to grips (or failing to get to grips) with 
global warming.  
 
In the next chapter, I will look at the intersection of this power with that of 
global institutions such as the World Bank - an institution at the heart of 























CHAPTER 7   South Africa and coal   
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter looks more specifically at the coal industry in South Africa and 
the contradictions this industry encompasses: such as between capitalist 
industrial development and deepening poverty; and between a global 
institution’s (the World Bank’s) purported aims of alleviating poverty, climate 
change and corruption and its real world support for coal based energy, 
community impoverishment and corruption. This chapter highlights the size 
and power of the mining sector and particularly coal mining to the South 
African economy and how it is integral to the imperatives of capital 
accumulation. It looks at some of the implications of the coal sector, both 
nationally for South Africa, but also more locally, in the Limpopo Province.  
This process is begun in Section 7.2 which looks at the costs and benefits of 
coal.  Thereafter, I will provide two case examples identifying these issues. 
The first example (section 7.3) examines the granting of a World Bank loan for 
the expansion of coal power by Eskom. Given the role of coal in global 
warming and the World Bank’s claim to have a major role in addressing global 
warming, this section of the chapter seeks to make sense of the granting of this 
loan. It is only able to do so in the context of the neoliberal world that the 
World Bank fosters. The impact of the hegemony of neoliberalism expressed 
through the actions of this major global institution on both the political and 
economic direction of South Africa is exemplified through this loan. Short of 
any major structural reforms, the worries for the prospects of change to combat 
global warming in this now global neoliberal political economy are manifest 
and identified in the conclusion in section 7.5. 
 
The second case example (in Section 7.4) is a direct outcome of the type of 
developments supported by international institutions such as the World Bank 
and revolves around Coal of Africa (most commonly called CoAL), an 
Australian-owned company, expanding its mining activities to an 
environmentally, historically and culturally highly sensitive region of South 
Africa. This example shows the political machinations involved in such a 
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development which in itself bodes ill for global warming. It also bodes ill for 
any prospect of controlling this industry in a neoliberal environment. The lack 
of concern on the part of the company for environmental and cultural issues is 
matched only by its ignoring of the local population’s concerns and its failure 
to recognise the impact its activities will have on poverty and inequality, the 
local environment generally and global warming particularly.  
 
7.2 The benefits and costs of coal  
 
As indicated in Chapter 6, the energy sector is critical to South Africa’s 
economy which is structured around large scale, energy intensive industry and 
mining. The industrial and mining sectors consume 62.7 per cent of total 
electricity output (Hallowes and Munnik 2007). It is the second most energy 
intensive economy in the world and the biggest greenhouse gas emitter on the 
African continent, with 73 per cent of African emissions (Hallowes and 
Munnik 2007) but with less than 5 per cent of the African population. 
 
Statistics South Africa 2009 (2009) reveals that mining is of major importance 
to the economy with, in 2006, the gold mining industry contributing 1.7 per 
cent to gross domestic  product  (GDP), the platinum  mining  industry  2.1 per 
cent  and  the  coal mining industry 1.4 per cent. The mining sector as a whole 
is responsible for a large number of formal jobs (as at March 2008 506,000 
people or 6.0 per cent of the total labour force). Coal provides the predominant 
source of energy and South Africa has an abundant supply.  
 
More than 70 per cent of South Africa’s primary energy and 90 per cent of 
electricity generation comes from coal, as does a quarter of its liquid fuels. The 
country is by far the largest coal producer in Africa and the world's fifth largest 
(Hallowes and Munnik 2007). It produces about 224 million tonnes of coal 
each year valued around R60 billion (or $A10 billion) (MBendi Information 
Services 2010). About 51 per cent of South African coal mining is carried out 
underground, with the balance produced by open cast methods. Coal is also a 
significant earner of foreign exchange. South Africa is the third largest coal 
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exporting country in the world.  The industry is highly concentrated, with a 
handful of companies producing about 80 per cent of the saleable coal 
production. More than 58,000 workers are employed in the industry (MBendi 
Information Services 2010).  
Figure 7.1  South Africa’s Energy Supply 
 
Source:   http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/South_Africa/Background.html (accessed April 
2010). 
 
The South African government’s current energy policy reflects a continuing 
and growing commitment to coal mining and coal power. As indicated in 
Chapter 6, rapid growth of the economy in recent years has resulted in the 
government now aiming to double its electricity generation capacity from coal 
fired power stations by 2025 (EIA 2010)54. Whilst one of the supporting 
arguments for expanding coal mining and the building of new coal fired power 
stations is that it contributes to employment, the reality is that the industry is 
being increasingly mechanised and computerised. Profits and output grow but 
mining employment is decreasing. The total number of jobs in the coal sector 
has declined by nearly 50 per cent over the last twenty years (Minerals 
Economics Directorate 2008). 
 
                                           
54 The Eskom expansion programme will require an additional 50 million tonnes of coal (Eskom 




Mining is also a sector which has depended on transient labour, transient in the 
sense that labour travels from one region of the country to another for work 
within South Africa but transient also in that it has relied heavily on migrant 
labour. This labour is yet cheaper than the already cheap labour of South 
Africans. Such migrant labour (mainly from Lesotho, Mozambique, Botswana 
and Zimbabwe) still plays an integral role in the South African mining industry 
(MBendi Information Services 2010).  
 
South African government ministers and mining companies argue that mining 
is essential for the development of South Africa, for the eradication of poverty, 
the reduction of unemployment, and to provide services such as electricity, 
water, education and health to South Africans. Yet there is little evidence that 
coal mining (and other forms of mining) is helping to alleviate poverty and 
providing community services, and much evidence to the contrary. 
 
The benefits of the mining industry in South Africa are skewed to the better-
off. This skewing is however exacerbated by what are effectively state 
subsidies to mining companies for water, roads, electricity and land. It is then 
the population in general who bears a considerable burden of the mining 
industry’s activities.  Additionally, there is the burden carried by the state, and 
hence tax payers, of workers’ compensation for mining injuries since mining 
companies do not pay royalties to the state (Spoor 2009). 
 
The costs, in the broader sense, of coal mining are many although often not 
well researched. For example, little research has been done on mining diseases. 
An important exception is the work of Roberts (2009: 109) who shows that 
‘26.3 per cent of former miners had been diagnosed and treated for TB while in 
mine service’. Again (Roberts 2009: 151):  
 
Extremely high levels of respiratory illness were found amongst the 
former miners. Although just over 31.2 per cent reported that they did not 
have lung disease on their own assessment, when clinical signs and 
symptoms were recorded 95.6 per cent were coughing, 71.2 per cent 
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experienced dyspnoea55, 82.4 per cent fever, 80.9 per cent pain and 83.4 
per cent had experienced weight loss. It would not be inaccurate to 
describe the majority of these former miners as “pulmonary cripples”.  
 
What is important beyond these statistics is, as Roberts (2009: 151) argues, that 
her findings ‘are a shocking indictment of the failure on the part of mining 
companies to provide information to their employees on the ODMWA 
[Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 78 of 1973 as amended] and 
to provide some detail of the established and institutionalized system that exists 
to cover lifelong medical surveillance, diagnosis, and compensation in the 
event of certification of an occupationally acquired disease. This legislation is 
something that should be taught before a miner steps into the first shaft lift that 
takes him underground.’ It is not. 
 
An even less recognised health issue is the impact mining generally has had on 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa, where the spread of HIV/AIDS 
(Epstein 2002) within and beyond South Africa has been attributed to mining 
employment practices and the transience of the labour force, with many foreign 
miners returning to their impoverished communities in other southern African 
countries, ill with AIDS or other mine related diseases, and with no recourse to 
compensation or health care. 
 
Turning to ecological health, in 2004 South African carbon dioxide emissions 
from coal mining were estimated to be 440 million tonnes (mt) with Eskom 
accounting for over 40 per cent of that (Hallowes and Munnik 2007: 12). 
Emissions have increased since and will go on increasing. The figures in the 
following table  (7.1) ‘underestimate the emissions’ (Hallowes and Munnik 
2007: 12) but they give an indication of coal consumption and carbon 
emissions for 2008, and the rate of increase since 2000. 
 
Table 7.1  Production, Coal and Carbon  
 
                                           
55 Difficult or laboured breathing and shortness of breath 
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                 2008        2004    2000 
Production (GWh)      222,366    206,799           178,193 
Coal consumed (tonnes)            125,300,000        109,600,000      92,500,000 
Carbon dioxide (tonnes)            223,600,000          97,700,000      61,200,000 
 
Source: Hallowes  2009: 12, adapted from the 2008 Eskom Annual Report.  
 
Creamer (quoted in Bond and Dada 2009) contends that if coal consumption 
increases in line with capacity, Eskom will burn around 218 million tonnes 
when the current projects become operational and emit 390 million tonnes of 
CO2. But Eskom itself is talking about ‘a possible demand of 374 million 
tonnes a year by 2018 if a third new coal fired plant is built’ (Martin quoted in 
Hallowes and Munnik 2009: 13). It has been estimated that 40 new coal mines 
will be needed to service the demands of coal fired power stations, once the 
new Medupi and Kusile stations are operational in addition to the 64 currently 
operating (Department of Minerals and Energy 2010).  
 
Other costs of coal mining and of beneficiation of coal in South Africa are the 
approximately 60 million tonnes per annum of discard coal, which is estimated 
to have accumulated now to more than 1 billion tonnes (Department of 
Minerals and Energy 2009). These discards have a number of damaging 
environmental consequences, including the leaching of acids and toxins into 
the soil and water ways and the spontaneous combustion of slag heaps, 
emitting carbon dioxide and other gases into the atmosphere. The slagheaps are 
also particularly unsightly and are dotted throughout the countryside in coal 
mining areas – and will continue to have a damaging impact on the 
environment well into the future. Oelofse (2008) for the Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research (CSIR) has indicated that acid mine drainage (AMD) is 
the single most important environmental concern from mining activities. He 
writes that ‘the decant of AMD is likely to persist for centuries to come' and 
the ‘legacies of the historical sites will remain problematic for many years to 
come due to the vast magnitude of the associated impacts, a problem which 
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continues due to institutional fragmentation’ and the fact that roles and 
responsibilities remain only vaguely defined (Oelofse 2008: np).  
Other negative impacts of coal mining on land and water are on market 
gardening, farming, and tourism, with visual, noise and air pollution effects 
spreading over a physically much greater area than that of the mining site. The 
history of conflicting interests over water usage in South Africa is well 
documented by Hallowes and Munnik (2007) with industry having both a 
‘voracious appetite’ (Hallowes and Munnik 2007: 103) for water and also 
being responsible for high levels of contaminants in rivers, wetlands and the 
underground water table. Mining has also contributed to the disappearance of 
wetlands and the damming of rivers.  
 
In summary, the economic benefits in terms of capital accumulation are 
considerable but the vast majority of these benefits flow only to the well-off. 
The effects on the ecology have been devastating and would cost billions to 
rectify. The costs hit the poor more than the well-off. These adverse effects 




7.3 Example 1: The South African government, Eskom and the 
World Bank 
 
I will now turn to an issue which is one of the most significant developments in 
South Africa’s recent energy history and which illustrates the further 
implementation of the neoliberal development programme in South Africa, 
despite the enormous social and environmental costs attached to it.  
 
The World Bank’s Strategic Framework on Development and Climate Change 
(quoted in Redman 2008) expresses the case for urgent action on global 
warming. It claims that global warming has the potential to undo the 
development gains made in recent decades in many countries, no matter how 
much money is spent trying to achieve the United Nations’ eight poverty 
reduction Millennium Development Goals. However, as Redman (2008: np) 
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writes, ‘the Bank does nothing substantial to prioritize ‘new’ renewable energy 
sources, or decentralized, locally driven mitigation of adaptation efforts’. 
Redman adds that the World Bank Group increased lending to coal, oil and gas 
by more than 90 per cent from 2007, and lending for coal alone increased by 
256 per cent in 2007.  
 
In 2010, South Africa was one of these beneficiaries of World Bank loans for 
coal power. This section looks at this loan, who will benefit and what it means 
for both South Africa in the context of the political economy of global 
warming, and the World Bank, as one of the leading institutions at the 
international global warming negotiating table. 
 
In early 2010, Eskom applied to increase electricity tariffs to help to fund 
Eskom’s expansion programme. At the same time, the largest industrial users 
continued to be exempted from paying an equitable share of electricity costs 
due to Special Pricing Agreements which were set up in the last days of the 
apartheid regime just before the handover of power in 1994. Under these 
agreements, corporations such as Anglo American Corporation, BHP Billiton, 
Arceleor Mittal and others are paying less than R0.14/kwh (6.7 Rand = $A1 
approx. in Nov. 2010) which has resulted in major inequities for domestic 
users.  For example, McDonald, (2009: 89-90) presents figures which show the 
residents of Soweto (a major township just outside Johannesburg) paid 30 per 
cent more for electricity than nearby white suburbanites, and that there is full 
cost recovery in domestic use, which is 700 per cent more than what some 
large corporations are paying. Statistics on domestic disconnections – due in 
large part to inability to pay - are difficult to come by, but McDonald (2009) 
suggests that there have been times since 1996 when the number of 
disconnections are greater than the number of connections. Eskom’s response 
has been to introduce pre-paid meters in poor areas. McDonald writes that this 
allowed for the logic of capital to ensure the consumers, who had social rights 
to electricity, paid for it. He quotes Raniero Panzieri (1980 from McDonald 
2009; 243): ‘science, the gigantic natural forces, and the mass of social labour 
…[are]… embodied in the system of machinery, which together with those 
three forces, constitutes the power of the master …[and the new] “technical 
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bases” progressively attained in production provide capitalism with the new 
possibilities for the consolidation of its power’.  
 
Between October 2007 and February 2008 South Africa experienced major 
power supply interruptions and load shedding, forcing the temporary closure of 
mines and aluminium plants. In the wake of this,  and seemingly as a result, in 
2008 South Africans were informed that the World Bank was going to lend 
Eskom US$5 billion, the largest World Bank loan ever in Africa, for an 
electricity expansion programme. (A table of Eskom’s current and planned coal 
fired power stations is provided in Table 7.2.)  
 
A concerted effort by civil society organisations was mounted against the loan 
based on a number of concerns, including those related to global warming 
(discussed in more detail below). Lack of clarity around the loan persisted until 
9th April 2010 when, perhaps with a little irony just four months after the 
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, the World Bank announced the 
awarding to Eskom of a US$3.75 billion loan to co-finance the building of 
what will be the world’s fourth largest new coal fired power plant, the Medupi 
Power Plant in Lephalale, Limpopo Province. Concurrent with this, Eskom 
applied to NERSA to increase electricity prices by 34 per cent to domestic 
consumers to help to fund a proposed R345 billion capital expansion 
programme, over the subsequent five years (SouthAfrica Info. 2009). Eskom 
















(Source: Hallowes 2009:10).  Hallowes (2009) writes that these already initiated 
projects will add a further 18,540 MW of capacity by 2017 – and this is what the 
World Bank loan is supporting.  
 
The World Bank has a history with Eskom. Between 1951 and 1967, at the 
heart of the apartheid years, it lent $100 million to Eskom. Victims of apartheid 
are now seeking reparations in the US and European courts from international 
banks that made money from the profits related to these loans as they did not 
develop or supply power to any black communities in South Africa. Bond 
(2010) writes that the Bank co-authored the 1996 Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) programme (as discussed in Chapter 5), which was also 
detrimental to the majority with, black incomes subsequently falling below 
1994 levels while white incomes grew by 24 per cent.  
 
Up until this time, due to both the conditionalities that are enforced by the 
World Bank and African countries' sensitivities to being caught in debt traps, 
South Africa post-1994 had not accepted any loans from the World Bank. So 
this $3.75 billion loan is a first for post-apartheid South Africa. In fact, with the 
end of the Mbeki government in 2009, the Zuma government has adopted a 
different attitude to the World Bank and its conditionalities. While the 




never be), it is to be expected that they will further cement South Africa’s 
economy into programmes of privatisation and liberalisation, a reduction of 
spending on social services, a lowering of tax on the wealthy, further 
privatisation of state industries and further reduction of tariff barriers, opening 
the economy yet further to multinational corporations.  Swilling (2010) argues 
that the loan gives the World Bank what it really wants and has never had 
before, a firm grip on the South African economy and influence over economic 
policy. 
 
In 2001, in a policy announcement, the World Bank stated (quoted in Bond 
2002: 318):  
 
The Bank will focus on countries which demonstrate – through actions – a 
credible intent to privatise and to liberalise … liberalisation of power 
supply will be pursued through privatisations and the removal of 
legislative and commercial barriers to public/private partnerships. 
 
In other words, as found elsewhere (see Hanieh (2011) in relation to Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Egypt), the World Bank and the West’s support for the 
neoliberal agenda of promoting Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) follows a 
pattern of outsourcing previously state run utilities and services to private 
companies and is a form of state-sponsored private accumulation. One of the 
conditions of the South African loan agreement is that Eskom will privatise 30 
per cent of its generating capacity, in other words a further public expense for 
private gain. 
 
The history immediately preceding the World Bank loan is revealing both 
because of the strength and breadth of opposition to it by civil society groups 
and because of the covert nature of the loan application and conditions. 
Arguments for the loan from business and political sectors have been that 
South Africa had no alternative: South Africa would be plunged into darkness 
and the economy would come to a stand-still if new coal powered energy 
wasn’t generated (Jacks 2010). It was argued the loan was needed to enable 
universal access to electricity in South Africa. The argument maintained that 
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the country needed the Medupi coal-fired plant by 2012 and Eskom indicated 
that technologies which reduced carbon emissions would be built into the 
plant.  
 
Internationally, more than 200 civil society groups, including 60 South African 
groups (Bond 2010), criticised Eskom’s loan application. Opponents of the 
loan prepared extensive evidence and arguments in opposition and, in doing so, 
were very critical of the government’s support for the loan, the World Bank’s 
lending record and the role it has been playing as the major international 
climate change lending agency. It is important in gaining more understanding 
of the workings of neoliberalism in this example to look more closely at the 
basis of this opposition. 
 
Hallowes (2009: np) writes on this proposed deal of ‘the shocking record of 
World Bank oil loans to Africa [which] tells [the] story [of how] 80 per cent of 
projects that the World Bank invested in between 1992 and 2003 were 
designed to export oil to Western Europe, Canada, the U.S., Australia, New 
Zealand and Japan’ and that, coupled with this, ‘South Africa’s energy and 
carbon intensive export-led economy, an economy in which 80 per cent of 
energy is used by industry and commerce, belies the argument that the loan has 
anything to do with universal access to energy by domestic consumers’. With 
the very explicit support of the World Bank, that economy is thus developing 
in a way that is completely contrary to what is needed to address the needs of 
the poor majority, or global warming.  
 
In a Third World Network Report (2010), it was suggested that the main 
beneficiaries of the loan would be multinational corporations BHP Billiton, 
Anglo American Corporation and other energy intensive industries which 
already benefit from some of the cheapest energy in the world. That report 
states that the loan would not alleviate poverty nor increase domestic users’ 
access to electricity and would exacerbate people’s energy poverty, in part 
through disconnections due to price increases (to pay for the loan and Eskom’s 
expansion programme). In effect, the South African poor majority were locked 
into a debt they did not want but will have to pay for in the short term through 
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increased electricity prices, and in the longer term, to cuts to social services, 
declining environmental conditions and, eventually, for the cost of carbon 
emissions. The costs of the loan repayment will mean less money is available 
for more community-friendly energy and services. An example of one response 
to this has been by the community organisation, the Soweto Electricity Crisis 
Committee, which was formed in 2000 to fight against Eskom’s cutting the 
electricity supply to 20,000 houses per month in Soweto as part of its cost 
recovery program (Africascan 2008).  
 
The Medupi power station alone will emit an extra 25-30 million tons of CO2 
per annum (Hallowes and Munnik 2009), with additional fugitive carbon 
emissions from the opening up of new coal mines and additional transport 
upon which it depends. The argument that South Africa has carbon emission 
space because it has large scale poverty to overcome is a red herring. South 
Africa’s per capita emissions of 9.8 tons of CO2 are as high as the UK's 
(Hallowes and Munnik 2009), but very unequally sourced. 
 
Earthlife Africa and Oxfam International (2009) has argued that the power 
plant will benefit mainly large mining and metallurgical industries. Hallowes 
and Munnik (2010) state that the new power plant and its associated 127 per 
cent electricity price increases for poor people over the next four years, 
indicate that the World Bank still gives preference to multinational fossil-fuel 
capital over poor people. The South African Faith Communities' Environment 
Institute (SAFCEI 2010) maintains that the electricity produced by Medupi 
will be for export-based industry, which continues to benefit from secret 
contracts that provide it with electricity that is below the cost of what it costs 
Eskom to produce it.  
 
I have not been able to find any cost-benefit studies on coal fired power 
stations compared to other energy sources. However, as Sharife (2010) writes: 
‘[i]ronically, the difference between the capital costs of the 5,000MW wind 
project, and 3,600–4,800 MW Medupi whose total costs stand at US$16.6 
billion, is US$3.5 billion – almost the full World Bank loan’. This is not taking 
into account the continuing costs of coal purchase or the costs of future carbon 
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emissions for coal fired power. Decisions on these developments are being 
based on analyses provided largely by Eskom which has a clear vested interest 
in maintaining the coal energy status quo, while the informed (on energy) 
community voice is not being taken into account. 
 
The World Bank loan is US dollar-based so that if the Rand weakens in 
relation to the dollar, the most likely scenario, the size of the loan will increase. 
It also means that Eskom, or the South African government which underwrites 
the loan, has to earn foreign currency to pay back the loan. This, according to 
Hallowes and Munnik (2010), means that there is yet a further entrenchment of 
the export-oriented economy in raw materials ‘an economic model that has 
consistently failed, for the last hundred years, to eradicate poverty in the 
country’ (Hallowes and Munnik 2010: np). Thus there is an inherent paradox in 
Eskom securing a loan that both supports and requires an export-oriented 
economy based on cheap raw minerals extraction which in turn requires cheap 
electricity.  
 
Coal mining, beneficiation and power production require significant quantities 
of water. The building of the Medupi plant will affect future water supplies and 
air quality around Medupi.  The environmental and social consequences of this 
development will impact on the major water catchments, as the Limpopo, Vaal 
and Senque (Orange) Rivers are all going to have their water diverted for 
Medupi and future power stations. The South African government already 
acknowledges that the Waterberg will exceed its air pollution-carrying capacity 
in future.   
 
South Africa has had a contentious experience in relation to water management 
on a previous occasion with the World Bank. In 1999, World Bank economist 
John Roome advised the South African water minister to impose a market price 
for people who could not afford water. According to Bond (2010a: np) such an 
approach earlier resulted in a cholera epidemic killing hundreds and ‘[s]imilar 
misery will follow the Eskom loan.’ Medupi will be built in a water-scarce area 




Another dimension of concern regarding the World Bank loan is that the ANC 
will benefit financially from the construction of Medupi (through its 
Chancellor House investment in Hitachi Power Africa) and hence from the 
loan.  Hitachi Africa is 25 per cent owned by the ANC's investment arm, 
Chancellor House, and, as a partner in the consortium constructing the Medupi 
power station, was awarded a R38bn Eskom contract (Bond 2010a.) When 
former chairman of Eskom, Valli Moosa made the decision to award the R38bn 
Eskom contract to Hitachi for the building of Medupi, Moosa was a member of 
the ANC national executive committee, a very clear conflict of interest. It has 
been widely claimed (Zille 2010: np) that the ANC will make an estimated R1 
billion from the building of the power station ‘enough to fund its election 
campaigns and the lifestyles of its leaders for years to come’, bringing about a 
situation which the leader of the Democratic Alliance party, Helen Zille claims 
will be where ‘no opposition party may ever be in a position to compete fairly 
with the ANC again’ (Boyle 2010). The ANC will entrench its single party 
dominance and, in doing so, weaken South African democracy. 
 
It will not be the ANC who have to pay back the loan. It will be the people of 
South Africa. The World Bank loan in summary is an illustration of World 
Bank hypocricy and the determination to consolidate further a particular, 
destructive, neoliberal economic model on South Africa. The World Bank loan 
is an illustration of a lost opportunity to invest in more equitable, 
environmentally benign energy infrastructure directions.  
 
7.4 Example 2: Coal of Africa (CoAL)  
 
One of the immediate outcomes of the building of the new Medupi power 
station is the increasing demand for coal, and thus coal mines. One area which 
is being more intensively and extensively surveyed and mined for coal is in the 
Limpopo Province. 
 
One company involved in this expansion programme is Australian company, 
Coal of Africa Ltd (CoAL), which is expanding its mining activities to the 
environmentally, historically and culturally highly sensitive northern Limpopo 
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region of South Africa. CoAL is a company concerned only with capital 
accumulation and the links to government which encourages such development 
at great environmental and social cost, with little or no benefit to South Africa. 
This study of CoAL provides an opportunity to take a more micro look at the 
negative consequences of coal mining, and an indication of the drive under the 
neoliberal policies of the South African government to push coal developments 
with seemingly no concern for the impact this will have on global warming, on 
the local environment or the health of the people.  
 
The geographic focus here is the Limpopo Province, one of the main mining 
provinces, and not coincidentally, one of the poorest in South Africa. Within 
the Limpopo Province, there are two main coal mining regions, one near 
Lephalale in the Waterberg area and, more recently undergoing development, 
the northern part of the state near the Limpopo River border with Zimbabwe. 
The latter is where CoAL has been developing its Vele colliery.  
 
The Limpopo Province is part of a larger Limpopo Basin which includes parts 
of Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa. As a consequence of 
this being a very poor region, the Limpopo population has high illiteracy and 
unemployment levels, particularly in the rural regions where 89 per cent of the 
population live. People rely heavily on agriculture and the natural habitat for 
food security. In recent years, drought has been more frequent (Anteneh et al. 
2004) impacting on food and water security. Mining, agriculture, trade and 
tourism all have to try to survive together but all compete for land and scarce 
water.  
  
Within the Limpopo Province, the Waterberg Biosphere Reserve was 
UNESCO–registered biosphere 2001.  The area is a Ramsar Wetlands (covered 
by the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, an international treaty for the 
conservation of wetlands), extending over 400,000 hectares of the arid 
bushveld which is dominated by different veld types, including tropical 
grasslands and savannas, low mountains and escarpments and poor soils. 
About 80,000 people currently live in the biosphere reserve – raising cattle, 
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growing crops, farming game and promoting tourism. It has been inhabited for 
hundreds of thousands of years and is an important San rock art area.56   
 
This area is now a major focus of coal mining companies. Coal in the 
Waterberg area lies beneath approximately thirty metres of overburden, which 
is considered shallow and therefore suitable for the relatively cheap, but 
environmentally more destructive, open cast mining. It is also where Eskom 
has commenced building the new power station supported by the World Bank 
loan, the Medupi Power Station, near Lephalale. Contrary to assessments of 
peak coal globally by Aleklett (2010), it has been claimed that the Waterberg 
area has enough coal for the next 150 to 200 years to fire eight power stations 
(CSIR 2009). The Exxaro company has the world’s largest open cast coal mine 
here, a mega-mine; a 3.2 kilometre-wide, 110 metre deep (Schalk 2011: np) 
swathe cut into the land. Visiting it, I was told by an Exxaro employee that it 
was going to be ‘driven all the way to the Botswana border, where it will meet 
up with another open cast mine’. The impact will be to turn this area into a vast 
black, tailings-strewn, toxic, lifeless and unrecoverable waste-land.  
 
To come back to CoAL’s operations, however, we return to the northern 
Limpopo. CoAL is a company incorporated in Western Australian and listed 
on the stock exchange in 1980. It is described on its web page 
(www.coalofafrica.com) as being focused on the acquisition, exploration and 
development of thermal and metallurgical coal projects in South Africa. The 
company is now also listed on both the London and Johannesburg stock 
exchanges. This section focuses on the recent and controversial development of 
the Vele coal mine although many of the issues raised are broadly common to 
all coal mine sites in middle and low income countries and highly pertinent to 





                                           
56 The San people are the Indigenous hunter gatherers of South Africa. 
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Map 7.1 The Vele Mining Site near Mapungubwe in Limpopo Province 
 
 
Source: van der Merwe (2009)  
 
The Vele coal mine site is adjacent to both the world heritage site of 
Mapungubwe (see Map 7.1), and the confluence of the Limpopo  and Shashe 
rivers which delineate the borders between South Africa and Botswana and 
Zimbabwe.  I visited this site in 2009 and witnessed a place of pristine and 
unique beauty and peace. Foremost among the concerns of opponents to the 
mine is that it is adjacent to this world heritage site which is of great historical 
significance to all of humanity with outstanding examples of San rock art and 
various ancient artefacts. It was in the Shashe-Limpopo river basin that the first 
complex society in southern Africa developed (Huffman 2008). There was also 
a hub of trade between African regions, China and southern Africa. Today 
there are numerous archaeological sites dating from the early, middle and late 
Stone Ages as well as the Iron Age sites found in the Mapungubwe National 
Park.  It is difficult to exaggerate the value of this place in terms of its its 
beauty and its historical and environmental significance. It is also located in the 
proposed Limpopo/Shashe Trans-frontier Conservation Area (TFCA) which 
straddles South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe.  This TFCA has the potential 
to be developed as a reservation for the Big Five (lions, leopards, rhinos, 





The Vele mine’s boundary will be just seven kilometres east of the 
Mapungubwe National Park boundary, while the coal processing plant 
infrastructure is planned to be 27 kilometres from the Mapungubwe World 
Heritage Site. The Vele coal mine site covers 8,000 acres and will involve both 
underground and open cast mining of the estimated 720 million tons of coal at 
the site. Prospecting continues to be conducted on farms throughout the 
surrounding area (Hatty 2009), indicating intentions of expansion by the 
company, with retreat on the part of some farmers in the area through the sale 
of their properties. 
 
According to CoAL’s web page, the company was granted an unconditional 
New Order Mining Right on 2nd February 2010, stating that CoAL planned to 
develop Vele in two phases: phase 1 commencing in the first quarter of 2010 
with the establishment of a modular coal treatment plant; and Phase 2 
eventually producing 5 million tonnes a year of coking coal. The coal will 
initially be transported from the mine to the railhead by truck. It will take 18 
months to complete the rail spurs and loading facilities, which lie about 40 km 
from Vele and 25 km from Makhado, the local capital. 
 
The capital expenditure for phase 1 is 450 million Rand (approx. US$61 
million). Contracts for hard coking coal for this project have been settled at 
US$200 per ton. There is clearly a lot of money in coal, the majority of which 
will go to CoAL with little or no long term benefit to the region.   
 
CoAL’s partners have changed since I began to research this example. In 2009, 
CoAL’s Vele project had a Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) partner, 
Mvelaphanda Group, which previously was headed by Tokyo Sexwale (a 
former high level ANC member) before he was appointed to the Cabinet of the 
South African Government. Mvelaphanda now owns a stake. 
 
Opponents of the mine have mounted a legal case, based around concerns for 
the protection and maintenance of the environmental integrity of the area 
around Mapungubwe. Furthermore, on 5th August 2010 the Department of 
Environmental Affairs (DEA) confirmed that it was issuing an immediate 
 
164 
Compliance Notice to CoAL to cease its activities. This notice related to 
CoAL's non-compliance with the provisions of the National Environmental 
Management Act (NEMA) in that, without the required prior environmental 
authorisation, CoAL was said to have commenced activities listed in the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Regulations promulgated in terms of 
the NEMA. These activities included the road construction, the storage of 
dangerous goods, activities too close to the flood-line of the Limpopo River, 
the construction of a sludge dam and a water pipeline network. It is apparent 
however that this was a mere technicality for the company and the government 
department to overcome and that the mine would go ahead.  In April 2011, it 
was reported (Latham 2011) that CoAL still faced a challenge from 
environmental groups on the basis that the company had ‘grossly 
underestimated the quantity of water it required for the Vele colliery’, thus 
affecting the flow of the Limpopo river.   
 
After having their water licence initially withdrawn due to breaches in water 
use by the company, CoAL has recently been granted a water use licence by 
the Department of Water Affairs.  According to opponents, the granting of the 
licence was done without the Department of Water Affairs fully reviewing and 
evaluating the submissions by all parties.   Since the South African 
government’s about-turn on the closure of Vele, opposition groups including 
the Association of Southern African Archaeologists, the Endangered Wildlife 
Trust and the Wilderness Foundation have undertaken to continue action to 
close the mine, threatening to take their argument to the High Court if 
necessary.   
 
Opponents of the mine have submitted an appeal to the water tribunal to 
investigate more fully the awarding of the licence.  At the same time, the 
World Heritage Commission is currently evaluating the status of the 
Mapungubwe region and will announce its decision in July 2011.  Meanwhile, 
according to opponents of the Vele project, the lawyers for the coal mine are 
doing everything to delay a High Court hearing of the interdict against the 
awarding of a New Order Mining Right (NOMR) which would decide the fate 




However, as CoAL’s CEO, John Wallington has indicated, his company 
‘continues to work closely with various government departments to resolve the 
challenges at the Vele Colliery [and] remains confident that any issues 
identified can be satisfactorily resolved allowing for the commencement of 
operations at the colliery in 2011’ (CoAL 2010: np).  
 
CoAL’s CEO is confident it will soon be resuming mining at the Vele site and 
have invested heavily in further infrastructure, trebling the size of CoAL’s 
export allocation in Mozambique’s Maputo harbour in anticipation of Vele’s 
continuation, along with other CoAL mine operations in Limpopo Province.  
The state-owned transport company, Transnet, is also continuing to invest in 
infrastructure to service the Vele mine, developing the rail line to provide 
additional capacity, in anticipation of the Vele mine’s operation, indicating the 
confidence held in official circles in relation to the operation of the Vele coal 
mine, no matter the consequences or the opposition.  
 
The additional coal mining activity at Vele, when added to other mining 
activity in the region, will have a compounded adverse effect on the fragile 
Limpopo ecology, especially with respect to water. This is expressed by 
Ashton (2009: np), a researcher with the CSIR who writes:  
 
[T]he Limpopo River basin is particularly water-stressed. Every tributary 
river in the basin has been exploited to the limits possible by conventional 
engineering approaches. Efforts to meet society's demands for water for 
domestic, irrigation, mining and industrial uses have caused a progressive 
deterioration of the aquatic ecosystems. Additional  [pollution] from the 
planned new coal mines and power stations in the area and the 
development of new towns to house the employees of mines and power 
stations, will only exacerbate the already poor water quality situation and 
accelerate the rate at which aquatic ecosystems deteriorate. There is 
simply too little water available in the basin to support projected 





A part of the travesty in this study of CoAL is that, in reality, it is a struggle 
which is being acted out not just here but on many stages – both micro and 
macro - across the globe, around the competing forces of economic growth, the 
commodification of the land and the accumulation of profits in an environment 
dominated by the imperatives of neoliberal capitalism juxtaposed to the 
ecology, issues of poverty and inequality, history and culture. It is a struggle 
whose urgency and potency is heightened by global warming. The hegemony 
of the neoliberal economic growth imperative prevails because the forces at 
play are very unequal both in the South African context but also globally. This 
is true of so many other countries even if it is less immediately apparent. As 
CoAL illustrates, such companies have significant resources and influential 
networks to draw upon to win their objectives. Community opponents to such 
developments are often more poorly resourced and fragmented.  More 
importantly though, in South Africa the corporations have also won over the 
state to their corner. Regulation is no answer when the rules of the game are set 
by the corporate captured state. 
 
The conflicts over the huge acreage of South African land which is under 
mining use or subject to mining licence applications are immensely significant, 
with large numbers of people and species suffering the cumulative impact of 
mining on water, land, air and food production. In a neoliberal world, to put the 
biological, social, community and historical richness and diversity of South 
Africa up against the coal owners and the government, there can be but one 
winner. To make progress at this level, to win respect for the ecology, to shift 




This chapter has pointed to some real concerns about the prospects for South 
Africa addressing global warming and the seeming impossibility of that in a 
political and economic environment which is driven by capitalist social 
relations of production and a political economy dependent on capital 
accumulation. Before considering this in the wider context, however, the 
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chapter has drawn attention to some of the conflicts of interest and corruption 
that exist in this frame of political economy within the ANC, the coal mining 
industry but, perhaps most crucially of all, at the global institutional level. This 
is also illustrative of the argument that it is not just African governments that 
are corrupt, for their corruption is dependent on equally corrupt, and often 
more powerful, partners.  Indeed the 2010 Eskom World Bank loan has been 
criticised as making a complete mockery of the World Bank's own efforts in 
tackling corruption and promoting good governance. Ironically, in the World 
Bank report, Africa Development Indicators 2010, Devarajan (2010) writes 
about the “quiet corruption”, the failure of public servants to deliver goods or 
services paid for by governments and how it is pervasive and widespread 
across Africa and is having a disproportionate effect on the poor, with long-
term consequences for development. This is probably very true; however, it is 
the corruption at the global institutional level that is most significant in terms 
of the potential for humankind to have or not have, a future. 
 
The vignette on CoAL shows how the entwinement of the political and 
economic elite and their interests in South Africa are dominant. Lying behind 
all of that, and most important of all in examining the political economy of 
global warming in this country which, as stated, is a microcosm of the global 
economy, is the drive to produce, and in turn consume, more and more coal-
based energy. This is the root problem or more accurately the root symptom of 
a political economy that has both created global warming and has no capacity 
to stop it. 
 
 Hallowes (2009: 28) concludes that the World Bank loan and Eskom’s 
government-endorsed expansion programme represent a case of ‘recreating the 
logic of an economy that is internally subordinated to the interests of the 
minerals and energy complex and externally subordinated to the imperial 
market’. It effectively enables South Africa to export cheap electricity (or 
continue sweet-heart deals with multinationals for below cost electricity) while 
suffering a shortage of affordable electricity for ordinary people at home. The 
building of further aluminium smelters, growing the economy through 
attracting an energy-intensive and highly polluting beneficiation industry and 
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continuing to supply cheap/underpriced electricity to the MEC is a very short-
sighted and irresponsible road to economic development, even without global 









This study has connected the coal and electricity sectors with the expansion of 
capitalism in South Africa and Africa through the perspective of the political 
economy of global warming. Chapters 4 to 7 have provided empirical evidence 
exposing the myriad of issues in the pursuit of ‘electric capitalist’ development 
in South Africa, the perpetuation of poverty, inequality and uneven 
development within South Africa and Africa, the expansion of capitalist social 
relations of production throughout the African continent on the back of 
electricity expansion, and the destruction of the environment; in short, a 
deepening of the divide between humans and between humans and nature. The 
key environmental concerns of this thesis is South Africa’s growing carbon 
emissions. South Africa, like China, Brazil and India, argues that 
industrialisation and growth are essential to lift the poor from poverty; in South 
Africa, growing inequality indicates this is yet another case of the rich and 
powerful hiding behind the poor.  
 
The study has also argued that South Africa, as the hegemonic power in sub-
Saharan Africa, the ANC government, with its adoption of neoliberalism as the 
model of development, and the MEC and financial sectors with their 
imperative for expansion, are all parts of what is driving the expansion of 
neoliberal capitalism throughout southern Africa. A consequence of all of this 
is a further weakening of the adaptive capacity of the people. In this sense, 
South Africa can no longer be considered as being on the periphery of global 
capital but rather better be viewed as in its own right an imperial power on the 
African continent. The South African state, by pursuing a particular economic 
trajectory, has deepened and entrenched poverty and inequality in South 
Africa. At the same time, it has developed a sophisticated and globally 
connected economy that is intimately involved in the process of capital 
accumulation through the push, by the merged interests of state and private 
capital, into the rest of Africa.  As Satgar (2009: 52) writes, ‘[t]he macro-
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restructuring project on the African continent through the AU[African Union] 
and NEPAD [New Partnership for Africa’s Development] is further deepening 
Africa’s integration into the global political economy’. This is being mediated 
by class interests, in particular the role of a transnational faction of the African 
ruling class. The ideological outlook and strategic orientation of the elite are 
expressed through the maintenance of a neoliberal economy, the growing gap 
in wealth and security between those who benefit and those who carry the 
burdens of capitalist development. 
 
South Africa’s former President Thabo Mbeki was the key driver behind the 
formation of the AU, NEPAD and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), all neoliberal institutions with the twin pillars of their 
agendas being accelerated economic growth and economic integration of 
African national economies into the global economy. There were always 
concerns by South Africa’s neighbours regarding the formation of these 
essentially transnational economic organisations that these were signs of South 
Africa’s ‘gigantism’ and ambitions of fulfilling the role of ‘domineering 
hegemon’ (Landsberg 2007). These concerns would seem to be wholly 
justified. 
 
The study of South Africa has drawn attention to the historical processes of 
capital expansion, racism and the political and economic power structures 
which underpin and drive energy policies in South Africa. That country is of 
special interest in that members of the post-1994 black political elite were part 
of the leadership which fought in the struggles against apartheid and which in 
the ANC adopted many principles from socialism in designing the blueprint for 
the post-apartheid majority rule government. However, not all in the ANC 
were socialists. There was a hard core with neoliberal ideological persuasion 
who also influenced the framework for Black Economic Empowerment. Many 
of the ANC political elite are now entwined with the powerful economic 
interests in South Africa and beyond on the continent. They have become 
integral players in the neoliberal expansionist project, as well as being 
intimately involved at a personal level in patronage, personal benefit and 
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corruption. As Franz Fanon warned57, the dangers of co-option of 
revolutionary goals by [neoliberal] capitalist policies amongst those ushering in 
the new order are real. This is precisely what has happened in South Africa. 
 
The fundamental issues emerging from this study however revolve around the 
contradictions between, on the one hand, African ecological sustainability and, 
on the other, the pursuit of neoliberal capitalist industrialisation within South 
Africa and throughout Africa. The continuing spread of capitalism outwards 
from South Africa and throughout the African continent is both harbinger and 
guarantor of global warming catastrophe and ecological collapse for both 
South Africa and the continent. The expanding capitalist social relations of 
production will not only increase the continent’s carbon emissions, but the 
wealth and growth created from this form of development will continue to 
benefit only the minority, while further locking in global warming, 
environmental destruction, economic insecurity and declining (global 
warming) adaptive capacities. 
 
Fine and Rustomjee (1996), and later McDonald (2009), have theorised around 
the links between energy and capitalism. This study has taken these links and 
intersected them with the political economy of global warming, particularly 
through the prism of the coal and electricity sectors in South Africa. Fossil fuel 
energy emerges as being central in powering capitalism's engine. Like all the 
fossil fuels, coal is particularly well suited to the capitalist mode of production 
for a number of reasons. First, it can be privately owned; second, it is a 
concentrated form of energy; third, it is easily transported; fourth, in the case of 
South Africa, it is readily accessible and seemingly in abundant supply; and 
fifth, the private capital in mining coal is structurally linked to public capital 
through contracts to supply the coal fired power stations, thus guaranteeing 
substantial profits. Ignored however are the so-called ‘externalities’ of the 
private market: pollution, health problems, impoverishment, the cumulative 
effects of land degradation, water consumption in a water-constrained 
                                           
57 From a quote from Lewis Gordon, Professor of African Studies, in Monthly Review, July 2002, in a 




environment and toxification of land, water and air. These are borne by the 
people, communities and the environment. On top of these, there is the impact 
of carbon emissions and their contribution to global warming. The existence of 
these externalities demonstrates the contradictions that exist between fostering 
the interests of the environment and those of the neoliberal economy and, in 
turn, between those of the economy and those of society. The cumulative 
effects of these externalities, those things that neoclassical economics cannot or 
will not handle, now threaten life on Earth, the ultimate contradiction of 
capitalism.  
 
8.2 Timeframe for coal production  
South Africa’s intense energy usage, and its dependence on coal for that 
energy, have enormous ramifications for the country’s future development 
path, the nature of that path and for global warming. As has been demonstrated 
in this part of the thesis, South Africa’s coal is integral to the energy sector and 
the energy sector is integral to its economy. However, despite government and 
coal industry claims that South Africa has sufficient coal to last 200 years, 
various studies indicate that South Africa’s coal production is close to peaking, 
perhaps as early as 2011 (Rutledge 2010; see also Aleklett 2010). This will 
mean more expensive coal and probably yet more environmentally damaging 
mining practices. It will also mean huge investments have been made in coal-
dependent infrastructure at a time when such investments should be being 
made in transforming that energy structure to one that is more environmentally 
benign. Eskom will invest an estimated R175 billion (about $A30 billion) over 
the next 20 years to try to ensure sufficient supplies of coal (Flak 2011). 
Despite both peak oil and global warming, a massive, coal-intensive energy 
infrastructure expansion programme is being undertaken, locking South Africa 
into an economically and environmentally disastrous future.  
 
This is clearly a momentous time in the energy sector in South Africa. This 
expansion programme has just got underway, yet if coal production is peaking, 
this energy programme is likely to end up being a hugely expensive white 
elephant, not able to provide the energy the country might need for the path it 
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has chosen. The loan repayments to the World Bank will still have to be repaid 
by South African citizens. It has also tied future generations of South Africans 
into being dependent on a growth economy, which may well turn out to be a 
suicidal path with respect to global warming. Here the capital accumulation 
imperative, and its impact on global warming, are perhaps best described by 
the phrase used by Istvan Meszaros (2001) of capital’s ‘destructive 
uncontrollability’. 
 
Hallowes (2000: 28) concludes that the World Bank loan and Eskom’s 
government-endorsed expansion programme represent a case of ‘recreating the 
logic of an economy that is internally subordinated to the interests of the 
minerals and energy complex and externally subordinated to the imperial 
market’. It effectively enables South Africa to export cheap electricity (or 
continue sweet-heart deals with multinationals for below cost electricity) while 
suffering a shortage of affordable electricity for ordinary people at home. The 
building of further aluminium smelters, growing the economy through 
attracting an energy-intensive and highly polluting beneficiation industry and 
continuing to supply cheap/underpriced electricity to the MEC are very short-
sighted and irresponsible roads to economic development, even without global 
warming. With global warming, it is a tragedy.  
 
8.3  The electricity problem 
 
It is claimed that South Africa is in the midst of an energy crisis due to ‘years 
of mismanagement, political interference and horrendous bureaucracy’ 
(Hallowes 2009: np). To respond to this situation with a major expansion 
programme further entrenching unsustainable, capital intensive, coal fuelled 
electricity growth is a travesty. That the shortages are linked to the type of 
economic structures that are determined by the needs of global capital rather 
than the needs of the population is too often ignored in the debate around South 
Africa’s energy crisis. As indicated, 30 per cent of the population have no or 
minimal access to electricity, and yet poor domestic consumers are paying 
more for their electricity than industry. Higher prices will arise as a result of 
the World Bank loan. The expansion programme will lead to further 
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contraction of possibilities for more equity-enhancing, localised, renewable 
energy systems, as well as for a development trajectory which is ecologically 
benign and socially just.  
 
The study has demonstrated how coal and electricity in South Africa are 
central to the economy and to the accumulation of capital. The entwinement of 
state capital with private capital, and the amount of capital flight from the 
country since 1994, are enormous indictments of the South African 
government, of the corporations profiting from the country’s minerals wealth 
and of the global financial institutions which have pursued the neoliberal 
doctrine and practices that have so clearly benefitted only elites. As Ashman et 
al. (2010: 178) write, the growing financialisation of the South African 
economy has produced a unique combination of ‘short term capital inflows 
(accompanied by rising consumer debt largely spent on luxury items) and a 
massive long-term outflow of capital as major ... corporations have chosen 
offshore listing and to internationalize their operations while concentrating 
within South Africa on core profitable MEC sectors’. Additional to legitimate 
capital flows are the huge sums involved in illicit flows. Conservative 
estimates of these illicit flows from South Africa on average each year from 
2000–2008 have been estimated to be $US 6,092 million (Kar and Curcio 
2011). Factors facilitating this flow include the proliferation of high net worth 
individuals and trade liberalisation, according to the report, Illicit Financial 
Flows from Developing Countries: 2000-2009 (Kar and Curcio 2011). The 
financialisation project thus further skews the economy towards the interests of 
the rich and powerful elite.  Any diminution of the power and size of the MEC 
is taken up by the growing finance sector, which has become entwined with the 
MEC and that sector is also heavily dependent on cheap and abundant 
electricity. Innes (1984: 17) writes that the ‘merging of bank capital with 
industrial capital to create finance capital [which gives] rise to the emergence 
of a financial oligarchy is one of the five characteristics of monopoly 
capitalism outlined by Lenin’. This is a process which has gained momentum 
in South Africa since 1994. That South Africa is both making massive 
investments in electricity and increasingly becoming a high carbon zone to 
attract foreign investment, when South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa will 
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suffer profoundly from global warming, is a reflection of this power and the 
imperatives of capital accumulation.  
 
There is a growing body of evidence supporting alternative, more socially just 
and environmentally benign energy sources in South Africa (Fig 2007; 
Hallowes and Munnik 2007; Oxfam 2008). While the importance of renewable 
energy sources has been acknowledged, relief from the current energy shortage 
in South Africa can only be tackled by fundamental structural changes to the 
political economy.  It is at the level of the political aspects of energy 
technologies, their structural and ideological significance in relation to global 
warming and the multitude of social and ecological crises, that attention has to 
be given, if energy solutions are to be found. McDonald (2009: 437) 
acknowledges this aspect of the centralised, fossil fuel-driven electricity 
institutions in South Africa - of the ‘inertia of planned investments, the 
enormous benefits to be gained by multinational capital, and the hard-nosed 
commitment on the part of South African policy-makers to an expansionist, 
supply-side policy agenda... [making] it difficult to create even the smallest of 
diversions from this electrical juggernaut’. It is no coincidence that South 
Africa has adopted inappropriate technologies, such as coal, nuclear and 
genetically modified crops58, as all are technologies most suitable for capital 
accumulation. They all have embedded in them the sense of prestige, power 
and control that comes with large scale, sophisticated and science-manipulated 
technologies, rather than the smaller scale, more democratic and accessible 
technologies that engender diversity, resilience, improvisation, innovation, 





8.4  The state and corruption 
                                           
58 South Africa succumbed to pressure from the biotechnology companies and is now the sixth largest 
producer of genetically modified (GM) crops in the world. In ‘the past five years, hundreds of 
thousands of hectares have been turned over to planting of GM crops … Small farmers have been 
supported to plant GM cotton … but are increasingly finding difficulties with debt, low cotton prices, 




South Africa illustrates some of the issues regarding the notion of the state (an 
issue pursued further in Part III), where the state (of South Africa) is 
dominated by particular class and economic imperatives which revolve around 
capital accumulation, growth and prestige. As Fine and Rustomjee (1996) 
argue, paradoxically in South Africa, the same class interests can potentially be 
served as much by nationalisation as by privatisation. This is crucial in the 
South African economy and is a reflection of the merging of private and state 
capital, and the capture and corruption of government by leading, mostly ANC, 
ministers and officials. Examples of these individuals financially benefitting 
from their positions of political power have been given in this part, and of the 
ANC benefitting from the building of the new Medupi power station, in 
Chapter 7. Many of the ANC political elite have long been captured by the 
MEC and the ideology of neoliberal capitalism. These elites have been 
corrupted as beneficiaries of the corporate sector, often, but not only, through 
the institution of Black Economic Empowerment. At the same time, they are 
cut off from and indifferent to the people they represent. They are able to and 
do use the state and state-owned assets to promote their own material interests 
through networks of political and economic patronage, nepotism and 
corruption. Although this is recognised publicly as corruption, there is, as yet, 
no body with the power and political will to put an end to it. It is claimed (see 
for example Persson et al. 2010) that no one can expose another’s corrupt 
practices in high offices as everyone has something on someone else. 
 
This is not to conclude that South Africa’s political elite is alone in its corrupt 
practices. As Ashman et al. (2010: 188) write: ‘South Africa is obviously not 
alone in the use of state assets and resources to promote private accumulation. 
Generations of African exclusion means that political office is highly important 
to promoting class formation. Corruption is the result, in its many forms.’ 
 
Multinational corporations which do business in this environment are a central 
part of it, as was the World Bank in making its recent loan. It can be seen 
perhaps as an inevitable part of the process of capital accumulation and 
particularly neoliberalism which facilitates illicit capital flows and a 
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deregulation of the financial part of the economy.  It can also be argued that 
corruption arises from an economic doctrine which offers no moral framework, 
no higher purpose other than to accumulate.  At the centre of this accumulation 
of capital and wealth are the systemic linkages between the political elite, 
mining, energy and finance which arise in two ways: first through investments, 
acquisitions and mergers; and second through the movement of people in top 
management positions through parastatal institutions such as Eskom, and 
private MEC/financial entities. The institution of Black Economic 
Empowerment has facilitated these linkages and the flow of benefits into 
(black) private hands, a new development only in the sense of the inclusion of 
the black elite. I have argued that BEE has facilitated the structural expansion 
of the white elite class to include now also a small black elite, overcoming the 
international constraints to capital accumulation posed by apartheid, while 
maintaining the basic class structure of South African society.  
 
Here it is also important to note the important historical context to corrupt 
governance and business practice in South Africa. Satgar (2009: 52) writes that 
‘while corruption and state failure clearly exist [in Africa], the state that has 
really failed in the post-colonial context is an inherited colonial state that 
generated racial and ethnic identities. The African failed state thesis attempts to 
explain a social reality by being ahistorical and blind to wider external and 
systemic realities.’ This is an important point to consider, and a reason why the 
World Bank loan vignette is so important: the form that corruption takes and 
the extent of it are the outcomes of a particular history and global political 
economy structure.  
 
It is evident that there have been considerable pressures on the ANC in South 
Africa from the MEC, even prior to 1994, when the MEC was wining and 
dining the then to-be elected ANC government. Once the ANC gained power, 
the collectivist content of the Freedom Charter gave way, first to the growth 
and profit driven interests of the MEC accumulation process, and second to the 
protection of the private sector ownership of the core areas of the economy, 
land, minerals, finance and energy. The convergence of the interests of the 
political elite with the corporate elite has meant that institutions, such as 
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parastatal Eskom and its secret sweet-heart deals with the mining 
conglomerates, were not confronted with any risks of being democratised from 
a government which was reneging on its commitments to the people. 
 
8.5  State power and democracy  
 
The economic and political powers of the coal and electricity sectors directly 
impinged on the environmental concerns about global warming, the gamut of 
immediately tangible environmental, governance and social issues: food and 
water security, health, air pollution and socio-economic issues of electricity 
access, poverty and inequality. They also threaten the young and already 
fragile democracy in South Africa.  It is not just that the coal and electricity 
sectors are integral to the MEC, and as such at the centre of the nation’s 
macroeconomic policies, but they are to a considerable extent driving 
macroeconomic policy through the enormous power wielded by such 
corporations as Anglo American and BHP Billiton.  The corporations can only 
have been enhanced by the deregulation and financialisation of the globalised 
economy, a structural reality that enables them to move their capital and profits 
rapidly in and out of countries according to where the greatest profits can be 
made. This is a deeply disadvantageous environment for any national 
developmental model that is to benefit the people. It is not the corruption of the 
political elite that is the fundamental problem. Rather it is the construction of 
the state and the financialised global political economy. With regard to the 
former, as Harvey (2003: 91) writes, ‘the preferred condition for capitalist 
activity is a bourgeois state in which market institutions and rules of contract 
(including those of labour) are legally guaranteed, and where frameworks of 
regulation are constructed to contain class conflicts and to arbitrate between the 
claims of different factions of capital.’ The power of the large corporations 
derives in part from the weight of such large scale capital investment in the 
sector and the ramifications of that investment for the rest of the economy, but 
also, because of the state’s commitment to the capitalist economic model. 
 
There are further consequences of the major capital intensive electricity 
expansion programme. Not only has it provided additional opportunities for 
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corruption; it in turn is a threat to democratic values by bringing the World 
Bank, an institution at the heart of neoliberal development and expansion in 
Africa, into a position of influence and leverage in South Africa. Additionally, 
through the expansion of South Africa’s electricity system throughout sub-
Saharan Africa, a significant component of the infrastructure for neoliberal 
industrial capitalist expansion is being consolidated as effectively as a sub-
imperial power being visited on its sub-Saharan neighbours.  
 
The work of Fine and Rustomjee (1996) is clear in its account of the linkages 
within the MEC and between the MEC and the state. The corporatised 
globalisation process has, however, gathered momentum for South Africa since 
1994 and has facilitated the flow of profits from multi-national mining 
companies back to the metropolis, in the case of CoAL, back to Australia; in 
the case of BHP Billiton, back to one of the enclaves of international capital. It 
is however outside the scope of this thesis to track these flows. To understand 
better however the moral bankruptcy of the neoliberal model of development, 
this flow of wealth to the wealthy, whether people or places, is best viewed 
juxtaposed with inadequate corporate tax rules and free access to minerals,  the 
suppression of workers’ claims for improved wages and conditions and the 
lack of the most basic services for people living in the townships. The state and 
its adoption of neoliberal economic policies are directly responsible for this 
state of affairs. 
 
8.6  What does all of this mean for global warming? 
 
It is of note nonetheless that, as compared with for example Australia with a 
somewhat comparable minerals energy complex, in South Africa there is a 
basis for hope in the convergence of historical and material conditions for a 
radical change to the political and economic structures. This hope lies in the 
starkness of the class inequities in South Africa; the numbers of people being 
burdened by rather than benefiting from the system; the clearly observable 
environmental degradation; the droughts and water shortages; the number of 
refugees in South Africa already, not from global warming necessarily, but as a 
harbinger of things to come; a more critical media; a stronger core of left-wing 
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trade unions; a more politicised and activist NGO sector; and a broader body of 
critical and activist scholarship. South Africa has been host to thousands of 
demonstrations in recent years, more demonstrations per capita than almost any 
other place on Earth (Bond 2010a)59, mostly against living conditions. In South 
Africa there is also a bigger and longer history and consciousness of struggle 
which is absent in Australia. Innes (1984: 241) wrote that the large corporate 
sector and ‘South African capitalism have achieved an awesome degree of 
power - but also have created a countervailing force which may well have the 
potential to wrest that power from them - it has produced the largest proletariat 
in Africa’. In South Africa the time seems right for historical, radical structural 
change.  
 
In Australia, that countervailing force may never emerge. We are closer to the 
centre of capitalism.  In this country, the neoliberal culture is not only 
hegemonic but the majority are benefiting from the system and are financially 
tied into it through share holdings, mortgages, superannuation funds and 
middle class, high consumption lifestyles. 
 
South Africa is facing multiple crises as a result of its development path and 
the global capitalist project. Global warming will be a significant and growing 
factor which will interact with other crises, such as food insecurity, poverty, 
inequality, drought, poor governance,  synergistically. Added to this will be the 
pressures wrought by yet more refugees and political instability in 
neighbouring countries of sub-Saharan Africa as increasing numbers of people 
are forced to leave their (ecologically) inhospitable homes. South Africa needs 
to change course and protect its environment, its heritage and biological 
diversity; recover and protect its democratic institutions; protect its waterways 
and land; and support and regenerate its small scale agriculture and food 
                                           
59 Bond (2010a: np) writes: ‘As the June-July 2010 World Cup draws the world’s attention to South 
Africa, the country’s poor and working-class people will continue protesting, at what is now among 
the highest rates per person in the world. Since 2005, the police have conservatively measured an 
annual average of more than eight thousand “Gatherings” incidents (public demonstrations legally 
defined as involving upwards of fifteen demonstrators) by an angry urban populace, which remains 
unintimidated by the year-old government of Jacob Zuma. This general urban uprising has included 
resistance to the commodification of life - e.g., commercialization of municipal services—and to 
rising poverty and inequality in the country’s slums’.  
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growing sectors60. Foremost, it must protect and support its people, pull down 
the barbed wire enclosing the rich enclaves and give the vast numbers of 
poorly paid, highly exploited security and domestic workers meaningful and 
productive employment. South Africa needs to democratise its institutions, de-
globalise, de-commodify, nationalise and redistribute its wealth, overthrow its 
social relations of production and become a good neighbour on the African 
continent, supporting sustainable, equitable and inclusive human development 
for all. 
 
This chapter has drawn together a number of strands from the study of South 
Africa to describe how that country’s coal industry and electricity sector, as 
parts of a complex structure straddling the financial, political, mining and 
energy sectors, have captured the state and is driving an agenda that is 
contributing to a catastrophic disjuncture between the interests of the majority 
and those of a small powerful national and global elite. What emerges in 
practice is that the coal and electricity sectors are part of an accumulation 
process which disenfranchises, impoverishes and alienates further the poor. At 
the same time it destroys the broad ecology with the result that there are 
declining natural resources for the poor to fall back on for survival. The South 
African development experience illustrates not only the corporate capture of 
the state, but also the corruption of the most powerful sectors of society.    
 
In summary, this study of South Africa illustrates a number of key points 
which are important to the political economy of global warming in that country 
but which also act as guides for helping to build the theoretical framework 
which is then developed in Part III of the thesis.  
 
Firstly, South African institutions are deeply committed to the process of 
capital accumulation, expressed through continuing to grow and expand both 
the economy and the coal and coal-fuelled electricity energy sector, despite the 
costs to the people, the environment, the negative effects on global warming 
adaptation and the incontrovertible growth in carbon emissions.  The chapter 
                                           




illustrates that the post-apartheid governments of South Africa have continued 
the pre-independence capitalist model of development which has further 
entrenched the (still largely racialised) class divisions of society.  
 
Second, the financialisation of the globalised economy and the 
internationalisation of South African corporate activity have exacerbated both 
class divisions experienced as wealth and power differences, and the rift 
between society and the ecology, as the rush for mining coal and other 
minerals continues and the profits from such activities leave the country.   
 
Third, international institutions such as the World Bank play a pivotal role in 
the endorsement of this political economy. The World Bank Medupi Power 
Plant loan is a global linking of elites and commonalities in their interests in 
the accumulation of capital. 
 
Fourth, the South African study has illustrated how the coal and electricity 
sectors are integral to the sub-imperial expansion of capitalism throughout sub-
Saharan Africa. Further, it has shown that the coal sector is central to the 
process of accumulation by dispossession: the dispossession of communities 
from their land, and the equally insidious dispossession of people from their 
livelihoods and health through the poisoning of the land, the water and the air. 
The Medupi Power Plant - with its World Bank loan, its projected emissions, 
its raison d'être being cheap power for multinational conglomerates, its corrupt 
links to the ANC elite, its need for yet more coal mines – is a metaphor for the 
anti-social, anti-ecological contradictions of neoliberal capitalism in South 
Africa. 
 
Fifth, the particular social relations of production unique to mining sites around 
the world and especially in Third World countries where labour is cheap, 
expendable and inadequately protected – necessary conditions for 
accumulation and multinational investments – have been causally linked to 
health problems such as tuberculosis and silicosis. The use of migrant and 
internal cheap labour, dislocated from their families and communities, have 
contributed to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. This is the ultimate exploitation and 
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alienation when people lose their health and lives due to the particular social 
relations of production, while the political elite seeks to keep up the facade that 
the latter is designed for their upliftment from poverty. At the same time the 
marketisation of the economy within South Africa and beyond, including land 
grabs and the industrialisation of farming, transforms increasing numbers of 
rural small holders into the proletarianised unemployed without a future – 
again destroying people, communities and the ecology. 
 
Sixth, the model of development has not only further impoverished the poor 
but widened and deepened the gap between rich and poor. It is continuing to 
undermine the health of the broad ecology that the poor depend on, and will 
increasingly depend upon, for their survival. Related to this, the IPCC has 
stressed the importance of good governance and infrastructure, equity, 
sustainable economic development and carbon emissions reductions as 
essential ingredients to cope with a global warming world.  South Africa is 
undermining and destroying these vitally important environmental and social 
lifelines for the future. If one throws into this mix a growing refugee 
population, internal racial tensions and xenophobia, declining food and water 
security, an extraordinary lack of moral leadership and political will to find a 
better way - and global warming – then the future of South Africa looks bleak. 
 
Seventh, the study illustrated another bi-product of neoliberal capitalism where 
the predominant value is money and the market. It has shown how the 
incubators of power, greed and corruption have destroyed the integrity of the 
ANC and contributed to the skewing of the economy toward sectors which 
make money for some and where corruption greases political policies and 
political careers. 
 
Finally, while there are manifold demonstrations against the poor conditions 
under which people live, civil society is the one sector in South African society 
which is consistently opposing this form of development.  The uprisings in 
Northern Africa and the Middle East since January/early February 2011 are 
beacons of hope and inspiration for oppressed people on the continent. The 
factor of global warming however leaves only a small historically specific and 
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short window of opportunity for change. Otherwise for this country, in five to 
ten years, the political, economic, social and ecological prospects are grim, as 
the impacts of global warming are more dramatically manifested. At such a 
point, it will become increasingly difficult and perhaps too late to carry out any 
sort of peaceful, transformative structural change.  
 
From this thesis, the particular significance of South Africa – a country which 
cannot be divorced from the wider African continent context – is that it is a 
microcosm of the global political economy. It shows the importance of first 
history to understanding global warming and to finding solutions to global 
warming; and second, the capitalist development model with its inexorable 
dependence on fossil fuels and relentless pursuit of growth and expansion in 
complete contradiction to the requirements of the biosphere and humanity. 
South Africa exhibits the consequences of a state dominated by the interests of 
conglomerate capital, with all the resulting aspects of the deepening rift 
between humans and the environment. It exposes the commonalities of 
interests of global elites, the merging of corporate and state interests and the 
significance of power and hegemony in preventing the development of 
metabolically restorative and harmonious communities. It demonstrates the 
distinctive, hegemonic and dangerous power of corporations to society. 
 
I have argued that South Africa is a microcosm of the global economy.  It is, 
however, one country which will feel the terrible impacts of global warming 
very profoundly, given predictions that, with business as usual and a 4oC 
temperature increase by the end of this century, the capacity of the planet to 
support humans is likely to be less than one billion, the loss being exponential, 
bunched toward the end of the century (Spratt 2011) and most severely and 
foremost impacting Africans.  This will mark an unprecedented shock for 
African and South African societies, bringing both to the point of fracture and 
chaos at a time of growing global fracture.  
 
This chapter has provided some empirical evidence of the socially and 
ecologically destructive forces of neoliberal capitalism in South Africa, 
particularly in relation to global warming. The next section, Part III, turns to 
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the theoretical underpinnings of the political economy of global warming, 
drawing heavily on Marxist theory. It provides a theoretical understanding to 
many of the contradictions raised in the empirical section, bringing to the fore 
issues of class, power, inequality, alienation, financialisation, the rift between 
humans and nature, and ecological destruction.  
 
Beyond these issues, as indicated, I have used the analysis of South Africa to 
help me to develop the theoretical framework for the thesis. The key points that 
have emerged in this context are the relationships and roles of the state, the 
market and corporate sectors; power, class and capital accumulation; the 
financialisation of the economy; the centrality of fossil fuels; and the deep 
divisions between who benefits and who carries the burdens of the capitalist 
political economic system. These form the bases of the development of my 
theoretical framework in Part III. That process and the springboard of the 
South African study have generated a theoretical structure and content that I do 
not think would have arisen in any other way.  It is not that this South African 
study has ‘dictated’ the theory of Part III, but it has influenced key aspects of 
it.  This Part II, given its content and focus, was never expected to be 
determinative of the theory, but it did assist in allowing me not only to make 
that theory much broader in focus (that is, broader than ‘simply’ the political 
economy of global warming); but also to present both Parts III and IV of the 
thesis in terms which are more immediately germane to the problems of, and 






PART III   A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Western positivist social and political theory and discourse promote the ideas 
of liberal democracy and market freedoms as being the goals of development. 
By so doing this tends to devalue the non-Western ‘other’, as undemocratic, 
primitive or perhaps even barbarous. However, 21st century South African (and 
African) society is permeated with the impact of colonialism and the globalised 
political economy of capitalism. It is on this permeation of capital 
accumulation and dispossession in the post colonial period of the Cold War, 
the Structural Adjustment Programmes and the pan-African institutions such as 
NEPAD, that Marxist theory sheds critical analytical light on the crises of 
capitalism and the conjoined growing crisis of global warming. 
  
There is some credence in what Chabal (2009) writes, that there can be no one 
political theory of Africa since the continent is faced with a wide diversity of 
cultures and economies. While this is true, and this thesis finds its moral 
purpose lies with that vast majority of people whose struggle for dignity and 
sufficiency takes place against unrelenting and deepening hardships, African 
countries, since the earliest days of colonialism, have been increasingly drawn 
into the global political economy structures of capitalism, and it is at this level 
that this thesis is pitched.  Political economy is concerned with power and 
economic structures, the social relations of production and class divisions. This 
thesis argues that there is validity in using a Marxist approach due to the 
history of colonialism and dispossession in Africa. It is also concerned with the 
division, the rift, between humans and the ecology as a result of the capitalist 
relations of production, relations I will show in this part, that are central to the 
problem of global warming. So while acknowledging Africa is a continent 
which gave rise to a richness and diversity in cultures, epistemologies, 
economies and theories, the focus of the thesis is restricted to the problems 




This theoretical framework in turn leads into Part IV which proposes principles 
for an alternative world in the light of the South African study and the desire to 
see what needs to be done to promote societies that may yet serve to save the 
planet.  
 
The study of South Africa revealed some of the historical, material, political 
and economic phenomena which are leading to irreparable damage of the 
biosphere. It illustrated a number of problems which are deeply engrained in 
the capitalist fabric which I want to explore further through the lenses of 
Marxist political economy theory. The centuries of environmental degradation 
and human dispossession and displacement, that have occurred as part of the 
process of global capital accumulation through to today, now constitute a rift 
so deep it may become fatal, taking the Earth’s system beyond the stable 
geological interglacial period in which human civilisation developed. At the 
same time the thesis has argued that global warming is but one of a number of 
crises of capitalism.  
 
A starting point for summarising the issue of global warming is the voice of 
those we seldom hear in the West and is found in the communiqué from the 
World Social Forum (2009: np) in Belém, Brazil which passionately expresses 
the divide between the rich who continue to contribute to global warming, and 
the poor, who are already paying the price.  
 
For us, the struggles for climate justice and social justice are one and the 
same. It is the struggle for territories, land, forests and water, for agrarian 
and urban reform, food and energy sovereignty, for women’s and workers’ 
rights. It is the fight for equality and justice for indigenous peoples, for 
peoples of the global South, for the redistribution of wealth and for the 
recognition of the historical ecological debt owed by the North. 
 
At the same World Social Forum, a Declaration of the Assembly of Social 
Movements continued in this vein: 
 
The international capitalist crisis manifests itself as detrimental to 
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humankind in various ways: it affects food, finance, the economy, climate, 
energy, population migration and civilisation itself, as there is also a crisis 
in international order and political structures. 
 
Chapter 9 deals with central systemic Marxist issues which relate most directly 
to global warming, such as the metabolic rift, capital accumulation and 
financialisation. Translating the lessons from Part II into a theoretical structure 
in this part, they thus emerge as being based, to a considerable degree, but not 
wholly, on Marxism: the metabolic rift and specifically the carbon rift and its 
historical, material and social roots; alienation, of humans from the broad 
ecology; capital accumulation; and the financialisation of capital. These 
conceptual areas, though selective, contain within them sufficient scope for an 
understanding of the basis of global warming and the related and various crises 
of capitalism. The thesis does not set out to provide a comprehensive 
theoretical critique of capitalism but attempts to bring a deeper understanding 
to the structural and historical material systemic characteristics which prevent 
capitalism from providing a sustainable model of human development. Chapter 
10 looks at questions of power, related to the state, corporations and 
financialisation, but still from a theoretical stance, and includes some 
concluding comments on what amounts to a criticism of capitalism in the 









While recognising the importance of the diversity of epistemologies to the 
future of humanity, in this chapter I will draw on particular aspects of a 
Marxist theoretical framework to shed critical light on the historical, structural 
and systemic causes of global warming. This framework enables me to break 
through ‘established reality’ (Marcuse 1964: 80). Additionally, as Marcuse 
(1967: np) argues for the rich in western society ‘it appears crazy at first to 
want a revolution for we have whatever we want’. But we need tools ‘to 
transform the will itself so that people no longer want what they now want’ 
(Marcuse 1964: 80). In considering the pathology of denialism inherent in 
neoliberal ideology with respect to global warming, where there is a preference 
to save capitalism over saving the planet, this is a big task. Marcuse was 
writing over 40 years ago when he  almost certainly would not have been 
thinking of global warming but his comments echo the need today to 
‘transform the will’ and create a conceptual framework that gives us hope that 
there are alternatives to the capitalist system.  
 
Relevant here is Fisher’s (2009: 7) observation: ‘we are inevitably reminded of 
the phrase attributed to Fredric Jameson and Slavoj Zizek, that it is easier to 
imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. That slogan captures 
precisely what I mean by ‘capitalist realism’: the widespread sense that not 
only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it 
is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it’. Fisher is right 
in his slogan, but perhaps too dark in his conclusion, as I hope to show in Part 
IV. 
 
This chapter looks more closely at selected key concepts relevant to global 
warming from a Marxist perspective, drawing in particular but not solely, from 
the lessons gleaned from the study of South Africa in Part II of this thesis. 
These were set out in summary form at the end of chapter 8. It was going 
through that study of South Africa – that microcosm of the global economy to 
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use Amin’s (Amin 1997) expression again – that I became convinced of four 
things: first that global warming must be seen not as an isolated problem but 
one of a series of problems with a common cause; second that that common 
cause is capitalism; third that critical theory and, in particular, various aspects 
of Marxist theory can provide the base for my theoretical discourse; and finally 
that the denialism so prevalent in the politics of global warming is a function of 
(1) isolating global warming as a problem; (2) not recognising capitalism as the 
root of the problem; and (3) sticking to positivist analysis and frameworks.  
 
Fortunately there is an accessible and growing body of literature on Marxism 
and ecology relevant to this part of the thesis.  
 
In viewing that literature, there are a number of major contributions published 
in the last decade which together provide a rich theoretical resource for 
understanding the political economy of global warming, as well as other 
related global ecological crises, poverty and inequality. In seeking to bridge the 
gap between ecological economists and Marxists, Paul Burkett’s books, Marx 
and Nature: a Red and Green Perspective (1999) and Marxism and Ecological 
Economics: Toward a Red and Green Political Economy (2006) take a 
multidisciplinary approach.  Burkett reconstructs Marx’s approach to nature, 
society and environmental crises through a comprehensive and clear exposition 
of the societal relations of humanity to nature. He demonstrates that Marx’s 
over-riding concern with human emancipation impels him to approach nature 
from the standpoint of materialist history, sociology and political economy. 
Marx’s concerns, Burkett argues, are compatible with current ecological theory 
which questions the ability of monetary and market-based values to represent 
adequately the natural conditions of human production and development. The 
principle message of Burkett’s 2006 book is that capitalism is experiencing not 
only a crisis of capital accumulation (2006: 171) but also a second, related 
crisis, ‘the crisis in the quality of natural wealth (that is, the environment) as a 
condition of human development’ (2006: 172). These two entwined crises he 
sees as giving rise to two struggles: the struggle for higher wages, better work 
conditions and more co-operative and democratic forms of ownership and 
management (2006:139); and the struggle to reduce alienation for the purpose 
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of realising ‘sustainable human development’(2006: 135). Furthermore, 
Burkett, unlike many ecological economists, emphasises the centrality of the 
class struggle, the social separation of the direct producers from necessary 
conditions of production (2006: 309) as the basis for the development of a truly 
radical ecological economics, which in turn feeds discussion below of 
alienation. 
 
Foster is another theorist who has extensively explored the Marxist perspective 
on ecology. Both his Marx’s Ecology (2000) and Ecology against Capitalism 
(2002) make specific reference to global warming. Foster (2000: 9) writes that: 
‘[f]rom the start, Marx’s notion of the alienation of human labour was 
connected to an understanding of the alienation of human beings from nature 
[a] twofold alienation which needed to be explained historically’ and grounded 
in an understanding of the material relations of society. Here we are taken back 
to Marx’s ‘metabolic relations’ between humans and the environment. This is 
not, as Foster (2000: 11) points out, a simple dualism of eco-centrism versus 
anthropocentrism, which is a perspective which Foster attributes to much 
contemporary Green theory. It is based in the class struggle. 
 
Foster and Clark (2009) show how Marx, in Capital, articulated the idea that 
capitalism degrades the environment in a way that disproportionately affects 
the poor. The scale of ecological destruction in Marx’s time was of a different 
and diminished order from today, but the principles and practice of economic 
imperialism and its impacts on the ecology continue to the present time.  
 
Foster (2002) raises issues on both global warming and global warming 
solutions that are relevant to this thesis. These include whether technology is 
the answer. Foster suggests that, while technological change can ‘lower 
environmental impact’ by reducing ‘the materials and energy used per unit of 
output’ and substituting ‘less harmful technology’ (Foster 2002: 92), with 
respect to the energy efficiency part of technical solutions ‘the materials used 
and the production technology are much more intractable problems under the 
current regime of accumulation’ (Foster, 2002: 93). For example, in the 
extraction and mining of rare earths, elements, such as dysprosium and 
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terbium, can cause destruction of land used for food production because of the 
toxicity of the production process.  China currently meets 95 per cent of the 
world's demand for rare earths (AFP 2011O. It is small farmers who have been 
displaced by this mining, for example, in Batou in northern China.  Burkett 
(2009: 170) also visits this issue, arguing that such solutions as recycling and 
waste management, environmental restoration of forests, strip mined lands and 
plundered maritime eco-systems,  become  ecologically impoverished 
constitutive parts of the problem, requiring a fresh expenditure of energy and 
materials rather than being ecologically restorative. More fundamentally, the 
idea of the possibility of dematerialising economic production, as proposed by 
many in the field of sustainability and mainstream economics, is discounted by 
Foster et al. (2010: 43) who argue that ‘such technological fantasies have no 
basis in reality’. The idea that capitalism can exist without consuming the 
planet’s materials is untenable. 
 
Drawing on the work of Foster (1999, 2000), Clark and York (2005, 2008) and 
Foster et al. (2010), I now turn to the metabolic rift. This concept has become 
centre stage in the Marxist ecological literature. As is apparent from the study 
of South Africa,  even if it was not formally identified as such, it is also central 
to this thesis.  
 
9.2 The metabolic and carbon rifts 
 
The concept of the metabolic rift is at the core of Marx’s ecological critique of 
capitalism. It has recently re-emerged as critical when set in tandem with the 
various global ecological crises of the late twentieth/ early twenty-first 
centuries, including global warming. The idea of the metabolic rift (and in turn 
the carbon rift – see  section 9.3) has very direct relevance to global warming.  
 
Foster et al. (2010: 7) state that the ‘ecological rift’ refers to the ‘rift between 
humanity and nature, a product of artificial divisions within humanity, 
alienating us from the material-natural conditions of our existence’.  The 
metabolic rift provides the conceptual framework for understanding the very 
basis of the break in humans’ relationship with the environment, through 
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humans’ labour in producing livelihoods within the capitalist system. Marx 
wrote (1976: 283) ‘[l]abour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a 
process by which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and 
controls the metabolism between himself and nature’. With the introduction of 
the capitalist system of production, this close relationship between humans and 
nature was broken.  
 
The metabolic rift thus refers to a rupture in the metabolism of the ecological 
system. The concept is built around how the logic of accumulation severs basic 
processes of natural reproduction, leading to the deterioration of the 
environment and ecological sustainability and disrupting the basic operations 
of nature. It neatly captures the lack of balance between ‘expenditure and 
income’ in the Earth’s metabolism under the capitalist system. In theorising on 
this, Marx goes to the very basis of society, how humans interact with the 
environment, socially and materially, to provide their means of survival. It is 
from this most fundamental relationship that the ecological contradictions 
inherent in the very specific mode of production found in the capitalist system, 
the foundation for the growing disequilibrium in the biosphere and the pending 
demise of human life, are to be found. 
 
With respect to this balance between expenditure and income, it is to be noted 
that many economists seem to have lost their way especially when we look 
back to what the eminent economist Hicks was saying more than 70 years ago. 
Hicks (1939: np) triggered a debate on sustainability when he defined income 
as ‘the maximum value which a man can consume during a week and still 
expect to be as well-off at the end of the week as at the beginning’. He argued 
similarly, at a national level, that wealth was what can be consumed while 
maintaining a constant level of national wealth. These Hicksian ideas represent 
the basis of what became ecological economics. 
 
Marx maintained that capitalism generated an unhealthy circulation of matter 
from urban industry and industrial agriculture which damaged the reproductive 
capabilities of both human labour power and the land (Marx, 1954 Capital Vol 
1). Whereas Marx saw that humans’ pre-industrial interaction with nature 
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enabled harmonious and sustainable production, capitalism was not able to 
maintain the social relations (Marx, 1954 Capital Vol 1: 533) or the conditions 
for the recycling of nutrients back to the soil. Thus was born the metabolic rift. 
 
Marx built on the work of German chemist, Justus von Liebig, who published 
ground-breaking work in the middle of the 19th century on the consequences of 
intensive farming practices which were being introduced at that time in the 
transition from feudal to industrial farming.  Liebig, in a pioneering work 
Organic Chemistry in its Application to Agriculture and Physiology, argued 
that British high farming methods were a ‘robbery system’, which were 
opposed to rational agriculture (Liebig 1862, quoted in Foster, 2002a). The 
new farming methods involved the transportation of food and fibre over long 
distances from country to city, breaking the natural and restorative recycling of 
nutrients such as phosphorous, nitrogen and potassium and which instead 
ended up in urban pollution in the form of human and animal wastes. Liebig 
saw this as part of a larger scale process in which, under imperialism, the soil 
of whole countries was robbed for the benefit of Britain.  He argued, for 
example, that England was able to maintain its industrialised capitalist 
agriculture by importing guano (bird droppings) from Peru.  However, even 
with the imported fertilisers, the soil condition and productivity declined, 
leading to the need for increasing the size of landholdings and the 
concentration of agriculture among smaller numbers of proprietors. The cycle 
of restoring to the land what was taken from it was broken. Liebig argued that 
rural areas were in essence exporting the fertility of their land. 
 
The metabolic rift is today nowhere more evident than in the closely linked 
areas of global warming and food security. While the study of South Africa did 
not reflect the issue of food security, the African continent as a whole 
illustrates the growing problem of declining food production as a result of 
global warming. With respect to food security, there is hugely unequal access 
to food. There are also the growing control of food by mega corporations 
which dominate the agri-food complex, the super exploitation of labour 
involved in food growing, picking and processing, the elongated transport 
routes for food delivery, the de-peasantisation and the trans-border land grabs 
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that are now taking place for food and biofuel production and the huge levels 
of food wastage (Rajca 2010)61 and, as Marx saw from Liebig’s work, the 
destruction of soil fertility. Today, we may have irretrievably tipped the 
balance in terms of soil fertility and the ability of soil to continue producing 
adequate food for the global population, with some 75 millions of tons of top 
soil lost annually globally with more than 80 per cent of the world’s farming 
land affected.   
 
Marx was working on Capital Vol 1 when he came across Liebig’s work and 
was greatly influenced by it, writing to Engels that ‘[t]o have developed from 
the point of view of natural science the negative, that is, destructive side of 
modern agriculture [was] one of Liebig’s immortal merits’ (Marx, quoted in 
Foster 2002a).  Marx wrote on the transformation of agriculture in the 19th 
century, that the capital accumulation process disrupts the natural processes 
and cycles and leads to the systematic degradation of the environment.  Marx 
(Capital Vol 3, 1970: 949-50) stated:  
 
all progress in capitalist agriculture is a progress not only of robbing the 
worker, but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of 
the soil for a given time is a progress  toward ruining the more long-lasting 
sources of that fertility. Capitalist production, therefore, only develops the 
technique and the degree of combination of the social process of 
production by simultaneously undermining the original sources of all 
wealth – the soil and the worker.  
 
Marx, however, developed the concept of the metabolic rift further. In fact he 
has two meanings for the term metabolism. One refers to the regulatory 
processes that govern the complex interchange between humans and nature, 
specifically with regard to nutrient cycles. The second holds a wider, social 
meaning, describing the institutional norms governing the division of labour 
and distribution of wealth. It is metabolism as moral economy. In this, Marx 
both anticipates and attributes environmental crises to the division of workers 
                                           




into classes and, in particular, their separation from the land as well as from the 
other conditions of production, explicitly linking these with social issues in the 
analyses of environmental concerns. The concept of the metabolic rift 
embraces both these meanings.  
 
Thus metabolism is used by Marx to refer to the complex, interdependent, 
social and dynamic interchange between human beings and nature. This 
enabled Marx to express the idea of alienation in two forms: alienation of 
humans from nature; and, in relation to the productive process, the alienation 
of labour.  As Marx writes, in Grundrisse (1971: 489):  
 
It is not the unity of living and active humanity with the natural, inorganic 
conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature, and hence their 
appropriation of nature, which requires explanation, or is the result of a 
historic process, but rather the separation between these inorganic 
conditions of human existence and this active existence, a separation 
which is completely posited only in the relation of wage labour and 
capital. 
 
Foster (2008) takes us back a step to the historical beginnings of capitalism, 
that is, the transition from feudalism, a process which occurred over centuries, 
to understand the metabolic rift more fully. In this transition process, the 
bourgeoisie developed from the feudal economy, with the transformation of the 
feudal mode of production to the capitalist social relations of production to 
form the capitalist system. This in turn changed the relationship of the workers 
to the land, replacing what had been a direct relationship in the agrarian feudal 
system between labour and rights to the commons and access to feudal lords’ 
lands to grow supplementary food. 
 
Through the expropriation of the commons during the enclosure movement of 
the 15th to 18th centuries (in Britain), formerly agrarian workers were 
dispossessed of commons land for the production of food, or access to feudal 
lands for the same, and forced to move to towns, with nothing to sell but their 
labour for their sustenance, causing not only the robbing of the soil, but also 
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the exploitation of the worker and the establishment of capitalist class 
relations. Marx (1954: 504) writes: 
In the sphere of agriculture, modern industry has a more revolutionary 
effect than elsewhere, for this reason, that it annihilates the peasant, that 
bulwark of the old society, and replaces him by the wage-labourer. 
Capitalist production completely tears asunder the old bond of union 
which held together agriculture and manufacture in their infancy. 
Capitalist production, by collecting the population in great centres, and 
causing an ever increasing preponderance of town population, on the other 
hand concentrates the historical motive power of society; on the other 
hand, it disturbs the circulation of matter between man and the soil, i.e., it 
prevents the return to the soil of its elements consumed by man in the form 
of food and clothing; it therefore violates the conditions necessary to 
lasting fertility of the soil. By this action, it destroys at the same time the 
health of the town labourer and the intellectual life of the rural labourer. 
 
Marx wrote furthermore of the agricultural labouring population being a 
surplus that is constantly at the point of becoming the urban proletariat, 
reduced to the minimum of wages and ‘always stand[ing] with one foot already 
in the swamp of pauperism’ (Marx 1954: 642). 
 
As was shown in the South African study, this process of ‘annihilating the peasant’ 
continues today where capitalist development, including industrial agriculture in the 
form of agribusiness and land grabs for food export and biofuel production, are 
growing, with the displacement of the Indigenous peasant and subsistence farmers 
and accompanied by the destruction of not only local economies and cultures, but 
also the environment at the periphery of the global economy. 
 
The industrialisation of agriculture and the displacement of small scale producers 
from the land has a particular significance and momentum today in terms of food 
security, burgeoning unemployment and the corresponding explosion in urban slum 
dweller populations. Foster et al (2011) discuss this destruction of the peasantry and 
the weakening position of labour as a part of the new 21st century imperialism. They 
argue that this destruction of the peasantry is amongst the numerous forces impacting 
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on the material basis by which multinational capital weakens labour. For example, 
Foster et al (2011: 2) write that the ‘vast “internal reserve army” within the 
developed capitalist countries, constituted the real material basis on which 
multinational capital was able to internationalize production - creating a continual 
movement of surplus population into the labour force, and weakening labour globally 
through a process of “divide and rule”.’ This process is compounded through 
financialisation, the internalization of monopoly capital, the global concentration and 
centralisation of production, and the polarization of wages - the ‘race to the bottom’ - 
all of which are linked through the global reserve army of labour (Foster et al 2011). 
This process is compounded by the huge numbers of unemployed in the third world 
being expanded significantly in recent decades by ‘the de-peasantisation of a large 
portion of the global periphery by means of agribusiness - removing peasants from 
the land, with the resulting expansion of the population of urban slums’ ( Foster et al 
2011: 3).  Foster et al (2011: 3) continue that between 1980 and 2007, this labour 
force grew from ‘1.9 billion to 3.1 billion ... with 73 per cent of [it] … located in the 
developing world’.   
 
Amin (quoted in Foster et al 2011: 22)  argued that ‘modern capitalist agriculture, 
encompassing both rich, large scale family farming and agribusiness corporations - is 
now engaged in a massive attack on third world peasant production’ displacing 
world-wide in excess of 3 billion rural workers by  twenty million new modern 
farmers.  This is the model of development supported by global institutions such as 
the WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF. 
 
The dominant ideology maintains, however, that the displaced rural workers and 
peasants will be absorbed by industry in urban centres as, it is falsely maintained, 
supposedly happened in the history of the developed capitalist countries.  However, 
the reality for European countries during the ‘depeasantisation’ and industrialisation 
periods is that many millions of surplus populations were transported or emigrated to 
other parts of the planet - a phenomenon which is not possible today.  Foster et al 
(2011:22) argue that the current de-peasantisation process is equivalent to ‘mass 
genocide’,  given that no amount of economic growth can possibly absorb the 
billions of peasants in the world today into employment.  Already, there are 3 billion 
plus people  concentrated in massive cities and slums in the South - the ‘dumping 
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grounds’ for surplus population (Foster et al 2011: 23).  The end result of this phase 
of imperialism is that ‘the share of wages in total world output decreases, while the 
rate of exploitation worldwide rises’ (italics and quote from Foster et al 2011: 24).  
This phenomenon characterises neoliberal development throughout Africa and South 
Africa and was discussed in Part II of the thesis in both the African context and 
within South Africa, with South Africa both experiencing and perpetrating this 
development model. Part IV of the thesis draws on the principles and experiences of 
movements such as via Campesina, or small scale farmers, as an alternative model of 
social relations which challenges the neoliberal, large scale capitalist model of 
development. 
 
For a global warming world, this phenomenon of de-peasantisation will be 
catastrophic, as the process of de-peasantisation goes hand in hand with the growing 
slum/urbanisation of both the South African and African population and with 
growing numbers of feet in the increasingly inescapable ‘swamp of pauperism’. 
 
Returning to the historical beginnings of this process, the transformation from 
feudalism to capitalism also meant a transformation from the direct connection 
of labour to land in producing livelihoods, thus tearing asunder the close and 
intimate connection between labour, land and livelihood and laying the 
foundation for human alienation. It is here that the social aspect of the 
metabolic rift is found.  The labour process is one in which humans interact 
with nature to produce their livelihoods. Labour is the key to this wealth. The 
use value of labour in the production process is nothing else than the result of 
the transformation of matter and energy, that is, the transformation of nature. 
This is the core of the human-nature metabolism and it is the disruption of this 
link which gives rise to the second sense of the metabolic rift, the disjuncture 
in relations between humans and the environment, due to the social relations of 
production within the capitalist system, specifically, the division between 
labour and capital, and the alienations to which this gives rise. 
 
Much of the labour from the land became the labour for the factories in the 
newly industrialising societies. Marx both anticipates and attributes 
environmental crises to the separation of workers from the land and their 
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subsequent division into classes. He thus explicitly linked materialist and social 
issues in the analysis of environmental concerns. While the industrial 
revolution began in Britain, the effects spread, both in the industrial mode of 
production and the accompanying social relations of production. Through 
colonialism and imperialism and the insatiable appetite for resources by the 
industrial centres, the peripheral states in turn were robbed of their resources, 
the people dispossessed of their lands, enslaved, impoverished or exterminated. 
Thus was born the metabolic rift on a global scale, and the foundation of the 
ecological debt the North owes to the South, the rich to the poor.  
 
Marx’s exposure and analysis of the metabolic rift associated with capitalist 
industrialisation is taken further when he analyses the origins of agricultural 
land rent in Capital Vol 3, (1981: 949), arguing that:  
 
Large landed property reduces the agricultural population to an ever 
decreasing minimum and confronts it with an ever growing industrial 
population crammed together in large towns: in this way it produces 
conditions that provoke an irreparable rift in the interdependent process of 
social metabolism, a metabolism prescribed by the natural laws of life 
itself. The result of this is a squandering of the vitality of the soil, which is 
carried by trade far beyond the bounds of a single country. 
  
The need for larger tracts of land for agricultural production meant the 
superfluous labour also had to move off small land holdings which merged into 
larger holdings. In turn they had to move to the towns compounding the 
problems of the division of labour, the separation of humans from nature and 
the alienation of humans from directly producing their food and fibre and being 
transformed into alienated labour.  As alienated labour, workers began working 
for exchange value rather than use value. Exchange value becomes 
increasingly important, driving yet further the material processes of production, 
the elevation of the market and money as the predominant social institutions, 
and hence the expansion of capitalism and, its converse, the decline of 
communities, the commons and the environment. Thus, the metabolic rift, 
caused by the taking of food and fibre from the countryside to the town, was 
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exacerbated by the building in of yet further rifts including the second aspect of 
the metabolic rift, which for Marx was inextricably linked to the labour 
process. This was illustrated in the South African study, particularly in the 
work of van Olselen (1996), in writing of the life and times of Kas Maine in 
The Seed is Mine. 
 
Foster (2008: np) writes that this capitalist system worked because of the 
incessant process of accumulation. This then resulted in ‘ever more divided, 
more alienated human beings, together with a globally destructive metabolism 
between humanity and nature’. The conquest of nature became also the 
conquest of man. He continues:  
 
this dialectic of domination and destruction is now spiralling out of control 
on a planetary scale. Economically, overall inequality between the centre 
and periphery nations of the world system is increasing together with the 
intensification of class inequality within each capitalist state. Ecologically, 
the world’s climate and the life-support systems of the entire earth are 
being transformed by a process of runaway global warming (Foster 2008: 
np).  
 
The rift, or breaking of this human-nature metabolism that is found in the 
disruption of the cycle of soil – nutrients – produce – consumption – waste – 
soil, is found again in the carbon cycle. It is to the carbon cycle and the 
accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere as a result of burning fossil 
fuels62, the process which provides the energy for the expansion of capitalism 
and which gives rise to a specific form of the rift in the Earth’s carbon 
metabolism that I now turn.  
 
The carbon rift refers to the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
as a result of human activities, to the point that the Earth’s ‘self regulation 
                                           
 62 The burning of fossil fuels is the predominant, but not only activity which released carbon dioxide 
into the atmosphere. Other activities, such as industrial agriculture (excluding the use of fossil fuel 
energy) for example, does also, but for the purposes of simplicity of understanding, I am referring 
only to fossil fuels here to make a point. 
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upon which all life depends will be put at risk’ (Lovelock 2006: xv), not only 
damaging the environment but specifically causing global warming.   
The extent and consequences of this accumulation of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere were covered earlier, in Part I of the thesis. The relationship 
between the metabolic rift and the global political economy system was 
outlined in 9.2 above, showing how capitalism systematically destroyed the 
social and biological basis for sustainability on an increasingly globalised 
scale.  The carbon rift is just one aspect of the metabolic rift, but the one most 
pertinent to the political economy of global warming. 
 
Foster et al. (2010: 126-131) provide a comprehensive summary of the 
geological and evolutionary history and physical structure of the biosphere’s 
carbon cycle, including how carbon was stored through geological processes as 
concentrated (and stable) energy in the form of fossil fuels. To reiterate. These 
processes effectively removed large quantities of carbon from the biosphere, 
making the biosphere eventually conducive to the evolution of humans and 
other species. The carbon cycle continues to involve the whole biosphere with 
carbon moving through air, water, soil, all living things, the oceans and so on, 
in a cyclical process. The various components of the carbon cycle contribute to 
the complex relationships of exchange and regulation of carbon throughout the 
biosphere. The global carbon cycle involves both the geological cycle, which 
operates over millions of years, and the biological/physical cycle which is 
observable as a continuous process, operating at shorter time scales (minutes to 
thousands of years). It is the changes to the geological cycle which is 
experienced as Anthropogenic global warming. For the past 400,000 years, the 
climate system and the carbon cycle have operated in a manner that has 
sustained an even temperature on the planet suitable for humans and other 
species. As outlined earlier, the concentration of carbon dioxide (and other 
gases) in the atmosphere has increased significantly, the balance which had 
prevailed is now out of kilter and the climate system is changing. This 
constitutes the carbon rift. If this is not restored in the very near future, in less 
than 10 years, it will deepen inexorably, setting in motion an irreversible 




As the economic system expands, the use of material and energy also 
increases, with nature providing free gifts to the owners of capital, free gifts 
which are not taken into account in capitalism’s accounting. Foster et al. 
(2010: 137-8) argue that  
 
[c]apital cannot operate under conditions that require the reinvestment of 
capital into the maintenance of nature. Short term profits provide the 
immediate pulse of capitalism.  Capital itself is a manifestation of 
completion in the accumulation of wealth. Money serves as a universal 
measure and means for international trade and aids capital in its 
international expansion, as it incorporates more people and nature into the 
global system. The monetary process comes to dominate the organisation 
of the material processes of production.  In this, capitalism conquers the 
earth (including the atmosphere), taking its destructive field of operation 
to the planetary level. The exploitation of nature is universalized, 
increasingly bringing all of nature within the sphere of the economy, 
subjecting it to the rationality of profitability. 
 
This is perhaps too bold from Foster et al. as some economists (see for 
example Hicks 1939 and Dasgupta 2010) have sought to take these ‘free gifts’ 
into the economic equation. Such economists remain a small minority. 
 
Herein lies the key to global warming, its cause and, from an understanding of 
this, the beginnings of a possible solution if the rift has not become 
irretrievably severed.  
 
Thus, Marx, in building on the work of Liebig, developed a theory of 
capitalism that has given rise to this schism between humans and nature. The 
consequences of this analysis are clear: these rifts, the metabolic and the 
carbon, cannot be resolved by mechanical solutions, such as carbon trading, 
carbon taxes, geo-sequestration and renewable energy. There must be social 
solutions. There must be a different economic structure. The metabolic 
restoration of the environment can only be fully achieved outside of the 
capitalist relations of production. For the solution, it is to a new political 
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economy that we need to look to rebuild the harmonious, cyclical relationship 
between humans both as part of the ecology and as actors upon the ecology, so 
we can restore the metabolic balance, including the balance in the carbon cycle 
and the balance in the social relations of production. Hence, if irreversible 
tipping points have not been passed, it is possible for society to achieve a 
systematic restoration of its reproductive metabolism with the land ‘in a form 
adequate to the full development of the human race’ (Marx Capital Vol 1, 638, 
quoted by Burkett and Foster 2006: 142). I will pursue this possibility in 
Chapter 11. 
 
In continuing the critique of capitalist political economy, I will now turn more 
specifically to one of the consequences of the metabolic rift – that of alienation 
- which helps to reveal some of the inabilities of societies to address the 
various contemporary ecological crises and to continue consuming endlessly, 
despite human societies being on the precipice of their extinction. 
 
 
9.3 Alienation  
 
The issue of alienation is important both to the understanding of and for the 
solution of the problems of global warming and the myriad of other ecological 
and social problems faced in a capitalist world.  
 
Foster et al. (2010:14) write: ‘[t]he planet is now dominated by a 
technologically potent but alienated humanity, alienated from both nature and 
itself and hence, ultimately destructive of everything around it. At issue is not 
just the sustainability of human society, but the diversity of life on Earth’. 
What I want to suggest is that alienation takes three (and perhaps even four) 
forms each of which is relevant to the theoretical framework being developed 
under the central concept of the metabolic rift. First following McClintock 
(2010) there is a biophysical metabolic relationship. Then there is the 
metabolic rift which is given birth from the way in which land is commodified 
and labour and food are no longer at the very heart of social and economic 
relations. Thirdly there is the individual rift for the worker, the alienation of 
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people from the products of their labour. There is however in a sense a fourth 
rift which is the combination all three in a unified metabolic rift.  
 
To give a full account of the complexities of Marx’s concept of alienation is a 
vast task. Fortunately that is not necessary for the purposes of this thesis. What 
is important is to examine the concept of alienation and its relationship to the 
metabolic rift and to explain how humans have got to the point of being more 
concerned with the continuation of current lifestyles and of the capitalist 
system than with confronting the causes of the several crises, including global 
warming, that they face. 
 
As indicated, the human-social relationship to nature is central to the metabolic 
rift and it is at this very point that alienated labour mediates the relationship 
within the capitalist relations of production. Meszaros’ Marx’s Theory of 
Alienation (1970) describes the double alienation of humans in the complex 
relationship between humanity, labour and nature.  Marx, and Hegel before 
him, treat human labour as fundamental and the particular labouring 
relationship of humans under the capitalist system as the basis of class relations 
and the source of alienation of humans from one another (as alienated labour) 
and from nature. The idea of the alienation of labour is critical to the concept 
of the metabolic rift and stems from Marx’s conception of the human condition 
as being in essence alienated labour under capitalism. Marx's economic 
analysis of capitalism is based on his version of the labour theory of value, a 
theory which he shared with earlier classical economists such as Adam Smith 
(1976), although Marx placed different significance on that theory. Most 
commonly Marx’s labour theory of value is interpreted as meaning that the 
value of a good is based or is to be based on the socially necessary amount of 
labour needed to produce it. While there has been much criticism of this 
interpretation, there are others. Marx’s main use of it was to explain the origin 
and size of profits and the rate of profits in the capitalist mode of production 
(Harcourt and Kerr 2009). It is of note, however, that Joan Robinson (1972: 
38) who was a keen contributor to Marxist thought, argues that ‘commodities 
normally exchange at prices proportional to their values in this sense [i.e their 
labour values]’. She notes that we do not have to test such a proposal because 
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‘we know in advance, and Marx also knows, that it is not accurate’. What she 
goes on to suggest (as Sen 1978 asserts she is saying) is ‘that labour has the 
right to the whole product’. This is the key for Robinson and for this thesis. 
The problem over the years with Marx’s labour theory of value has been that, 
by its critics, it is seen purely in technical terms and at that level I would argue 
that much of the criticism may well be valid. Adopting, however, this deeper, 
social interpretation of Robinson and in turn Sen, which seems often to be 
missed by his critics, is a more valid interpretation of Marx’s labour theory of 
value, at least for the way in which this thesis seeks to use it in the context of 
alienation and in turn the metabolic rift. 
 
The really central issue here is thus not about the relationship between value 
and price but rather, going back to Marx’s view of value as ‘a relation between 
persons expressed as a relation between things’ (Marx 1887 quoted in Sen 
1978). This point is amplified by Maurice Dobb (1973: 145): 
 
Such an approach serves also to explain the place assigned [by Marx] to 
labour as human productive activity: why it is natural for Marx to place it 
in the very centre of the stage. Implied in this is a virtual definition of 
productive activity in the sense of the annexation or receipt of part of the 
fruits of production by those who have contributed no productive activity 
and lack any personal participation in the process of production per se.  As 
such ‘exploitation’ is a factual description of a socio-economic 
relationship.  
 
Braverman (1974: 51) adds emphasis to the human dimension of labour, as 
seen by Marx: ‘for humans in society, labour power is a special category, 
separate and inexchangeable with any other, simply because it is human’. 
 
Alienation is a historical and systemic problem arising from capitalist social 
relations.  That is, the capitalist social relations of production do not just 
produce more wealth for the capitalist, but institute a system of domination and 
exploitation in which the worker is robbed of his/her autonomy, sense of 
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community and humanity. Marx wrote that in capitalist society, labour was 
organised in such a way as to make work involuntary for the vast majority of 
the population. Workers were wage slaves who had to work in order to eat. 
According to Marx (1963: 125):  
 
The worker feels himself at home only during his leisure time, whereas at 
work he feels homeless. His work is not voluntary but imposed, forced 
labour. It is not the satisfaction of a need, but only a means for satisfying 
other needs. Its alien character is clearly shown by the fact that as soon as 
there is no physical or other compulsion it is avoided like the plague ... the 
external character of work for the worker is shown by the fact that it is not 
his own work but work for someone else, that in work he does not belong 
to himself but to another person. 
 
This alienated labour results in the degradation of human life in exchange for 
the things necessary merely to survive. Human beings are thus alienated from 
their social nature as species beings (Marx 1971). It was the liberation from 
this alienation that Marx saw as the central historical problem of human 
existence and it is this historical problem that is now also central to a solution 
to global warming.  As Burkett (2009: 88) writes: 
 
The structural powerlessness of working people vis-a-vis the 
capitalistically developed conditions of production helps explain the 
limited ability of non-class political and ideological struggles to defend 
pro-ecological values against the market ... these struggles will remain 
rearguard actions as long as they do not strive toward a dis-alienation of 
working people and their communities vis-a-vis the main conditions of 
production. This systemic/structural problem explains why non class 
political and ideological struggles are unable to ‘save the planet’ from 
ecological destruction. 
 
The very lack of political and ideological struggles in the rich industrialised 
world can also in part be attributed to a new type of alienation of workers, with 
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the middle class having ‘completely recast even the notion of work as the 
activity that provides individual motivation, social integration and systemic 
reproduction ... what has become central is consumer sovereignty and freedom 
in the market’ (Chachage and Annan-Yao 2004). These are powerfully 
seductive and alienating phenomena. There would be much consensus that 
alienation is a pervasive malaise in contemporary society. Indeed while he does 
not label it as such, Taylor (1991) clearly has this in mind when he writes of 
the ‘malaise of modernity’. This he describes as ‘the dark side of 
individualism’ with its ‘centring on the self, which both flattens and narrows 
our lives, makes them poorer in meaning and less concerned with others or 
society’ (Taylor 1991: 4).  
 
In addition to the structural aspects of alienation, there are now cultural and 
technological aspects which compound the original source of class alienation. 
Human alienation on all levels has a synergistic effect on humans’ ability to 
tackle issues such as global warming and other ecological problems. Levels of 
alienation of humans as species beings are compounded by, for example, 
information technologies, to the point where it was reported that a young 
Japanese man married his cyber bride (BBC News 2009) and, again, a Korean 
couple were so addicted to a cyber-game around rearing a child, they failed to 
feed their real human baby daughter (Daily Mail Online 2010).  
 
There is a separation in reality of humans from nature which is deeply flawed 
and contrary to the pursuit of sustainable living. This alienation is explored by 
Rutherford (2008) in The Culture of Capitalism in which he argues that, under 
the sustained affluence in the west, there is a powerful trend toward a liberation 
ethic of self-expression (echoing again Taylor’s ‘malaise of modernity’). 
Within this culture ‘the ideological weapon of neo-liberalism and the new 
technologies of information and communication [are] key resources for 
creating the new regimes of capital accumulation’. He continues: ‘the fastest 
growing economic sector [in the UK] during the 1990s was the cultural 
industries – advertising TV and radio, music, publishing, film and video, 
design, designer fashion and computer and video games [and] indicative of the 
rise in an experience-oriented consumerism whose ends are aesthetic pleasure 
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and self-fulfilment’ (Rutherford 2008: np). Thus technology and the market are 
creating new kinds of commons and opportunities for capital to commodify 
such cultural practices. There is thus a move to what Rutherford (2008: np) 
calls ‘desiring consumers’ and the ‘economic sphere expands as production 
conscripts the thinking, imagination and sensibilities of individuals’. He thus 
argues we have a new kind of capitalism which seeks to enclose new commons 
- ‘the cultural and intellectual commons – the commons of the human mind and 
body, and the commons of biological life’ (Rutherford 2008: np). This culture 
of capitalism is pervasive, including in our education systems where the 
cultures of schools and universities have been transformed to meet the needs of 
the market, where individuals are conditioned to meet market criteria. What is 
valued and rewarded is the individual’s economic potential in the market.   
 
Rutherford’s thesis is what I would describe as the colonisation of people by 
the market and, perhaps even more sinisterly, the colonisation of the minds of 
the populace, with manifest implications for a deep alienation and 
disconnection in people’s social and ecological relationships. Here there are 
echoes of the point I made in section 9.1 from Marcuse (1967): that the aim 
must be ‘to transform the will itself so that people no longer want what they 
now want’. This has potentially major ramifications for human society. This is 
especially the case in a world in which, if we are going to solve the problems 
of global warming, poverty and inequality, we require critical thinking, human 
solidarity and a recognition of our being both a part of and interdependent with 
the broad ecology and the human community. The liberation from this 
alienation is critical to the transformative changes needed to solve the problem 
of global warming, of finding a way to create the level of critical awareness 
necessary to transform society to one that is sustainable and in which humans 
live in harmony with the environment. I will return to this problem in Chapters 
11 and 12 where, although I do not cover the operational solutions to the 
change process, I do offer some clear pointers for the future. Meanwhile, I 
return to criticising further other aspects of the capitalist system which are of 





9.4  Capitalism and capital accumulation 
 
Global warming (and the many other systemic problems) has resulted from 
more than a problem of capital accumulation. However, the dynamics of 
capital accumulation are critical to the unsustainability of capitalism, as argued 
in section 9.2, but also because of the physical consumption of resources and 
production of wastes. Capital accumulation, euphemistically called economic 
growth, so central to almost all nation states today, is the ‘elephant in the 
room’ for proposed solutions to global warming. As the study of South Africa 
illustrated, capital accumulation imperatives have over-ridden the objectives of 
employment, equity and sustainability in South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Marx proposed that, if the productivity of labour is such that each person can 
only produce enough for their subsistence, social divisions do not take place in 
the society. However, if productivity is increased beyond this subsistence level, 
the conditions are established for a struggle over how the surplus is shared. 
Also, with an increase in the productivity of labour, conditions then arise 
whereby some are freed from having to work for their subsistence. Some of 
these in turn become the ruling class.  
 
Marx wrote in Capital Vol.1 (1954: 715) that ‘the economic structure of 
capitalistic society’ grew out of the decline of ‘the economic structure of feudal 
society, when the labourer only had his own labour to dispose of after he had 
ceased to be attached to the soil and ceased to be the slave, serf, or bondman of 
another’. This was the starting point for the creation of the wage labourer, the 
defining element of exploitation under capitalism and the capitalist. Within this 
framework, the exploitation of people goes hand in hand with the exploitation 
of nature.  
 
It was maintained by Marx that ‘[t]he so-called primitive accumulation is 
nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the 
means of production. It appears as primitive, because it forms the pre-historic 
stage of capital and of the mode of production corresponding with it’ (Marx 
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Capital Vol. 1 1954: 714-5). He continued that ‘the labourer, could only 
dispose of his own person after he had ceased to be attached to the soil and 
ceased to be the slave, serf, or bondman of another ... these new freedmen 
became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own 
means of production, and of all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old 
feudal arrangements [thus giving rise to] the transformation of feudal 
exploitation into capitalist exploitation’. Marx (Capital Vol. 1 1954:716) adds 
that ‘[i]n the history of primitive accumulation great masses of men are 
suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled as free 
and “unattached” proletarians on the labour market. The expropriation of the 
agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole 
process.’ This is a process which was central to colonialism and continues 
today in Africa. It is a key aspect of the globalising metabolic rift and human 
alienation. 
 
The history of the Middle Ages in England shows clearly this transformation 
from feudal society to capitalist society and the violent process of primitive 
accumulation. Marx considered the first ‘law of motion’ of the capitalist mode 
of production to be the compulsion for the capitalists to step up constantly the 
rate of capital accumulation through the production of new goods, new 
methods of production and the conquest of new sources of raw materials. The 
inner logic of capitalism is to work for not only profit but also capital 
accumulation.63 Capitalists are compelled to act in that way as a result of the 
need to grow and accumulate or to be taken over by the accumulation 
processes of others, a process which continues until today. This law of 
accumulation was amply illustrated in the study of South Africa. 
 
Economic growth is essential to capitalism. It remains not only the cornerstone 
of neoliberal economic policy and the raison d’être of so many governments’ 
economic policies; it is seen as the only way. The contemporary expression of 
this imperative for continual accumulation is the equating of the concept of 
economic growth with that of human and social development. Thus Beckerman 
                                           
63 Accumulate, accumulate; that is Moses and the Prophets’, states Marx in Capital Vol. 1. 
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(1974: 9, quoted in Fig 2007: 227) states: ‘a failure to maintain economic 
growth means continued poverty, deprivation, disease, squalor, degradation 
and slavery to soul-destroying toil for countless millions of the world’s 
population’. In reality, however, capitalism is not concerned with the 
eradication of poverty or deprivation. Capitalists have gone beyond a concern 
to produce commodities to satisfy basic human needs such as food, shelter and 
clothing. The use value of commodities has become subordinated to the 
exchange value for the sake of profit, with the actual use of the goods being 
produced becoming increasingly immaterial, a problem overcome by 
advertising and the marketing industry which, in addition to persuading people 
to buy useless items, convince people that such buying is an essential 
expression of one’s democratic rights and a way of building an identity in 
today’s society. 
 
The violent birth of capitalism was a precursor to the events which occurred 
during imperialist expansion and colonisation. The ‘constant generation of a 
relative surplus population … keeps wages low corresponding with the wants 
of capital’. The labourers’ dependence on capital is ‘guaranteed in perpetuity 
by the conditions of production themselves while the bourgeoisie … uses the 
power of the state to ‘regulate’ wages, an essential element of the so-called 
primitive accumulation’ (Marx Capital Vol 1, 1954: 737). This relationship of 
labourers to capital is structural; the power imbalance is evident in the vast 
supplies of unemployed labour found in slums and the ‘informal economies’ 
such as in the townships of South Africa today. There the abundant supply of 
cheap, exploitable and exploited labour underpins the first world economy of 
the city centres, the elite and the state institutions relevant to the business 
sector.  
 
Contemporary Marxist theorists such as Ernest Mandel (1979: 68) have 
developed the theory of primitive accumulation to include the ‘law of 
combined and uneven development’. This seeks to explain the process 
involved in the expansion of the capitalist economy on a global scale under 
imperialism, which has in turn led to the under-development of peripheral 
countries and regions. Mandel also distinguishes between the primitive 
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accumulation of money capital and the primitive accumulation of industrial 
capital, using the example of the enormous capital value to Europe of the slave 
trade during the sixteenth to mid eighteenth centuries which underwrote the 
development of industrialising countries. In a similar vein, Harvey (2003) in 
The New Imperialism, develops Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation and 
introduces the term ‘accumulation by dispossession’. Harvey argues that this 
form of accumulation is a continuing process, within capital accumulation on a 
global scale, and now also includes such dimensions as intellectual property 
rights and patents. This is particularly important in considering neoliberal 
solutions to global warming, such as carbon emission trading schemes, which 
are simply market solutions seeking to justify the privatisation of the 
atmosphere. This means in turn that the atmosphere becomes another site for 
capital accumulation.  
 
A part of the balance sheet which is obscured in the capital accumulation 
process and which intersects with the problem of global warming is the issue of 
ecological debt. There have been no reparations for the capital flow from non-
industrialised to industrialised countries. These flows continue today, as was 
shown in the case of South Africa.  Industrialised countries were built on the 
flow of raw materials, cheap labour, expropriated land, minerals and 
agricultural produce from the colonised periphery to the industrialising centre. 
There can be no solution to global warming without a cessation of this practice 
and some redress of the historical expropriation and exploitation. 
 
There is a separation in reality of humans from nature which is deeply flawed 
and contrary to the pursuit of sustainable living. This alienation is explored by 
Rutherford (2008) in The Culture of Capitalism in which he argues that, under 
the sustained affluence in the west, there is a powerful trend toward a liberation 
ethic of self-expression (echoing again Taylor’s ‘malaise of modernity). Within 
this culture ‘the ideological weapon of neo-liberalism and the new technologies 
of information and communication [are] key resources for creating the new 




For Marx, capitalism and capitalist history are driven (at an abstract level) by 
contradictory structural relationships based on antagonistic class relations 
around (over) production and the expropriation of surplus value; by 
competition between capitals that imposes the need for further competition, 
accumulation and growth; by the relationship between the forces and relations 
of production and between relations of production and the land and soil. At the 
heart of these are class relations which are fundamental in capitalism. They are 
the social relations of exploitation of one group of people by another. It is this 
social rift which is at the epicentre of the ecological rift. At the global level, 
there is certainly a division between North and South, centre and periphery, 
rich and poor countries. At the very basis of these divisions however is the 
division of class. Within the globalised economy there is a hierarchy of states, 
and a regionalisation of economic activities around a dominant state for 
example in Europe it is Germany; in Asia, Japan but with China rising 
(Navarro 2007 :19). The US is currently the most dominant state of all, with its 
position being maintained by class alliances with the dominant classes in other 
states. As Navarro (2007: 19) argues, ‘[n]eoliberal ideology provides the 
linkage among these classes’ with the commonality of ruling class interests 
outweighing the tensions of difference. The ruling classes therefore are 
transnational; likewise the exploited classes, although the inequalities in the 
exploited classes are deep and systemically divided and robbed of the 
opportunities and culture of international solidarity. The strong ideological 
linkages between the global and (South African) national elites was 
demonstrated in the example of the World Bank loan to build the new Medupi 
coal fired power station (see 7.3). 
 
The significance of class to global warming is profound.  The incessant drive 
for growth for the benefit of ruling class-based profits and capital accumulation 
is directly linked to the exploitation of both labour and land. The exploitation 
of the land leads to its ruin and the ‘externalities’ of this imperative push the 
environment to the brink of being no longer recoverable. Foster et al. (2010) 
argue that the overexploitation of nature’s resource taps and waste sinks, under 
the capitalist system, has reached the point where both are negatively impacted, 
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firstly at a regional, then at a planetary level, affecting the climate and the 
biosphere itself. This situation is further evidence for a major conclusion of this 
thesis: the need for economic regime change. 
 
What is happening in practice is that the imperative for accumulation is 
gathering momentum and new ways are being found of expanding which bring 
new forms of alienation and exploitation leading to a deepening of the 
metabolic rift. One of these new forms of capital accumulation is 
financialisation, as demonstrated in the study of South Africa. This 
phenomenon has particular significance for global warming, both directly but 
also less directly because of the implications it has for proposed carbon 
reduction strategies such as emissions trading schemes. Let us look at 
financialisation. 
 
9.5   The financialisation of capital  
 
‘If Marx had one big idea, it was that capitalism was the rule of money which 
was itself the expression of greed’ (Muller 2002: 191). This rule of money was 
fundamentally immoral because it deprived the vast majority in a capitalist 
society of their humanity. This is central, particularly given the shift in the 
nature of capitalism during the last three decades from the monopoly capital of 
the real economy, i.e. from the material, tangible goods, services and resources 
produced and exchanged to monopoly finance capital – what Harvey (2001: 
15) refers to as an ‘unprecedented autonomy of money capital from the circuits 
of material production’.  This shift, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the 
era of neoliberalism, was a major factor in the 2008-2009 crisis of capitalism 
(Foster and Magdoff  2009; Palley 2007) but it also contributes to other 
ongoing problems: of class differences, the disenchantment with democracy 
and the more general environmental crisis.  
 
So what is this financialisation of the economy? In short it means the economy 
has moved toward proportionally greater economic activity in the financial 
sector rather than in the productive sector, with an increasing role being played 
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by financial markets and institutions. Palley (2007: 2) describes 
financialisation as ‘a process whereby financial markets, financial institutions, 
and financial elites gain greater influence over economic policy and economic 
outcomes. Financialisation transforms the functioning of economic systems at 
both the macro and micro levels.’ He argues that it has three main impacts: to 
‘(1) elevate the significance of the financial sector relative to the real sector, 
(2) transfer income from the real sector to the financial sector, and (3) increase 
income inequality and contribute to wage stagnation’ (Palley 2007: 2). 
 
Epstein (2006: 3) examines a number of definitions of financialisation. The 
following two are most relevant for this thesis. The first is that by Hilferding, 
who uses the term to refer to the increasing political and economic power of a 
particular class grouping - the rentier class (i.e. people who live on income 
from property or investments). Second the definition by Krippner (2004: 14 
quoted in Epstein 2006: 5) states that financialisation is a ‘pattern of 
accumulation in which profit making occurs increasingly through financial 
channels rather than through trade and commodity production’. The extent of 
the momentum of this financialisation is apparent in the figures from the Bank 
of International Settlements, showing that the ‘daily volume of foreign 
exchange transactions rose from 570 billion dollars per day in 1989 to 1.9 
trillion dollars per day in 2004’ (quoted in Epstein 2006: 4). 
 
Another measure of the move to financialisation is that funds raised on 
international financial markets as a percentage of world exports rose from 0.5 
per cent in 1950 to over 20 per cent in 1996 (Baker et al. 1998 quoted in 
Epstein 2006: 4).  Particularly germane to this thesis is that the consequences 
of this financialisation have been ‘highly detrimental to significant numbers of 
people around the globe’ (Epstein 2006: 5). It has meant a growth in power of 
the financial institutions and a consequent decline in power of labour unions, 
whose links to the economy are through the production process. As the 
financial sector is separated from both the means and modes of material 
production, this is a double alienation of labour; first from the environment; 
and second from the means of production. It has also meant growing 
inequality, nationally and internationally, an increase in the percentage of 
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national incomes going to capital (Ruccio 2010), as well as the centralisation 
and concentration of capital.  
 
Bagchi (2005: 319) writes that ‘[o]ne of the central tendencies of the move 
toward liberalization is to throw all the assets into the casino of the stock 
market’.  This metaphor captures the irresponsibility and unaccountability of 
the financialisation of the economy.64 The logic of financialisation is tied up in 
short-term returns, a temporal logic that runs counter to the logic of natural 
cycles of reproduction. This then serves to exacerbate the metabolic rift.  
 
Of particular concern for this thesis is that the financialisation of the economy 
siphons wealth from the poorest to the richest. It also further weakens 
democratic processes, both by being beyond the governance of nation states 
and by increasing the vulnerability of the poorest and weakest and conversely 
increasing the power of the largest conglomerates. As such it has awakened the 
ire of trade unions internationally. Thus in a paper for the International Labour 
Organisation, Rossman and Greenfield (2006: 9) write with respect to 
financialisation: ‘The last quarter century of ‘deregulation’ involved the 
introduction of a vast array of new legal mechanisms and regulations  by 
national governments to protect the interests of investors and shareholders.’ 
These national arrangements to protect capital, they suggest, need to be 
dismantled. ‘New legal mechanisms and regulations must be introduced 
nationally to subordinate investment capital to democratic requirements.’ 
Financialisation also increasingly underpins an insecure global economy in the 
same time-frame as the increasingly unstable biosphere. 
 
As Painceira (2009: 7) shows, financialisation since 2000 has resulted in ‘flows 
of capital to the USA’ because of the ‘role of the dollar as international reserve 
currency’ and which ‘has allowed the USA to run very large trade deficits 
throughout this period’. He states: ‘Financialisation has … resulted in the 
                                           
64One of the many figures illustrating the vastness as well as the casino nature of the stock market and 
included in Foster and Magdoff’s (2010) The Great Financial Crisis: Causes and Consequences, is 
the fact that daily trading on world currency markets averages about US$1.8 trillion a day – a figure 
which equals the annual GDP of the whole world.   
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absurd situation of the poor financing the rich in the world economy, while 
allowing the USA to run vast trade deficits.’ 
 
Much of this financialisation activity is carried out by ‘secretive, unregulated 
investment partnerships’ (Foster and Magdoff  2010: 58). That carbon 
emissions trading schemes have become a major part of the territory of 
financialisation (as indicated in Chapter 3) does little to encourage faith in any 
ETS. At the same time this financialisation removes ETSs from any semblance 
of democratic control or direction, dangerously furthering the rift between 
humans and the environment. There is a deep disjuncture between the real 
economy and finance, with the additional factor of the proliferation of easy 
credit enabling citizen consumers to live beyond their means and encouraging 
patterns of unsustainable consumerism. This supports further over-production 
(and consumption) and thus energy, material through-puts and waste (Keen 
2010). This scenario graphically captures the material essence of the carbon 
rift. Furthermore, banks, for example, have ‘increasingly turned away from 
financing corporate investment to directly tapping into wage earners’ revenue 
through mortgage, credit card and other forms of consumer debt’ (Rossman 
2010: np). As we saw in the Global Financial Crisis, all of this contributes to 
an increasingly unstable and complex pack of cards which, when one card 
falls, leads to chaos. Add in global warming and we will have unprecedented 
human suffering. 
 
Neoliberalism is characterised by the de-regulation of financial markets and 
trade, privatisation, economic reform (which essentially means privatisation) 
and the reduction of government services such as health, education and social 
welfare. At the same time, institutionally it seeks to strengthen the role of the 
market and de-unionise labour. It results in a shift in emphasis to the 
individual, the consumer, the ‘rule of the market’ and the minimisation of the 
concept of public good and community (Harvey 2005; Simon and McBride 
2007). Deregulation in this context normally refers to the weakening or 
removal of regulation at a national level. Internationally, however, with the 
globalisation of the capitalist economy, international – and undemocratic - 
institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO have become the 
 
219 
regulatory bodies, regulating trade and investment. Driven by a neoliberal 
ideology, these international organisations, it can be argued, are primarily 
under the control of the rich, the powerful and the large private, corporate 
bodies.  
 
There are numerous dimensions to the consequences of the financialisation of 
the economy. One that can be missed is that it increases the fragility of 
democracy. The activities of the financial sector are global and outside the 
jurisdiction of any national government. Of great concern are the secrecy and 
complexity in the activities of this sector, placing financial activities beyond 
the scrutiny of people and democratic regulation. The consequences of free 
financial movement can be seen in Africa for example, where foreign debt 
increasingly becomes difficult to tackle because of large-scale capital flight.  If 
due weight were attached to this capital flight, many sub-Saharan African 
countries would likely be net creditors rather than debtors. Certainly financial 
liberalisation has increased the size and ease of this capital flight. The South 
African study illustrated this point. 
 
It is of note that writing in 2007, before the GFC, Palley (2007) suggested that 
‘financialisation may put the economy at risk of debt deflation and prolonged 
recession’. He was also concerned that the two decades up to then had seen 
increasing ratios in household debt-income and corporate debt-equity and he 
pointed to the inherent fragility and unsustainability this brought in its wake, 
‘because debt constraints must eventually bite’ (Palley 2007: 3). 
 
Thus fundamentally it can be argued that it was increased financialisation 
which led to easier access for households to borrowing and at the same time 
increased inequality in the economy. These were the very factors (or perhaps 
more correctly the inability to control these factors) that led to the GFC (Keen 
2010). To that extent – that major extent – it can be argued that financialisation 
was the root cause of the GFC. 
 
The impact of the growing financialisation of the economy is felt nowhere 
greater than in the agricultural/food production sector. As Rossman (2010: np) 
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writes: ‘[t]he fate of agricultural workers, a large percentage of the nearly 1 
billion women and men who are now chronically hungry and malnourished, is 
increasingly linked to movements on commodity exchanges thousands of 
kilometres from the farms and plantations on which they work. This is the 
reality of financialisation’.  
 
The growing financialisation of the economy is linked to capitalist expansion 
through another dimension central to this thesis, the demand and supply of 
electricity. As McDonald (2009: 5) writes ‘[e]lectricity may not be an innate 
feature of capitalist modes of production but it has become an essential one 
upon which to build new production systems and products that lend themselves 
to the rapid pace of change in contemporary global markets as the capitalist 
centre of gravity shifts towards the services sector (particularly finance), 
electricity becomes an even more indispensable input, heightening pressures 
for cheap and reliable supplies of electric power from the ‘commanding 
heights’ of this new global economy and the transnational elites that run it’. 
Thus, with growing financialisation, we can see the increasing dependence on 
electricity and a growing role for finance capital in national political decision 
making.  Growth in the financial sector results in turn in a growing dependence 
on fossil fuels. This is occurring at the same time as the greater financialisation 
of the economy is resulting in the increasing percolation of wealth from the 
bottom to the top. 
 
Financialisation brings with it an extent of control over the Earth and over 
global governance institutions by corporations which is not being adequately 
scrutinised nor is it adequately covered in Marxist theory. How can global 
institutions, which are themselves members of a political economy structure 
which is so dominated by the interests of capital accumulation, be expected, or 
entrusted, to formulate solutions to global warming? Yet, corporations are 
intimately involved in the course of policy developments around global 
warming at the international and national levels. 
 
Finally, as Foster et al (2010) argue, the financialisation of the accumulation 
process results in increasing irrationalities including ‘drawing ever more 
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destructively on the limited resources and absorptive capacity of nature, as the 
economy continually grows in scale in relation to the planetary system. The 
result is emerging and expanding ecological rifts that are turning into planetary 
chasms’ (Foster et al. 2010: 29). 
 
 
9.6  Conclusion 
This chapter has drawn primarily on the work of Marx and Marxists to provide 
arguments of how and why the capitalist system can never be sustainable, and 
why the institutions of capitalism will never be able to save, resolve or restore 
the biosphere from the impact of global warming. It provides a theoretical 
framework to understand the severity and complexity of the problems faced in 
South Africa. At the same time the study of South Africa has given me 
important insights to allow me to grapple better with the theoretical structure 
built in this chapter.  
It was in this way that my thinking around the theoretical content of the thesis 
developed and how in developing a theory to understand better the political 
economy of the ways in which global warming has been both caused and in 
many quarters denied I came to rely more and more on Marxist ideas. The 
answer to the question however regarding how helpful Marxism is in finding 
the road to the ‘brave new world’ is limited but it is of great assistance in 
formulating the principles that might underlie that new world.   
This is perhaps not surprising since Marx was dealing with a consequence of 
the metabolic rift which he could not have foreseen. He did not nor could he 
have been expected to foresee that capitalism would lead to the current very 
specific threat of global warming (even if this phenomenon can be seen as an 
extension of the metabolic rift). That is why in chapter 12 the principles set out 
while drawing partially on Marxism do not rely nearly as heavily on them as 
did the examination of the causes of global warming. Any seeming disjuncture 
here is simply the result of a realisation on my part that these needed to be 
separated. It may appear neater, more coherent or academic if that had not  
occurred.  To come up with principles for the future which only draw on 
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Marxism would seem to me to be trying to fit the square peg of resolving 
global warming into the round hole of Marxist thought.    
The next chapter will look at the superstructures and the question of where the 
political power lies, particularly in relation to the state, markets and 
corporations. That chapter will also take a theoretical approach to the political 
economy of fossil fuels - a core component of the capitalist relations of 
production and a key to global warming - to conclude the theoretical criticism 





CHAPTER 10   The political economy of power and global warming 
 
10.1  Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate further the irresolvable contradictions 
between capitalism and sustainability. I do this by looking at the power 
relations in the global capitalist society. These have an international dimension, 
but also are replicated within nation states as illustrated in the study of South 
Africa. In both contexts, they are most keenly played out in relation to the 
state, to markets and to corporations. One could include power in relation to 
ideology - the hegemony of neoliberal ideology – but rather than taking that as 
a separate sub-set, I have included on culture and ideology in the discussion on 
corporations. No theoretical approach to global warming would be complete 
without a historical materialist approach to energy in general and in fossil fuels 
in particular, which are the source of the physical power that underpins the 
system of social and economic power which may wrench asunder the growing 
rift between humans and the environment.  
 
Much of Marx and Marxism is concerned with power in society, 
conceptualised around the unequal power relations in the very social relations 
of production upon which the economy is built, social relations that give rise to 
the metabolic rift discussed in the previous chapter. It is these social relations, 
these class relations between the owners of the means of production and the 
labourers, which form the basis of the powerful/powerless dichotomy, 
intermediated by the state, that are central to discussions on the causes of and 
solutions to global warming. Twenty first century society has developed many 
layers of complexity in the structure of the economy, but the social relations 
captured in the concept of class, though ‘not a stable social configuration’ 





The chapter next examines corporate power before, in section 10.3, homing in 
on corporate power in the fossil fuel sectors of the economy which are those 
most relevant to this thesis. Section 10.4 offers a conclusion to this theoretical 
critique.  
 
Anarchist Michael Bakunin (front page of Chomsky 2003, For Reasons of 
State) wrote: 
 
The State is the organized authority, domination, and power of the 
possessing classes over the masses the most flagrant, the most cynical, and 
the most complete negation of humanity. It shatters the universal solidarity 
of all men on the earth, and brings some of them into association only for 
the purpose of destroying, conquering and enslaving all the rest. This 
flagrant negation of humanity which constitutes the very essence of the 
State is, from the standpoint of the State, its supreme duty and its greatest 
virtue. Thus, to offend, to oppress, to despoil, to plunder, to assassinate or 
enslave one’s fellowman is ordinarily regarded as a crime. In public life it 
is all transformed into duty and virtue there is no horror, no cruelty, 
sacrilege, or perjury, no imposture, no infamous transaction, no cynical 
robbery, no bold plunder or shabby betrayal that has not been or is not 
daily being perpetrated by the representatives of the state, under no other 
pretext than those elastic words, so convenient and yet so terrible: “for 
reasons of state”.  
 
In Marxist theory, the state plays an important role. Unfortunately, and 
somewhat oddly however, Marx left no coherent body of theory of the state. 
The state, its role in governance in relation to global warming, and ideas of the 
social contract around citizens, are all highly relevant to the thesis. The role of 
the state is effectively ambivalent under the capitalist system, although citizens 
look to the state to take care of them, particularly if potentially catastrophic 
events such as global warming should befall them. The state has access to the 
best scientific resources and has the responsibility both to keep citizens 
informed and to act on potential threats to citizens’ wellbeing. The state 
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however, has the dominant role in defining the terms of this relationship and 
often chooses to pursue ends that are not necessarily in the best interests of the 
majority.  
 
There is a wide range of views regarding the ways in which states are formed 
and how they act. Broadly, it is often assumed people give up individual or 
local group sovereignty to receive certain benefits, such as social order, various 
infrastructures and security.  From the concept of the social contract arises the 
notion that legitimate state authority is derived from the consent of the 
governed. Philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries such as Thomas Hobbes, 
John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau built on the ideas of the social contract, 
thereby providing the theoretical groundwork for constitutional monarchies, 
liberal democracies and republicanism respectively. In democracies, such as 
South Africa, theoretically, the legitimacy of the state is grounded in its 
citizenship through the election process and the principles of accountability, 
transparency, freedom of speech and equality of opportunity. In reality the 
power-elite perpetuates the belief in the national ‘we’, drowning out any 
critique of the inherently conflicting interests between the different class 
interests in society, for example, on the one hand the political economic elite 
who owns and controls both the means of production and the ideology and, on 
the other, the people. The elected representatives, the parliaments, are 
presumed in democracies to represent the citizens.  
 
Wright (2010) maintains that representative democracy has been a critical 
source of social stability in advanced capitalism. He draws on the work of 
Przeworski (quoted in Wright 2010: 281) who analysed both the ‘dynamic 
reproductive effects of capitalist democracy’ and how the ‘mechanism by 
which capitalist democracy channels social conflicts in ways that tend to 
reproduce capitalist social relations’.  The dilemma faced by socialist parties to 
avoid marginalisation was to participate in electoral competition, where, to 
win, they had to support policies that would attract middle class voters and if 
they won and wanted to remain in power, pursue policies ‘which would foster 




While elections by the people are a fundamental principle of democracy, the 
entwinement of the political elite with the economic elite and corporate 
interests constitutes very often a major departure from rule by the people. 
Examples of this were provided in the chapters on South Africa. For additional 
examples relevant to this thesis, we need look no further than the degree of 
influence coal mining companies have been able to exert over state, national 
and international institutions in policies relating to global warming (Pearse 
2010) or the power of undemocratic bodies such as the IMF and the World 
Bank. 
 
Many, however, such as Adam Smith, have recognised the potentially 
subversive influence of the state. He wrote: ‘[c]ivil government, so far as it is 
instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of 
the rich against the poor or of those who have some property against those who 
have none at all’ (Smith 1976: 149). In reality, however, the state is more 
complex and dynamic than that. This is also true of the global capitalist 
political economy in which the elite in the South has joined the elite of the 
North in furthering their common interests against the interests of the poor and 
working classes the world over. Certainly at a national level, the state is often 
where there is a huge concentration of economic, political, social and cultural 
power. Globally the site can be the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank or the 
G2065 but at both these levels the power of large corporations is also very 
much at play. Capitalism both spawns and depends on this concentration of 
power.  
 
Power matters. In the context of global warming and particularly in light of the 
lessons learned from the study of South Africa in Part II, it follows that there is 
a need to focus on the sources of power in a society and how that power is 
reproduced. Navarro (2002) argues that, while these sources are multiple, class 
provides the frame within which the various power matrices – race, gender, 
national, regional and so on - operate. ‘Class power is based primarily on the 
                                           
65 The G20 is a group of major advanced and emerging economies brought together in the wake of the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis. It includes South Africa. 
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ownership of resources, be they the means of production, knowledge or 
organisation’ (Navarro 2002: 465-6). Thus while power is reproduced in many 
different spheres, state power and class power are often related (Navarro 2002). 
As Navarro writes (2002: 466) ‘[c]lass power is realized through the 
expression of political projects’. The obfuscation of not only the evidence 
about, but the required solutions, to global warming is a political project. As 
this thesis argues, it is not only the planet that is at stake; it is also the structure 
of class interests. 
 
Writing on the power of the state, Harvey (2001: 14-15) maintains that there is 
a ‘dramatic asymmetry’ with the nation state being, on the one hand, the 
fundamental regulator of state-labour relations but, on the other, unable to 
regulate global financial capital. The state is now often merely the agent of 
large multinational oligopolists. Harvey (2001: 14) argues that the idea that the 
power of the state is ‘dwindling or disappearing as a centre of authority in the 
age of globalization is a silly notion’. He writes that this ‘distracts attention 
from the fact that the nation state is now more dedicated than ever to creating a 
good business climate for investment, which means precisely controlling and 
repressing labour movements in all kinds of purposively new ways: cutting 
back the social wage, fine tuning migrant flows, and so on.  The state is 
tremendously active in the domain of capital labour relations’ (Harvey 2001: 
14) and in fact in all aspects of production and consumption. He points out, 
however, that in the relations between different forms of capital, the state has 
no power to regulate. This is because, since the 1970s, global financial flows 
have been beyond the domain of national regulation, affording money capital 
‘unprecedented autonomy’ from the cycle of material production (Harvey 
2001: 15). This was shown in the discussion on financialisation in section in 
9.5 and also empirically in the study of South Africa.  
 
Harvey writes of the ‘ubiquity and volatility of money as the impalpable 
ground of contemporary existence’ (2001: 15). This can be taken further. There 
is a lack of independence of the state from capital not only in regards to the 
regulation of labour (where the state also acts to the bidding of the corporate 
sector) but also on policy issues, such as are seen in relation to global warming, 
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including regulating carbon emissions, phasing out fossil fuel energy, coal 
mining and increasing corporate taxes.  An inherent contradiction exists in the 
power of the state, in so far as it is the ruling class ruling, while at the same 
time it is argued by the state (i.e. the ruling class) that it is ruling in the 
interests for and of all. Concepts such as the ‘national interest’, ‘national 
identity’ and state-fostered common ‘enemies’ (such as ‘terrorists’, the 
Taliban, ‘illegal boat people’) build a vacuous national solidarity and help in 
this obfuscation of who holds power and in whose interests. In issues around 
global warming, when the power of corporations is beyond the governance and 
control of governments or when governments and ministers of government are 
so captured by the interests of corporations, the system is, and will remain, 
unable to act democratically, appropriately or decisively in the interests of the 
people.  
 
10.2  Corporate power 
 
I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves me and causes 
me to tremble for the safety of my country corporations have been 
enthroned and an era of corruption in high places will follow, and the 
money power of the country will endeavor to prolong its reign by working 
upon the prejudices of the people until all wealth is aggregated in a few 
hands and the Republic is destroyed.  
U.S. President Abraham Lincoln (quoted in Shaw 1950). 
  
Abraham Lincoln’s prescience is remarkable. The recent granting of the rights 
of unlimited lobbying power by U.S. corporations, during U.S. elections, by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, is a harbinger of yet greater power to corporations 
and, conversely, a further de-legitimising of the state as a people’s democratic 
institution66.  
 
                                           
 66 Liptak (2010: np). It was stated that ‘The court affirmed that groups of passionate individuals, like 
billionaires - and corporations and unions after Citizens United - have the right to spend without limit 
to independently advocate for or against federal candidates.’ 
 
229 
Following on from the previous section, here I outline how corporations 
represent a supreme vehicle for capital accumulation and, concurrently, for 
power which they are able to exercise in, through and over the state.  The MEC 
in the South African study is an example of the convergence within the state of 
the enormous powers of the political and capitalist elite to steer the state in the 
direction of that elite’s interests. It is a particularly poignant example because 
the state in South Africa had appeared to have been built on the promises of a 
more just and equitable life for the majority. The dynamics around such 
corporate power are further fleshed out here. 
 
The objective of corporations is to maximise profit.  The rising power of the 
corporate sector and the converse weakening, corporatisation and/or sidelining 
of democratic states and international institutions, such as the United Nations, 
are the consequences of a number of factors. Most significantly for this thesis, 
are the hegemonic ideology and economic principles of neoliberalism and the 
growing wealth and power of the mega corporations and oligopolies. As both a 
cause and consequence of this rising corporate power is the declining 
legitimacy of the state as a democratic institution and the exercise of a very 
thin concept of democracy in democratic nations. These are crucially important 
issues in finding and enabling solutions to global warming. The state and 
international institutions today do not serve the interests of the majority. In this 
context, it is to be noted that Stiglitz (2003: 105), having left the powerful post 
of senior vice-president and chief economist of the World Bank and co-winner 
of the 2001 Nobel prize in economic science, argued that the centrepiece of the 
WTO’s policies (TRIPS) ‘reflected the triumph of corporate interests in the 
United States and Europe over the broader interests of billions of people in the 
developing world. It was another instance in which more weight was given to 
profits than to other basic values, like the environment, or life itself.’ In a 
biosphere-constrained world, the conjunction of corporate and 
state/international organisations presages disaster.  The corporation is in 
essence and in practice the logical outcome of capital accumulation. Thus the 




Corporations are a major, pervasive and growing influence on humanity and 
the planet. They touch on almost every dimension of our lives from education 
to health care, from controlling global food production and distribution to 
‘fixing’ global warming and moulding an ideology to embrace all the 
dimensions of life. Globally today there are over 50,000 trans-national 
corporations which now constitute the major holders of global wealth (Owen 
2010).  
 
How did corporations arise and become so powerful?  In neoclassical 
economic theory, there is a benchmark of the perfect world of perfect 
competition where commodities are produced by many firms, each accounting 
for only a small part of total output. This then leads to competition and in turn 
efficient use of scarce resources. The competitiveness of commodities in the 
market place depends on their relative cost, hence the cost of labour and its 
productiveness and in turn the scale of production. Marx, however, recognised 
both the instability of any economy based on such an assumption and its 
impossibility in anything other than theory. He saw there was an imperative in 
a competitive market to cut costs and expand production, a process which 
required constant accumulation of capital and ever new technologies. In 
Capital, Vol 3 (1970), Marx shows that through the twin processes of 
centralisation and concentration of capital, monopolies are formed. To explain, 
the concentration of capital refers to the process where individual capitalists 
accumulate more and more capital, thus increasing the absolute amount of 
capital under their control. Centralisation of capital is a complementary process 
which occurs when this capital rests in fewer and fewer hands, for example, 
through mergers and acquisitions when larger firms take over smaller firms. 
This was seen in the discussion of South Africa’s MEC and financial sectors in 
chapter 6. 
 
Under these processes, continually repeated, corporations end up capturing 
larger and larger shares of the market, for example, through mergers and 
acquisitions, leading to a growing concentration of capital. While the twin 
processes of mergers and acquisitions have ‘waxed and waned’ throughout 
history, ‘in the last quarter of the twentieth century the process of centralization 
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of capital [became] much more powerful than that of its concentration, but both 
processes have contributed to an enormous increase in the concentration of 
economic power among a handful of [transnational corporations]’ (Bagchi 
2005: 38).  With that growth in wealth of the largest corporations has come a 
parallel growth in power. One material expression of this is the rate of transfer 
of wealth from workers to corporations which has increased exponentially.67 
Figure 10.1, from Ruccio (2010) and the Real World Economics Review, 
captures one aspect of this in the growing income difference between workers 
and top executives (see Figure 10.1, p243).  
 
In the early 1960s executive compensation, including salaries, bonuses and 
option grants, began to rise faster than the earnings of most workers.  
Compensation for the most highly paid executives has grown the fastest 
(Ruccio 2010). 
 
The concern about the growth in power of the corporations is echoed by 
Soederberg (2009) at two levels: ‘the first is the tremendous power that 
corporations wield over all aspects of everyday life; the second is the dramatic 
rise of mass ownership [in the North] of these corporate behemoths’ 
(Soederberg 2009: 3). Given the key role that corporations play in destroying 
the ecology, she suggests ‘it is imperative that we identify and transcend the 
ideologically laden and class led nature of the corporate governance doctrine 
and begin to question critically who benefits’ (Soederberg 2009: 159). I agree, 
and in researching for this thesis, find it remarkable how little academic inquiry 
there has been into the social, political and economic impacts of this power 
(but then, as discussed later in section with university capture by corporations, 




                                           
67 Ruccio, D. 2010, Graph of the month: The wide divide  
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Figure 10.1  Income discrepancy    Source: Ruccio (2010) 
 
Drawing on a Marxist-informed framework, Soederberg (2009) shows how the 
doctrine of corporate governance has become obscured from view, in large part 
because of its very power and pervasiveness. The principal feature of corporate 
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governance is its legal obligation to return the highest level of profit to 
shareholders, putting it in clear conflict with the imperatives of truly 
democratic institutions.  If we are serious in the quest to protect our 
institutions, features such as freedom and openness are the very elements 
which ought to make it essential for the power and pervasiveness of corporate 
governance to be transparent and understood. Corporations, in liaison with the 
state, have in effect depoliticised the structural relations of corporate 
domination and delinked, in the public mind, these relations from the wider 
power and contradictions of capitalism. Soederberg (2009) claims that the part 
ownership of corporations by the working class, especially through pension 
funds as part of global institutional investments, has tied Main Street to Wall 
Street, with Main Street increasingly dependent on and in turn supportive of 
Wall Street. This is a telling point given that the pensions market of countries 
in the OECD was valued at a massive $24.6 trillion in 2006 (OECD 2007: 3). It 
is however a tying-in only materially or financially and not in terms of power; 
and a tying-in that still excludes the vast majority on the planet. As was very 
well demonstrated in the GFC, it does little if anything to shift the balance of 
political power to Main Street or indeed to democratically elected 
governments. These, often transnational, corporations are huge and become 
self-contained economies in themselves with enormous political power, as was 
demonstrated in the examples of corporate activities in South Africa around the 
coal and energy sectors. 
 
As noted above, there has been an odd unwillingness (relatively speaking and 
given its very great importance not just economically but also socially) in 
academic research to examine the nature and dynamics of corporate power in 
neoliberal-led capitalism. This is matched by a failure to acknowledge the geo-
political significance of corporations, particularly the US corporations, in 
global capitalism. One aspect of this is that the Anglo-American forms of 
corporate governance are presented as the most efficient market-based 
arrangements and therefore a model that other countries, especially those in the 
developing world, should emulate. The South African study demonstrated how 
the parastatal corporation of Eskom, in expanding into sub-Saharan Africa, sets 




Historically, family firms were replaced with bigger joint stock companies. 
These in turn have been replaced by corporations. Soederberg (2009: 8-9) 
argues that ‘one of the most transformative  instruments in corporate history is 
the ownership or creditorship as a stock [share] or bond - especially in shaping 
the relations between those who own and those who control a publicly listed 
company’. It is largely because of this ownership arrangement that Main Street 
ends up relatively powerless in the control of corporations (even if technically 
the ownership of shares appears to convey power). 
 
The power of corporations can be envisioned and interpreted in many different 
ways.  Here the interpretation that I see as apposite for this thesis is based on 
seven considerations. 
  
The first is that the corporation is best seen in the context of class relations. 
Corporate power cannot be separated from the wider struggles and 
contradictions of capitalism.  
Second, explanations of the source of corporate power cannot be or at least 
should not be limited to the bounds of the doctrine of corporate governance. 
There is, I would argue, what might be termed a social legitimisation of 
corporate power as a result of the links that corporations have forged with the 
state and also the state with corporations. It is a two-way street. This results in 
both the corporations and the state pursuing the interests of the dominant 
classes in society and what amounts often to the corporatisation of the state. 
One particularly explicit facet of this is the so-called ‘revolving door’ 
syndrome in the United States, where not only millions are spent by 
corporations on lobbying the US government but leading government and 
corporate heads move almost seamlessly between high government office and 
high corporate office. In South Africa, it was illustrated that there is a strong 
merging of interests and identities in the political and economic elites.  
Third, the credit system is a critical feature in the growth in power of 
corporations. Soederberg (2009) argues that this represents a clear link between 
corporations and capital accumulation, endorsing Marx’s view of credit as the 
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principal lever of overproduction and speculation. Further, by expanding the 
pool of potential investors, credit brings benefits for capitalism, by fostering 
the perception of ending or at least reducing class conflict through the co-
opting of workers’ interests into those of capitalism. 
A fourth consideration is that the capitalist state plays a central role in 
mediating, naturalising and depoliticising the corporate-financial nexus. This it 
achieves through the mantra of freedom, the free market, free trade and the 
freedom of movement of capital (but not labour). The state ends up defending 
the freedom of the market at the expense of the principles of freedom of the 
citizen, equality and openness.    
 
Fifth, and relatedly, as Klein (2007: 15) argues, there can be no more profitable 
way (for corporations) to exercise and shore up their power than to be involved 
in organising society by seeking to erase the boundaries between the state and 
the corporations. This is what Klein describes as the ‘triumph’ of corporations 
under neoliberal capitalism. In The Shock Doctrine (2007), she highlights the 
collusion between the neoliberal doctrine, the interests of the leading capitalist 
economies and corporate accumulation. She writes of the policy trinity of 
neoliberalism: ‘the elimination of the public sphere, total liberation for 
corporations and skeletal social spending’ (Klein 2007:15). As the study of 
South Africa demonstrated, the adoption of neoliberal policies in that country 
at the time of the transition from apartheid to democratic rule is a case in point.  
Sixth, one important aspect of corporate power and the elimination of the 
influence of the public sphere lies in the capture of universities under 
neoliberal governments. Historically these institutions have been a site for 
independent reflection and critique of society. With increasing corporate 
funding of research at universities, these once independent institutions of 
research, learning and scholarship are increasingly being transformed by the 
corporate sector. Of particular concern to this thesis, this includes funding of 
environmental science and sustainability schools. An added dimension of this 
is that corporations not only fund research in areas that are related to the 
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environment and global warming but are the major employers of 
environmental science graduates (Griffin 2010). 
 
This is identified, especially in the context of the fossil fuel corporations in 
Australia, by Hamilton and Downie (2007). They write: ‘In Australia over the 
last decade the fossil fuel industries have become steadily more involved in 
Australian universities. Fossil fuel industry associations and fossil fuel 
companies have spent millions of dollars funding research projects and 
sponsoring university chairs, academic posts and even entire schools’ 
(Hamilton and Downie 2007: vi) They go on to point out that in 1999 ‘the 
Minerals Council of Australia set up the Minerals Tertiary Education Council 
with $15 million to achieve ‘cultural change in universities’ (Hamilton and 
Downie 2007: vi). These resources show the extent of the close relationships 
between the universities and the fossil fuel corporations, using examples from 
the University of Queensland, the University of Western Australia and Curtin 
University of Technology. 
 
However, more than simply influencing what is done in universities (as 
Hamilton and Downie also identify), they also influence how it is done, as 
managerialism and corporate governance become the dominant driving values 
of these institutions. 
 
Finally an aspect that I have not come across in Marxist theoretical literature 
but is covered in development studies literature, by Shiva and even Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring, is that beyond the dominance by corporations of key 
sectors in the economy, they also wield enormous power over the basic needs 
of human survival. This is at the very core of the metabolic rift where food, 
essential for human survival, is controlled by organisations which are 
undemocratic, unaccountable and far removed from people’s control. While the 
study of South Africa looked at the coal and electricity sectors, it is the same 
market dominated institutions which determine the ideology and political 
economy of the elements even more immediate and essential for human 
survival, such as food production. Through ownership and control over all 
aspects of food production, from the ownership of seeds, pesticides, and 
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fertilisers, through to land ownership to the grain elevators, processing 
facilities, shipping companies and grocery stores (Magdoff and Tokar 2009), 
corporations now have a very significant and growing influence over global 
food supplies.  Not unrelated, but less well understood and perhaps yet more 
insidious, is the patenting of genetic technologies, effectively giving 
corporations growing control and ownership of the genes at the very base of 
the human food chain.  
 
A number of contemporary Marxists shed light on aspects of the growth of 
power of corporations and of monopoly capitalism more generally. Amin 
(2006: 4) for example, suggests that, after the Second World War, various 
powers came together to form a collective imperialism, the triad (USA, Europe 
and Japan), effectively transforming the global competitive conditions in which 
large corporations operated. Earlier, corporations ‘waged their competitive 
battles essentially on national markets’, whereas today they require markets of 
‘500 to 600 million potential consumers’ (Amin 2006: 4) and their competitive 
battles are now fought on a global stage. Amin (2006: 4) continues: 
‘[t]ransnational corporations have common interests in running the world 
market [and the] dominant segments of transnational capital in all the partners 
of the triad have a real solidarity with one another that is expressed in the 
rallying to globalized neo-liberalism’. 
  
There is an entwinement of elite interests, at the global, state and corporate 
level. This entwinement is especially relevant to global warming. 
  
The neoliberal state is no longer the state of Keynes, a capitalist state but one 
which nevertheless did incorporate a degree of social welfare support for 
citizens.  Under Keynesian capitalism, the state had the role of duty of care for 
its citizens and used public expenditure to promote the wellbeing of the less 
well off. Such state roles have been eroded and replaced by the market, as 
virtually the only basis for the allocation of resources. Thus the interventions 
by various governments in the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC) 
through stimulus packages may have appeared Keynesian in nature, although 
this in fact marked one of the greatest transfers of wealth from the working 
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class to the ruling class in human history. This to some extent marks the degree 
to which the state has been captured by the private corporate sector and the 
interests of capital. The various state responses to the GFC show clearly that 
the interests of the capitalist elite over-ride the interests of the masses and there 
is no reason to believe the state will act otherwise as the crisis of global 
warming is increasingly manifested. 
  
The thesis emphasises that global warming is but one of a number of problems 
facing capitalism today. Certainly the accumulation of power in corporations 
and the links between that power and the power of the state, as we have seen in 
this section, have grave implications for any reasonably thick form of 
democracy. The separation of that power to serve the elite’s own ends means 
that the vast majority of humanity continues to lose out, to be poor and to be 
disadvantaged. The repercussions that follow for global warming are clear, as 
the growing inequalities across the globe which have followed in the wake of 
neoliberalism and corporatisation of both the economy and the state, are not 
just in income but in power. There seems little concern to serve the majority 
and with that lack of concern an accompanying lack of concern for the planet.  
Nowhere is that clearer or more important than in the fossil fuel energy sector, 
as illustrated in South Africa in Part II. It is to that sector that the next section 
turns.  
 
10.3  Corporate power in the fossil fuel energy sector 
The key agents of both the rapid expansion of industrial capitalism and a direct 
and major cause of global warming are fossil fuels: oil, gas and coal. While the 
peaking dates68 of coal, oil and gas production are not of such relevance to 
global warming, the projected peaking dates are a further reason why 
governments should be urgently taking steps to transform economies from their 
reliance on fossil fuel energy. The implications of not beginning the process of 
                                           
68 It is projected that oil supplies peaked in 2005, that coal also peaked in 2010 and that gas will peak 
by 2030 (Aleklett 2010). The Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas 
(www.peakoil.net/contact-us) has a comprehensive website of peer reviewed literature which covers 
peak fossil fuels and provides  evidence we are passing the peak production levels of oil, gas and coal. 
This ‘peaking’ is discussed more in Chapter 11. 
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making transformative structural changes are profound and will have a major 
adverse effect on fossil fuel-dependent economies as early as the next decade.  
 
Marx emphasised the crucial enabling role of power supply and transmission in 
the industrial revolution.  The mechanisation of tools meant that capitalists 
were freed from the limitations imposed by workers’ labour power as the direct 
motive force. The replacement of that power with other motive forces 
graduated from the use of animals, water and wind to coal driven steam 
engines and electric power (Marx Capital Vol 1, 1976: 496). 
 
Huber (2009: 105-106) extends these ideas by arguing that ‘fossil fuel energy 
represents a necessary aspect of capitalist production and circulation’ and that 
the shift ‘from solar-based energy sources (muscles, wind and water) to fossil-
based energy sources (coal, oil and gas)’ coincided with a ‘dramatic shift 
toward the generalization of capitalist social relations’. He stresses that this 
was because of fossil fuels’ particular characteristics for increasing 
productivity. Huber’s view, which it transpires is central to both the way in 
which the problem of global warming and the solution are conceived in this 
thesis, is that fossil fuel energy needs to be reconceptualised in terms of social 
relations which are embedded in networks of power and socio-ecological 
change. The South African study illustrated some of these power networks 
enmeshed around the coal/energy sector. 
  
10.4  Conclusion  
This chapter and indeed the whole of Part III have been concerned with 
developing an appropriate critical theoretical perspective in which to place the 
development of global warming. It has sought to illustrate how the relationship 
between humans and the environment around the pursuit of sustenance is 
essential in building a picture of how a society works. It is on the basis of this 
most core of social relationships in capitalist society that Marx constructed a 
theory that enables us to gain a critical understanding of how global warming 
and the gamut of other intractable problems of political economy and society 
have developed. This part of the thesis has covered a selection of key points of 
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Marxist theory relevant to the thesis - the metabolic rift, alienation, capital 
accumulation and issues of class and power around the state, markets and 
corporations, cornerstones in attributing global warming to the global political 
economy of capitalism. It has sought to apply Marxist concepts to the 
contemporary global economy, again in relation to the ecology and global 
warming and to provide a context to the most recent developments in the 
global economy. These include the rise in the hegemonic power of 
corporations and growing financialisation, the latter of which is designed to 
enable a new aggressive thrust to the momentum of capitalist expansion and a 
new dimension to the metabolic rift between humans and nature.  
 
Thus the problems of global warming and the other crises of capitalism have 
their embryonic roots in the earliest stage of capitalism and primitive 
accumulation. This continual process of accumulation throughout the whole 
history of capitalism has exacted an enormous cost on various populations and 
environments. One can argue that that history is the history of ongoing crises, 
geographically separate but connected through the never ending growth and 
thrust of a particular political economy throughout the past four centuries that 
today has resulted in a convergence of crises which is taking humankind to a 
critical threshold for survival. 
 
Of course, Marx and Engels could not be expected to reach into the future, our 
present, and foresee the detailed complexities that have arisen around, for 
example, the corporate/state power nexus, financialisation and the various 
technologies and social relationships which have subsequently developed. 
Nevertheless, Marx’s work and Marxism provide the key elements of my 
theoretical framework for understanding contemporary capitalist society and its 
crises, and in particular the developments that are encapsulated under the 
heading of the political economy of global warming. That body of work 
however in my view falls short of allowing adequate sight of the way forward 
from here in dealing with the threat of global warming. To place the whole 
thesis within a Marxist framework was however never the intent. Indeed as 
explained in Part III, the relevance of Marxism as a theoretical and conceptual 
framework ‘emerged‘ to help to explain the political economy phenomenon of 
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global warming as the thesis developed. It was my researching into the political 
economy ‘global microcosm‘ (Amin’s words) of South Africa in part II of the 
thesis that led me to that Marxist framework. I submit that that framework has 
served me well in analysing the development of global warming in a political 
economy context. That does not mean that, looking to the future, a Marxist 
framework will continue to be the most relevant nor at the same time will it 
necessarily be wholly redundant.       
Relevant here in this shift from past to future is what Bolivian President Evo 
Morales (2009, quoted in Bond 2011: 13) stated before the World People’s 
Conference on Climate Change69 ‘we can’t look back; we have to look 
forward. Looking forward means that we have to review everything that 
capitalism has done. These are things that cannot just be solved with money. 
We have to resolve problems of life and humanity. And that’s the problem that 
planet earth faces today. And this means ending capitalism.’ 
 
Ending capitalism is the goal and thus I endorse Morales’ words. The 
mechanisms for the ending of capitalism are currently far from clear. Marxism 
provides only partial answers and in my view we cannot expect complete 
answers from Marxism. There are various signs in the Arab Spring and the 
Occupy movement.70 The fact that so soon after the Global Financial Crisis of 
2008 we are facing another with the political stalemate to deal with the 
economic crisis in the Eurozone. COP 17 may give rise to a greater recognition 
that radical change is needed.  
 
Underlying these symptoms of the crisis facing capitalism, and I submit that 
these are but symptoms, is the growth in inequality and power across the planet 
and within nation states. That inequality may turn out to be the harbinger of 
death for capitalism as it is significant that the levels of inequality in the US 
immediately prior to the Global Financial Crisis had only been reached 
previously immediately before the Great Depression in 1928 (Saez 2009) . 
                                           
69 The World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth was held in 
Cochabamba Bolivia in 2010. The conference was attended by about 300,000 people, many from 
grassroots movements from the South.  
70 See Chomsky 2011 at http://www.democracynow.org/seo/2011/5/11noam-chomsky-the-us 
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Global warming is already exacerbating such inequalities and one can readily 
argue that it will be the effects of global warming on inequality which will 
precipitate capitalism’s end. The thesis could speculate at length on the 
mechanisms that might lead to the demise of capitalism but that would be 
another thesis in its own right. 
 
South Africa provided the thesis with a microcosm of this capitalist global 
political economy and the growing social rift between those who enjoy the 
benefits and those who carry the burdens, and the ecological rift between 
society and the ecology. It showed the destruction that occurs to the 
environment and communities as the system expands. It also illustrated the 
increasing fragility of that system by looking at certain particular aspects such 
as the financial sector and the insecurities and injustices associated with this 
sector; the damage to the ecology felt most by those who most immediately 
and closely depend on it; or the lives that are destroyed by a system which 
promises so much and yet, to many, delivers so little. Turkish writer Orhan 
Pamuk (2001:12) states: ‘at no time in history have the lives of the rich been so 
forcefully brought to the attention of the poor through television and 
Hollywood film. But far worse, at no other time have the world’s rich and 
powerful societies been so clearly right, and ‘reasonable’. Pamuk continues 
(2001: 12): 
 
Today an ordinary citizen is aware of how insubstantial is his share of the 
world’s wealth; he knows that he lives under conditions that are much 
harsher and more devastating than those of a ‘Westerner’ and that he is 
condemned to a much shorter life. At the same time however, he senses in 
a corner of his mind that his poverty is to some considerable degree the 
fault of his own folly and inadequacy, or those of his father and 
grandfather. 
The fragilities, insecurities and injustices of the global capitalist system and its 
inherent unsustainability are nowhere more evident than in the ‘modernisation’ 
that is capitalisation and industrialisation of food production, a transformation 
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that is occurring with growing momentum on the African continent71. Because 
of the imperative of food security for all people, and the fact that obtaining 
food is an essential site of intersection between humans and the environment, I 
will return to this in looking at the principles and structures of future societies 
in Part IV. 
 
One of the problems in criticising capitalism and calling for its end is the lack 
of conceptualisation, at least in the West, of an alternative. The next chapter 
(Chapter 11) puts forward some key principles which, it is argued, must be 
adopted in building theories and practices in social organisation that have the 
potential to be enduring in the future, if we do manage to avert ecological 
catastrophe.  
 
In doing so I acknowledge immediately that these principles are not uniquely Marxist 
although they are heavily Marxist-orientated. There may be a way in which 
continuing on the Marxist road of thought could get us there more comprehensively. 
I do not agree. This difference may arise because I did not start out on the road of the 
thesis with the avowed intent to follow a Marxist theoetical framework as I have 
sought to make clear. I ‘found‘ the Marxist road as the thesis developed and this is 
why the theoretical section comes as late as it does in the thesis and why the South 
African experience was not a case study in the normal sense but as explained a 
microcosm of the global political economy.  
 
Having proceeded down that road, I did then look to Marxism to help to provide the 
principles for the future. To some limited extent they did but the fit was far from 
adequate.  I was using Marxism in an almost pragmatic way to provide a critical 
materialist theoretical framework to seek to understand the phenomenon of global 
warming as one of the crises of capitalism. I then had an open mind about how the 
                                           
71 Drivers including white, industrial-scale South African farmers. A mass movement of white South 
African farmers in what is called the ‘next great trek’, is occuring on the African continent. The 
movement is supported by Agri South Africa, an association that represents 70,000 South Africa 
farmers. Agri SA has offers of land from 22 African countries, including with free land come tax 
holidays, free reign to export produce and profits, and promises of new roads and power lines – 
angering local peasants who have never enjoyed such benefits. For example, Congo-Brazzaville has 
offered South African farmers long leases on up to 10m hectares of land. In these deals, South Africa 
is not only exporting its farmers, but industrial scale farming and neoliberal values to the rest of the 
continent (Pearce 2011), while disenfranchising local farmers: accumulation by dispossession.  
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future might best be addressed. A Marxist might have taken a different perspective 
and most certainly a different route. 
 
So from the considerations surrounding the theoretical issues that emerged 
from the analysis of the political economy of South Africa and especially its 
coal and electricity sectors, what might the principles be that might serve to 
underpin societies able to address global warming in the future? Clearly the 
divide - even chasm - that has opened up between humanity and nature, Marx’s 
metabolic rift including the carbon rift, is a major starting point. Environmental 
restoration here is essential.   
 
Immediately related to this is a second form of restoration, the restoration of 
the commons for the benefit of all, and all species.  A third principle must 
address the issue of the social relations of production and think through the 
question of what is to be meant by the community of producers. Related again 
is the question of production of what and for whom giving rise to questions 
around the principle of food security my fourth principle.  
 
South Africa also helps to identify or simply underlines the need for two other 
principles involving major redistributions one of resources and the other of 
power with for the latter a move away from a class based system and a move 
towards a more genuine form of democracy.  
 
The dependence on fossil fuels in a growth economy such as South Africa’s 
suggests that for the future such dependence must be broken (giving me my 
sixth principle) and continued economic growth cannot be sustained without 
that fossil fuel dependence. The future  must be based on no-growth 
economies. 
 
These principles are addressed at length in chapter 12.  
 
 
         
PART IV   THE FUTURE  
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With regard to looking to the future, I would first want to refer to the work of 
Harvey (2010: 223) who writes that ‘[i]t has long been the dream of many that 
an alternative to capitalist (ir)rationality can be defined and rationally arrived at 
through the mobilisation of human passions in the collective search for a better 
life for all’.  These alternatives Harvey (2010) claims have been  historically 
called socialism or communism - both of which have been tried in various 
times and places but are now widely dismissed.  
 
For Marx and Engels communism was not seen as a “master plan” but ‘as a means of 
organizing the workers’ movement and structuring and guiding debate in and around 
it’ (Burkett 2009: 331), an approach consistent with what they saw as a difficult and 
prolonged process of transition to communism (Burkett 2009: 331).  Burkett 
continues (2009: 331-2), ‘[communist production is not simply inherited from 
capitalism; it requires “long struggles, through a series of historical processes, 
transforming circumstances and men”’.  He adds, the ‘transition to a communal 
system of sustainable human development is by nature a highly path-dependent co-
evolutionary process ... [with] communism’s human developmental preconditions 
[being] ... generated in large part by the revolutionary struggle itself’ (Burkett, 2009: 
332). The problem of this situation is that the science is telling us we do not have 
time for a long struggle. 
 
Today, as Harvey (2010) writes, there are all sorts of small-scale experiments being 
undertaken around the world which reflect some sort of convergence between 
Marxist and anarchist traditions which draw on collaboration evident in the Marxist 
camp before the schism between Karl Marx and anarchist Michael Bakunin in the 
1860s. That is, these alternatives to capitalism involve forms of collective social 
organisation to ‘displace market forces and capital accumulation as the basis for 
organising production and distribution’ (Harvey 2010: 225).  However, as Harvey 
maintains, there is no clear path outlining the process of transformation from the 
current multitudinous crises of capitalism to a better world. 
 
Amin (2008), in The World We Wish to See, writes of the challenges of building a 
globally cohesive opposition to the world capitalist system as a result of unequal 
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development within the system between the centres and peripheries and the 
competitions between different interests within the centres and peripheries. In raising 
the issue of the diverse forms of labour’s subjection, Amin notes that this  ‘precludes 
reducing the political actors on the world stage to simply the bourgeoisie and 
proletariat ... [resulting in] fragmentation within ... resistance struggles’ (Amin 2008: 
8).  At the same time, he acknowledges the advantages of this diversity for the 
dominant classes who are able to exploit it. Of central relevance to this thesis,  is 
Amin’s point, that it is not possible to ‘change the world without taking power’ 
(Amin 2008: 37) and that that power is ‘related to the concentration of capital and 
the centralization of power that is connected to it’ (Amin 2008: 48).  This is a central 
issue of this thesis - the concentration of power that is central to the South African 
political economy - around the MEC; in the theoretical section in discussion of 
corporations and financialisation; in the convergence of the interests of capital and 
state; and in the power of the oligopolies and the systems built around them, that will 
preclude real solutions to global warming being implemented. There is currently no 
coherent global movement to tackle this hegemonic concentration of power. 
 
Amin (2008: 70-1) writes of ‘opening the debate on the long transition to socialism’ 
and the need for an effective action strategy - the first condition of which is 
‘obviously the defeat of Washington’s project for military control of the planet’, and 
the need to rebuild and radicalize social resistance against the offensive of imperialist 
capitalism’ (Amin 2008:74). This is true, but again, it does not reveal the ‘how’. 
 
Harvey agrees that while there is a sense that a better world is possible, the 
critical problem is that there is no ‘sufficiently unified anti-capitalist movement 
that can adequately challenge the reproduction of the capitalist class and the 
perpetuation of its power on the world stage’ (Harvey 2010: 226-7).  There is 
thus  a dual problem of the lack of an alternative vision underpinning a global 
oppositional movement and a lack of a global oppositional movement to 
implement the vision.  The question, as Harvey entitles his chapter ‘What is to 
be done? And who is going to do it?’ (Harvey 2010: chapter 8) is a huge one. I 
take comfort in acknowledging that answering it appears to be beyond the 
scope of such thinkers as Harvey and Amin. It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. It is a thesis in its own right.  At this level the thesis attempts to make a 
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small, considered contribution to the discussion on what sort of principles 
should underpin future just, equitable and sustainable societies. These 
principles have emerged in the thesis as a result of critically examining the 
unsustainability of capitalism and the impossibility of the problem of global 
warming being solved in a world dominated by the capitalist relations of 
production.  Given the long years of struggle that will be necessary to build a 
sufficiently broad based global opposition movement to overthrow the 
capitalist system and the timeframe the science is telling us we have for the 
reduction of global carbon emissions (alone) to maintain the biosphere within 
the limits conducive to human and other species survival, I can not foresee that 
society will be able to stop the disastrous trajectory that we are on. I think this 
conclusion is realistic.  Nevertheless, I prefer to remain idealistic, and hence 
offer idealistic principles. I believe we have little more than idealism but 
remain hopeful that the will and commitment for broad based and global 
political mobilization will emerge.  
 
The thesis so far has been primarily a theoretical and empirical criticism of 
capitalism in the context of global warming. Part IV now draws on the lessons 
to be learned from Part II of the thesis and from the theoretical critique of 
capitalism developed in Part III to look to how both to overcome the problems 
thereby identified and to build for some positive future.  It thus combines 
messages arising in practice from South Africa in Part II with the theory of Part 
III, to show that other models of human social organisation are not only 
possible but can address many of the crises and contradictions emanating from 
capitalism, including the crisis of global warming. Neither the critique 
embodied in the South African study nor that in the theory in Part III provides 
a comprehensive guide to provide a blueprint or ‘checklist’ for future societies. 
Rather this part of the thesis builds on these critiques, learns from them but 
rejects the idea of simply reacting against them. That would have serious risks, 
not least in thereby having the past dictate the parameters for the future. That 
has to be partly true but Part IV avoids a slavish dependency on any past 
structuring of ideas. The focus in Amin’s ‘microcosm’ that is South Africa 
cannot of course cover all relevant issues; the theoretical critique could not be 
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so detailed as to address all aspects. Thus considerations of, for example, the 
relevance of Indigenous knowledge are added to the mix in looking to the 
future.    
 
This is a more pragmatic approach than others might have taken. It is not that the 
idea of principles would have been foreign to a Marxist approach if I had sought to 
continue specifically within a Marxist paradigm. Marx in his thinking seemed to be 
very much at ease with the idea of principles but it was Engels who expressed better 
what I would want to think of as principles. In the Anti-Duhring (Engels 1947) he 
wrote:  
 
When we consider and reflect upon nature at large or the history of 
mankind or our own intellectual activity, at first we see the picture of an 
endless entanglement of relations and reactions in which nothing remains 
what, where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into 
being and passes away… But this conception, correctly as it expresses 
the general character of the picture of appearances as a whole, does not 
suffice to explain the details of which this picture is made up, and so long 
as we do not understand these, we have not a clear idea of the whole 
picture. In order to understand these details we must detach them from 
their natural or historical connection and examine each one separately, its 
nature, special causes, effects, etc. 
… 
the principles are not the starting-point of the investigation, but its final 
result; they are not applied to nature and human history, but abstracted 
from them, it is not nature and the realm of man which conform to these 
principles, but the principles are only valid in so far as they are in 
conformity with nature and history. That is the only materialist 
conception of the matter.  
 
The task of this part is to make a contribution to the discussion of what are key 
elements for building sustainable societies. It is written on the premise that 
positive, enduring and deep social, political and economic changes are not only 
necessary if human society is to continue, but are possible. It assumes that 
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there is time before catastrophic tipping points are passed - an assumption 
based on shaky ground - and that urgent, deep and transformative change can 
happen. Such change will be outside the market mechanisms currently on the 
table such as carbon taxes and carbon trading; will involve structural changes 
around the social relations of production; and will place constraints on energy 
and material resource use. This chapter provides not a blueprint for the future 
but broad principles to underpin a sustainable future. It presents a picture that 
is radically different from the world in which we currently live. It learns from 
that but is more than – has to be more than – simply a reaction against that.  
 
In thinking about how to address the future, I have drawn on a construct  from 
Vanberg, (1994) on the idea of a set of principles or, as he goes on to call 
these, a ‘constitution’.  Vanberg, in his analysis of organisations from an 
institutional economics perspective, sets out three paradigms: the goal 
paradigm; the exchange paradigm; and the constitutional paradigm. The goal 
paradigm is a common notion and is easily understood. Organisations can have 
‘goal-directed systems’ (Vanberg 1994: 126). With the exchange paradigm, 
organisations are ‘portrayed as a network of exchange relations among persons 
who make contributions ‘to the organization’ in return for the inducement that 
they receive ‘from the organization’’ (Vanberg 1994: 129). Finally and most 
relevant to this thesis is the constitutional paradigm. ‘Instead of concentrating 
on the ‘goals’ that organizational action is supposedly directed at, it draws 
attention to the procedural foundations that organizational action is based upon. 
It concentrates on the social mechanisms that bring about the intra-
organizational co-ordination of individual choices and actions’ (Vanberg 1994: 
135). He argues that: ‘When a group of persons establishes an organization by 
pooling resources for joint or combined use, they establish – explicitly or 
implicitly – a constitution’ (Vanberg 1994: 136). 
 
This construct from Vanberg, while different, has echoes of Marx’s economic 
basis of society. Marx used different language and was directly concerned with 
societies while Vanberg’s immediate concern is with organisations. What I see 
as useful in Vanberg, however, is that his principles or constitution can be 
moved to a societal base and the construct of a constitution developed on the 
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basis of the values of the community. That can then indicate in more Marxist 
terms how the social relations are organised as humans pursue their production 
of food, clothing, shelter and so on. This constitution can thus be used to reflect 
solutions to many of the criticisms of capitalism aired in Part III as well as 
responding to the reality of the now very real constraints of the biosphere.  
Thus in setting out the principles and institutions for societies for the future, 
what I am doing is trying to establish a ‘constitution’, a set of principles, that 




CHAPTER 11   Getting to the future  
 
11.1 Introduction 
Is there a way forward other than simply in principle? Are there real life 
examples of socio/economic models which have been adopted by communities 
or nations in building more equitable or sustainable societies? Can we learn 
from these both how we might not only proceed with transformative economic 
and societal changes but also how to acknowledge their limitations vis-à-vis 
these changes. This chapter looks at some examples of these to show that 
another way is possible; that some people not only have or have had visions of 
better societies but have also been successful in transforming a part of their 
world into something more just, more resilient and enduring. This provides 
some practical guidance for building some of the principles to be included in a 
‘constitution’ as set out in the next chapter.  
 
Examples at the micro level are many. I have chosen to report on the South 
African one because it is one with which I am particularly familiar. The 
transitions town discussion covers, as far as I am aware, a unique series of 
actions but there are many individual actions of a similar kind. Cuba is in a 
sense unique but other countries and regions have some of the same features 
but not all. The state of Kerala in India and Venzuela are probably the best 
known of these.  
 
In examining these issues it is timely to look back at the objectives of the 
thesis. The main objective is to research the question: can capitalism solve the 
problem of global warming?  The final objective (number 6) is particularly 
worth recalling here: 
  
‘To develop alternative core social, political and economic principles 
compatible with a diversity of  just and sustainable futures. For this objective, I 
use some historical examples of transformative change and based the core 
principles being proposed for future sustainable societies in large part on a 




With respect to the main research question, we might try to take the stance 
adopted by Ha-Joon Chang in his ‘secret history of capitalism’ in Bad 
Samaritans. There he argues (Chang 2008: 16):  
there are certainly some people in the rich countries who preach free 
market and free trade to the poor countries in order to capture larger shares 
of the latter’s markets and to pre-empt the mergence of possible 
competitors. They are saying ‘do as we say, not as we did’ and act as ‘Bad 
Samaritans’, taking advantage of others who are in trouble. But what is 
more worrying is that the history of capitalism has been so totally re-
written that many people in the rich world do not perceive the historical 
double standard involved in recommending free trade and free market to 
developing countries.’ 
  
He suggests too that such people who in fact may be well meaning and believe 
falsely that markets are the way to prosperity may actually be more of a 
problem for developing countries than those ‘knowingly engaged in ‘kicking 
away the ladder’. 
 
It would be good to share Chang’s optimism that the majority of Bad 
Samaritans ‘are neither greedy nor bigoted (Chang 2008: 221), and he cites the 
period from 1950 to the emergence of neoliberalism at the end of the 1970s as 
an example of a time when the ‘rich countries, led by the US, did not behave as 
Bad Samaritans’. He goes on (Chang 2008: 222): ‘The fact that rich countries 
did not behave as Bad Samaritans on at least one occasion in the past gives us 
hope.’ I am not as clear as Chang that that era does constitute a period of Good 
Samaritanism. The fact that even then he can cite only one occasion does bring 
to mind the notion that one swallow does not make a summer! 
 
This chapter also looks at the issue of how to make the transition to a new 
world, particularly given the time constraints science is saying we face to 
prevent run-away global warming. There is a vast literature on political 
economy transformation (see for example Ellman 1997). Much of this focuses 
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on the transition from socialist economies to market economies; some on 
structural adjustment programmes; as well as some from the broad school of 
modernisation theory which examines the transition of peasant societies to 
modern societies (Mol and Spaargaren 2000) but a much smaller literature is 
more immediately relevant to the sorts of transformation needed to address 
global warming (see Andreasson 2010). Where there is a gap in this literature 
however is on the transition from global industrial capitalist society to no 
growth, community based, localised economies. This has to be the focus here. 
  
Chapter 11 thus turns to the process of transformation using a few concrete 
examples. These are presented to try to aid our understanding of the nature and 
seriousness of the radical and rapid change that is necessary to save the planet. 
The chapter however can do little more than raise issues in relation to 
transformative change. To delve into that in greater detail would be a thesis in 
its own right. All that I seek to achieve here is to indicate two things: that 
radical transformation is possible; and that it has happened, even if (obviously) 
not to date in the specific context of global warming. 
 
In section 11.2 there is a recapping of some of the key theoretical problems 
identified in the thesis and which need to be addressed in any future society 
which can secure a future for the planet. 
 
The question then arises about the practicality of such future societies. 
Inevitably at present no economy exists which embraces the sorts of principles 
that might be sought for the future with, to some extent, the exception of Cuba. 
There are however currently some macro and micro examples of social units 
which have adopted some of the characteristics essential for building future 
societies. Since in practical terms these are all we currently have, they are 
worth exploring and that is done in section 11. 3.  
 
The examples presented in that section are at different levels.  Abalimi 
Bezekhaya in South Africa is very much a micro example among the poor of 
Cape Town which illustrates how the availability of land and small scale 
inexpensive support can bring not only food security to people, but a sense of 
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mutuality, community, personal empowerment and connectedness to others. 
Scaling up from this, transition towns are a social movement that is seeking to 
build from the micro to the macro. The example of Cuba is an example of a 
state which has undergone a radical transformation process. Each of these 
examples provides some insights into how aspects of future economies might 
operate, which is the subject of the next chapter. The section ends with an 
attempt to draw some practical lessons for future societies from these quasi 
pilots. In 11.4 Cuba is discussed on its own, in essence because it is an 
example of both a society which helps us to envisage the sorts of principles we 
are looking for (and which are set out in Chapter 12) but also a case study of 
how transition can occur. Section 11.5 concludes and looks forward to the 
principles of the kinds of societies we might want to see in the future. 
 
11.2 To the future recognising the theoretical concerns 
At this point it is worth recapping on some of the key theoretical problems that 
have been identified in the thesis and which need to be addressed in any 
society which can secure a future for the planet. 
Most fundamentally, as has been a major theme of the thesis to date, the issue 
that has to be overcome is that the planet is permeated with the impact of the 
globalised political economy of capitalism. There is also the division between 
humans and the ecology as a result of the capitalist social relations of 
production which have been identified as central to the problem of global 
warming.  The lengthy history of environmental degradation and human 
dispossession and displacement, that have occurred as part of the process of 
global capital accumulation through to today, now constitute a potentially fatal 
threat taking the Earth’s system beyond the stable geological period in which 
human civilisation developed. At the same time the thesis has argued that 
global warming is but one of a number of crises of capitalism.  
 
Relevant here as noted previously is Fisher’s (2009: 7) observation ‘that it is 
easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism’. Yet the 
thesis is clear that we must and thus not give in to the fatalism of Fisher and 
‘the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and 
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economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent 
alternative to it’.  
 
Thus capitalism has given rise to this schism between humans and nature as 
expressed in both the metabolic rift and the carbon rift. These cannot be 
resolved by mechanical solutions but require social and economic structural 
transformation.   
 
Alienation is crucial where such alienation has been explored most 
satisfactorily from the standpoint of this thesis by Rutherford (2008) when he 
argued that the sustained affluence in the west has resulted in  a powerful 
growth in  a liberation ethic of self-expression and within which ‘the 
ideological weapon of neo-liberalism and the new technologies of information 
and communication [are] key resources for creating the new regimes of capital 
accumulation’. 
 
At the heart of all of this are class relations, the social relations of exploitation 
of one group of people by another and which lie at the epicentre of the 
ecological rift. This applies also at the level of the globalised economy where 
there is a hierarchy of states and where as Navarro (2007: 19) argues, 
‘[n]eoliberal ideology provides the linkage among these classes’ with the 
commonality of ruling class interests outweighing the tensions of difference.  
 
The significance of class to global warming is profound.  The incessant drive 
for growth for the benefit of ruling class-based profits and capital accumulation 
is directly linked to the exploitation of both labour and land. Foster et al. 
(2010) argue that the overexploitation of nature’s resource taps and waste 
sinks, under the capitalist system, has reached the point where both are 
negatively impacted, firstly at a regional, then at a planetary level, affecting the 
climate and the biosphere itself. This situation is further evidence for a major 




The imperative for accumulation is gathering momentum with new ways being 
found to bring additional forms of alienation and exploitation into play further 
deepening the metabolic rift. One of these new forms of capital accumulation is 
financialisation which brings with it an extent of control over the Earth and 
over global governance institutions by corporations which is neither adequately 
scrutinised nor I would submit adequately covered in Marxist theory. How can 
global institutions, which are themselves members of a political economy 
structure which is so dominated by the interests of capital accumulation, be 
expected, or entrusted, to formulate or even be part of the solutions to global 
warming?  Such financialisation draws ‘ever more destructively on the limited 
resources and absorptive capacity of nature, as the economy continually grows 
in scale in relation to the planetary system. The result is emerging and 
expanding ecological rifts that are turning into planetary chasms’ (Foster et al. 
2010: 29). 
 
In highlighting these issues the thesis also has expressed a somewhat different 
type of concern. While in Marxist theory, the state plays an important role, 
unfortunately, Marx left no coherent body of theory of the state. Yet concerns 
about the state, its role in governance in relation to global warming, and ideas 
of the social contract around citizens, remain highly relevant to the thesis. 
 
Another concern that I have not come across in Marxist theoretical literature 
(but it is covered in development studies literature) is that beyond the 
dominance by corporations of key sectors in the economy, such corporations 
wield enormous power over the basic needs of human survival. This is at the 
very core of the metabolic rift where food, essential for human survival, is 
controlled by organisations which are undemocratic, unaccountable and far 
removed from people’s control.Through ownership and control over all aspects 
of food production, from the ownership of seeds, pesticides, and fertilisers, 
through to land ownership to the grain elevators, processing facilities, shipping 
companies and grocery stores (Magdoff and Tokar 2009), corporations now 




As the thesis has also noted there has been an entwinement of elite interests, at 
the global, state and corporate level which is immediately relevant to global 
warming. Huber (2009: 105-106) extends these ideas by arguing that ‘fossil 
fuel energy represents a necessary aspect of capitalist production and 
circulation’ and that the shift ‘from solar-based energy sources (muscles, wind 
and water) to fossil-based energy sources (coal, oil and gas)’ coincided with a 
‘dramatic shift toward the generalization of capitalist social relations’. He 
stresses that this was because of fossil fuels’ particular characteristics for 
increasing productivity. Huber’s view, which it transpires is central to both the 
way in which the problem of global warming and the solution are conceived in 
this thesis, is that fossil fuel energy needs to be reconceptualised in terms of 
social relations which are embedded in networks of power and socio-ecological 
change. 
 
At this point bringing these issues together from the earlier theoretical 
discussions in the thesis is helpful in thinking about some current practical real 
life communities and societies which might in some ways exemplify the 
principles that might underlie future societies and in turn help us to identify 
these principles more fully. The former are set out in the remainder of this 
chapter; the latter are addressed in chapter 12.  
 
 
11.3 Micro and macro examples of the future 
11.3.1 Abalimi Bezekhaya    
Abalimi Bezekhaya’s72 ‘Harvest of Hope’ program in South Africa is an 
example of urban agriculture. The program provides urban organic micro-
farming support and access to outside markets to cash-poor urban micro-
farmers to sell their produce. It seeks to achieve ‘poverty alleviation, food 
security, sustainability, income generation, job creation, environmental 
renewal, community based nature conservation, healthy diets, HIV/AIDS 
alleviation and climate change mitigation’ (Small 2010: 1). The target 
                                           
72 Abalimi means ‘the Planters’ in Xhosa, the predominant local language. 
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population are very poor people located in South Africa’s townships who are 
‘trying to survive and advance, are constantly shifting and moving about, often 
divided and disempowered, easily distracted and always looking for greener 
pastures’ (Small 2010: 1).  
  
 I visited one of the sites of Abalimi Bezekhaya, in the Gugelethu township 
outside Cape Town, in May 2010. It is an inspiring story set in a township that 
in a very real sense captures many of the contradictions and problems of 
industrial capitalism and contemporary South African society. The project was 
bounded physically on one side by a state-of-the-art six-lane freeway, on the 
other three sides, by slums. It was unpromising land, criss-crossed with high 
voltage electricity lines and subject to floods and 400 temperatures. It sat 
amidst the shack dwellings of the poor, the sick, unemployed and marginalised 
black population, many of whom had no access to water or electricity. The 
energy and technologies used are small scale and simple: the women are the 
energy and the technologies are spades, picks and knives; hemp string for tying 
bundles of vegetables together; an old small shed for tool storage; and some 
tins for sitting on and washing the vegetables.  
 
Abalimi Bezekhaya had initially been a Quakers’ project amongst the urban 
poor of Cape Town. Today, however, it is managed by its Director, Rob Small 
and the incorporated Abalimi organisation. The project aims to ‘maintain 
permanent organic food growing and nature conservation projects as the basis 
for sustainable lifestyles, self-help job creation, poverty alleviation and 
environmental renewal’ (Small 2010: 1). This it achieves and, as such, is an 
approximation at a micro level of urban agriculture and a part of what a new 
economy, post-capitalism, might contain. 
  
Small, the Director, claims that the Abalimi initiative proves that ‘under-
educated, unemployable South Africans can live healthy lives, with dignity, on 
very small pieces of land, in the worst possible climate and conditions, and 
earn a decent income, using their own initiative and with only a very modest 
amount of assistance’ (Small 2010: 1). For less than $A15 per month, farmers 
produce fresh food and unlimited potential for self help. At the same time they 
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have transformed formerly wasted environments and re-established Indigenous 
conservation areas. Additionally, they are sinking 1–2 kilograms of carbon per 
square metre per annum. Small (2010) writes that such micro farms can not 
only transform family and community health but have powerful social benefits, 
improve personal empowerment, community engagement and pride and 
contribute to grassroots democracy. At the end of 2009, Abalimi worked with 
over 3000 micro farmers, providing training, and assistance with getting micro 
farm projects established, supplying manure and water and providing 
marketing assistance. 
 
The case of Abalimi Bezekhaya illustrates graphically some of the key 
principles that might be sought for the future. It shows how small-scale, low 
input, locally, organically produced food can bring food security and more. 
The women, sceptical at first, now  say they have never been happier, healthier 
or had more control over their lives. Their status has risen in the community; 
before they had been nobodies. Now they have company, other women to work 
with and talk to, a purpose, and they are contributing to the material basis of 
their own lives as well as to that of others. They say that now, even the young 
men in the community want to do what they are doing. It is of note too that, 
although this urban farm is in the middle of an impoverished, crime-ridden 
slum, there has been no problem with stealing or destroying produce. Yet there 
are no fences around the farm. 
 
11.3.2  Transition Towns   
Hopkins, founder of the transition town concept and author of The Transition 
Town Handbook (Hopkins 2008: 8) writes that ‘[c]limate change – an issue of 
great severity – is only half of the story: developing an understanding of peak 
oil is similarly essential. Together, these two issues have been referred to as the 
‘hydrocarbon twins’. He argues that they are so entwined that, seen in 
isolation, a large part of the story remains untold.  
 
The transition towns movement is based on the premise that peak oil and 
climate change require that we change how we live and that this can best be 
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done through communities coming together, examining their use of fossil fuels, 
and then transitioning to more sustainable lifestyles around localisation, 
cooperation, organic food production and energy descent into renewable and 
reduced energy systems. Central to the transition towns’ movement is the 
concept of community resilience. This refers ‘to their ability to not collapse at 
first sight of oil or food shortages and to their ability to respond with 
adaptability to disturbance’ (Hopkins 2008: 49). This means ‘being more 
prepared for a leaner future, more self-reliant, and prioritising the local over 
the imported’ (Hopkins 2008: 50). He maintains there are three keys to 
resilience. First is diversity of land use, functions, people, cultures and 
systems; second is modularity which means structures which can more 
effectively self organise in the event of shocks such as local food or financial 
systems; and finally, tightness of feedbacks referring to how quickly the 
consequences of a change in one part of the system is contained and responded 
to by another, enabling timely responses to events/things, and bringing the 
consequences of actions closer to home. Hopkins (2008: 43) quotes an example 
from Vandana Shiva of the villages which recovered best when the 2004 Asian 
tsunami hit, saying:  
 
it was the villages with the greatest resilience that were up and running 
relatively quickly, and those that had dismantled their resilient economies 
in favour of an import-dependent, tourism-based model that were hit the 
worst. The indigenous tribes of Andaman and Nicobar, the Onger, the 
Jawaras, the Sentinelese, the Shompen, who live with a light ecological 
footprint, had the lowest casualties even though, in the Indian 
subcontinent, they were the closest to the epicentre of the earthquake. 
  
Hopkins’ focus is primarily on peak oil as he believes people are less familiar 
with this issue than with climate change. He recognises that there are many 
forces arrayed against action to address such issues and that to engage with 
neighbours in the community on these matters amounts to a considerable 
challenge to get people to take the big step of reconsidering every aspect of our 
reliance on cheap oil. He points out that this involves local energy and water 
self-sufficiency, personal and community transport, housing, food sources, 
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recreation and leisure, health systems, education, financial matters and how the 
community deals with emergencies. The changes envisaged are to develop self-
reliance and resilience in the face of future oil and climate shocks. 
Transitioning recognises that the problem is vast and doing nothing is not an 
option.  
 
On the premise that the way of life in rich countries is  unsustainable, Trainer 
(1995), author of The Conserver Society: Alternatives for Sustainability, in a 
similar vein, talks about transition societies and what such sustainable societies 
might look like. He argues that we need to be clear about where we are 
transitioning to and that we cannot make the transition just by technical means, 
such as using solar power. As does this thesis, he also emphasises the need for 
a just global economy.  Trainer (1995) maintains that practical and attractive 
alternatives exist and that we can in fact improve the quality of life for most 
people not just in the South but also in the North. At the same time he stresses 
that the transition to an ecologically sustainable and just world must involve 
huge changes. Trainer’s book echoes much of what this thesis has argued as he 
outlines alternatives available around the design of settlements, housing, 
energy, food production, the development of a new economy and the shift to 
new values. He emphasises that the essential principles for sustainability must 
be more materially-simple living standards and small-scale, self-sufficient local 
economies. Trainer (1995) provides examples of alternative communities, and 
offers a strategy for people to begin moving their own localities in that 
direction. 
  
The concept of transition towns73, however, is not without critics. James in a 
debate conducted over several issues of Arena Magazine, 2009, writes that:  
 
[c]limate change is no small problem that can be averted by small steps: it 
will take big decisions and a lot of intervention as well as the political 
                                           
73 I have been involved in initiating a community garden as a preliminary step toward a transition 
town movement in East Fremantle, an upper middle class area close to the Swan River and Indian 
Ocean in Western Australia.  The aim for many involved in the early stages of establishing the 
community garden is to create a transition town, to link up with other community gardens/transition 
towns, so we can illustrate that another way of life is possible.  
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willingness to change things.  The problem with the Transition Movement 
is that it has a mandate that avoids any political conflict; hence, it is 
allowed to proliferate and gains the support of governments and local 
councils, doing nothing to upset the economy or the status quo ... Small 
steps of like-minded souls who combine vision and will and tenacity and 
who must choose their own goals and ways of functioning; if the 
magnitude of the problems were not so great I would be supportive; small 
steps might be good occupational therapy, alleviating a growing 
disenchantment, but it will not solve the world’s environmental problems. 
 
There are a number of points to consider in evaluating the transformative 
possibilities of transition towns. Firstly, is the question around whether the 
proletariat, the workers, are the only true and potentially effective agent of 
challenge to capital. Holloway (2002, quoted in Desai 2004) argues that for 
example in South Africa, most resistances to capital are at the point of 
consumption (that is – of services, water, electricity, housing and so on) rather 
than production, and are community-driven rather than union driven. A similar 
situation exists in Australia, although the issues are not about such basic needs 
as housing, water, electricity, but about wages, conditions and the environment. 
The most oppressed and alienated people in Australian society - Indigenous 
people and people impoverished because of mental and physical disabilities - 
are so marginalised, fragmented and powerless and have internalised inferiority 
and passivity, that the possibilities of contesting the system are remote. There 
are very different material factors affecting the possible sites of transformative 
change in Western industrialised countries, particularly in a country such as 
Australia where the material realities of the majority of the population place 
them in the top twenty per cent of the world’s income bracket, a historically 
and radically different location in the global capitalist economy than those 
struggling for change who are located in the periphery. Even in the face of 
catastrophic global warming, the historical and material position of people in 
the global political economy centre is antithetical to radical structural change. 
The language of global warming protest, of opposition to coal mining, is not, in 
the main, the language of deep and radical structural change and, furthermore, 
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the number of people participating in opposition to the status quo is 
comparatively small and fragmented. 
 
We can gain a further insight into the transformational potential of transition 
towns by returning to a more explicitly Marxist analysis. As Harvey argues 
(2001), all social activities become absorbed into the processes of capital 
accumulation, whether they are environmental NGOs, educational institutions 
or health care. While transition towns and community gardens are operating 
within the framework of capitalist society, there is an inevitability about their 
absorption within capitalist accumulation processes. Harvey (2001: 125) 
writes: ‘The accumulation of market niches, of diverse preferences and the 
promotion of new heterogeneous lifestyles, all occur within the orbit of capital 
accumulation’. 
 
In the Marxist tradition, James (2009: 18) rightly maintains that ‘[e]nvironment 
issues cannot be easily extricated from the system in which they exist: 
neoliberal capitalism’. She suggests however, that ‘[s]mall steps will simply 
divert our attention from the real crimes [and] act like a pause in the political 
language of environmentalism, ensuring that we interpret the discursive power 
plays in a more conceptual, friendly and unobtrusive way.  It encourages 
participation on the basis that we do not engage in assertions of political blame 
or accountability. On the contrary, small steps act like a meditation with a 
mantra buried in subordination and false consciousness. The whole earth, 
nature based phenomenon encourages individuals to feel not think’ (James 
2009: 18). It is difficult to argue against James’ viewpoint. Perhaps she is 
correct, but what are the alternatives? Transition towns do have the potential to 
exacerbate the social divide unless those involved maintain a sense of 
international solidarity with other transformative movements and a critical 
perspective. I would contest James’ accusation that the discourses around 
transition towns are necessarily depoliticised and that this could accentuate the 
deepening conservatism that is taking hold in Australia and elsewhere. 




Of course, there are many question marks over how significant any impact the 
transition towns’ movement will have.74 It has the undoubted, even if limited, 
benefits of providing concrete examples of the fact that other ways are 
possible; it brings people together in what is otherwise a very atomised 
individualised society; it involves people working to produce food in ways that 
break down some elements of alienation and which have the potential to make 
people more connected to the soil and the ecology, learning the principles of 
soil care, water conservation, the importance of bees, insects, earthworms and 
so on, facts of life that have been largely lost in Western industrialised 
societies. It also involves sharing and building community relationships. Will 
the transition towns’ movement spread sufficiently to make a dent in growth, 
capital accumulation and consumerism? It is unlikely unless the movement is 
linked to struggles to change the political and economic basis of society. 
Nevertheless, given the ideological and cultural hegemony of capitalism, if this 
movement helps to create even a crack in the dominant ideology and the 
existing social relations and consumerism, it is a start, with people making 
changes and becoming, in the process, more critically aware about the world 
around them. We need as a minimum to find spaces in which to build 
alternatives to global capitalism. Again to quote Harvey (2001: 411) we need 
to search for spaces in the hope to find ‘[o]ne in which the progressive forces 
of culture appropriate those of capital rather than the other way round’.  
We have a very short timeframe in which to act and a moral imperative which 
says to do nothing is not an option. The question of a socialist government 
through the ballot box, through revolution or armed struggle in Australia, or in 
any part of the rich industrialised world, is a non starter; so, if not transition 
towns, I would ask James (2009), where do we start? The trade union 
movement in the main in Australia and many other parts of the developed 
world, is deeply conservative in relation to the environment, global warming, 
and for some, even with respect to such issues as the proposed mining 
company super-profits tax. The left wing leadership of the trade union 
movement so evident during the 1970s and early 1980s on many international, 
                                           
74 In Australia at the moment there are few alternatives beyond voting for the Greens (a limited 
alternative) or Socialist minority parties in elections and voting once every few years hardly 
constitutes active participation in change processes.   
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social justice and environmental issues seems to have largely disappeared, in 
part as a result of neoliberalism. Whatever the reason, the strength and 
progressiveness of the trade union movement has declined. 
  
 
11.4     Cuba 
The changes that are going to be needed to move to the post capitalist societies 
envisioned in Chapter 12 will be both radical and traumatic.  Cuba is a rare 
case which illustrates the creation of an ecologically more sustainable type of 
society, the critical factors being that it has broken away from the capitalist 
social relations of production, dramatically reduced its use of fossil fuels, 
adopted ecological agricultural practices, localised food production, built a 
significantly more equitable society and has adopted many ecologically 
regenerative practices. Other radical changes, but of a different type, have 
occurred elsewhere but have often been very painful. Thus, for example, in the 
old Soviet Union, close examination of the major transformation from a 
communist, state-controlled economy to a free market economy raises some 
critical issues about such very different social change but are nonetheless 
relevant to changes that should and could occur in the wake of global warming. 
The process of transformation in the Soviet Union became an opportunity for 
capital accumulation and dispossession on a grand scale, with formerly state-
owned assets being sold at bargain prices to former party apparatchiks and 
other elite, enabling them to form the very wealthy and powerful Russian 
oligarchy of today. What is particularly relevant in the context of this thesis is 
that there were no culturally relevant institutions or detailed and clearly 
enunciated principles put in place to transform to and to protect the interests of 
the people. The institutions that were set up were in essence imported from the 
West or thrust upon what became Russia by the West. What this suggests, as I 
have indicated, if the situation were to arise in the future, and not just in 
Russia, is that there is a clear need to have in place the relevant principles and 
institutions to ensure that any new economy is able to be built in a way which 




Returning more specifically to Cuba, there are many problems with that 
society, several of which it could be argued arise as a result of the forced 
isolation of the island and its economy, for example through the US trade 
embargo. It is however unique in that the egalitarian political economic 
structure is strongly embedded in both state and local community. The 
transition to local, low-level benign technologies, urban (and rural) agriculture, 
local and organic food-growing practices is only one (but an important) part of 
Cuba’s transformation. At the heart of the economy are its socialist structure 
and principles of production for people’s needs rather than profit, and its 
resistance (to date) to capitalist economics. The problems faced by Cuba can be 
put into some better perspective if one compares Cuba with its near neighbour 
Haiti (Clarke, 2003) which has been embraced by the neoliberal development 
model and the patrimony of the United States and until very recently had a 
very high per capita national debt (some of it now forgiven – perhaps too late – 
in the wake of the earthquake in early 2010). 
 
The political economy of Cuba is illustrative of several relevant dimensions of 
future societies and economies. First I will give a brief over-view to put that 
political economy in its historical context.   
 
First, Cuba underwent a radical and rapid transition from a capitalist economy, 
described as a vast sugar plantation (Raby 2009: 1), to one overseen by a pre-
socialist democratic liberation government from 1959 to 1963, before then 
becoming a socialist country in the mid 1960s. The economic changes were 
structural and profound. The truly revolutionary changes took place during the 
period 1959–61 on the basis of calls for democracy, anti-imperialism and 
social justice. In a sense these were not unlike the anti-globalisation and anti-
capitalist movements at a global level in the period from the 1990s until now. 
Second, Cuban democracy is based on local communities with neighbourhoods 
and workplaces engaging people in decision making that directly affects their 
lives and livelihoods. Third, the country has faced the longest US trade and 
travel embargo in history, from 1962 until now. For a number of reasons this 
point is relevant to the creation of new transformative economic models. It 
illustrates how countries, even with very severe constraints on its resources, 
 
267 
can survive and become resilient in a way that is relevant to the new world 
economics that global warming and peak oil demand. Cuba did not just 
survive; it developed and maintained free universal health care and education, 
it subsidised rates for housing and utilities, and it increased sites for democratic 
consultation with the broad mass of the population, bringing them on board in 
facing the many difficulties and crises experienced since the early 1960s. In so 
doing, it retained the support and commitment of the population, despite the 
many hardships faced, particularly during the economic crisis which came 
about with the collapse of the Soviet Union from whom Cuba had received 
considerable support in aid. 
  
Fourth, from the Cuban experience, we can get some sense of the importance 
of ideology, in the context of both social change and social cohesiveness. Cuba 
also demonstrates the significance of the Gramscian argument that, for 
Marxism to be successful, the ideas need first to become hegemonic, that is, in 
this context to become common sense (Raby 2009). While the 1950s’ Cuban 
revolutionaries were influenced by Marxism, they nonetheless remained 
independent of the international communist movement, thereby retaining a 
degree of flexibility that ‘was crucial to their success’ (Raby 2009: 4). Cuba 
thus built institutions, particularly using the community as a central institution, 
that were fundamentally and culturally Cuban in nature and identity. The 
Cuban revolution drew on its own internal experiences of national political and 
economic corruption, exploitation, repression and domination by the US 
government. So in January 1959, Fidel Castro claimed that while the war of 
independence had been won, the revolution was still to be carried out. 
Certainly there had been a popular victory by the mass of the Cuban population 
with Castro stating that ‘the revolution is as Cuban as the palm trees’ and 
‘many people have not yet realized the scope of the change which has occurred 
in our country’ (quoted in Raby 2009: 4 from the Cuban periodical 
Revolución). There had been no reference to socialism, class struggle or 
Marxism and, according to Raby, what ideology there was, was seen as being 
in the interests of the people, for the good of all, to agrarian reform and to 
defeating the monopolistic and powerful interests of the large land/plantation 
owners. Thus the basis of the Cuban revolution was not socialist per se but 
 
268 
grew out of the strength of popular support for self-determination and social 
justice, backed by its consensual and inclusive character and the particular 
historical materialist situation in Cuba. It was not achieved on the basis of 
some abstract or explicit Marxist theory. As Raby (2009) maintains, it was 
only in the 1960s at a certain point in the transformation process that it was 
identified as socialist. The key points of relevance to this thesis and the future 
economy are the importance of the motivation; the coherence between the 
ideology and the reality of people’s lived experience; the use of the community 
as a central institution built on Cuban values; and the fact that, if it is in the 
people’s interest and becomes the people’s will, radical transformative change 
is possible within a relatively short time.   
 
Fifth, Cuba today is an example of a socialist society which has attained a high 
level of stability, equity, education, health status, grass-roots democracy and 
economic independence and this despite the enormous pressures from its near 
neighbour and bastion of neoliberalism, the United States. In spite of its 
isolation from the global economy, Cuba’s emphasis on egalitarianism, 
education and health care has resulted in its human development indices being 
on a par with the world’s most economically powerful nation. It has a Human 
Development Index (HDI) of 0.863 which gives it a ranking of 51 out of 182 
countries.75   
Sixth, in transforming its economy from a fossil fuelled industrial plantation-
based economy into an ecological, diversified, organic food-producing, self-
sufficient economy, Cuba has not only been able to improve significantly the 
quality of physical life of its citizens, it appears to have built a socially 
cohesive society. 
  
                                           
  75 Cuba has human development indicators on a par with the most developed democracies in the 
world – with the exception of income. It has a per capita GDP of $US6,876 PPP; a 99.8% literacy 
rate; and a life expectancy at birth of 78.5 years. This compares with the United states which has a 
HDI of 0.956 and ranks 13th,out of 182 countries; a GDP per capita of $US45,592 PPP; a 98% literacy 
rate; and a life expectancy at birth of 79.1 years. Cuba has one of the most highly skilled workforces 
in the world (Ranis and Kosack 2004) and ‘exports’ thousands of doctors as a form of aid to Third 
World countries (19,000 physicians alone in 2008 – more than all the G8 countries combined) as well 
as training Third World doctors in their own countries (Direct Action 2009). 




There are many lessons here for the type of transformational change that 
neoliberal countries will need to undergo if we are to save the planet for human 
occupation. Much of the trade, aid and oil for Cuba came from the Soviet 
Union until it collapsed in 1989-90. This meant that thereafter Cuba’s 
development had to be based on its own natural and population resources. For 
example, with the demise of the Soviet Union, imports of oil to Cuba were cut 
by more than half and of food by 80 per cent. The film ‘Power of Community’ 
(Morgan 2006) shows how Cuba went from having a highly mechanised, 
industrial agricultural system to one using organic methods of farming and 
local, urban gardens, building a resilient, locally based economy. The country 
made a fundamental change to organic agriculture and adopted ecologically 
sound practices throughout the economy. It developed a system of 
organoponkos, intensive cultivation of fruit and vegetables and an extensive 
urban organic agriculture system. Today, Havana, the capital, produces within 
the city, 60 per cent of its fruit and vegetables, a scheme that is now being 
adopted in a number of other South American countries (Morgan 2006). Cuba 
of necessity, underwent an energy revolution with the demise of the Soviet 
Union, and has now a system of decentralised power generation where 
communities depend more on small but efficient local generators. More 
recently Cuba has invested significantly in wind and solar power generation. 
 
Seventh, Cuba is one of the few countries which has been increasing its 
biomass, has not been involved in depleting other countries’ biomass and has 
the record of being the only country which has increased its forested land area. 
It is the only country in the world to meet the World Wildlife Fund’s (2006) 
criteria for sustainable development. 
 
In making an overall assessment of the Cuban experience, perhaps the main 
lesson for future post-capitalist economies is that when change to local, 
community-based production is necessary or is forced on a country, Cuba tells 
us that it can be done. Cuba also provides one example of how it can be done. 
Leadership, resilience, a community-focus, culturally relevant institutions, 
belief in a principle (justice) and an imperative to survive – there really was no 
alternative – were essential ingredients of the Cuban success. Importantly, the 
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very basis of society was transformed from being divided, hierarchical and 
unequal to one where the social relations of production were socialised and 
large scale land reform was carried out. Urban agriculture has played an 
important role in providing the population with food security and involvement 
in the nation’s transition. There will be many routes to the future post-capitalist 
world but the odds have to be high that all successful roads will involve these 
characteristics. 
11.5 Conclusion  
Over the last four centuries or so, capitalism has transformed the face of the 
earth to the point that we are now confronted with a planet that may not much 
longer be able to support human life as we know it. Despite this, the capitalist 
system is still set to engulf the last remaining corners of the planet, all but 
guaranteeing widespread human and ecological catastrophe. This trajectory has 
been examined in the thesis through the perspective of the political economy of 
global warming but, as has been made clear from the very beginning of this 
thesis, global warming is but one product of a system which has many crises 
and contradictions, is unjust, unstable and destructive and where the 
manifestations of these characteristics are many. As Harvey (2001: 121) 
suggests: ‘someone, somewhere has to think about what kind of social system 
should replace it’. 
 
This chapter has attempted to make a contribution to addressing Harvey’s 
suggestion, by considering a few examples that might point the way.  The next 
chapter seeks to address Harvey’s point more explicitly, but still at the level of 
setting a constitution rather than specific guidelines. It has sought to show that 
stable and just societies can be built around the institution of the community.  
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CHAPTER 12 Principles for future societies  
 
12.1  Introduction  
The focus of this chapter is on what sorts of societies will best address global 
warming. It has been argued throughout the thesis that global warming is but 
one of a suite of interrelated issues and that we need to address the structural 
causes of the whole gamut of problems that constitute a convergence of crises 
that have been called the ‘crises of civilisation’. What sorts of societies can we 
build that might resolve these crises, especially of global warming? What are 
the key principles and values, structures and institutions for such societies? We 
need to be clear about where we want to go before we set out on the journey, 
and then have some idea of how we are going to get there. This chapter will 
suggest some major considerations in building theories and societies for the 
future, developing these ideas in part from the considerations set out in parts II 
and II of the thesis. I use the plural ‘societies’ for, as I will argue, diversity and 
localisation are key principles for any future societies. Attempting to devise 
alternatives to neoliberalism and capitalism more broadly is a challenging task. 
As previously discussed at various stages of the thesis, the whole orientation of 
contemporary capitalist society has effectively sought to delegitimise such 
possibilities. There is however, as never before, an urgent need for alternative 
visions, perhaps even for utopian visions, or what Chomsky (2010: 309) calls a 
‘rekindling [of] the radical imagination’ for humanity. The capitalist system is 
filled with too many contradictions and has given rise to too many crises – not 
the least of which is global warming - for it to continue. 
 
Chapter 11 has provided some practical guidance from some existing examples 
both micro and macro, regarding what sorts of principles we might want to 
underpin these new societies of the future. Particularly in the West, there is 
little institutional appreciation of the non-material accumulation concepts of 
development or that, beyond a certain point in material wealth, more goods do 
not necessarily equate with better, happier or more developed lives (Hamilton 
2003). As argued earlier in the thesis, there is little acknowledgement of the 
historical processes which have given rise to the ‘champagne glass’ model of 
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global wealth distribution (see Figure 12.2 below); or that the vast majority of 
the planet’s resources are owned, controlled and exploited for the narrow ends 
of a few; or that the issues of inequality and the exploitation of labour are key 
factors in finding solutions to global warming. Nor is there a sense of 
transformative or revolutionary change. In the few pockets where (in the West) 
a sense of the need for change does exist, it is captured in large part by the 
various factions of largely marginalised socialist politics. In Central and South 
America and India, there are small-scale farmers’ movements, such as the 
Latin American Movimiento Campesino a Campesino, members of the World 
Social Forum, Bolivia’s Mother Earth and Indigenous groups calling for 
structural change to the global economy. In Africa, there are many anti-
capitalist movements and groups working for democratic change. The 2011 
events in North Africa and the Middle East reveal the extent of the desire for 
radical change. The strength, pervasiveness and in a sense ‘solidarity’ of the 
power of the world’s rich, however, maintain the status quo globally. This 
power not only includes the hegemonic ideology but also (in the West) 
structural ties such as superannuation, pension funds and share ownership 
(albeit minority shareholdings) that support the capital accumulation process 
and capture the communities’ interests in the capitalist system, but do nothing 
for the redistribution of wealth or power or for laying the groundwork for 
sustainable futures. This is not fertile ground for deep and radical change. 
Further, we in the West too easily distance ourselves from what is happening in 
the South and have an almost pathological disassociation from what global 









Figure 12.1 The Champagne-glass Distribution of Global Wealth (Source: 
Conley 2008: 392) 
 
This chapter is structured around six main themes and draws in part at least 
from the examples presented in Chapter 11. Beyond this introduction, section 
12.2 outlines the different world-views that will be required in future. The 
constraints that future societies face are outlined in 12.3. Acknowledgement of 
these constraints is important not only to avert global warming but to establish 
a realistic basis for what is available to meet the material needs of future 
societies. The question of institutions for the future is discussed in 12.4. 
Section 12.5 outlines the key principles and values that must underpin future 
societies if they are to sustain life on the planet while 12.6 suggests some 
research questions to help us to progress . The conclusion follows. 
  
12.2   Different world-views 
To have a future, humans need to become critically conscientised regarding the 
hegemony of neoliberal ideology and the alienation of human lives as a result 
of the capitalist system and face up to the reality of the interconnected crises of 
civilisation. Thereafter human societies need to reconnect with the living planet 
through our cultures and the social relations of production. People’s behaviours 
are located within structural and ideological frameworks which mean that, 
alongside the transformation of the economic structures, new cultures and 
forms of human expression and satisfaction need to be developed. Future 
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societies need to give more emphasis to the intrinsic and inalienable qualities 
of health, happiness and connection through community which are singularly 
missing for example in today’s South Africa (and the west generally). Related, 
rather than the extrinsic material values fostered through over-production and 
consumption, there will need to be a re-establishment of life-enhancing values. 
A central tenet of the relationship between humans and the broad ecology, as 
prescribed by Marx, is that a condition of sustainability is that it is the 
responsibility of all peoples and societies on behalf of all generations to come 
to care for the maintenance of the planet (Foster and Clark 2009). The modern 
world under capitalism has lost its connection and sense of place in the broad 
ecology – to the land, water, animals and plants – and the metabolic systems 
supporting life on Earth.  There needs to be a healing of the metabolic rift. 
 
The epistemologies and values of future societies can learn much from the 
wisdom and worldviews of Indigenous cultures. These see that everything that 
has been created and given to us in nature is precious and is governed by divine 
laws. Their conceptualisation of humans as custodians, caring for nature and 
seeing nature as sacred and central to all wellbeing, calls out to be emulated. 
For the Hopi Indians, for example, the Indigenous peoples of the world are the 
caretakers of life and, as with many Indigenous societies, believe humans ‘are 
to protect and use all these precious things wisely, and to share them in order to 
keep harmony among all people’ (Knudtson and Suzuki 1992: 190).  
 
This is not to argue for future societies to adopt Indigenous culture. That is not 
possible. It is rather simply to point to the fact that future societies can learn 
from Indigenous culture the values of custodianship of the land and with that 
the communitarianism of that culture in respecting the value of community not 
only of people but of the broad ecology more generally. Future societies need 
to adopt new cultures only to the extent that either the acting out of their 
existing cultures cannot be maintained in a globally warming world or these 
cultures continue to embrace the neoliberal values of individualism and 
acquisitiveness (so apparent in the new Black elite in South Africa and which 
get in the way of the development of the future societies as identified later in 
this chapter). I am hesitant to try to predict how difficult it will be to bring 
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about these necessary cultural changes, but take heart from the example in 
Chapter 11 that it is possible.  
 
Given the many crises of capitalism, there is now an imperative to develop a 
shared vision which embraces all humans more justly and equitably. To get 
from where we are now to that shared vision, however, is a great leap, not least 
because of the enormous power wielded by the global elite, the beneficiaries of 
the current system and the pervasiveness of the neoliberal ideology. 
  
In the context of spelling out the key differences between today’s economic 
neoliberal system and that of the future, highly relevant is the Lauderdale 
Paradox (Foster and Clark 2009). Lauderdale revealed the contradiction of the 
inverse correlation between public wealth and private riches, ‘such that an 
increase in the latter often served to diminish the former’ (Foster and Clark 
2009: np). This paradox starts from the fact that market economists treat 
nature’s contribution to wealth as zero. Hence the destruction of nature does 
not register. Foster and Clark (2009) argue that, behind this paradox, is the fact 
that neoclassical economics fails to recognise the distinction between the value 
in use and the value in exchange. As John Stuart Mill (1909) suggested, in 
economics ‘the word value always means value in exchange. The use of a thing 
[in economics] means its capacity to satisfy a desire or serve a purpose.’ 
 
Now while one can see the logic in this, it means that certain resources which 
clearly have value in use (such as air) end up with zero value or at least lower 
values when seen in terms of their value in the market place. Something which 
is not a commodity, which is not exchanged in the market, has no value. This 
has major implications for planetary destruction as many of the resources that 
are not traded in the market place have value ecologically (the biomass for 
example) and even some which are traded in the market do not have their full 
use value attached to them.  
 
The paradox lies in the fact that increases in scarcity, in such necessary 
elements of life as air, water, and food, would, if privatised and hence have 
exchange values attached to them, enhance individual private riches, and 
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indeed the riches of a country, but only at the expense of the common wealth. 
For example, if one could commodify water that had previously been available 
free by placing a fee on wells, measured riches of a nation would be increased 
but at the expense of the growing thirst of the population.  
 
There is much more to the changes needed in economies and in economic 
thinking than is exemplified in the Lauderdale Paradox. However it exposes 
what is a key element here. The issues here are not just about technical 
questions. They are much more fundamentally about what ideology and what 
worldview one adopts.  
 
Transformational change will not be possible while people remain locked into 
the capitalist paradigm where their world-views are in large part formed by the 
consumption-focussed knowledge industry76. It is of note however that some 
studies have found that critically informed citizens (and in the context in which 
this issue is raised here being critically informed is crucial), even those in the 
West who are the beneficiaries of the system, respond to questions around 
social issues and the allocation of resources in just and compassionate ways. In 
doing so, citizens draw on values of community solidarity and wellbeing and 
preferential support for the most marginalised or impoverished (Mooney 
2009). Yet this is not how people vote in Western democracies.77   Much of 
the appeal in Western democratic elections is short term and within narrowly 
defined personal, private and nationalistic interests with voters voting as 
relatively uninformed individuals  rather than critically informed members of 
the community. In a global warming world, the potential through the ballot box 
is there to lead to the politics of survival of the most powerful and with no or 
little concern for the longer term or the majority or for the planet. 
 
Paulo Freire (1970) provides useful insights in building transformative social 
relations.  For example he is critical of the ‘banking concept of education’, that 
                                           
76 The knowledge industry refers to the media, including the advertising industry, but also all the 
institutions which are associated with education that perpetuates the status quo, that is not critical and 
analytical of the status quo. 
77 See for example for Australia, Kitney 2004. 
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is, education which is uncritical and indoctrinating, is fundamentally 
oppressive of people’s liberation and serves to maintain the unjust and 
inequitable status quo. Freire (1970: 85) advocates instead critical education 
which enables a deepened consciousness of people’s situations and a ‘historical 
reality susceptible to transformation’. He argues for the building of critical 
tools to enable the transformation of societies. Drawing on Marxist theory, 
Freire’s liberation theology work was developed in the context of the poor and 
oppressed during the 1950s and 1960s in Latin America and one could argue 
that it has no potential for resonance in middle class Australia or North 
America. I would propose that particularly given the problems arising from 
global warming, growing numbers of refugees, food and water crises, and the 
many other problems that are going to intersect in the foreseeable future, the 
building of critically conscientised societies is much needed. That in itself can 
assist in reducing alienation. If one combines the work of Freire, with the 
studies of Mooney (2010), then for many in the West, social transformation 
based on the principles of critical awareness, equality, justice, compassion and 
community, has the potential for creating a coming together of humanity – 
reducing the problems of individualism - based on community participation, 
engagement in decision making processes and critical thought.  
 
Furthermore, Freire’s work revolves around the moral and philosophical 
question of what it means to be human. By actively engaging in the collective 
liberation of all, we are also engaged in a process of liberating ourselves and 
fulfilling our potential as moral, ethical, empowered and history-making 
human actors, collectively working to transform our society to one that is 
enduring and rich in social and cultural diversity. This is the pathway to 
making ourselves more fully human and, at the same time, better equipped to 
live in a state of connection and harmony with our fellow species and the broad 
ecology. As part of this, leadership must be a part of the community, rooted in 
and subject to the same experiences as the community and dependent on the 
same ecological constraints as the community from which it develops. It must 




This factor alone helps to define the limits to the size of community. The 
socialist revolutions of the 20th century failed in part because the physical or 
geographical scale of revolutionary action was defined by the state rather than 
the community.  They replaced one distant state with another. Further the 
process of change was violent. These repressive transformational methods are 
both unacceptable and risky in the 21st century. They will also fail.  
 
12.3   Constraints for future societies  
Part I of the thesis discussed some of the biological constraints to human 
activities if we are to maintain the planet’s biosphere as being fit for the lives 
of humans and other species. To recap: We need to reduce carbon dioxide in 
the atmosphere to 350 ppm CO2 as a matter of urgency, and then more 
gradually reduce further to 280–300 ppm CO2. Currently we are heading for 
390 ppm CO2. Scientists argue that 350 ppm is the safe upper limit and that we 
need to get back to pre-industrial levels, 280 ppm, to return the planet to a state 
conducive to the development of human societies. 
 
Beyond this, there must also be recognition of the limited remaining capacity 
of the atmosphere to act as a sink for carbon emissions and that we have, at 
most, 10 years to pull back from the brink. This then raises the really difficult 
question of who should be allowed what share in this sink. This is a resource 
that should be used for only essential human activities, the most crucial being 
the transformation of the current relations of production. The global political 
and economic elite cannot continue to have such a big per capita share of the 
global atmospheric commons. Equity demands a transfer globally of resources 
from those who pollute, and have historically polluted more, to those who have 
polluted and who do pollute less. This transfer however has to be on the 
condition that those resources are used to minimise growth in emissions as 
those poorer countries develop their own economies. This should form the 
centrepiece of relations between North and South. These issues of reduction 
and redistribution need to be considered and acted upon within a clearly 
defined target of 280-300 ppm.  
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There are a range of multi-faceted constraints that need to be considered with 
respect to future societies in addition to carbon emissions.  I will discuss four 
of these constraints now.   
 
The first is in relation to the biocapacity of the planet in general. Wackernagel 
et al. (1995) introduced both a significant baseline for conceptualising the 
Earth’s biocapacity and a metric for measuring it. These authors established 
that the planet had a total of 13.2 billion global hectares (gha) of biocapacity. 
This represents its ability to produce and reproduce the biological conditions 
for life on the planet. For a population of 6.3 billion inhabitants, this equates to 
approximately 2.1 gha per capita, but clearly less as population grows. Trying 
to operationalise this baseline in some way or other would be highly complex, 
but conceptually it performs three important roles. First it graphically 
illustrates just how little room there is in the biosphere to provide for each 
person’s needs, while also providing space for other species.  Second, it 
provides a clear guideline for the use of the Earth’s resources (compared to the 
current system which is based on continual growth of the economy), and hence 
use of the Earth’s bioresources.  Third, if one accepts the principle of equity, it 
places clear limitations on what each person and community can consume of 
the biosphere. 
 
It follows that the main focus of future societies will involve developing 
economic and political systems which provide access to what will be a heavily 
constrained but equitable ecological footprint. This consideration will need to 
over-ride all others. Every human being should have a right to their share of the 
Earth’s biomass, but no more. To exceed one’s footprint entitlement is both to 
rob another of theirs and to endanger the sustainability of the planet. 
 
The champagne glass (Figure 12.2) graphically illustrates the extremely 
unequal distribution of wealth currently, and hence access to the Earth’s 
biocapacity.  The richest 20 per cent, who also have the greatest capacity for 
change, are those with the least desire for change and with the greatest power 
to resist change. They continue to suck up resources from the bottom 80 per 
cent, through land acquisition, through mining and other resources extraction, 
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through capital flows and the financialisation of the economy and, most 
importantly, through establishing the international rules for the governance of 
the global economy (Conley 2008: 392). The top 20 per cent represent the 
vision of where the development of human societies is leading to, although 
there is no apparent ceiling to this vision. Currently, in the international 
debates about global warming, the top 20 per cent want to impose restrictions 
on the bottom 80 per cent, while at the same time continuing their own 
increasing production and consumption patterns (and carbon emissions). As 
was illustrated in the study of South Africa, not all elites live in the North; 
most countries have their high consumption elites, and the model of 
development being imported to the South, in collusion with southern elites, is 
one that perpetuates this champagne glass distribution of wealth and power. 
 
A second constraint, the peaking of fossil fuels, will have an enormous impact 
on the organisation of future economies and societies. According to the work 
of the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (ASPO)78 (and as raised 
briefly previously in section 10.4), the peaking dates for fossil fuels are oil 
2010; coal 2010; and gas 2030. 
 
To illustrate the significance of this peaking, let me look more closely at ‘peak 
oil’. While there is some confusion surrounding the meaning of this term, most 
frequently it refers to the point at which oil production is at a maximum. It has 
implied within it that thereafter there is a decline in production, instead of 
continuing to rise steadily as it has done over the past 100 years.  Relevant here 
is the world oil depletion curve (Figure 12.3 on page 229). This is based on 
known oil reserves plus best estimates of the amounts yet-to-be–found (clearly 
a less than precise figure). This curve indicates that world oil production 
reached a peak (87 million barrels per day) in 2010 and is now in decline 
(Aleklett 2010). The part before 2007 is historical fact. The part that comes 
afterward is an ASPO extrapolation. The detail of what will now happen is 
largely ‘unchartered territory’ (Hopkins 2008) but the ‘downward curve’ does 
                                           
78 Aleklett (2010) public lecture, Perth 16 December. 
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mean that the amount of energy required to extract any fixed amount of oil is 
now rising and the extraction process increasingly environmentally risky. 
 
While the curve does not show the amount of energy being used to extract the 
declining amounts of oil, for example, there is a relationship known as ‘energy 
return on energy invested’ (EROEI) and it is changing. For example, in the US 
in the 1930s, the EROEI was 100:1; today globally it is somewhere between 
11:1 and 18:1. Also, in considering alternatives, it is worth noting that the 
EROEI for wind is 11:1, for photo-voltaics between 2.5:1 and 4.3:1; for hydro 
23:1; and for biodiesel about 2:1 (Hopkins 2008: 45). Trainer (2007) argues 
that while renewables will have a key role to play in future energy needs, the 
idea that consumer (capitalist) society can be powered entirely by renewables 
is absurd.  Future societies will need to be organised to depend on much less 
energy. Hence the idea of energy descent which is described by Hopkins 
(2008: 45) as ‘[t]he continual decline in net energy supporting humanity … It 
also refers to a future scenario in which humanity has successfully adapted to 
declining net fossil fuel energy availability and has become more localised and 
self-reliant.’  
 
Figure 12.2 World Oil Depletion Curve 
 




Behind peak oil and energy descent lies a third constraint, the imperative for 
de-industrialisation. Heinberg (2007: 55) describes this in the context of 
agriculture as ‘[a] radical reduction of fossil fuel inputs to agriculture, 
accompanied by an increase in labour inputs and a reduction in transport, with 
production being devoted primarily for local consumption’. Fossil fuel 
depletion almost ensures that this will happen. De-industrialisation, however, 
will of course need to occur across all economic sectors, with production being 
planned and directed initially toward the transition phase (to localised, non 
fossil-fuelled economic activity) and thereafter only for the production of 
essential items. 
 
A final constraint relates to the biological needs of humans for healthy 
survival. One measure of this is the number of calories required by humans per 
capita per day. Today, the average per capita consumption of food has 
increased to 2,760 kilocalories per day, but that average masks significant 
differences, from millions of obese people to one billion humans who lack 
access to adequate food (Pretty 2009). Whatever, humans require a basic and 
measurable number of calories per day to remain healthy. 
 
  
12.4  The community as an institution 
It was identified in the theoretical section (Part III), and is confirmed in the 
examples in Chapter 11, that the key institution for the future will be the local 
and regional, critically conscientised community. This issue of community is 
crucial as it sits at the centre of the new economics and the new societies. 
Power and decision making must be rooted in the material realities of people 
producing their livelihoods within the context of local geographical 
communities. This will ensure leaders are not alienated from the communities 
which they represent because their material interests will remain the same as 
those of others in their communities. Their knowledge and influence will be 
dependent on the strength of their connection to their community and the 
degree of trust in which the community holds them. There is no future for 
global elites and no material basis for people to become elites. Just as 
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contemporary global power relations have led to the invisibility of most of 
humanity, in a transformed future, the great mass of people will be the history 
makers, the key actors and the stage will be local communities and regions. 
  
The concept of community has many historical homes, including from 
Indigenous epistemology, to Indian political philosophies, to Western 
communitarianism. I refer to community as being geographically localised, 
consisting of politically, economically and socially linked groups of people 
who are connected through the production of their livelihoods, their inter-
dependent social relations and cultures. Such communities may be intentional, 
that is, where people have chosen to work together in pursuit of a common 
ideal or vision or have historical roots. They may be urban or rural, but in 
either case, they have a strong and inter-dependent economy and relationship 
to the local environment.  In localised economies, people require greater 
autonomy on two fronts. ‘Their livelihood and lives themselves are critically 
dependent on the local resource base’ and ‘they must have primary control 
over those resources’ (Kothari and Parajuli 2004: 235). In this way, 
communities have a vested interest in looking after and building knowledge of 
their local environments as they have to produce their livelihoods and sustain 
their lives from that environment. In a fossil-fuel constrained world, 
communities will have to turn to their own resources for not only their 
sustenance, but for their culture, their identity, their education and their 
healthcare, and for their rest and recreation. The community will of necessity 
be central to people’s lives. 
  
The intent here is that each member ought to be able to participate 
meaningfully in the material matters which affect their living. For such 
communitarian democracy to have the chance to work, citizens need to be 
critically educated and informed - in the sense of Freire’s (1970) critical 
pedagogy - and know that their engagement is meaningful and built on 
principles of responsibility, reciprocity, sharing and co-operation. Regional, 
national and international governance bodies will need to remain rooted in 
local communities and based on the same principles of custodianship of the 




The economist Dasgupta (2010:np), whom I referred to earlier in section 9.2 as 
recognising that nature’s resources should not be treated as free gifts, also 
emphasises the importance of communities for the future. He sees this in the 
contexts of trust, sustainability and social capital. He writes that all accounts of 
social capital, and in turn it seems sustainability, must ‘rely on social capital 
occur[ring] somewhere between the individual and the State: they are 
conducted within communities’. He continues: ‘For some time now it has 
seemed to me that in tracking social capital, the most fruitful first step isn't to 
ask what that object might be, but to ask instead a question that is faced by any 
group of people who have agreed on a joint course of action: under what 
contexts can they be sanguine that the promises they have made to one another 
are credible? The question suggests that the fundamental problem facing 
people who would like to transact with one another is one of trust.’ He 
continues: ‘if the idea of social capital is to serve a useful purpose in 
economics, it should be interpreted as interpersonal networks where members 
develop and maintain trust in one another to keep their promises by the device 
of "mutual enforcement" of agreements.’ 
 
The italics here are in the original. They reflect my view of the centrality of 
community for the future. It is noteworthy that Dasgupta here also signals, in 
his comments about ‘interpersonal networks’, ‘trust’ and ‘mutual 
enforcement’, the need for what amounts to some set of principles to underpin 
society. While different, these in a sense echo, in spirit at least, those 
developed in section 12.5 below.  
 
Building on the primacy of communities as the centres of power, participation 
and economic activity, future societies will be based on the principles of a 
localised socialism – that is, common ownership and cooperative management 
of the means of production and the allocation of resources valued according to 
their use values (as discussed above in section 12.2). There are a number of 
reasons for localisation.  As indicated, the early part of the 21st century is 
witnessing the peaking of the production of all fossil fuels which are the energy 
sources for inter alia the current powering of long distance travel, trade and 
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industry. Metabolically restorative practices require localised production, 
consumption and waste recycling. Again, the community is the social basis for 
the economy; for humans’ interactions with the environment to produce their 
livelihoods; for de-alienating society; and for involving people in the common 
stewardship of the land. 
 
Capitalism will not deliver these. Only by building an alternative political 
economy, based around the community, will societies be able to cope with this 
dismantling. It follows that ‘the state versus the community’ is an important 
site for discussion around the nature of future societies. In Chapter 9, I 
presented a Marxist interpretation of the state as the institution which protected 
the interests of capital. The corporatisation of the state and the conjuncture of 
interests of corporate capitalism and the nation state have called into question 
the value of maintaining the state as a structure in future societies. The 
alternative institution is the community. 
 
Kothari and Parajuli (2004: 234) write of the need to ‘re-demarcate 
communities in terms of ecological bio-regions, cultural boundaries and access 
and control over productive resources’. Urbanised people will need to relearn 
their dependence on the land and environment and how to nurture and care for 
them. Especially relevant here is Gandhi’s understanding of the relationship of 
humans to the environment and his idea that the ‘logic of self reliance is the 
logic of place, people and resources bound into locally sustaining ecological 
systems’ (Fattal 2006: np). In this Gandhi showed great foresight in not only 
his non-violent opposition to colonialism but his support for development 
processes which focused on the village community and on the maintenance of 
technologies used by, and which were culturally appropriate for, villagers and 
rural people.  
 
Gandhi’s philosophy has much to offer in designing a future society faced with 
global warming. The Indian writer Ramchandra Guha (1990) outlined the 
deeply ecological and deliberately political agrarian environmentalism and 
prescience of Gandhi. The political programme of Gandhian agrarianism was 
‘to resist the onslaught of commercialism and industrialism where they have 
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not yet made inroads, and where they have to resolutely turn one’s back on 
modern society and go back to the land‘ (Guha 1990: 434). Guha (1990: 236) 
in turn argues for ‘greater autonomy for each community with at the same 
time, linkages among communities, watersheds, bio-regions and nations’. He 
suggests that there is a need for ‘a framework in which each community can 
exercise enough autonomy to build its internal solidarity and find some 
common definition of mutual rights, responsibilities and obligations’ (Guha 
1990: 236). By neighbouring communities sharing different attributes – forests, 
water, soil for example - alliances for mutual benefit and local interdependence 
are created.  
 
It is of note that Guha’s prescription is for communities in a nation (i.e. India) 
that currently has in excess of one billion people. It is one that has been 
dominated by village life until recently when trends toward urbanisation and 
industrialisation, the expansion of urban slums and the consolidation of 
inequality have occurred. This very sub-continent which will be most gravely 
affected by global warming is thus currently weakening its adaptive capacities 
in favour of industrialisation, corporatisation, urbanisation and growth.  
 
It is to be noted that the state and representative democracy have been 
developed within the narrative of capitalism. As Wright argues (2010: 281) 
‘representative democracy has been one of the critical sources of social 
stability in developed capitalism’. However, critically conscientised 
communities have the potential ‘to lead a subterranean, potentially subversive 
life. Communities have eminent possibilities of being the site of resistance to 
capitalist re-colonization’ (Kothari and Parjuli 2004: 235). This is an important 
principle to recognise in the transformation of society as to where the seat of 
power for transformation rests.  
 
With the community as the centrepiece of future societies, the most 
marginalised social actors under capitalism come to the fore in the political 
arena. The community becomes the site of political decision making, of what 
to produce, with whom to trade, how resources are allocated, what sort of 
education the community needs to provide for its members and what sort of 
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health care. In societies with very limited material resources, there is no room 
for ecologically destructive practices, for externalising costs and pollution. The 
community has to absorb all of its costs of production; it has to deal with its 
own wastes. They cannot be shipped off to foreign shores or into ecological 
commons such as the atmosphere. In this world, everyone is closer to nature, 
for even the teacher or the doctor who exchanges their skills for food, water 
and housing, depends very closely on the health of the local ecology to ensure 
adequate sources of food, water and shelter. Development in this context is 
matched to and driven by local needs; it builds local solidarity and 
interdependence. It is measured by the health and vitality of the community. 
Ecological regeneration and care are integral to development, for that is 
recognised as the basis of the community’s wellbeing.  Such ecologically 
grounded development does not have the aura of prestige, of success, power 
and modernity that large scale industrial development projects have. It does not 
depend on credit or capital investment, but on a sense of community, co-
operation and communal decision making. The producers and owners of this 
localised development are the local community. The beneficiaries of this 
localised development are the local communities. It is the local community 
which, through having the responsibility for the good use of resources for 
development as well as the fruits of development, can then build a sense of 
pride, engagement and belonging. The local community has power and control 
over the community and their own lives.  Everyone is employed or engaged or 
has a role to play, including the children, teenagers and the elderly. There is no 
retirement in such communities. Rather, over the whole life cycle the principle 
applies of from each according to their abilities, to each according to their 
needs. The very young, the sick, the disabled and frail are taken care of by the 
community in the community.  Again, they cannot be ‘shipped off’ to be taken 
care of elsewhere.  
 
The community makes provisions for the future, for failed harvests, floods, 
droughts and for difficult times by setting aside food, water and other 
resources. The community is responsible for building and recovering its 
ecological commons, its forests, parklands, endemic wildlife species and water 
resources and in turn for building  resilience. Living close to the land and 
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environment, to the means of production and being intimately engaged in the 
social relations of production enables the development of a knowledge around 
all the basic elements of subsistence. This further contributes to the resilience 
and wellbeing of the community. 
 
A relevant example here is the Chipko movement in Uttarkhand in the middle 
Himalayas. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Chipko Indigenous women began a 
protest to protect their livelihoods that were closely tied to the forests which 
were being felled for use by urban commercial and industrial interests. The 
forests provided the rural villages with food, fodder and fuel as well as 
stabilising the soil and water resources. They were also central to the ecology 
that entwined with Chipko culture and identity. In their protest, the Chipko 
women employed the methods of Gandhian non-violent resistance, hugging 
trees and blocking tree-felling machinery. They succeeded in gaining 
international recognition, with the UN stating that ‘in effect, the Chipko people 
are working a socio-economic revolution by winning control of their forest 
resources from the hands of a distant bureaucracy which is concerned with 
selling the forest for making urban-oriented products’ (Routledge 1993). There 
is a parallel here for the future in the West in that the currently wealthy classes 
of Western Europe, the Americas, the Middle East, Australia and Japan will 
not be able to live their high consumption lifestyles by drawing on the biomass 
of Third World countries. 
  
12.5 Principles underpinning future societies 
 
In the wake of the discussions in the theoretical chapters in Part II and the 
acknowledgement above of the constraints facing future societies, this section 
sets out the key epistemological issues, the values and principles, and the 
material framework on which to base societies if we are to maintain a healthy 
and balanced biosphere. In the terms of Vanberg (1994) (see the introduction to 
Part IV), this represents a possible ‘constitution’ for these societies. This 
section draws in particular on some of the ideas emerging from Chapter 11. 
More generally it builds on the implications for the political economy of global 
warming as expressed in parts II and III of the thesis but, as explained in the 
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introduction to this part of the thesis, is not and cannot be constrained by these. 
in the introduction to this part of the thesis, is not and cannot be constrained by 
these. The key considerations here are overcoming the metabolic rift by the 
establishment of metabolically restorative social relations of production. 
 
The fundamental issues that emerged in the study of South Africa revolved 
around the contradictions between African ecological sustainability and the 
pursuit of neoliberal capitalist industrialisation within South Africa and 
throughout Africa. It was pointed out in that study that the expanding capitalist 
social relations of production and the wealth and growth created from this are 
continuing to benefit only the minority, while further locking in global 
warming. 
 
To tackle the multiple ecological crises, we will have to create societies which 
are conducive to living simply and in harmony with the broad ecology. This 
will include seeing humans as part of that broad ecology. From Marx we have 
learnt the principles of the historical material basis of society and the 
importance of both social and productive relations and of ideology; from 
Gandhi, we learn the centrality of community and of the universal principles of 
peace, pacifism and equity in guiding the foundations of a ‘good’ society; and 
from social movements such as Campesino a Campesino, we can learn about 
the community solidarity required to meet the challenges ahead collectively.  
 
This thesis does not attempt to define in any detail what is meant by a ‘good’ 
society. Over the centuries, the question of what constitutes a society that is 
good is one that has intrigued both philosophers and political scientists. The 
Greek philosophers for example were much concerned with this issue. In more 
recent times and more immediately relevant to this thesis, Laski (1933: 164) 
wrote of the impossibility of achieving a good society under capitalism. He 
argued that a good society could ‘no more make peace between the motives of 
private profit and public service than it could continue to be half-slave and 
half-free’. Galbraith (1996: 2) argued that ‘[t]o identify and urge the good and 
achievable society may well be a minority effort but better that effort than none 
at all. In any case, there is no chance for the better society unless the good and 
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achievable society is clearly defined’. However he was not optimistic 
describing ‘the modern political dialectic’ in these terms: ‘It is an unequal 
contest: the rich and the comfortable have influence and money. And they vote. 
The concerned and the poor have numbers, but many of the poor, alas, do not 
vote. There is democracy, but in no slight measure is it the democracy of the 
fortunate’ (Galbraith 1996: 8). 
  
In setting out these principles, I take heart from Galbraith’s comment that 
identifying ‘the good society’ may well be a minority effort but better that 
effort than none at all (Galbraith 1996: 2). There is an imperative for radical 
change summed up by Lovelock (2006: 7) arguing that the planet is ‘a finite 
and living organism which is suffering a grave illness as the result of human 
activity, and there exists a threshold, set by the level of carbon dioxide 
equivalent in the atmosphere’, which ‘once passed nothing the nations of the 
world do will alter the outcome and the Earth will move irreversibly to a new 
hot state’. There is an imperative for action. Before that there is an imperative 
for establishing the principles and structures which can form the basis of future 
sustainable societies. These are now spelt out. 
 
The Principles: 
1. Metabolic Restoration 
 
Examining the political economy of South Africa in Part II,  it was 
demonstrated that that country exhibits the consequences of a state dominated 
by the interests of conglomerate capital, with all the resulting aspects of the 
deepening rift between humans and the environment. Further as identified in 
Part II, the Marxist concepts of the metabolic rift and metabolic restoration are 
my starting points for establishing the principles for future social organisation. 
Addressing the problems created by the metabolic rift requires radical 
structural change including the dismantling of capitalist social relations of 
production which currently dominate humans’ relationships to the environment 
in producing their livelihoods. The metabolic restoration means we have to 
localise production and consumption and limit consumption to what the local 
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biosphere can support, with a continual cycle of replenishment of the 
biological basis of production. The capitalist social relations of production 
need to be transformed into social relations of production that are collective, 
co-operative and non-exploitative of either humans or nature. Of particular 
importance is the dis-alienation of humans in the relations of production 
(Burkett 2006: 88). Thus, just as Keynesian reforms cannot address the very 
basic faults at the root of the capitalist economy, environmentalism that is not 
grounded in an understanding of the social relations of production and class 
analysis cannot solve the contradictions in capitalism that have given rise to 
global warming and the various other crises of capitalism. 
 
The need is for human societies to live within metabolic cycles – that is, 
production, consumption and waste – thereby forming part of a self-sustaining 
cycle in which the only new inputs are energy from the sun. There can be no 
separation between city and country – both supporting ecologically sustainable 
agricultures to feed the local population. If production is localised and set 
within the confines of local and regional ecological imperatives, the 
imperatives relating to the ability of the elements of the biosphere to reproduce 
themselves and to absorb the wastes from production as part of a sustainable 
cycle of life are likely to be addressed. Thus this principle of metabolic 
restoration is founded on a need for humans, in producing their livelihoods, to 
re-establish their relationships to the land/biosphere, their need to care for, to 
rebuild and restore the health of the land to allow it to sustain them and to help 
to restore the health of the biosphere. There is a major change in perception 
here. The land is the font of life, integral to human survival and wellbeing. The 
status of food production will be elevated in accordance with its fundamental 
importance and sovereignty to the community. (I return to food production 
below under the third principle). 
 
What this amounts to is that any new economy will treat a community’s, 
region’s or country’s regenerative bio-capacity as a priority and as its wealth 
base. Biocapacity here refers to the total amount of living matter within a given 
environmental area, irrespective of any definable use purpose by humans. By 
establishing biocapacity as the basis of wealth, there is thereby established the 
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foundation for human relationships with the environment and in turn how 
humans will produce their means of living. Wealth itself becomes a concept 
that is intrinsic and integral to human wellbeing and, while it has a material 
existence, it is not the alienated material riches that come with capitalist 
accumulation. Thus, the new economics will be a part of a holistic approach to 
the biosphere and social relations, underpinned by the values of conservation, 
futurity, equitable distribution and common property. Thus nature, in the new 
economics, will be recognised as the ultimate source of wealth. 
 
2. Restoration of the Commons 
 
As observed earlier, Lohmann (1999: 13) writes:  
 
[j]ust as in pre-20th century England legal means had to be found or 
invented to allow landowners full private property rights over land and 
forests which would allow them to exclude commoners from sharing their 
pasturage, fuel, and food sources, so exclusionary legal mechanisms are 
now being formulated to give investors private property rights to parcels 
of the atmosphere or of forest or plantation carbon.’ 
 
Lohmann’s description of the commodification of land (but its is also true of 
the atmosphere) breaks humans’ most fundamental relationship – between 
themselves and the environment - from which they produce the means of their 
subsistence and survival. It was also noted in chapter 5  that the gradual 
removal of the dispossessed black population from white farming resonates 
with Marx’s descriptions of the enclosures of the commons and the 
consolidation of landholdings in England in the 16th and 17th centuries. Hence 
the second principle lies in re-establishing the importance of the commons – 
the air, water, sea, rivers, forests and land – which remain outside the realm of 
private property. Here the issue is both global and local. For example at the 
global level, Harcourt (2011: np) writes of the need to think ‘beyond aid and 
charity solutions, beyond disaster scenarios and climate denial and beyond the 
current North-South impasse to talk about the commons we are sharing. 
Citizens living in elite urban enclaves in the North and South need to change 
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ways of life and values in order to stop the selling of land, forests, water and 
land, the destruction of communities, traditions and knowledge.’ 
 
The value placed on the commons in the future would be greatly enhanced with 
the result that they will then be cared for by local communities in custodianship 
for future generations. For example, the rivers, lakes and ocean shores will be 
returned to the commons to be farmed and managed by local communities, 
using appropriate, low scale technologies and community based institutions. As 
Shiva (2002: 20)) writes in the specific context of water as a part of the 
commons:  
 
Throughout history and across the world, water rights have been shaped 
both by the limits of ecosystems and by the needs of people. Water has 
traditionally been treated as a natural right – a right arising out of human 
nature, historic conditions, basic needs, or notions of justice. Water rights 
as natural rights do not originate with the state; they evolve out of a given 
ecological context of human existence. 
 
As Shiva (2002: 21) claims, for thousands of years ‘[r]iparian rights, based on 
concepts of usufructuary rights [i.e. legal rights to use], common property, and 
reasonable use, have guided human settlement all over the world’.  Such rights 
involve notions of responsibility for and sharing and conserving of the 
commons so that it is not diminished.  
 
Where Indigenous communities remain intact and are able to look after forests, 
these forests will be returned to their custodianship.  Land will become 
common land just as the ecology will become common ecology to be taken 
care of by the community. Such a process both changes the social relations of 
production and brings people into direct contact with the land and with nature, 
thus also contributing to overcoming the alienation in the metabolic 
relationship between humans and nature under the capitalist system. Humans 
have to respect and understand the soil and its role in the metabolic connection 
between humans and the environment.  This relationship is very grounding yet 
to my knowledge has been little theorised about, although Karl Polanyi, in The 
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Great Transformation (1944) and quoted in Bellamy Foster (2002: 31) 
captured the centrality of land when he wrote: 
What we call land is an element of nature inexplicably interwoven with 
man’s institutions. To isolate it and form a market out of it was perhaps 
the weirdest of all undertakings of our ancestors ... the economic function 
is but one of many vital functions of land. It invests man’s life with 
stability; it is the site of his habitation; it is a condition of his physical 
safety; it is the landscape and the seasons. We might as well imagine his 
being born without hands and feet as carrying on his life without land. 
And yet to separate land from man and organize society in such a way as 
to satisfy the requirements of a real estate market was a vital part of the 
utopian concept of a market economy. 
 
One can draw parallels between the commodification and marketisation of land 
of yester-year with contemporary policies which, through carbon taxes and 
emission trading schemes, are bringing the atmosphere into the privatised, 
marketised and commodified domain. For future societies the move back to a 
recognition of the importance of the commons provides the basis for building 
healthy co-operative relationships with others who are also engaged in this 
most essential of human activities, i.e. producing for their own subsistence. 
Social relationships are then built on a healthy basis and with a common aim, 
with no artifices, no class divisions and no opportunities for exploitation. 
  
There is little point to private property if there is no capital accumulation. In 
The Right to the Use of the Earth, Herbert Spencer (1851: IX: 1) wrote 
‘[e]quity does not permit property in land, or the rest would live on the earth by 
sufferance only. It is impossible to discover any mode in which land can 
become private property. A claim to the exclusive possession of the soil 
involves land-owning despotism’. Spencer concluded that property belongs to 
the ‘great corporate body’, that is, the whole of society, the commons. New 
institutions need to be created which develop and support the values of 
communitarian life and communal ownership, for the cultivation of citizenship, 
the sense of community, of sharing and belonging. Prior to ‘development’, 
communities preserved their social cement and survival by curtailing personal 
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desires and acquisitiveness, subordinating these to the interests of the common 
good. The values of mutuality, interdependence and reciprocity need to be 
fostered and become again a part of future societies. 
 
3. Ensuring Food Security  
Food security is a predominant concern of all human societies and for this 
reason food sovereignty - the ownership and control over the seeds, the 
planting, caring and maintenance of food growing and preparation - needs to be 
returned to the community. It is also inherently entwined with the maintenance 
of the commons and with stopping the forces driving de-peasantisation. This 
issue will come increasingly to the fore in a global warming world.  Food 
security was defined by the of the World Food Summit (FAO 1996: np) as 
‘when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, 
safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life’.  
 
The study of the marketisation of the economy within South Africa identified 
land grabs and the industrialisation of farming as being critical, transforming 
increasing numbers of rural small holders into the proletarianised unemployed 
without a future,,  as argued in this thesis in relation to the massive process of 
de-peasantisation. 
 
It is also the case as identified earlier that the metabolic rift is today nowhere 
more evident than in the closely linked areas of global warming and food 
security. This is highlighted through the growing control of food by mega 
corporations, the super exploitation of labour involved in food production and 
the depeasantisation and land grabs taking place for food and biofuel 
production and the huge levels of food, and, as Marx saw from Liebig’s work, 
the destruction of soil fertility.  
 
Food security will depend on a whole range of fundamental changes in the 
social relations involved in food production and consumption. Global 
movements such Via Campesina, for example, have been implementing food 
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sovereignty practices, where the real producers of food have control over the 
food economy; that is they have sovereignty over their food production,  thus 
enabling food security. 
 
Food security is one important site at which capitalist and post capitalist 
societies diverge in relation to fossil fuels. It is also a site at which another of 
the contradictions of capitalism is exposed, as decreasing percentages of 
national incomes are attributed to the agricultural sector.  Non-industrial 
agricultural practices have traditionally been and can again be developed to be 
independent of fossil fuels, through adopting metabolic cycles around humans’ 
production of food and their relationship to the land; through growing and 
consuming locally and eating seasonally; and by eliminating the industrial 
scale production of animals and animal products and grain growing. 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest non-industrial farming practices, 
such as permaculture practices, absorb rather than emit carbon (Pretty 2009, 
Pimentel et al. 2009) and sustainable farming practices generally provide ‘a 
range of valued public goods such as clean water, wildlife, and habitats for 
beneficial organisms, carbon sequestration in the soil, flood protection [and] 
groundwater recharge’ (Pretty 2009: 48). 
 
The alternatives to industrialised agriculture are captured under the loose 
heading of ‘sustainable agriculture’ which has numerous expressions - 
biodynamic, permaculture, organic, free range, localised, community based – 
all of which have a broadly common philosophy, that of producing food in a 
manner that is more harmonious with nature. Importantly, and not so often 
emphasised, such food production processes have at their heart particular social 
relations of production which are non-classist and non-hierarchical and in 
which the actors are directly involved in producing their means of survival. 
They are also directly engaged in a symbiotic relationship with the land, the 
soil, the local ecology, the produce they consume and the community of 
producers. The energy used in such productive processes can be, and often is 
human or animal energy, the production of and waste from which are parts of 




For future economies, local community organic agriculture represents an 
important paradigm in food production. This is currently practised in 120 
countries, representing 31 million hectares (ha) of certified croplands and 
pastures plus more difficult-to-quantify, uncertified organic production systems 
of several million small farmers (Scialabba 2007), including Indigenous food 
producers who follow organic principles, even if inadvertently. Urban 
agriculture will be a centrepiece of the transformation to sustainable living. 
Bio-diverse, localised, ecological agriculture will reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions significantly. Furthermore, such practices will improve biodiversity 
and soil quality while reducing the need for water. They are conducive to a 
wide diversity of plants in a small area, providing its farmers/communities with 
a healthy and mixed diet and greater resilience, as, if disease or pests attack 
one plant species, there is more chance that all is not lost. Borrowing from the 
principles of heirloom production, seeds are collected from the best produce, 
further building local resilience and breeding crops suitable to the local 
environment.79 Organic agriculture is premised on humans as custodians of the 
ecology and of the importance of looking after the soil and keeping a high 
humus and healthy soil organism content. Evidence shows healthy soil absorbs 
carbon from the atmosphere (Wightman 2010) and humus rich soil reduces 
water consumption. Most importantly, for global warming, local and 
biologically diverse agriculture can reduce greenhouse gas emissions while at 
the same time improving the security of farmers’ livelihoods and improving the 
quality and nutrition of food. 
  
Such organic agriculture (Pimental et al. 2005, Scialabba 2007) will contribute 
to reduced consumption of fossil fuel energy carbon dioxide emissions (48 – 
60 per cent less, except for very intensive crops, according to Scialabba 2007), 
reduced nitrous dioxide, reduced soil erosion and increased carbon stocks, as 
well as much higher carbon absorption in comparison with conventional 
agriculture. Organic and labour intensive agriculture produces a net carbon 
                                           
 79 This gathering of seed and growing locally produced seed is one of the key principles in heirloom 
vegetable production.  The other is maintaining plant diversity. 
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sink which, as Hallowes (2009) suggests, can transform agriculture and secure 
a fair exchange between the producers and consumers of food in what is a 
critical part of re-orienting the economy to make it more resilient in the face of 
global warming. 
 
4. Community of Producers 
The study of South Africa and its capitalist development model with its 
inexorable dependence on fossil fuels and relentless pursuit of growth reveals 
(as indicated in part II) the consequences of a state dominated by the interests 
of conglomerate capital, with all the resulting aspects of the deepening rift 
between humans and the environment. It exposes the commonalities of 
interests of global elites, the merging of corporate and state interests and the 
significance of power and hegemony in preventing the development of 
metabolically restorative and harmonious communities. It demonstrates the 
distinctive, hegemonic and dangerous power of corporations to society. 
 
This points the way for a new economic system to be built around new social 
relations of production so that the most fundamental relationship - of human 
labour to the environment - will be transformed. The value of labour will be 
intrinsic in the sense that the new economic system will be built around new 
relations of production so that the most fundamental relationship - of human 
labour to the environment - will be transformed. The value of labour will be 
intrinsic in the sense that each human will be directly engaged in his or her 
own means of survival in relation to the land and the producing of goods for 
exchange. Excess value, or surplus value as it became in capitalist societies, 
when created, will become a part of the commons. No one person or 
community will be able to use or accumulate more than their share of the 
biomass. There is thus an overturning of the fundamental principles of 
neoclassical economics - private property and accumulation.80  
 
                                           
80John Locke's treatises on property effectively legitimized the theft of the commons in Europe during 
the enclosure movements of the 17th century. These treatises continue to inform theories and practices 
that erode the commons and destroy the earth. (See Shiva 2002: 25.) 
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The emphasis is on placing the environment at the centre of the value system.  
As Foster and Clark (2009) maintain, there needs to be a broader social and 
ecological conception of wealth and a reconsideration of extrinsic and intrinsic, 
exchange and use values. Marx argued, in relation to use values, that nature 
should not be reduced to a mere commodity.  Quoting Thomas Muntzer, a 
revolutionary leader of the sixteenth century German Peasants War, Marx 
observed that it is intolerable that ‘all creatures have been made into property, 
the fish in the water, the birds in the air, the plants on the earth - all living 
things must also become free’ (Foster and Clark, 2009: np). 
 
Marx (quoted in Muntzer 1988: 335) wanted a society of associated producers 
who would ‘govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, 
bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a 
blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in 
conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature’. At the time of 
writing, he could not have envisaged that the society of associated producers, 
the socialist society he advocated, would spawn varieties of state socialism in a 
large number of states that were antithetical to Marx’s philosophy, and at huge 
cost to many millions of people, and the environment. The state socialism – of 
the former Soviet Union, China, Cambodia, Vietnam and Eastern Europe – is 
clearly not the alternative model being proposed in this thesis for the future. It 
is noteworthy that the terms ‘socialism’ and ‘communism’ have become 
problematical because of their historical baggage. The damage these state 
socialist regimes have done to Marxism is very great indeed and the 
triumphalism of the capitalist west in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall 
was no time for a reasoned assessment of state socialism versus Marxist ideals. 
 
A possible parallel here could be the various interpretations which have been 
placed on the Christian Bible and which have never been used to justify the 
Inquisition, the Crusades or, more recently, the activities of right wing 
Phalangists81 in Lebanon, all brutal and extremist, built on what appear to be 
readings from the Bible which others interpret as a philosophy of peace, 
                                           
81 Christian fundamentalists 
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pacifism, love and understanding. Yet interestingly there has not been the same 
ridiculing nor condemnation of the Christian church in the wake of its many 
sins, as there has been of Marxism in the wake of its undeniably horrific 
transgressions during the 20th century.  
 
Transforming to a society of associated producers from a capitalist society, in which 
humans have been inculcated with the behaviours and values of competitiveness, 
material acquisitiveness, individualism and selfishness will be a high-risk venture. 
As argued in this thesis, however, transform we must. Building social solidarity 
amongst people and developing utopian visions and idealised values as possibilities 
for the future are central. We need philosophers, dreamers and utopians as never 
before to sketch and legitimise visions of just and good societies. 
 
5.  Contracted No-growth Economies  
 
As identified in part III, the significance of class to global warming is profound.   In 
the specific context of South Africa and in turn Africa, as Satgar (2009: 52) writes 
and as already noted  in Chapter 8, there has been a ‘further deepening [of] Africa’s 
integration into the global political economy’ which is being mediated by class 
interests, in particular the role of a transnational faction of the African ruling class. 
This is expressed through the maintenance of a neoliberal economy, the growing gap 
in wealth and security between those who benefit and those who carry the burdens of 
capitalist development. 
 
Foster et al. (2010) argue that under capitalism the overexploitation of nature’s 
resource taps and waste sinks has reached the point where both are negatively 
impacted, affecting the climate and the biosphere itself. They thus point to the need 
for economic regime change, with an end to economic growth. 
 
Thus building on the evidence in this thesis that human production and consumption 
have gone beyond what the planet can support (Simms and Johnson 2010),82 future 
societies will have to be built on contracted, no-growth economies. That means an 
                                           
82 If the whole world wished to consume at the same rate as the industrialised nations, it would 
require 3.4 planets like Earth. 
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end to capital accumulation, economic growth and private property; in essence, an 
end to capitalism. The current rate of growth of global production and consumption 
has not only to fall; global production must contract – and sufficiently to allow for 
any population growth in the future - and be equitably redistributed within the 
constraints laid out above. The simplicity principle, that is the way of life to live with 
less, will have to prevail. Under capitalism, no growth means social collapse, mass 
unemployment, poverty, homelessness, civil unrest, foreclosures of housing, schools 
and other public services,   and instability. Transformation from the capitalist system 
is thus fraught with dangers if that transformation is not planned and organised. 
However, under the new community-based metabolically restorative economies, 
advocates such as Hopkins (2009) and Holmgren (2009) see the new community-
based structures as promising positive alternatives to what we have in society today. 
Hopkins (2009: 21) writes that this transformed future ‘offers the potential for a 
society which is better in many ways, more connected to nature, healthier, with more 
meaningful work, access to nutritious food, enhanced social capital and more 
cooperation’. 
  
6.  Equity, Ecological Debt and Redistribution 
 
It was concluded in Chapter 8 that ‘South Africa needs to democratise its 
institutions, de-globalise, de-commodify, nationalise and redistribute its 
wealth, overthrow its social relations of production and become a good 
neighbour on the African continent, supporting sustainable, equitable and 
inclusive human development for all’. Most fundamental here in terms of 
tangible outcomes is the question of redistribution.   
 
The sixth principle is thus one based essentially on the notion that each person 
is entitled to an equitable share of the Earth’s biomass, including adjustment 
for the historical distortion of wealth distribution. Whereas within the capitalist 
system, Marx saw redistribution as merely a palliative mechanism, 
redistribution in the new paradigm will be an adjustment for inequities caused 
by colonialism. In the new economies the nature and function of distribution 
will be clearly different from distribution in neoclassical economics which is 
based on the notion of profit maximisation. There is no profit to maximise but 
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a surplus to be distributed and this is to be done by the community to the 
community. There is no individual utility to be maximised but instead 
community wellbeing to be achieved through, amongst other things, principles 
of equity and fairness of distribution. This means that contrary to what happens 
in neoclassical economics, where the supply side and the demand side are in 
theory at least, completely separate, here the community is both producer and 
consumer, both collectively and in the full recognition of the finite nature of 
the biosphere. 
 
Crucially here and at the heart of the new societies is the question of what is 
meant by just or fair. To examine this however there is a need first to 
acknowledge that a central tenet of capitalism is a supposed freedom of choice 
and the idea that the individual is able to use his or her autonomy to decide 
what he or she wants and does so in such a way as to maximise their utility. 
This is neoclassical economics’ so-called consumer’s sovereignty. This is the 
freedom that is at the centre of neoclassical economics, freedom of enterprise, 
freedom of choice, free trade and so on. As Stanlake and Grant (1995: 19) state 
the ‘freedom of consumer choice is usually held to be the most important of 
these economic ‘freedoms’. The consumer is regarded as being sovereign since 
it is the ways in which he chooses to spend his income which determine the 
ways in which society uses its economic resources’.  
 
In the new societies individual consumer sovereignty will be severely 
constrained within principles established by the community.  As Joan Robinson 
(1972: 274), one of the most eminent economists of the 20th century, argued 
‘[n]o-one who has lived in the capitalist world is deceived by the pretence that 
the market system ensures consumer’s sovereignty’. Robinson (1972: 274) 
states: ‘[t]he true moral to be drawn from capitalist experience is that 
production will never be responsive to consumer needs as long as the initiative 
lies with the producer.’ Nor can there be consumer’s sovereignty when three 
fifths of the world’s population live in poverty, that is, the poor’s existential 
reality is that they cannot consume what they want, for many, even of the most 
basic of survival necessities. Furthermore, the very concept of ‘consumer’ is a 
concept of capitalism which will be replaced in future sustainable societies by 
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critically conscientised citizens whose concerns will not just be in seeking 
sustenance and shelter from the environment, but in nurturing and being 
custodians of the environment. 
 
This does not mean there will be no differences in individual preferences but 
what is available and in what overall quantities will be determined by the 
community. Each person will contribute to the community and each will be 
entitled to consume only their fair and just quantity of goods, including food, 
clothing and shelter. What is fair and just is determined by one’s ecological 
footprint entitlement and one’s biological needs. This is fundamentally 
different to current capitalist society where those with the highest 
incomes/wealth accumulation and thus entitled to the greatest ecological 
footprints are in many cases not those who contribute most to the wider society 
– the high-fliers in the financial and banking sectors and the owners and CEOs 
of major environmentally destructive mining conglomerates. 
The concept of ecological debt repayment is relevant since the question of 
from what point societies begin their transition cannot ignore the past. It can be 
argued that the whole history of capitalism provides an account of the 
development of the gross inequalities that exist on the planet now.  
 
While the concept of ecological debt has yet to be operationalised, it played a 
significant role at the United Nations Earth Summit in 1992 (see section 3.3) in 
that it was proposed that the external debt of the South be swapped for the 
region’s ecological and social losses derived from colonialism and past 
exploitative foreign investments. It has become a guiding principle amongst 
climate justice movements, especially those from the South. It can be used both 
conceptually and eventually to assist quantification in reassessing relations 
between the classes, the rich and the poor, the colonised and colonisers and in 
finding solutions to such issues as Third World debt, climate justice and access 
to the atmospheric commons. It can place the global warming crisis in a 
historical context once it is accepted that such a context is necessary in finding 
just solutions to global warming. Most fundamentally it can be used to address 
the problems faced by the atmospheric commons which will be exhausted as a 
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carbon sink, perhaps in less than 10 years. There need to be equitable rights to 
this sink but taking due account of the way in which it has been used to date 
and crucially by whom i.e. the industrialised countries. 
 
There is thus a strong moral compunction for the repayment of ecological debt 
by those who have exploited the biosphere in the past. These repayments can 
then be used to pay for the transition to new sustainable societies. There is no 
institution however currently in existence to unravel and enforce such debt 
repayment. Current international institutions seem only to exacerbate the 
problem. That needs to change.  
 
7. Real Participatory Democracy  
In chapters 6 and 7, with respect to the power of the energy sectors and their 
entwinement with the state, it became clear that these represent a threat to the fragile 
democracy that is South Africa today. As Fig (2007) argues, that power is significant 
in driving macroeconomic policy on the continent. It is a major influence on global 
warming and on the prospects for South Africa getting to grips (or failing to get to 
grips) with global warming. The ‘democracy‘ that emerged after 1994 and is 
supposedly enshrined in the constitution is exposed as a sham. What it reveals and 
this is by no means unique to South Africa is the need for a more genuine form of 
democracy which involves citizen participation and the removal of power structures 
based on class.  
 
 
There is thus a need to ensure that economies of the future will be democratic 
but a thick form of democracy and not as Galbraith (1996: 8) has described 
current US democracy as ‘the democracy of the fortunate’. As Wright (2010: 
367) suggests, the key to ‘realizing radical democratic egalitarian conceptions 
of social and political justice requires social empowerment over the economy’. 
Significantly, as is argued in this thesis, such social empowerment (Wright 
2010: 368) ‘is not restricted to meaningful democratic control of the state; it 




One consequence of these new economies and communities will be that there 
will no longer be such inequitable purchasing powers as currently and social 
status will not be derived from one’s material accumulations. Such shifts will 
result in benefits not only for everyone’s health and wellbeing (see Wilkinson 
and Pickett 2009) but will enable societies and communities to reflect more 
genuinely the will of the people in total. Economies of the future will be driven 
by ecological and social principles.  
 
Such principles require that there will be considerable decentralisation, scaling 
down and localisation of economic activities. This will entail a large degree of 
de-industrialisation and reduced energy consumption as non-essential goods 
and services are removed from the economy. Addressing this energy descent, 
de-industrialisation and the contraction in production will require a transition 
to more labour intensive technologies and productive practices. While labour 
intensive will be a characteristic of production, people in future societies will 
also have more free time, as there will be fewer goods to produce and the vast 
numbers of currently un- and under-employed people will all be involved in 
the production of food and other essentials. In the new proposed localised 
community-based economies, technologies will not be capital intensive, will be 
developed to meet the specific needs of the local community and will remain 
under the control of the community.  
 
The ideology of progress, so central to capitalism and so intimately associated 
with technological developments, will be replaced by a more simple way of 
living, a sense of security and connection, of dis-alienation and metabolic 
restoration. It is reasonable to anticipate that people’s sense of 
interconnectedness and dependence on the broad ecology and local community 
will have implications for population numbers as people’s security and quality 
of life will depend on maintaining the metabolic balance between humans and 
nature. People will no longer be commodities to be bought and sold as labour, 
but will have a direct relationship to their produce, the fruits of their productive 
processes being theirs to consume or exchange. Community resilience, that is, 
the community’s ability to respond and adapt to situations and self-sufficiency,  
will be enhanced by the localisation of the economy. The economy will thus be 
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based on non-exploitative practices, non-exploitation of land, labour or 
communities; there will be no basis for profit or the commodification of goods 
or services.   
 
12.6 Future research directions 
 
In considering future research directions, let me return to the main research 
objective of the thesis which is embodied in the question ‘Can capitalism solve 
the problem of global warming?’. I have attempted to answer this within the 
thesis, although clearly more work can and should be done on various facets of 
this. 
 
Beyond that there are six sub objectives to this thesis. Let me set these out 
again, identifying where I see future research being needed before going to 
some broader research considerations that the thesis has thrown up. 
 
1. To place the discussion of global warming into a critical theoretical context, 
emphasising the importance of the distinction between critical theory and 
positivism.  
 
The thesis has demonstrated that, in terms of the political economy of global 
warming, future research needs to be bedded in critical theory, critical 
education and in international solidarity with climate justice groups. The 
‘people’ as citizens are in many respects ahead of their governments (and 
research institutions) in wanting action on climate change. Research is needed 
on how to harness that and get governments and global institutions to act. 
   
Most of the research on global warming is within the positivist framework. 
This means, as the thesis has argued, that there is a major lacuna in 
understanding and action around global warming. In the main body of the 
thesis, I have revealed these gaps in research are substantial. It follows that 
there is a major body of research using critical theory waiting to be done. It is 
perhaps significant that, based on my experience with the ‘microcosm’ of 
South Africa, the extent to which these issues are being researched in that 
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country is markedly greater, than for example, in Australia. There is a research 
project waiting to be done to analyse why there is such a relative poverty of 
research using critical theory and methodologies in countries like Australia. 
 
2. To summarise what the science is saying about global warming and the 
health of the biosphere. 
 
This is already well researched. 
 
3. To document and outline some of the key criticisms of neoliberal 
solutions to global warming. 
 
The thesis has sought to do this within the confines of a PhD. More research is 
needed on this front. Perhaps where it is most needed is in how best to get 
across to governments and people that the oft proposed neoliberal solutions to 
global warming will not work and why this is the case. 
 
4. To present a microcosm of the globalised capitalist system from the 
perspective of political economy. The microcosm selected is South 
Africa. 
  
There is already considerable rich research on this. This is not a priority area 
for future research. 
 
5. To provide a Marxist theoretical framework for criticism of aspects of 
capitalism selected for their relevance to global warming. 
 
I have found that the revival of research on Marx and Marxism in recent years 
is most welcome on a number of fronts. Yet having said that, I have established 
what literature does exist in this area with respect to global warming, while 
most helpful and of very high quality, is limited to perhaps ten names and to 
the more radical journals. That needs to change. Thus research within the 
Marxist theoretical framework specifically on global warming does need 
extension. This to me is a key area for future research. The thesis has also 
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sought to demonstrate that research needs to focus on how to save the planet. 
The message of the thesis is that that cannot be done under capitalism and yet 
the existing climate of denialism prevents that being acknowledged in a 
number of research institutions.  
 
6. To develop alternative core social, political and economic principles 
compatible with a diversity of just and sustainable futures.   
 
In looking to the future, to societies which might be based on these principles, 
it is necessary to research into what is needed to help to get us there. With 
respect to research on the political economy of global warming, what the thesis 
has shown is that any such research needs to accept that there is very little time 
left before irreversible tipping points are passed and humanity is on a global 
warming trajectory over which we no longer have any control. 
  
More generally and stepping back from these immediate more empirical and 
policy concerns, there needs to be research on how to address the ideological 
hegemony which supports the distortion of priorities of saving capitalism at the 
expense of the planet.  The principles set out in this thesis need to be developed 
further with more empirical flesh put on these, still rather delicate bones.  
 
The most important research question however lies in how to bring about 
transformative change. The existing literature is scant on this. Answering this 
question of transformative change - which I see as a political economy 
question but has so many dimensions including ideological, economic, 
political, cultural and anthropological as well – is where the major research 
focus needs to be. How to bring about transformative change in the time frame 
available is the big question. 
 
The possible sites for further research are manifold, if we are to transform 
society to one that is metabolically restorative and in equilibrium with nature. 
Much of the knowledge needed for living in harmony with nature is already 
known and available. The critical blocking point is the hegemonic nature of 
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capitalist ideology and the vested powerful interests which converge to protect 
the status quo. 
  
Other areas for further research include the myriad of crises arising from the 
capitalist system and how these will increasingly compound and intersect with 
each other; how the financialisation of the economy is linked to growing 
poverty, insecurity and inequality; how the capitalist model of development is 
disenfranchising and proletarianising small scale farmers in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America; and how food security and food sovereignty are being 
threatened by conglomerate ownership, regulation and control. There is a case 
for more research on operationalising the concept of the ecological footprint 
and ecological debt; and on how to get the governments, communities and 
people of the North to accept a fair share of responsibility for refugees and 
displaced people. There needs to be more critical evaluation of arguments that 
technology alone can provide a solution to global warming. 
 
12.7   Conclusion 
The new societies and economies will be built on the principles of the 
centrality of the local community, restoration of the commons (land, water, air 
– the biosphere), metabolic restoration, equity and justice. Humans and hence 
labour are a part of nature, but when the social relations of production are 
alienated and exploitative, the ruling class exploits not just the workers who 
work nature; they exploit nature as well, extracting profit from nature. In the 
new post-capitalist economies, there can be no capitalists, no dominant class. 
Conversely, there can be no alienated labour, there will be no labour which is 
working without care for nature’s nurturance and health. Then labour, which is 
producing food from the soil, will form a restorative, metabolic relationship 
with the soil; will come to know the soil; will understand how it works; what it 
needs to be healthy, full of the life-giving microbes and part of a healthy 
carbon cycle; how the metabolic cycle of growing, composting, replenishing 
the soil for what it has produced; and that, in this process of producing 
humans’ livelihood and food security, will acknowledge that this underpins the 
relationship between humans and nature.  As such this human/nature 
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relationship will overcome the alienation found in the various levels of social 
relations between humans and between humans and nature in existing capitalist 
societies. 
 
In the new community-based systems, where property is community 
controlled, there will be no capacity (or motivation) for accumulation. This is 
compatible with the metabolic relationship between humans and the biosphere. 
Humanity’s common resources will be for the benefit of all.  The potential to 
accumulate more than one’s biomass entitlement is removed and any surplus is 
for the benefit of the community. The detail and practice of how this will work 
remain to be addressed. The thesis stops at setting out the requirements but 
each human being will have a need to have their caloric, shelter, water, social 
and cultural needs met within the confines of biosphere capacity.  
 
Harvey (2001: 61) writes that the definition of scarcity is ‘inextricably social 
and cultural in origin. Scarcity presupposes certain social ends, and it is these 
that define scarcity just as much as the lack of natural means to accomplish 
these ends’. He continues that ‘[s]carcity is in fact necessary to the survival of 
the capitalist mode of production’ (2001: 61). In the new society the ideology 
around resources is different. It is based on the concept of sufficiency and 
maintaining the biosphere’s health through the ethos of custodianship. 
  
It is thus proposed that these principles – this constitution to use Vanberg’s 
(1994) term - form the basis for the organisation of future societies so that such 
societies are sustainable, just and equitable. They also represent propositions to 
consider in showing that other ways of living are not only possible but may 
bring greater meaning and purpose to society and help lay the foundation for a 
future for humankind, very possibly even a better future. I have not included 
negative principles, such as there will be no armaments, no warfare, no space 
travel and so on, as the economic fundamentals of future societies will not 
support, nor have the motivation, for such, what will be then, anti-social 
activities. The world is in desperate need of utopian and radical visions without 
which there is little chance of redirecting the current course of human history. 
In proposing these principles, I have attempted to bring together the constraints 
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facing the planet as spelt out in section 12.3 and a set of principles (in section 
12.4) to underpin the social organisation of human societies around that most 
important relationship of all, how humans organise their social relations in 
meeting their physical needs from the environment, that is, the way societies 
support and perpetuate themselves. Bringing all of this together is the crux of 
any successful endeavour to address the practical and theoretical problems of 
global warming (as discussed in parts II and III) where humans both act upon 
and are part of the environment in securing their livelihoods and that of future 
generations. 
 
This part of the thesis has also identified a number of key principles in 
designing a blueprint for future societies, beginning with an acknowledgement 
of the enormous diversity of peoples, geographies, cultures, social and 
economic systems - a diversity which is currently ‘being swept away, crushed 
under the homogenizing heel of the circulation and accumulation of capital’ 
(Harvey 2001: 119).  For that diversity to be maintained and fostered is 
essential to the quality of life of future societies. The hope has to be that the 
human species has a sufficiently deep sense of connection and commitment to 
enable it to build on a commonality in finding solutions to our universal desire 
for survival.   
 
Finally in this chapter I have sought to indicate what research on the political 
economy of global warming needs to be done to guide humanity for the future. 
In doing so I have emphasised that, according to the findings of this thesis, 
there is no longer a need to research into the problems created by capitalism. 
The urgent research tasks are how to move to that post capitalist world and 









This thesis has sought to address the question of whether capitalism can solve 
the problem of global warming. This is a question of particular relevance in the 
West where, despite what the science is telling us about global warming, the 
dominant institutions of capitalism remain largely unchallenged in any 
transformative sense. This whole thesis has enunciated very clearly that 
capitalism cannot solve the problems of global warming. Capitalism has 
created the problem of global warming. While in so many quarters and so 
many countries and so many global international institutions there has been a 
continuing hope that capitalism might provide the answer, this thesis responds 
to this question with a resounding no. Such a response may well be provocative 
to many in the West who are used to seeing the world through the 
epistemological framework of capitalism.  
 
The methodology adopted as set out in section 1.3 is that of political economy, 
using critical theory and drawing quite heavily on Marxist theory. It was 
highlighted that one of the major problems in finding an effective solution to 
global warming is that the hegemonic nature of capitalism over the last 400 
years has blinded us from being able to evaluate critically the political and 
economic framework in which we in the West are embedded. To address this 
problem, this part of the thesis first turned to why critical theory is important in 
seeking to understand phenomena such as global warming. It was emphasised 
that these phenomena arise from particular social relations of production and a 
particular political economy and ideology (that is, capitalism) which have 
become increasingly hegemonic over the last century. 
  
Also in that first part of the thesis, it was indicated that not only is the evidence 
of global warming irrefutable and the consequences both imminent and on a 
global scale but, due to the non-linear nature of the phenomenon and the 
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amplifying effect of tipping points, we are at a critical point in the global 
warming process where we have to decide whether to continue with the 
capitalist system or undergo radical, revolutionary systemic change to just and 
sustainable political economy systems. The most optimistic assessment of the 
science is that, at the very least, the planet is on red alert. We have now 
reached the stage in the history of the planet’s ecology whereby capitalism’s 
appetite for resources and its production of waste threaten the survival of 
humanity and other species. This ecological crisis, if not addressed 
immediately, will be terminal; it could result in the extermination of most 
species on the planet, including humans. 
  
What the science is telling us about global warming is both simple in its over-
riding message and complex in its detail. There are powerful vested interests 
able to take advantage of the latter, obfuscating both the messages from the 
science and the urgency of these messages, and promoting denialism, 
skepticism and delays in action. 
 
Predominantly, there is acknowledgement that anthropogenically-caused global 
warming is taking place and neoliberal institutions have come up with market, 
biological and technical solutions to address global warming. The solutions, 
however, are all based on the non-negotiable premise of maintaining the 
political economy status quo of global and national economies, of continually 
growing economies and the impossible promise of progress and prosperity for 
all. Yet this same economic system has impacted adversely on the ecology of 
the planet since the beginning of the industrial revolution. Within the capitalist 
system, those who hold power take a deductive, compartmentalised view of 
global warming, treating it as solvable through the mechanisms of capitalism: 
the market, market-driven technologies and biofuels. The first part of the thesis 
provided a criticism of these solutions, arguing they were dangerous 
distractions in that not only would they not solve the problem; they have the 
potential to exacerbate it and to delay the effective actions urgently required. It 
was concluded that neoliberal views of global warming framed the problem 
incorrectly, de-contextualising it from the very history and political economy 
which have given rise to it. These ‘solutions’ would add to economic growth, 
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with such growth being particularly strong in those parts of the economy which 
both service the rich and are most carbon emission polluting.  Thus I have 
argued for example that taxing fossil fuels is not a deterrent (to consumption) 
for the richest stratum of global society. That stratum is in essence so rich and 
has such a massive disproportionate share of total income - and in turn 
consumption - that even substantial price increases would do little to shift its 
consumption patterns away from its current fossil fuel dependence (Kapur et 
al. 2006).   
 
An early and crucial point in the research on this thesis situated global 
warming within a wider context, comprising the many problems arising from 
global capitalism. The thesis argued that, when the issue of global warming is 
combined more generally with the evidence of the destructiveness of 
capitalism on the environment and society, single-issue, deductive solutions 
can better be understood with respect to their ineffectiveness and 
inappropriateness. This myriad of problems includes: declining biodiversity 
and the disappearance of species; the increasing fragility of ecological sub-
systems; the crises facing the majority of the world’s rivers and lakes, 
desertification, deforestation, salination, soil erosion, and the pollution of land, 
sea and air and the acidification of the oceans; the continuing disappearance of 
whole languages and cultures; food and water crises  (which are both socially 
constructed and a result of changing biospheric conditions); the ecological 
overshoot which is occurring earlier and earlier each year, as we consume the 
planet’s biospheric resources faster than they are being regenerated; peak oil; 
and more. These crises are compounded by a profound and growing global 
inequality and cultural homogenisation. Most recently, the global financial 
crisis – the crisis of capitalism itself - has been attended by a further transfer of 
wealth from the public arena to the private, and hence to the rich. All of these 
crises arise out of the same global social relations of production.  The thesis 
thus argues, indeed takes it modus operandi, from the fact that global warming 
is but one of the many manifestations of the problems of the capitalist system – 
and global warming cannot be solved without systemically tackling the 




However, because of the hegemony of capitalism and the proposed solutions to 
global warming, I have examined these but with most emphasis on criticising 
market approaches since these are most favoured in current policy debates. I 
have provided evidence and argument refuting the efficacy of such solutions. 
This, along with the urgency and incontrovertibility of global warming 
evidence, underpinned the whole approach of the thesis. 
The first part of the thesis also concluded that, while renewable technologies 
such as wind and solar have an important role to play, they could at best meet 
only a small part of the energy needs of a capitalist growth economy. This is 
particularly the case given that there is a fossil fuel energy cost, and other 
environmental costs, in providing these technologies, such as in mining and in 
the use of highly polluting rare earths required for their construction. 
Furthermore, renewable energies do not do anything to help to transform the 
social relations needed to tackle global warming even though they have the 
potential for adoption within more equitable and democratic social structures. 
Given the atmosphere is already ‘overloaded’ from carbon dioxide emissions, 
and there is no room left for ‘undeveloped’ countries to lift their impoverished 
populations to an even basic standard of living, it was argued that resources to 
develop renewable energies should be diverted to poor nations.  
 
The thesis further argued that the Copenhagen Accord, drafted by the US, 
China, India, Brazil and South Africa at the conclusion of the 15th Conference 
of Parties of the UNFCCC held in Copenhagen in December 2010, 
encapsulates the failure of international leaders to address global warming in 
any meaningful way, even within the doomed-to-fail terms of capitalist 
political economy. 
 
13.2 South Africa as a microcosm of the global economy 
The empirical side of the thesis focussed on South Africa, chosen for study 
because it represents a microcosm of many aspects of the global economy. 
Additionally it reveals the contradictions of a country being on the front line in 
both facing the consequences of global warming and perpetuating its causes. 
South Africa’s history reveals the deepening of the rift between humans 
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(expressed in terms of class) and between humans and the environment, as it 
traces human development from colonial times through to racialised 
capitalism, followed by neoliberal capitalism, a system which has brought 
deepening inequality in a country that now ranks amongst the most unequal on 
the planet. The South African study looked at the historical development of the 
economy and within that of the South African coal and energy sectors. These 
are inextricably linked with the processes of accumulation and 
impoverishment, expansion and dispossession within South Africa and the 
wider African continent. South Africa exemplifies the socially divisive and 
ecologically destructive forces of capitalism. The study of South Africa 
however also performed the role of allowing me to learn from that global 
microcosm what selective parts of Marxist ecological theory were particularly 
relevant to this thesis.  
 
The South African political elite continues to build on the legacy of poverty, 
inequality and injustice and is an integral part of globalised capitalism, actively 
engaged in taking this model of political economy to the rest of Africa. In this 
capacity, South Africa is a hegemonic nation on the African continent and well 
positioned to influence the destiny of other African nations. The study showed 
how South Africa represents a semi-peripheral nation within the global 
political economy. It has adopted the practices of neoliberal capitalism and 
expanded capitalist social relations into other parts of the African continent. 
The South African study presented a slice of this hegemonic political economy 
through the coal and electricity sectors, providing a view of what constitutes 
electric capitalism at work. It promotes at home, and in other African countries, 
an ethos of capitalist management together with unsustainable development 
structures, disempowering, dispossessing, de-peasantising and proletarianising 
the population. It was concluded that South Africa illustrates Marx’s ecological 
critique of capitalism as a system of ‘unsustainable development rooted in the 
continuing pillage and unceasing exploitation of humans and nature’ (Marx, 
Capital, vol 1, 1976). 
 
The study of South Africa began by looking at the African context of South 
Africa, highlighting the adverse consequences of global warming on this 
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continent which is still reeling from the impacts of colonialism and continuing 
ecological imperialism.  The majority of the one billion Africans have a very 
small ecological footprint, contributing nothing of substance to the global 
ecological crisis. The majority population has already only a fragile foothold 
on survival. It was identified that global warming will impact - is impacting 
already - most heavily on the African continent and this for various reasons: its 
lack of infrastructural supports for the population; poor governance structures; 
the lack of voice in the international arena; and the continuing legacy and 
practice of ecological exploitation by nations and elites at the centre of the 
global economic system.   
It was concluded that anything over a 1.50 C temperature increase in Africa will 
be catastrophic for many Africans as a result of more droughts and more severe 
droughts, expanding deserts, exacerbated water stresses, extreme weather 
events and food insecurity. The majority of Africans are directly dependent on 
the weather for the production of food through the growing of crops, foraging 
in commons areas, seasonal grasses and fruits. The African continent has many 
delicate and niche ecological systems which are vulnerable to climate change. 
It is clear that the disturbance of these niches, through rapid climate change, 
will have far-ranging negative consequences for the larger ecology, including 
humans.   
 
The South African study also outlined the projected population growth of 
Africa and the large and growing numbers of populations living in urban slums 
with no infrastructural support or adaptive capacity. It was predicted that 
global warming has the potential to push many over the brink, causing 
devastating catastrophe for enormous numbers of Africans even early in this 
first half of the 21st century. The study illustrated the power links between 
South Africa and global institutions through a recent World Bank loan to the 
coal-electricity sector. It was concluded that this loan was another example of 
the global elite acting in concert with a national elite against the interests of the 
environment, of the majority South African population and, in a very real 
sense, given that the loan allowed two of what will be amongst the world’s 
largest coal powered stations to be built, against the interests of all Africans in 
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the global warming threatened world. Additionally, the South African study 
provided a vignette of the future of the world’s most vulnerable people, 
refugees. The country is the destiny of many of Africa’s refugee population, 
people who have survived the hazards of trekking across the continent in 
search of a safe haven, to be then subjected to xenophobic attacks by almost as 
vulnerable poor, unemployed South Africans. These are the ‘lost futures’ of 
Africa – a flood of refugees now; with global warming, a tsunami further into 
this century. 
  
In terms of using the South African study to help to develop my theoretical 
framework, this, as it transpired, proved to be most useful to me. I am aware 
that to have the theoretical part of a thesis following the empirical study is 
unusual. My original intention had been to have the study of South Africa as a 
‘case study’ following the theoretical part and exemplifying certain issues from 
the theory. It was, however, as explained earlier (see section 1.1), on reading 
the comment from Samir Amin (1997 np) that South Africa is ‘a kind of 
microcosm of the world capitalist system’ that I could see that to use the study 
of this microcosm to further my understanding of the issues involved would be 
most fruitful when it came to building my theoretical frame. 
  
The key headings in my theory emerged (even if not always under these 
headings) from the South African study: the metabolic rift and the carbon rift; 
alienation (in its various forms); capital accumulation; the role of the state, 
power, and financialisation. More substantially the study of and research on 
South Africa pushed me to accept two key considerations for the thesis. First, 
as I have sought to demonstrate, global warming is best seen as one of a suite 
of problems arising from capitalism and that to see it in isolation is 
conceptually and practically to misinterpret both the problem of global 
warming and the solutions to it. Second, what was then needed was a critique 







13.3 Theory  
Part III of the thesis turned to theoretical issues. It was argued that theory 
matters, particularly if one is to assess critically a system from within.  This 
thesis drew explicitly and heavily on Marxist ecological theory in providing a 
framework for answering the question of whether capitalist institutions could 
solve the problem of global warming. In approaching the theoretical heart of 
the thesis, I argued that it was particularly important to establish the 
significance of Marxist theory in discussing such      a complex, historically, 
and ideologically anchored issue as global warming. This is primarily in 
juxtaposition to the fact that global warming is too often elsewhere being 
conceptualised in isolated and normative terms as a market failure, requiring 
market or neoliberal solutions. 
  
Having provided argument and evidence of why neoliberal institutions cannot 
solve the problem of global warming, the thesis examined first of all the 
paradigmatic frameworks within which global warming has been 
contextualised. What is immediately striking from much of the literature on 
global warming is how a-theoretical it is and how unquestioning it is of the 
wider political economy context. In other words, a covert ideological position – 
that of the hegemonic status quo – forms the conceptual context of much 
(global warming) literature and mainstream political discussion, including the 
arenas of sustainability policy and politics.  Challenging this conceptualisation 
is central to the thesis and marks the importance of theory and methodology to 
the thesis, in its analysis and in its conclusions.  
 
The critique of capitalism presented was both broad and selective. It had to be 
broad to capture the essential ingredients of capitalism: growth, social relations 
of production, the metabolic rift, the carbon rift, alienation, institutions such as 
states and markets but also particular features of neoliberal capitalism, 
financialisation and the rise and power of corporations. These aspects of the 
theoretical criticism of capitalism emphasised focal points to illustrate the 
argument that capitalism is not sustainable and cannot support an effective 
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solution to global warming. It had to be selective to retain the ideas at a 
manageable length.  
 
Central to the whole thesis is the realisation and demonstration that this system 
of political economy is not only the context in which global warming has 
arisen; it is the cause of global warming. This phenomenon has occurred as a 
direct result of the insatiable appetite of fossil-fuelled economic activity for 
more and more resources which pollute the planet with more and more waste 
products, and the atmosphere with various greenhouse gases.  
 
Once the theoretical conceptual basis of the thesis was laid out, I moved to 
examine significant components of the global capitalist system to understand 
and critique that system and show how its structures precluded not only 
effective action on global warming, but also more generally the possibility of a 
sustainable model of human development. In this section I drew on Marx and 
Marxist writings to give a historical materialist account of global warming, 
arguing that it was a product of the social relations of production and the 
processes of accumulation and expansion of capital. Marx built this part of his 
more general critique around the notions of primitive accumulation and the 
expropriation of the commons (the privatisation of land, forests, water, air) and 
hence the expropriation and dispossession of the people and their means of 
subsistence. Here, as was identified, is the foundation for the capitalist 
relations of production and capital accumulation. It is this capitalist imperative 
to accumulate and to grow that allowed the major conclusion of the thesis: that 
no reform of the capitalist system will ever enable it to be sustainable. 
 
The centre-piece of the theoretical chapters however was around the concept of 
the metabolic rift, the rift caused by the systemic separation of humans from 
the environment in the fundamental relationship of humans’ producing their 
livelihoods. The thesis argued that it is at this point that the rift, which has led 
to global warming and the myriad of other environmental problems, has its 
basis. This represents the breaking of the natural organic metabolism between 
human beings and nature. The thesis has argued that it is this metabolic rift 
which is the crux of the ecological critique of capitalism as an unsustainable 
 
321 
model of political economy.  This rift constitutes two parts. There is the 
material rift between humans and the environment (of which humans of course 
are a part), between town and country and, as capitalism expanded, between 
coloniser and colonised. Secondly there is the rift in social relations between 
the owners of the means of production and labour. This latter division in social 
relations is captured by the notion of the class divide, between the owners of 
the means of production and alienated labour. Today, alienated labour includes 
the growing pool of unemployed and dispossessed from any form of adequate 
means of survival. 
 
The thesis has argued that by understanding Marx’s analysis of humans’ 
metabolic relationship with the broad ecology and the disjuncture which occurs 
as a result of the capitalist exploitative relations of production, we can gain a 
deep and thorough understanding of the structural basis of environmental 
problems including global warming. Thus the historical materialist theory of 
the metabolic rift and the centrality of fossil fuels to capitalist production give 
a very clear and comprehensive account of the causative relationship between 
capitalism and global warming. The metabolic rift which occurred in the 
transformation from feudal to capitalist agriculture in England continues to 
spread and deepen today with the expansion of the capitalist system. As the 
thesis has exposed, the plunder which occurred during the colonial era is 
maintained in many forms, through the unregulated flow of capital from the 
periphery to the centre, through the expansion and activities of industrial and 
financial conglomerates and agribusinesses in peripheral countries, through 
land grabs and, most recently, through neoliberal solutions to global warming 
such as using the Clean Development Mechanisms and Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) offsetting schemes. (For a 
discussion on global land grabs see Harcourt 2011.) Such plundering of 
peripheral nations and peoples continues the historical process of dispossessing 
people of their lands and bringing social and ecological destruction in its wake. 
This de-peasantisation and its corollary, the proletarianisation of the periphery, 
is particularly common throughout the African continent, with South African 
history and contemporary South African political and economic activities 




This thesis also argued that the rift between centre and periphery has today two 
very broad spatial configurations. First is the centre-periphery divide, with the 
centre being the nexus of power and wealth held by the U.S., Europe and Japan 
(with China rising) triangle, with resources and wealth flowing from the South 
(Africa, Asia, South America) back to the centre, the centre being not so much 
a geographic location as a centre of accumulation, wealth and power. The 
second is the division within nation states between the powerful and wealthy 
elites and the majority of the populations, many of whom constitute the 
exploited and unemployed. Elites the world over have a commonality of 
purpose that binds them together on the macro structural arrangements in the 
globalisation process, constituting in effect a global plutocracy.  It was argued 
that in the face of global warming, this plutocracy has no interest in supporting 
or leading transformational change that would bring about a sustainable global 
economy as it would necessarily bring to an end their power and wealth. It is 
this plutocracy which dominates the global institutions such as the IMF, the 
World Bank and the WTO.  This is the same elite who oversaw the transfer of 
enormous public wealth to the private pockets of the already rich during the 
economic crisis of 2008-2009, a crisis which continues to afflict the global 
majority into 2010/2011. This is the same elites who in turn dominated the 
Kyoto climate change negotiations.  
 
The thesis has argued that it is the deliberate efforts of this elite to have global 
warming perceived as an isolated problem which has been a major factor in 
helping to obfuscate both its causes and solutions and to prevent it from being 
conceptualised as a systemic problem. A central finding of the thesis has been 
that both governments’ inaction and neoliberal approaches to solving global 
warming are to a large extent a rational outcome of a positivist hegemonic 
framework for conceptualising the world and global warming. Beyond this, 
neoliberal responses to global warming are little more than a form of denialism 
of the systemic causes of global warming, driven by global elite whose 





13.4 A new world order? 
From the critique of capitalism (in relation to global warming), the thesis 
turned to solutions. These, it was argued, necessarily require systemic 
transformational change. The thesis has shown that the momentum of 
capitalism is great, with considerable ability to adapt, absorb and reconfigure 
and to turn obstacles into profitable opportunities but all the time expanding 
and increasing the consumption of material resources from nature. It has been 
demonstrated that we are coming to a time in human history which marks the 
end of an epoch – the Holocene Epoch of the last 12,000 years, the geological 
period within which human civilisation has developed - when the Earth’s 
biosphere has been conducive to supporting the flourishing of the human 
species. Anthropogenic global warming threatens to end this period. 
   
It is not to date so much global warming, but the growing poverty in the face of 
growing riches, the disappearance of commons, the loss of lands and 
livelihoods as capitalism expands, that is resulting in increasing numbers of 
people having little to lose in changing the system (Narain 2011). As Foster et 
al. (2010: 439) write, ‘the main force for ecological revolution stems from 
movements in the global South, marked for example, by the growth of the Via 
Campesina movement, socialist organisations like Brazil’s MST, and ongoing 
revolutions in Latin America (the ALBA countries) and Asia (Nepal)’. The 
thesis also identified as relevant here the movements that come under the 
banner of the World Social Forum, a forum of particular significance to 
African social and environmental justice groups which lack the visibility of 
some of their Latin American counterparts. I have argued that the most likely 
agents for change are to be found in the poor majority populations of the 
developing countries, thus endorsing the view of Foster et al. (2010: 440) that 
‘it is conceivable that the main historic agent and initiator of a new epoch of 
ecological revolution is to be found in the Third World masses most directly in 
line to be hit first by the impending disasters.’  
 
It is however unrealistic to conclude as Foster et al. (2010: 440) would want to 
do that the ‘weight of environmental disaster is such that it would cross all 
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class lines and all nations and positions  leading to a rejection of the engine of 
destruction in which we live’. Nearly twenty million people were affected by 
devastating floods in Pakistan in August 2010 – and the world stood by; Haiti 
lost more than 200,000 people in an earthquake at the beginning of 2010 and a 
year later people are still living without water, toilets, shelter and adequate 
food and dying from cholera while U.S. business interests maintain a system 
which continues to impoverish and disenfranchise the people of Haiti (Field 
and Bell 2010).  
 
Solutions to global warming will have to address the gamut of related social 
and environmental problems arising from capitalism, at the same time as 
tackling global warming. The criticisms of capitalism used in the thesis are 
based primarily on the work of Marx. It is noted, however, that neither Marx, 
nor Engels, provided a detailed blueprint for future society. However, their 
vision does allow the thesis to develop on the basis of the principle of 
sustainable human development, drawing on metabolically restorative 
processes and the dis-alienation of the social relations of production. It is 
argued that justice and equity will have to prevail as foundational principles for 
future global society and this will necessarily be expressed through various 
institutional and cultural arrangements. These principles will, among other 
things, mean the issue of rights to future carbon emissions and historical 
ecological debt will have to be resolved, taking into account historical 
emissions and involving the contraction and convergence of carbon emissions 
globally. Future societies will need to build their economies on equitable 
ecological footprints within the restorative capacities of the Earth’s biosphere. 
 
It was argued that the struggle for a metabolically restorative and dis-alienated 
sustainable world will be violently resisted by vested class interests. The 
struggle to bring about solidarity amongst the impoverished, fragmented, 
alienated and exploited class alone will be a major undertaking but it is here 
that hopes lie. Samir Amin (2011) argues for a ‘convergence in diversity’ of all 
oppressed and exploited people to form a new international open and flexible 
organisation to co-ordinate opposition movements around the world. While 
strongly defending localisation and diversity, the thesis concludes that the 
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struggle is against a hegemonic globalised system and that global solidarity 
will be important in over-throwing this system, while building sustainable 
communities locally.  
 
Marx and Engels’ vision of the commons, of the dis-alienation of labour, of 
metabolically restorative relations between humans and nature in the 
production of livelihoods, and of common property as bases of socially 
sustainable communities, foreshadows a future with the potential for hope. 
This vision encompasses what the biological sciences tell us is possible and the 
social sciences tell us about humane human nature which is healthy and 
convivial. There are few grounds for optimism that global society will be able 
to or willing to make the necessary radical political economy changes in time 
to avert global warming. Yet, given the enormous suffering which has begun 
and will continue to grow as a result of global warming, there is a moral 
imperative to try to divert the course of human history on to a pathway that is 
just and enduring. It might seem idealistic to have concluded the thesis with a 
belief that transformational change is possible. There is, however, no 
presentation of a blueprint for future societies. That was never the intent of this 
thesis. To propose a blueprint for future societies would be contradictory. 
Given the importance the thesis has ascribed to cultural and economic 
diversity, to human creativity and to human societies developing their own 
histories, it would also have been inappropriate and pretentious to propose such 
a blueprint. 
 
What the thesis did do however was to propose a set of principles as 
foundation stones for new sustainable societies which can lead to just, 
equitable, disalienated, culturally rich and materially secure societies. These 
also fit within the parameters of Marx’s metabolically restorative, dis-alienated 
relations of production. What is clear from the thesis is that such epochal 
transformation is contingent on community and class solidarity, an agreed set 
of guiding principles, critical political conscientisation and trial and error 




In addition to proposing core principles – what I have called a constitution -  
within this paradigm for future societies, the thesis indicates how some 
transformational changes have taken place in the last few decades. It was 
suggested that we can learn from these for future change processes. The thesis 
also presented examples of what can be achieved when communities or nations 
decide to build a just and enduring society. 
 
What the thesis makes abundantly clear however is that effective change will 
only come from the majority who through their struggles for more equitable 
and environmentally sustainable lives build a powerful transnational base 
rooted in local cultures and economies, spreading the vision that another world 
is possible. The Marxist vision of the dis-alienation of the social relations of 
production has much to contribute to a framework for this movement. 
However, the negative experiences of state socialism and communism in the 
20th century support the argument for local communities being the foundation 
of such a framework for human development. Localised food security (water 
and shelter) will be a predominant focus of economic activity in future 
communities, as the point of inextricable connection between humans and the 
environment. This human/environment relationship must be metabolically 
restorative, with social use rather than ownership of nature. Localised food 
production will also be the basis for building social institutions which support 
sustainable lifestyles, for supporting and building cultures which are life-
affirming and politically critically conscientising of its members so people can 
realise their full potential as human actors. Communal (rather than individual) 
needs must be centre stage, not only of present but also of future generations. 
The needed ecological transformation requires the distribution of benefits 
according to community need.  Indeed the institution of the community 
emerges very firmly as central to these new societies. This means focusing on 
first and foremost the collective needs of food production, education, 
recreation and public health. This will mean reconceptualising Marx’s vision of 
socialism/ communism.  
 
The demand for more equitable and environmentally sustainable life 
opportunities is central to the growing worldwide rebellion against dominant 
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economic institutions (transnational corporations, the unholy trinity of the IMF, 
the World Bank and the WTO). Communities built on the realisation of 
humans’ dependence on the environment have the potential to develop a sense 
of solidarity across cultures as well as to develop a political consciousness.   
 
The future holds only two possibilities. First, ecological destruction; the 
second, radical, systemic, transformative, epochal change. This is a 
provocative call but the latter is the only possibility which promises a future for 
humanity. 
 
During times of war and times of crisis, the best in people can be brought out 
and a sense of sacrifice and solidarity built. There has never been a time when 
that sense of sacrifice and global solidarity is more needed. Those who have 
contributed least to causing the crisis, the ones whose lives are already the 
most vulnerable, are the very ones who will suffer first and most, but in the end 
all people and societies will be affected. We in the West have a moral 
obligation to address the huge ecological debt owed to the poor and the unborn 
which arises from the super-exploitation and pollution of the biosphere. It is a 
debt that must be addressed and paid through reparations, redistribution or 
compensation as an integral part of international climate negotiations. Only by 
addressing this issue can the West hope to build the essential cooperative 
alliance with all countries and peoples to tackle carbon emission reductions and 
the myriad of other social and ecological crises which confront humanity.   
 
We have a small window of opportunity in which we can have both the hope 
and the power to change the disastrous trajectory we are on. We can choose to 
fiddle while the globe burns, to be afraid to be called alarmists, to be secure in 
the knowledge that we in the West will not be so immediately and 
devastatingly affected by global warming. That however would leave us 
morally bankrupt and living in a sea of chaos on a stricken planet. 
  
The task is monumental and complex. The lives of nearly seven billion people 
who share a finite planet, enveloped and interconnected through a thin layer of 
fragile biosphere - our global commons – are at stake. Any addressing of this 
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task demands that we heal the deep structural chasm that has developed in the 
metabolic relations between humans and nature as a result of the social 
relations of production inherent in the capitalist system. We can do this by 
building new political, economic and cultural systems and societies that are 
metabolically restorative, equitable, resilient, just and democratic. It is a 
challenge that could bring the different peoples of the world together, to build 
something better together and make history for the benefit of all people. We 
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